David Eastwood - Revision history

Melissa Jones: /* Notes */ typo

2015-03-22T23:54:11Z

Notes: typo

Tom Griffin: category:Malaya

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category:Malaya

Tom Griffin: /* External Resources */

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External Resources

Tom Griffin: external resources

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external resources

Tom Griffin: intro

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intro

Tom Griffin: age tally

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age tally

Tom Griffin: /* The "Signal" Document */

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The "Signal" Document

Tom Griffin: /* The "Signal" Document */

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The "Signal" Document

Tom Griffin: /* Other Documents relating to Observer C */

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Tom Griffin: /* Other Documents relating to Observer C= */

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← Older revision		Revision as of 23:54, 22 March 2015
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−	[[Category:MI5\|Eastwood, David]][[Category:Northern Ireland\|Eastwood, David]][[Category: State Violence and Collusion Project\|Eastwood, David]][[Category:Saville Inquiry witnesses\|Eastwood, David]]][[Category:Malayan Emergency\|Eastwood, David]]	+	[[Category:MI5\|Eastwood, David]][[Category:Northern Ireland\|Eastwood, David]][[Category: State Violence and Collusion Project\|Eastwood, David]][[Category:Saville Inquiry witnesses\|Eastwood, David]][[Category:Malayan Emergency\|Eastwood, David]]

← Older revision		Revision as of 00:51, 22 March 2015
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−	[[Category:MI5\|Eastwood, David]][[Category:Northern Ireland\|Eastwood, David]][[Category: State Violence and Collusion Project\|Eastwood, David]][[Category:Saville Inquiry witnesses\|Eastwood, David]]]	+	[[Category:MI5\|Eastwood, David]][[Category:Northern Ireland\|Eastwood, David]][[Category: State Violence and Collusion Project\|Eastwood, David]][[Category:Saville Inquiry witnesses\|Eastwood, David]]][[Category:Malayan Emergency\|Eastwood, David]]

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 ==External Resources==
 *[http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20101103103930/http://report.bloody-sunday-inquiry.org/transcripts/Archive/Ts330.htm 'David' testimony to the Bloody Sunday Inquiry], 13 May 2003, National Archives.
-*[http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20101103103930/http://report.bloody-sunday-inquiry.org/evidence/K/KD_0002.pdf 'David' Witness statments to the Bloody Sunday Inquiry, National Archives.
+*[http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20101103103930/http://report.bloody-sunday-inquiry.org/evidence/K/KD_0002.pdf 'David' Witness statments to the Bloody Sunday Inquiry], National Archives.
 *[http://www.rwuk.org/new/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/BloodySundayWeek91.pdf Bloody Sunday Inquiry], Week 91, 12 - 15 May 2003, report by British Irish Rights Watch.

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 ===CBE===
 Eastwood was awarded a CBE in January 1973, with the ''London Gazette'' describing him as a 'senior technical advisor' in the [[Ministry of Defence]].<ref>''London Gazette,[https://www.thegazette.co.uk/London/issue/45860/supplement/8 Supplement 45860], p.8.</ref>
 ==Notes==

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 [[David Eastwood]] (1919-2010) was an Army and [[MI5]] officer.<ref name="TelObit">[http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/military-obituaries/army-obituaries/8192510/David-Eastwood.html David Eastwood], ''Telegraph'', 9 December 2010.</ref>
-Acccording to [[Nigel West]], He served as director of intelligence in Northern Ireland from 1971 until 1973.<ref>Nigel West, ''Historical Dictionary of British Intelligence'', Scarecrow Press, 2014, p.192.</ref> This strongly suggests that Eastwood was the MI5 officer who testified to the Bloody Sunday Inquiry as 'David'. Eastwood's date of birth in 1919, would appear to match 'David's age of 84 at the time of his testimony to the inquiry.
+Acccording to [[Nigel West]], He served as director of intelligence in Northern Ireland from 1971 until 1973.<ref>Nigel West, ''Historical Dictionary of British Intelligence'', Scarecrow Press, 2014, p.192.</ref> This strongly suggests that Eastwood was the MI5 officer who testified to the Bloody Sunday Inquiry as 'David'. Eastwood's date of birth in 1919, would appear to match 'David's age of 84 at the time of his testimony to the inquiry in 2003.
 ==Early life==

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 'David's 2003 statement also addressed a number of specific evidential issues:
-===The "Signal" Document===
+====The "Signal" Document====
 'David' said in his 2003 statement:

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 ::The first document I have been shown has been described to me as the 'signal document' dated 27 January 1972. As I said in my previous statement, I do not remember any specific intelligence relating to the march on Bloody Sunday and I do not recollect this particular document. However, I believe that it is genuine; I recognise my signature on the covering letter and the format is a standard one that I used. I find it surprising that I did not initial this document before it was sent; that was my normal practice. However, while I do not recollect sending this document, it is unlikely that any of my staff would have issued it in my name, without first clearing it with me.
 ::I have been asked where the information contained in the signal document might have come from. I believe, based on the wording of the covering letter, that the information on which this document was based would have been sent to me in Northern Ireland by Security Service headquarters in London, although I do not recollect this particular information. I cannot say from where the Service had obtained this information, but it may have been from a human source, given the terminology used within the document (for example, "source believes that.,.he expects that.. in paragraph four). I have seen Julian's latest draft statement in which he describes the agent who he believes provided the intelligence contained in the signal document. While I cannot recall this case myself, I understand that based on Julian's recollection the Security Service have identified the agent (described in Julian's statement as Observer C), and as a result have disclosed to the Inquiry documents (a) - (t), as described in Julian's latest statement. I comment on them below.
-::The intelligence contained within this document would have been classified as 'operational", by which I mean intelligence about possible criminal acts or law and order issues, which might require immediate police or army action. For myself I would have been more interested in security intelligence; operational intelligence would require immediate action to prevent an incident occurring, whereas security intelligence would assist long term, strategic understanding of the general threat from and capabilities of the IRA. lt would have been less usual to receive operational intelligence from London. The type of operational intelligence in the signal document would have been of no great Interest to me and I would not have been in a position to judge its significance, but I would have been concerned to pass it on as quickly as possible to those who would be able to assess its value i.e. the Army and the RUC, I note from my covering letter that I passed the signal document to Commander 8th Infantry Brigade. I also obviously passed it to the RUC. I note that there is a hand-written annotation at the top of the letter which reads 'this has been read by ACC Ops and CC and by
+::The intelligence contained within this document would have been classified as 'operational", by which I mean intelligence about possible criminal acts or law and order issues, which might require immediate police or army action. For myself I would have been more interested in security intelligence; operational intelligence would require immediate action to prevent an incident occurring, whereas security intelligence would assist long term, strategic understanding of the general threat from and capabilities of the IRA. lt would have been less usual to receive operational intelligence from London. The type of operational intelligence in the signal document would have been of no great Interest to me and I would not have been in a position to judge its significance, but I would have been concerned to pass it on as quickly as possible to those who would be able to assess its value i.e. the Army and the RUC, I note from my covering letter that I passed the signal document to Commander 8th Infantry Brigade. I also obviously passed it to the RUC. I note that there is a hand-written annotation at the top of the letter which reads 'this has been read by ACC Ops and CC and by Ch/Insp Donnelly". I believe this refers to the Assistant Chief Constable of the RUC responsible for operations, whose name I cannot recall, to the Chief Constable and to Chief Inspector Donnelly, who I believe was head of Special Branch in Londonderry. This is not my annotation.
 ::The covering note also refers to a "planning meeting" being held that morning (i.e. 27 January 1972). I have been asked to what this refers. I do not recall the specific meeting, at which I would not have been present, but the Army held regular planning meetings, as necessary, to consìder their response to forthcoming events such as civil rights marches and for their own operational purposes. I assume that this is the type of meeting to which I was referring in my covering letter. As the letter indicates, I would normally have sent this kind of information to the RUC first, but because of the time scale on this occasion, I sent the information directly to the Army. I do not find this surprising in the circumstances,
 ::I have been asked whether I can recollect anything of the reliability of Observer C. I cannot. I note that the document contains no assessment of the source's reliability; this may be because Brigadier McLelland was already aware of this source (as indicated in paragraph one of the document). However, it would have been unusual for the Service to disclose details of a source to someone outside the Service. Normally, we would simply have given an assessment of the source's reliability. After so long, I simply cannot remember why this was not done in this case, but all this does suggest that Brigadier McLelland knew Observer C's identity.

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 'David' said in his 2003 statement:
 ::As I have indicated, although I have had the benefit of viewing Julian's fourth statement in which he sets out the background to the agent case and describes the documents disclosed to the inquiry, I do not recall this case.
-::I cannot recall seeing any of documents (a) - (t) (as listed in Julian's statement) before. As Director of Intelligence, I would not have been copied an agent handier's notes of meetings with their agents:Nor would I have had access to the agent files, held in London, as  I had no need for it. Furthermore, as I explained in my first statement, while much of the documentation would be addressed to or referred to me, such was the volume of correspondence at that time there was a lot that 1 would not have seen. However, while I cannot say whether 1 read any of documents (a) to (t) during my time as Director of Intelligence, I have no reason to doubt their authenticity. After 30 years I simply cannot remember these documents or the sequence of events they record. I find it difficult to
+::I cannot recall seeing any of documents (a) - (t) (as listed in Julian's statement) before. As Director of Intelligence, I would not have been copied an agent handier's notes of meetings with their agents:Nor would I have had access to the agent files, held in London, as  I had no need for it. Furthermore, as I explained in my first statement, while much of the documentation would be addressed to or referred to me, such was the volume of correspondence at that time there was a lot that 1 would not have seen. However, while I cannot say whether 1 read any of documents (a) to (t) during my time as Director of Intelligence, I have no reason to doubt their authenticity. After 30 years I simply cannot remember these documents or the sequence of events they record. I find it difficult to concentrate on detailed text for long periods and I can only say that these documents seem to give a good indication of the manner in which tasking and intelligence were routinely communicated between London and Northern Ireland at the time.
 ::I do recall the general practice that Julian describes in paragraph 7 of his latest statement, whereby Security Service case officers visiting their agents in Northern Ireland would often brief me in person or by telephone prior to travelling back to Head Office in London. This practice facilitated the quick dissemination of time critical intelligence.
 ::As I have stated previously, I do not remember seeing any specific intelligence reports warning that the IRA would infiltrate the march and use the crowd for cover. It therefore follows that I cannot say for certaìn whether these documents form the basis of the information contained within the "signal document". I can only say that, given the similarities in detail between the intelligence from Observer C and the wording of the "signal document", it seems highly likely that they do.<ref name="2003statement">[http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20101103103930/http://report.bloody-sunday-inquiry.org/evidence/K/KD_0002.pdf David witness statement], Bloody Sunday Inquiry, 11 April 2003.</ref>

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 ::I have been asked whether, despite the fact that I cannot remember Observer C, I can say anything, based on my experience of dealing with intelligence matters, about his comment that he "expects the IRA will be armed with sticks and stones and will use the crowd as cover. As I cannot remember Observer C, I cannot comment on whether he had first hand knowledge to this effect, or whether this was speculation.<ref name="2003statement">[http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20101103103930/http://report.bloody-sunday-inquiry.org/evidence/K/KD_0002.pdf David witness statement], Bloody Sunday Inquiry, 11 April 2003.</ref>
-====Other Documents relating to Observer C=====
+====Other Documents relating to Observer C====
 'David' said in his 2003 statement:
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 concentrate on detailed text for long periods and I can only say that these documents seem to give a good indication of the manner in which tasking and intelligence were routinely communicated between London and Northern Ireland at the time.
 ::I do recall the general practice that Julian describes in paragraph 7 of his latest statement, whereby Security Service case officers visiting their agents in Northern Ireland would often brief me in person or by telephone prior to travelling back to Head Office in London. This practice facilitated the quick dissemination of time critical intelligence.
 ::As I have stated previously, I do not remember seeing any specific intelligence reports warning that the IRA would infiltrate the march and use the crowd for cover. It therefore follows that I cannot say for certaìn whether these documents form the basis of the information contained within the "signal document". I can only say that, given the similarities in detail between the intelligence from Observer C and the wording of the "signal document", it seems highly likely that they do.<ref name="2003statement">[http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20101103103930/http://report.bloody-sunday-inquiry.org/evidence/K/KD_0002.pdf David witness statement], Bloody Sunday Inquiry, 11 April 2003.</ref>
 ====Specific Comments on the Documents====