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	<id>https://powerbase.info/index.php?action=history&amp;feed=atom&amp;title=Hard_Power</id>
	<title>Hard Power - Revision history</title>
	<link rel="self" type="application/atom+xml" href="https://powerbase.info/index.php?action=history&amp;feed=atom&amp;title=Hard_Power"/>
	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://powerbase.info/index.php?title=Hard_Power&amp;action=history"/>
	<updated>2026-11-10T21:15:48Z</updated>
	<subtitle>Revision history for this page on the wiki</subtitle>
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	<entry>
		<id>https://powerbase.info/index.php?title=Hard_Power&amp;diff=214079&amp;oldid=prev</id>
		<title>James Gallagher: /* Coercive Diplomacy */</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://powerbase.info/index.php?title=Hard_Power&amp;diff=214079&amp;oldid=prev"/>
		<updated>2015-03-25T11:10:19Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;&lt;span dir=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;autocomment&quot;&gt;Coercive Diplomacy&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;table class=&quot;diff diff-contentalign-left diff-editfont-monospace&quot; data-mw=&quot;interface&quot;&gt;
				&lt;col class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; /&gt;
				&lt;col class=&quot;diff-content&quot; /&gt;
				&lt;col class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; /&gt;
				&lt;col class=&quot;diff-content&quot; /&gt;
				&lt;tr class=&quot;diff-title&quot; lang=&quot;en&quot;&gt;
				&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; style=&quot;background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;&quot;&gt;← Older revision&lt;/td&gt;
				&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; style=&quot;background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;&quot;&gt;Revision as of 11:10, 25 March 2015&lt;/td&gt;
				&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-lineno&quot; id=&quot;mw-diff-left-l38&quot; &gt;Line 38:&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-lineno&quot;&gt;Line 38:&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class='diff-marker'&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;In some cases, just the threat of military action or economic sanctions can be as useful as the real thing. This strategy, often called Coercive Diplomacy, involves an organisation reinforcing its demands to an opposing force with a threat of punishment for non-compliance that is seen as credible and potent enough to make compliance inevitable. Whether the threat of military or economic sanctions is implicit or overt, it still serves to compel others to change their behaviour&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Alexander George (2004), 'Coercive Diplomacy' in Robert Art and Kenneth Waltz (eds) &amp;quot;The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics&amp;quot;. U.S.A.: Roman &amp;amp; Littlefield, Inc.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;.  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class='diff-marker'&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;In some cases, just the threat of military action or economic sanctions can be as useful as the real thing. This strategy, often called Coercive Diplomacy, involves an organisation reinforcing its demands to an opposing force with a threat of punishment for non-compliance that is seen as credible and potent enough to make compliance inevitable. Whether the threat of military or economic sanctions is implicit or overt, it still serves to compel others to change their behaviour&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Alexander George (2004), 'Coercive Diplomacy' in Robert Art and Kenneth Waltz (eds) &amp;quot;The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics&amp;quot;. U.S.A.: Roman &amp;amp; Littlefield, Inc.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;.  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class='diff-marker'&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class='diff-marker'&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class='diff-marker'&gt;−&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;Illustrations of coercive diplomacy in action can be seen in Kosovo in 1998 and between China and the United States in the early 1990’s. The President of Kosovo's consent to the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1199 in the Milosevic-Holbrooke agreement was influenced, according to some, by the threat of an air campaign in Kosovo by the North Atlantic Treaty Agreement ([[NATO]])&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;PublicDiplomacyWikia&amp;quot;/&amp;gt;. Similarly, the Memorandums of Understanding between the U.S. and China in the early 1990’s regarding IP rights were produced only after each simultaneously threatened trade sanctions&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Charles Baum (2001),[http://web.stanford.edu/group/sjeaa/journal1/china4.pdf Trade Sanctions and the Rule of Law: Lessons From China], Stanford University website, accessed 24 March 2015. ''Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs'' 1, February/March, pp.46-72&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;.&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class='diff-marker'&gt;+&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;Illustrations of coercive diplomacy in action can be seen in Kosovo in 1998 and between China and the United States in the early 1990’s. The President of Kosovo's consent to the &lt;ins class=&quot;diffchange diffchange-inline&quot;&gt;[[&lt;/ins&gt;United Nations&lt;ins class=&quot;diffchange diffchange-inline&quot;&gt;]] &lt;/ins&gt;Security Council Resolution 1199 in the Milosevic-Holbrooke agreement was influenced, according to some, by the threat of an air campaign in Kosovo by the North Atlantic Treaty Agreement ([[NATO]])&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;PublicDiplomacyWikia&amp;quot;/&amp;gt;. Similarly, the Memorandums of Understanding between the U.S. and China in the early 1990’s regarding IP rights were produced only after each simultaneously threatened trade sanctions&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Charles Baum (2001),[http://web.stanford.edu/group/sjeaa/journal1/china4.pdf Trade Sanctions and the Rule of Law: Lessons From China], Stanford University website, accessed 24 March 2015. ''Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs'' 1, February/March, pp.46-72&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;.&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class='diff-marker'&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class='diff-marker'&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class='diff-marker'&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;==Resources==&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class='diff-marker'&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;==Resources==&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/table&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>James Gallagher</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://powerbase.info/index.php?title=Hard_Power&amp;diff=214078&amp;oldid=prev</id>
		<title>James Gallagher: /* Coercive Diplomacy */</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://powerbase.info/index.php?title=Hard_Power&amp;diff=214078&amp;oldid=prev"/>
		<updated>2015-03-25T11:09:18Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;&lt;span dir=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;autocomment&quot;&gt;Coercive Diplomacy&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;table class=&quot;diff diff-contentalign-left diff-editfont-monospace&quot; data-mw=&quot;interface&quot;&gt;
				&lt;col class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; /&gt;
				&lt;col class=&quot;diff-content&quot; /&gt;
				&lt;col class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; /&gt;
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				&lt;tr class=&quot;diff-title&quot; lang=&quot;en&quot;&gt;
				&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; style=&quot;background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;&quot;&gt;← Older revision&lt;/td&gt;
				&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; style=&quot;background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;&quot;&gt;Revision as of 11:09, 25 March 2015&lt;/td&gt;
				&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-lineno&quot; id=&quot;mw-diff-left-l38&quot; &gt;Line 38:&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-lineno&quot;&gt;Line 38:&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class='diff-marker'&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;In some cases, just the threat of military action or economic sanctions can be as useful as the real thing. This strategy, often called Coercive Diplomacy, involves an organisation reinforcing its demands to an opposing force with a threat of punishment for non-compliance that is seen as credible and potent enough to make compliance inevitable. Whether the threat of military or economic sanctions is implicit or overt, it still serves to compel others to change their behaviour&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Alexander George (2004), 'Coercive Diplomacy' in Robert Art and Kenneth Waltz (eds) &amp;quot;The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics&amp;quot;. U.S.A.: Roman &amp;amp; Littlefield, Inc.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;.  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class='diff-marker'&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;In some cases, just the threat of military action or economic sanctions can be as useful as the real thing. This strategy, often called Coercive Diplomacy, involves an organisation reinforcing its demands to an opposing force with a threat of punishment for non-compliance that is seen as credible and potent enough to make compliance inevitable. Whether the threat of military or economic sanctions is implicit or overt, it still serves to compel others to change their behaviour&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Alexander George (2004), 'Coercive Diplomacy' in Robert Art and Kenneth Waltz (eds) &amp;quot;The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics&amp;quot;. U.S.A.: Roman &amp;amp; Littlefield, Inc.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;.  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class='diff-marker'&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class='diff-marker'&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class='diff-marker'&gt;−&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;Illustrations of coercive diplomacy in action can be seen in Kosovo in 1998 and between China and the United States in the early 1990’s. The President of Kosovo's consent to the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1199 in the Milosevic-Holbrooke agreement was influenced, according to some, by the threat of an air campaign in Kosovo by the &lt;del class=&quot;diffchange diffchange-inline&quot;&gt;[[&lt;/del&gt;North Atlantic Treaty Agreement]] &lt;del class=&quot;diffchange diffchange-inline&quot;&gt;(NATO&lt;/del&gt;)&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;PublicDiplomacyWikia&amp;quot;/&amp;gt;. Similarly, the Memorandums of Understanding between the U.S. and China in the early 1990’s regarding IP rights were produced only after each simultaneously threatened trade sanctions&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Charles Baum (2001),[http://web.stanford.edu/group/sjeaa/journal1/china4.pdf Trade Sanctions and the Rule of Law: Lessons From China], Stanford University website, accessed 24 March 2015. ''Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs'' 1, February/March, pp.46-72&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;.&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class='diff-marker'&gt;+&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;Illustrations of coercive diplomacy in action can be seen in Kosovo in 1998 and between China and the United States in the early 1990’s. The President of Kosovo's consent to the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1199 in the Milosevic-Holbrooke agreement was influenced, according to some, by the threat of an air campaign in Kosovo by the North Atlantic Treaty Agreement &lt;ins class=&quot;diffchange diffchange-inline&quot;&gt;([[NATO&lt;/ins&gt;]])&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;PublicDiplomacyWikia&amp;quot;/&amp;gt;. Similarly, the Memorandums of Understanding between the U.S. and China in the early 1990’s regarding IP rights were produced only after each simultaneously threatened trade sanctions&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Charles Baum (2001),[http://web.stanford.edu/group/sjeaa/journal1/china4.pdf Trade Sanctions and the Rule of Law: Lessons From China], Stanford University website, accessed 24 March 2015. ''Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs'' 1, February/March, pp.46-72&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;.&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class='diff-marker'&gt;−&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot;&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class='diff-marker'&gt;−&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot;&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class='diff-marker'&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class='diff-marker'&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class='diff-marker'&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;==Resources==&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class='diff-marker'&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;==Resources==&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/table&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>James Gallagher</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://powerbase.info/index.php?title=Hard_Power&amp;diff=213990&amp;oldid=prev</id>
		<title>James Gallagher at 22:08, 24 March 2015</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://powerbase.info/index.php?title=Hard_Power&amp;diff=213990&amp;oldid=prev"/>
		<updated>2015-03-24T22:08:10Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;table class=&quot;diff diff-contentalign-left diff-editfont-monospace&quot; data-mw=&quot;interface&quot;&gt;
				&lt;col class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; /&gt;
				&lt;col class=&quot;diff-content&quot; /&gt;
				&lt;col class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; /&gt;
				&lt;col class=&quot;diff-content&quot; /&gt;
				&lt;tr class=&quot;diff-title&quot; lang=&quot;en&quot;&gt;
				&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; style=&quot;background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;&quot;&gt;← Older revision&lt;/td&gt;
				&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; style=&quot;background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;&quot;&gt;Revision as of 22:08, 24 March 2015&lt;/td&gt;
				&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-lineno&quot; id=&quot;mw-diff-left-l5&quot; &gt;Line 5:&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-lineno&quot;&gt;Line 5:&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class='diff-marker'&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;Hard Power strategies include a wide range of measures geared toward coercing or threatening others into compliance. However, it has been argued that shows of Hard Power are much more commonly geared towards military strength rather than providing economic incentives, overemphasising military intervention, economic sanctions and coercive diplomacy&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ernest Wilson (2008), &amp;quot;Hard Power, Soft Power, Smart Power.&amp;quot; ''The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science'', March 2008, pp.110-124, Sage Publications: Los Angeles&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;   &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class='diff-marker'&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;Hard Power strategies include a wide range of measures geared toward coercing or threatening others into compliance. However, it has been argued that shows of Hard Power are much more commonly geared towards military strength rather than providing economic incentives, overemphasising military intervention, economic sanctions and coercive diplomacy&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ernest Wilson (2008), &amp;quot;Hard Power, Soft Power, Smart Power.&amp;quot; ''The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science'', March 2008, pp.110-124, Sage Publications: Los Angeles&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;   &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class='diff-marker'&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class='diff-marker'&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class='diff-marker'&gt;−&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;del style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;[[Smart Power]] involves a mix of Hard Power and [[Soft Power]], the ability to attract, persuade or co-opt others&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Nye2011&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Joseph Nye (2011), &amp;quot;The Future of Power&amp;quot;, New York: PublicAffairs, p.84&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;.&lt;/del&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot;&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class='diff-marker'&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class='diff-marker'&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot;&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class='diff-marker'&gt;+&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;'''Manifestations of Hard Power include:'''&lt;/ins&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot;&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class='diff-marker'&gt;+&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;* Economic sanctions&lt;/ins&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot;&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class='diff-marker'&gt;+&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;* Trade embargos&lt;/ins&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot;&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class='diff-marker'&gt;+&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;* Physical military intervention&lt;/ins&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot;&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class='diff-marker'&gt;+&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;* The actual threat of military or economic force&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;PublicDiplomacyWikia&amp;quot;/&amp;gt;&lt;/ins&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot;&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class='diff-marker'&gt;+&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;&lt;/ins&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot;&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class='diff-marker'&gt;+&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;&lt;/ins&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot;&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class='diff-marker'&gt;+&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;Commentators have argued that to avoid questions of legitimacy and authority, Hard Power needs to be interlaced with the skillful use of diplomacy; a more nuanced approach in order to legitimate the use of power. This collaborative approach is called [[Smart Power]] and involves a mix of Hard Power and [[Soft Power]]; the ability to attract, persuade or co-opt others&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Nye2011&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Joseph Nye (2011), &amp;quot;The Future of Power&amp;quot;, New York: PublicAffairs, p.84&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;.&lt;/ins&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot;&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class='diff-marker'&gt;+&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;&lt;/ins&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot;&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class='diff-marker'&gt;+&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;&lt;/ins&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot;&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class='diff-marker'&gt;+&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;==Problems with Hard Power==&lt;/ins&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot;&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class='diff-marker'&gt;+&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;&lt;/ins&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot;&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class='diff-marker'&gt;+&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;===Legitimacy and Credibility===&lt;/ins&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot;&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class='diff-marker'&gt;+&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;Hard Power strategies that fail to take into account public opinion and the reaction of the international community may have serious consequences. If an organisation is exercising Hard Power initiatives of publicly questionable legitimacy, their credibility both at home and abroad may begin to deteriorate. If this happens enough, attitudes of mistrust and resentment towards them tend to grow as the likelihood that others will cooperation diminishes, making it even more difficult for the organisation to achieve its objectives &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Joseph Nye (2004), [http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/59888/joseph-s-nye-jr/the-decline-of-americas-soft-power The Decline of America's Soft Power], Foreign Affairs website, ''Foreign Affairs'', May/June 2004, accessed 24 March 2014&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;.&lt;/ins&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot;&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class='diff-marker'&gt;+&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;&lt;/ins&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot;&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class='diff-marker'&gt;+&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;In this vein, some authors note the crisis in legitimacy that American Hard Power has seen in recent years. The consequences of American use of Hard Power during the 1990-1991 Gulf War provide an unfortunate example. Survey data reveals growing anti-Americanism and disillusionment with United States foreign policy among the international community, with a shift in public opinion condemning its exercise of Hard Power in following conflicts in the Middle East. This mobilisation of opinion has severely reduced the United States' capacity to achieve its foreign policy objectives on a variety of fronts&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Pew Research Centre (2007),[http://www.pewglobal.org/2007/06/27/global-unease-with-major-world-powers/ Global Unease with Major World Power] Pewglobal website, 27 June 2007, accessed 24 March 2015&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;. &lt;/ins&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot;&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class='diff-marker'&gt;+&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;&lt;/ins&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot;&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class='diff-marker'&gt;+&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;&lt;/ins&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot;&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class='diff-marker'&gt;+&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;&lt;/ins&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot;&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class='diff-marker'&gt;+&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;==Examples of Hard Power==&lt;/ins&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot;&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class='diff-marker'&gt;+&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;&lt;/ins&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot;&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class='diff-marker'&gt;+&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;===Military Intervention===&lt;/ins&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot;&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class='diff-marker'&gt;+&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;One of the most obvious and visible exercises of Hard Power is the use of physical military intervention to achieve an organisation's goals. The 21st century is littered with examples, including: the 1900 invasion of China by the 8 Country Alliance in order to quell the Boxer Rebellion; the 1939 invasion of Poland by Germany that triggered the second World War; the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union, an attempt to prop up Afghanistan’s Marxist government; the 2003 invasion of Iraq by the U.S. over concerns about Iraq’s weapons capabilities&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;PublicDiplomacyWikia&amp;quot;/&amp;gt;&lt;/ins&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot;&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class='diff-marker'&gt;+&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;&lt;/ins&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot;&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class='diff-marker'&gt;+&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;&lt;/ins&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot;&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class='diff-marker'&gt;+&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;===Economic Sanctions===&lt;/ins&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot;&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class='diff-marker'&gt;+&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;Military force is not the only weapon in a political body's arsenal; the exercise of economic pressure can be used to achieve similar ends. United States trade embargos on countries like Cuba, Iran, and Iraq in the latter half of the 20th century provide prime examples. The 1995 Iran Sanctions Act, for instance, was implemented in response to Iran’s nuclear program and its alleged funding of organizations such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. The sanctions were designed to limit investment in Iran’s oil fields and infrastructure. Thus, by impeding the development of a key sector of Iran’s economy, petroleum, the United States hoped to discourage Iran from engaging in any further undesirable activity&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Kenneth Katzman (2007), [http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS20871.pdf The Iran Sanctions Act (ISA)], CRS Report for Congress, 12 October 2007. Federation of American Scientists website, accessed 24 March 2015&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;. &lt;/ins&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot;&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class='diff-marker'&gt;+&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;&lt;/ins&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot;&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class='diff-marker'&gt;+&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;&lt;/ins&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot;&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class='diff-marker'&gt;+&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;===Coercive Diplomacy===&lt;/ins&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot;&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class='diff-marker'&gt;+&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;In some cases, just the threat of military action or economic sanctions can be as useful as the real thing. This strategy, often called Coercive Diplomacy, involves an organisation reinforcing its demands to an opposing force with a threat of punishment for non-compliance that is seen as credible and potent enough to make compliance inevitable. Whether the threat of military or economic sanctions is implicit or overt, it still serves to compel others to change their behaviour&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Alexander George (2004), 'Coercive Diplomacy' in Robert Art and Kenneth Waltz (eds) &amp;quot;The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics&amp;quot;. U.S.A.: Roman &amp;amp; Littlefield, Inc.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;. &lt;/ins&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot;&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class='diff-marker'&gt;+&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;&lt;/ins&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot;&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class='diff-marker'&gt;+&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;Illustrations of coercive diplomacy in action can be seen in Kosovo in 1998 and between China and the United States in the early 1990’s. The President of Kosovo's consent to the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1199 in the Milosevic-Holbrooke agreement was influenced, according to some, by the threat of an air campaign in Kosovo by the [[North Atlantic Treaty Agreement]] (NATO)&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;PublicDiplomacyWikia&amp;quot;/&amp;gt;. Similarly, the Memorandums of Understanding between the U.S. and China in the early 1990’s regarding IP rights were produced only after each simultaneously threatened trade sanctions&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Charles Baum (2001),[http://web.stanford.edu/group/sjeaa/journal1/china4.pdf Trade Sanctions and the Rule of Law: Lessons From China], Stanford University website, accessed 24 March 2015. ''Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs'' 1, February/March, pp.46-72&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;.&lt;/ins&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class='diff-marker'&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class='diff-marker'&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class='diff-marker'&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class='diff-marker'&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-lineno&quot; id=&quot;mw-diff-left-l13&quot; &gt;Line 13:&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-lineno&quot;&gt;Line 45:&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class='diff-marker'&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;*Public Diplomacy Wikia, [http://publicdiplomacy.wikia.com/wiki/Hard_Power Hard Power]: Definition and History of Hard Power&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class='diff-marker'&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;*Public Diplomacy Wikia, [http://publicdiplomacy.wikia.com/wiki/Hard_Power Hard Power]: Definition and History of Hard Power&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class='diff-marker'&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;*Jan-Philipp Wagner, [http://www.e-ir.info/2014/05/14/the-effectiveness-of-soft-hard-power-in-contemporary-international-relations/ The Effectiveness of Soft &amp;amp; Hard Power in Contemporary International Relations]: Discussion of the Effectiveness of Hard Power&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class='diff-marker'&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;*Jan-Philipp Wagner, [http://www.e-ir.info/2014/05/14/the-effectiveness-of-soft-hard-power-in-contemporary-international-relations/ The Effectiveness of Soft &amp;amp; Hard Power in Contemporary International Relations]: Discussion of the Effectiveness of Hard Power&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot;&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class='diff-marker'&gt;+&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;*Wikipedia, [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hard_power Hard Power]: Brief overview of Hard Power concept&lt;/ins&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot;&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class='diff-marker'&gt;+&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;*Alistair Burnett, [http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/china-russia-and-us-juggle-soft-and-hard-power China, Russia and the US Juggle Soft and Hard Power]: Article detailing modern resurgence of Hard Power&lt;/ins&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot;&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class='diff-marker'&gt;+&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;*The Economist, [http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21601535-no-other-country-comes-close-americas-hard-power-its-lead-slipping-unrivalled American military power: Unrivalled, for now]: Modern measurement of the Hard Power of states&lt;/ins&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot;&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class='diff-marker'&gt;+&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;*Nathan Gardels, [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/nathan-gardels/china-power-confrontation_b_5496816.html Is China's Hard Power Undermining its Soft Power?]: Article detailing China's use of Hard Power&lt;/ins&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot;&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class='diff-marker'&gt;+&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;*Eleanor Albert, [http://www.cfr.org/japan/japans-hard-power-play/p36129 Japan's Hard Power Play]: Article looking at questions of Japanese Hard Power&lt;/ins&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot;&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class='diff-marker'&gt;+&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;&lt;/ins&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class='diff-marker'&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class='diff-marker'&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class='diff-marker'&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class='diff-marker'&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/table&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>James Gallagher</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://powerbase.info/index.php?title=Hard_Power&amp;diff=213989&amp;oldid=prev</id>
		<title>James Gallagher: Created page with &quot;{{Template:Propaganda badge}}  Hard Power describes a nation or political body's ability to use economic incentives or military strength to influence other actors’ behav...&quot;</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://powerbase.info/index.php?title=Hard_Power&amp;diff=213989&amp;oldid=prev"/>
		<updated>2015-03-24T18:54:30Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Created page with &amp;quot;{{Template:Propaganda badge}}  &lt;a href=&quot;/index.php/Hard_Power&quot; title=&quot;Hard Power&quot;&gt;Hard Power&lt;/a&gt; describes a nation or political body&amp;#039;s ability to use economic incentives or military strength to influence other actors’ behav...&amp;quot;&lt;/p&gt;
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[[Hard Power]] describes a nation or political body's ability to use economic incentives or military strength to influence other actors’ behaviours&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;PublicDiplomacyWikia&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Public Diplomacy Wikia, [http://publicdiplomacy.wikia.com/wiki/Hard_Power Hard Power], Public Diplomacy Wikia website, accessed 24 March 2015&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;. In this way it is the ability to use the carrots and sticks of economic and military might to make others follow your will&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Joseph Nye (2004), &amp;quot;Smart Power in the Global Information Age: From Realism to Globalization. London, New York: Routledge&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
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Hard Power strategies include a wide range of measures geared toward coercing or threatening others into compliance. However, it has been argued that shows of Hard Power are much more commonly geared towards military strength rather than providing economic incentives, overemphasising military intervention, economic sanctions and coercive diplomacy&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ernest Wilson (2008), &amp;quot;Hard Power, Soft Power, Smart Power.&amp;quot; ''The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science'', March 2008, pp.110-124, Sage Publications: Los Angeles&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
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[[Smart Power]] involves a mix of Hard Power and [[Soft Power]], the ability to attract, persuade or co-opt others&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Nye2011&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Joseph Nye (2011), &amp;quot;The Future of Power&amp;quot;, New York: PublicAffairs, p.84&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
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==Resources==&lt;br /&gt;
*Public Diplomacy Wikia, [http://publicdiplomacy.wikia.com/wiki/Hard_Power Hard Power]: Definition and History of Hard Power&lt;br /&gt;
*Jan-Philipp Wagner, [http://www.e-ir.info/2014/05/14/the-effectiveness-of-soft-hard-power-in-contemporary-international-relations/ The Effectiveness of Soft &amp;amp; Hard Power in Contemporary International Relations]: Discussion of the Effectiveness of Hard Power&lt;br /&gt;
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==Notes==&lt;br /&gt;
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[[Category:Propaganda Techniques]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Propaganda]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>James Gallagher</name></author>
	</entry>
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