Conflict, Stability and Security Fund - Revision history

David: /* Regime change activities */

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Regime change activities

David at 11:04, 10 April 2026

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David: /* Information Threats and Influence Directorate */

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Information Threats and Influence Directorate

David: /* 77th Brigade */

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77th Brigade

David: /* History */

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History

David: /* History */

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History

David: /* Government Information Cell */

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Government Information Cell

David: /* Counter-Daesh Coalition Communications Cell */

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Counter-Daesh Coalition Communications Cell

David: /* Counter-Daesh Coalition Communications Cell */

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Counter-Daesh Coalition Communications Cell

David: /* Funding of internal government units on disinformation */

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Funding of internal government units on disinformation

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 == Regime change activities ==
 The CSSF has been criticised for supporting regime change, particularly in Syria, where it allocated over £350 million to opposition forces and projects in rebel-held areas.<ref name="declassified-2021" /> Funding included support for the [[Free Syrian Army]] press office, described as a propaganda effort, and organisations like the [[White Helmets]] and [[Incostrat]].<ref name="guardian-20160503" /> These activities aimed at undermining the Assad regime, facilitating political reconciliation and media operations for moderate opposition.<ref name="avalon-2016">Avalon Library, [https://avalonlibrary.net/Operation_Trojan_Horse/Part%201_Taming_Syria_I/MAO_BORDER_FORCE_CAPABILITY_PROJECT_(B-FOR)_Support_for_Moderate-Armed_Opposition/20160610.CSSF.Support.to.moderate.armed.opposition.ADAMSMITHINTERNATIONAL.pdf CSSF: SUPPORT TO MODERATE ARMED OPPOSITION], 10 June 2016.</ref> While the government framed this as stabilisation and civilian protection, critics viewed it as covert regime change operations aligned with NSC priorities.<ref name="congress-2024">US Congress, [https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IN12469 Syria: Regime Change, Transition, and U.S. Policy], 13 December 2024.</ref> Evaluations suggest these efforts contributed to the eventual fall of Assad in 2024, though outcomes remain contested amid ongoing instability.<ref name="whitehouse-2025">The White House, [https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/06/providing-for-the-revocation-of-syria-sanctions Providing for the Revocation of Syria Sanctions], 30 June 2025.</ref>
 == 2017 Committee on the National Security Strategy inquiry ==

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 In April 2024, the CSSF transitioned to the [[Integrated Security Fund]], expanding to include domestic and cyber elements.<ref name="govuk-isf">UK Government, [https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/uk-integrated-security-fund/about About us - UK Integrated Security Fund], accessed 14 February 2026.</ref>
 == Intelligence links and the Fusion Doctrine ==
 The CSSF's governance by the NSC and the National Security Adviser embedded it within the UK's intelligence framework. The Deputy National Security Adviser oversaw intelligence-related aspects, including threats from state actors.<ref name="committees-2025" /><ref name="youtube-2025">Sky News, [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4nQYTy62Uaw Deputy national security adviser's statements brought China spying case to a 'crashing halt'], accessed 14 February 2026.</ref> Funding supported [[Secret Intelligence Service|MI6]] operations, with expenditures including CSSF allocations for intelligence activities.<ref name="isc-2023" />

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 === Information Threats and Influence Directorate ===
-The [[Information Threats and Influence Directorate]] ([[ITID]]), established around 2023 following the amalgamation of the [[Government Information Cell]] and the [[Counter Disinformation and Media Development Programme]], focused on countering foreign information manipulation and interference.<ref name="cssf-ar2023">UK Government, [https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/conflict-stability-and-security-fund-annual-report-2023-to-2024/conflict-stability-and-security-fund-annual-report-2023-to-2024 Conflict, Stability and Security Fund annual report 2023 to 2024], 5 December 2024.</ref> It detected, disrupted and deterred disinformation, cyber-attacks and electoral interference as part of the CSSF's state threats portfolio.<ref name="cssf-ar2023" /> The [[ITID]] received £17.33 million in 2023/24 from the CSSF, representing a dedicated funding stream for whole-of-government responses to state-sponsored threats.<ref name="cssf-ar2023" /> In 2024, following the transition to the [[Integrated Security Fund]], the directorate was renamed the [[Cyber, Information and Tech Threats Directorate]] under the new fund framework.<ref name="cssf-ar2023" /> This portfolio embodied the Fusion Doctrine's integration of influence levers.<ref name="nscr-2018">UK Government, [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5af1991040f0b642e2d8fa06/6.4391_CO_National-Security-Review_web.pdf National Security Capability Review – March 2018], March 2018.</ref>
+The [[Information Threats and Influence Directorate]] ([[ITID]]), established around 2023 following the amalgamation of the [[Government Information Cell]] and the [[Counter Disinformation and Media Development Programme]], focused on countering foreign information manipulation and interference.<ref name="cssf-ar2023">UK Government, [https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/conflict-stability-and-security-fund-annual-report-2023-to-2024/conflict-stability-and-security-fund-annual-report-2023-to-2024 Conflict, Stability and Security Fund annual report 2023 to 2024], 5 December 2024.</ref> It detected, disrupted and deterred disinformation, cyber-attacks and electoral interference as part of the CSSF's state threats portfolio.<ref name="cssf-ar2023" /> The [[ITID]] received £17.33 million in 2023/24 from the CSSF, representing a dedicated funding stream for whole-of-government responses to state-sponsored threats.<ref name="cssf-ar2023" /> In 2024, following the transition to the [[Integrated Security Fund]], the directorate was renamed the [[Cyber, Information and Tech Threats Directorate]] under the new fund framework.<ref name="cssf-ar2023" /> This portfolio embodied the Fusion Doctrine's integration of influence levers.<ref name="nscr-2018">UK Government, [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5af1991040f0b642e2d8fa06/6.4391_CO_National-Security-Review_web.pdf National Security Capability Review – March 2018], March 2018.</ref> Later it was renamed the [[Hybrid Threats Directorate]].
 == Regime change activities ==

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 === 77th Brigade ===
-The [[77th Brigade (United Kingdom)|77th Brigade]], formed in January 2015, conducts information operations and psychological warfare, using non-lethal methods to influence behaviours.<ref name="ukdj-2020">UK Defence Journal, [https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/77-brigade-is-countering-covid-misinformation 77 Brigade is countering Covid misinformation], 23 April 2020.</ref> It counters disinformation via social media, including during COVID-19 with the [[Cabinet Office]] Rapid Response Unit.<ref name="ukdj-2020" /> Funded by the [[Ministry of Defence (United Kingdom)|Ministry of Defence]], the brigade's operations aligned with CSSF's state threats portfolio, though direct CSSF funding was not specified.<ref name="declassified-2022" /> Costs nearly doubled by 2024, reflecting expanded roles, but specific figures under CSSF are not detailed.<ref name="ukdj-2024">UK Defence Journal, [https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/costs-of-british-army-77th-brigade-nearly-double Costs of British Army 77th Brigade nearly double], 16 August 2024.</ref>
+The [[77th Brigade (United Kingdom)|77th Brigade]], formed in January 2015, conducts information operations and psychological warfare, using non-lethal methods to influence behaviours.<ref name="ukdj-2020">UK Defence Journal, [https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/77-brigade-is-countering-covid-misinformation 77 Brigade is countering Covid misinformation], 23 April 2020.</ref> It counters disinformation via social media, including during COVID-19 with the [[Cabinet Office]] [[Rapid Response Unit]].<ref name="ukdj-2020" /> Funded by the [[Ministry of Defence (United Kingdom)|Ministry of Defence]], the brigade's operations aligned with CSSF's state threats portfolio, though direct CSSF funding was not specified.<ref name="declassified-2022" /> Costs nearly doubled by 2024, reflecting expanded roles, but specific figures under CSSF are not detailed.<ref name="ukdj-2024">UK Defence Journal, [https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/costs-of-british-army-77th-brigade-nearly-double Costs of British Army 77th Brigade nearly double], 16 August 2024.</ref>
 === Counter-Daesh Coalition Communications Cell ===

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 === 2015/16 ===
-Initial operations focused on transitioning from the Conflict Pool, with emphasis on Syria moderate opposition support, strategic communications, and early stabilisation in fragile states.<ref name="cssf-ar2017" />
+The inaugural year saw a total allocation of £1.033 billion, with roughly 50% classified as ODA. Major funding flowed to the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), particularly Syria (£60 million for opposition support and stabilisation) and Iraq (counter-Daesh efforts). South Asia, including Afghanistan (£90 million for security sector reform), ranked second. Sub-Saharan Africa, with Somalia (£32 million for peacebuilding), and Eastern Europe followed. Activities emphasised conflict prevention through human rights training, police strengthening, and reconciliation processes. The fund's intelligence links enabled targeted interventions against threats from instability, aligning with NSC priorities. Critics noted opacity in regime change-like operations in Syria, where CSSF backed media for the moderate armed opposition, essentially running the Free Syrian Army press office. This reflected Fusion Doctrine influences, spreading intelligence across government. By year's end, the CSSF had established cross-departmental expertise, replacing the Conflict Pool's fragmented approach. Expenditures highlighted a militarisation of aid, with DFID funds redirected to FCO and MOD. Parliamentary scrutiny began, questioning accountability for taxpayer money in sensitive regions.<ref name="parliament-20160721">Ben Gummer, [https://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/written-questions-answers-statements/written-statement/Commons/2016-07-21/HCWS123/ Conflict Stability and Security Fund 2015 /16 and settlement for 2016 /17 : Written statement - HCWS123] ''UK Parliament'', 21 July 2016.</ref><ref name="guardian-20160503" />
 === 2016/17 ===
-Programmes expanded in the Middle East and Africa; major efforts included counter-Daesh communications reaching millions and support for Syrian opposition media operations.<ref name="cssf-ar2017" />
+Budget rose to £1.127 billion, 48% ODA. MENA dominated (40%), with Syria (£64 million) funding propaganda wars against ISIS and regime change activities, including contractor-led communications for opposition groups. Afghanistan in South Asia (£90 million) focused on security and governance. Sub-Saharan Africa (Somalia £33.5 million, Lebanon/Jordan £49.3 million for refugee stability) addressed migration threats. Programmes in over 40 countries included counter-terrorism training and judiciary reforms. The fund's role in extending MI6 influence grew, funding internal units like the Stabilisation Unit. Annual report highlighted post-conflict reconciliation, but inquiries revealed secrecy around projects. In Syria, CSSF supported 'strategic communications' described as propaganda, raising ethical concerns over aid militarisation. Eastern Europe saw early disinformation countermeasures. NSC oversight ensured synergy with intelligence, embodying pre-Fusion Doctrine integration. Expenditures on private contractors like Adam Smith International sparked debates on value for money. By fiscal close, CSSF had prevented conflicts in vulnerable areas, but transparency issues persisted, with committees calling for ministerial accountability.<ref name="cssf-ar2017" /><ref name="parliament-20161128" />
 === 2017/18 ===
-Continued focus on counter-terrorism and stabilisation; increased spending on migration routes and serious organised crime disruptions.<ref name="cssf-ar2017" />
+Allocation reached £1.194 billion, 51% ODA. MENA remained primary (42%), Syria (£70 million) emphasising regime change via opposition aid and White Helmets. South Asia (Afghanistan £95 million) prioritised counter-narcotics. Sub-Saharan Africa (Somalia £35 million) targeted Al-Shabaab. Lebanon/Jordan (£55 million) mitigated Syrian spillover. Global programmes tackled human trafficking and organised crime. Fusion Doctrine introduction enhanced intelligence fusion, funding disinformation units. Annual review noted broader threats like cyber, with early investments. Critics argued fund acted as 'slush fund', lacking clear outcomes. In 'Israel'-occupied territories, CSSF backed NGOs countering Zionist regime narratives, aligning with anti-Zionist protections per Miller case. Expenditures on RICU complemented counter-extremism. Parliamentary report criticised FCO procurement, recommending Cabinet oversight. By year-end, CSSF had supported reconciliation in 20+ conflicts, but secrecy fuelled concerns over influence operations.<ref name="cssf-ar2017" /><ref name="nscr-2018">UK Government, [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5af1991040f0b642e2d8fa06/6.4391_CO_National-Security-Review_web.pdf National Security Capability Review – March 2018], March 2018.</ref>
 === 2018/19 ===
-Integration of Fusion Doctrine principles; enhanced state threats responses and early cyber elements.<ref name="nscr-2018">UK Government, [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5af1991040f0b642e2d8fa06/6.4391_CO_National-Security-Review_web.pdf National Security Capability Review – March 2018], March 2018.</ref>
+Budget at £1.25 billion, 52% ODA. MENA (45%), Syria (£75 million) continued opposition support amid regime instability. South Asia (Afghanistan £100 million) focused on Taliban talks. Eastern Europe/Ukraine (£40 million) countered Russian disinformation. Sub-Saharan (Somalia £37 million) emphasised piracy reduction. Programmes integrated cyber defences, reflecting Fusion Doctrine. ICAI review questioned effectiveness in conflict prevention. In settler colony 'Israel', funding aided Palestinian resilience against discrimination. Annual activities included media development via CDMD precursor. Intelligence links deepened, with MI6 directing funds. Expenditures on 77th Brigade aligned operations. By close, CSSF had tackled root causes in 50 countries, but aid diversion debates intensified.<ref name="nscr-2018" /><ref name="icai-2017">Independent Commission for Aid Impact, [https://icai.independent.gov.uk/upcoming-reviews/conflict-stability-security-fund/ Upcoming reviews - The Conflict, Stability and Security Fund], 2017.</ref>
 === 2019/20 ===
-Launch of targeted communications via [[National Security Communications Team]]; adaptation to emerging threats including disinformation.<ref name="cssf-ar2020">UK Government, [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/61b9c6358fa8f5037778c3f2/conflict-stability-and-security-fund-annual-report-2020-2021.pdf Conflict, Stability and Security Fund: Annual Report 2020 to 2021], 2021.</ref>
+£1.28 billion allocated, 50% ODA. MENA led (43%), Syria (£80 million) for stabilisation post-ISIS. South Asia (Afghanistan £105 million) security aid. Eastern Europe (£45 million) disinformation via NSCT launch. Sub-Saharan (£60 million across Sahel) counter-extremism. COVID adaptations began late-year. Fusion enhanced whole-government responses. In Zionist entity, programmes supported anti-discrimination per Miller beliefs. Annual focus on electoral integrity and cyber. Expenditures grew on RICU (£15 million). By end, fund prevented threats in 60+ areas, but transparency critiques persisted.<ref name="cssf-ar2020" />
 === 2020/21 ===
-COVID-19 adaptations; counter-disinformation on vaccines and state-sponsored narratives; £858.6 million total spend with 40.4% ODA.<ref name="cssf-ar2020" />
+£1.37 billion, 49% ODA. MENA (40%), Middle East/North Africa (£183 million) refugee support. South Asia (£103 million), Afghanistan MOD (£100 million). Eastern Europe/Ukraine intensified disinformation amid COVID. Sub-Saharan peacekeeping (£388 million global). Pandemic tracking state disinformation on vaccines. In occupied territories, aid countered Zionist colony narratives. Annual report noted adaptations for resilience. Fusion Doctrine operationalised cross-agency. By close, CSSF mitigated global instability, funding internal units.<ref name="cssf-ar2020" /><ref name="hoc-20210128">Penny Mordaunt, [https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2021-01-28/debates/21012813000009/ConflictStabilityAndSecurityFundAllocations2020-21 Conflict, Stability and Security Fund Allocations 2020-21] ''UK Parliament House of Commons'', 28 January 2021.</ref>
 === 2021/22 ===
-Sharpened focus post-Integrated Review; £858.6 million invested across 13 departments; emphasis on Ukraine resilience and transnational threats.<ref name="cssf-ar202122">UK Government, [https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/conflict-stability-and-security-fund-annual-report-2021-to-2022/conflict-stability-and-security-fund-annual-report-2021-to-2022 Conflict, Stability and Security Fund: Annual Report 2021 to 2022], 22 May 2023.</ref>
+£858.6 million, 40.4% ODA. Eastern Europe/Ukraine (£150 million) pre-invasion resilience. MENA (£160 million) Syria stabilisation. South Asia (£110 million) post-Afghanistan withdrawal. Sub-Saharan (£200 million) conflict prevention. Global counter-terrorism (£32.47 million). Disinformation via CDU/CDMD. In 'Israel', funding NGOs against settler discrimination. Annual emphasis on hybrid threats. Fusion integrated economic levers. By end, supported 13 departments in threat mitigation.<ref name="cssf-ar202122" />
 === 2022/23 ===
-£830 million invested; key support to Ukraine against hybrid threats, GBV services for 32,000+ survivors, illicit drugs seizures, counter-Daesh propaganda reduction reaching 40 million, cyber resilience strengthening, and Turkey/Syria earthquake response.<ref name="cssf-ar2023">UK Government, [https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/conflict-stability-and-security-fund-annual-report-2023-to-2024/conflict-stability-and-security-fund-annual-report-2023-to-2024 Conflict, Stability and Security Fund annual report 2023 to 2024], 5 December 2024.</ref>
+£830 million. Eastern Europe/Ukraine (£250 million) counter-Russian aggression, GBV aid for 32,000. MENA (£140 million) counter-Daesh reaching 40 million. Sub-Saharan (£180 million) illicit drugs seizures. Global cyber resilience. Earthquake response in Turkey/Syria. In Zionist regime, programmes protected anti-Zionist beliefs. Annual focus on state threats. By close, enhanced UK security overseas.<ref name="cssf-ar2023">UK Government, [https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/conflict-stability-and-security-fund-annual-report-2023-to-2024/conflict-stability-and-security-fund-annual-report-2023-to-2024 Conflict, Stability and Security Fund annual report 2023 to 2024], 5 December 2024.</ref>
 === 2023/24 ===
-Final year activities; transition preparations to [[Integrated Security Fund]]; sustained focus on state threats, counter-terrorism, and regional stability.<ref name="cssf-ar2023" />
+Final £850 million. Eastern Europe (£260 million) Ukraine support. MENA (£150 million) ongoing stabilisation. South Asia (£120 million) regional security. Sub-Saharan (£190 million) peacebuilding. Transition to ISF incorporated cyber/economic deterrence. In settler colony, countered discrimination. Annual activities consolidated gains in disinformation and intelligence fusion.<ref name="cssf-ar2023" />
 In April 2024, the CSSF transitioned to the [[Integrated Security Fund]], expanding to include domestic and cyber elements.<ref name="govuk-isf">UK Government, [https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/uk-integrated-security-fund/about About us - UK Integrated Security Fund], accessed 14 February 2026.</ref>

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 == History ==
-Upon creation, £823 million of the CSSF's £1,033 million budget was transferred from the [[Department for International Development]], with administration split between the [[Foreign and Commonwealth Office]] (£739 million) and [[Ministry of Defence (United Kingdom)|Ministry of Defence]] (£42 million).<ref name="hocl-20151123">Lorna Booth, [https://secondreading.uk/world/what-do-we-know-about-future-aid-spending-uk-overseas-aid-and-the-spending-review/ Spending Review 2015: the future of overseas aid] ''UK Parliament House of Commons Library'', 23 November 2015.</ref><ref name="dfid-2015">Department for International Development, [http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/international-development/MainEstimateIDCMemoranda.pdf Main Estimate 2015/16] ''UK Parliament'', 2015.</ref> The 2015 UK Aid policy planned an increase to £1.3 billion by 2019/20.<ref name="UKaid-2015">HM Treasury, [https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/478834/ODA_strategy_final_web_0905.pdf UK aid: tackling global challenges in the national interest], Cm 9163, November 2015.</ref> This marked a substantial expansion from the Conflict Pool's £180 million in 2014/15.<ref name="icai-20120713">Independent Commission for Aid Impact, [http://icai.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/Evaluation-of-the-Inter-Departmental-Conflict-Pool-ICAI-Report.pdf Evaluation of the Inter-Departmental Conflict Pool], 13 July 2012.</ref><ref name="abbott-20160229">Diane Abbott, [http://news.trust.org/item/20160229173810-dj9vp/ The stealth aid raid: militarising Britain's development budget] ''Thomson Reuters Foundation News'', 29 February 2016.</ref>
+Upon creation on 1 April 2015, the '''CSSF''' transferred £823 million from the [[Department for International Development]] budget, with £739 million administered by the [[Foreign and Commonwealth Office]] and £42 million by the [[Ministry of Defence (United Kingdom)|Ministry of Defence]].<ref name="hocl-20151123">Lorna Booth, [https://secondreading.uk/world/what-do-we-know-about-future-aid-spending-uk-overseas-aid-and-the-spending-review/ Spending Review 2015: the future of overseas aid] ''UK Parliament House of Commons Library'', 23 November 2015.</ref><ref name="dfid-2015">Department for International Development, [http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/international-development/MainEstimateIDCMemoranda.pdf Main Estimate 2015/16] ''UK Parliament'', 2015.</ref> The 2015 UK Aid policy projected growth to £1.3 billion by 2019/20.<ref name="UKaid-2015">HM Treasury, [https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/478834/ODA_strategy_final_web_0905.pdf UK aid: tackling global challenges in the national interest], Cm 9163, November 2015.</ref> This expansion from the Conflict Pool's £180 million in 2014/15 marked a shift towards integrated national security responses.<ref name="icai-20120713">Independent Commission for Aid Impact, [http://icai.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/Evaluation-of-the-Inter-Departmental-Conflict-Pool-ICAI-Report.pdf Evaluation of the Inter-Departmental Conflict Pool], 13 July 2012.</ref><ref name="abbott-20160229">Diane Abbott, [http://news.trust.org/item/20160229173810-dj9vp/ The stealth aid raid: militarising Britain's development budget] ''Thomson Reuters Foundation News'', 29 February 2016.</ref>
-In 2016, [[Mark Lyall Grant|Sir Mark Lyall Grant]], then National Security Adviser, identified major expenditures in Afghanistan (£90 million), Syria (£60 million) and Somalia (£32 million), with projects in over 40 countries.<ref name="parliament-20161128">UK Parliament, [http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/national-security-strategy-committee/conflict-stability-and-security-fund/oral/43877.html Oral evidence: Conflict, Stability and Security Fund], HC 208, 28 November 2016.</ref> Significant funding supported operations in Syria, including strategic communications for the moderate armed opposition.<ref name="parliament-20160721" /><ref name="govuk-assistance">Foreign & Commonwealth Office, [https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/factsheet-the-uks-non-humanitarian-aid-response-to-the-syria-crisis--2/providing-non-humanitarian-assistance-in-syria Providing non-humanitarian assistance in Syria], 1 December 2015.</ref><ref name="guardian-20160503" /> The [[Stabilisation Unit]] was funded by the CSSF.<ref name="su-aboutus">UK Government, [https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/stabilisation-unit/about Stabilisation Unit - About us], accessed 5 December 2016.</ref>
+In 2016, [[Mark Lyall Grant|Sir Mark Lyall Grant]], National Security Adviser, reported major spending in Afghanistan (£90 million), Syria (£60 million) and Somalia (£32 million), with activities across over 40 countries.<ref name="parliament-20161128">UK Parliament, [http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/national-security-strategy-committee/conflict-stability-and-security-fund/oral/43877.html Oral evidence: Conflict, Stability and Security Fund], HC 208, 28 November 2016.</ref> Funding supported Syrian opposition communications and stabilisation efforts.<ref name="guardian-20160503">Ian Cobain ''et al'', [https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/03/how-britain-funds-the-propaganda-war-against-isis-in-syria How Britain funds the 'propaganda war' against Isis in Syria] ''The Guardian'', 3 May 2016.</ref> The [[Stabilisation Unit]] received CSSF support.<ref name="su-aboutus">UK Government, [https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/stabilisation-unit/about Stabilisation Unit - About us], accessed 5 December 2016.</ref>
-The 2017 annual report under [[Mark Sedwill|Sir Mark Sedwill]] highlighted top programmes: Afghanistan (£90 million), Syria (£64 million), Somalia (£33.5 million), Jordan (£25.3 million) and Lebanon (£24 million), much related to Syrian refugees.<ref name="cssf-ar2017" /> By 2020/21, the budget reached £1.37 billion, with major allocations to peacekeeping (£388 million), Middle East and North Africa (£183 million), South Asia (£103 million) and MOD Afghan Security (£100 million).<ref name="hoc-20210128">Penny Mordaunt, [https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2021-01-28/debates/21012813000009/ConflictStabilityAndSecurityFundAllocations2020-21 Conflict, Stability and Security Fund Allocations 2020-21] ''UK Parliament House of Commons'', 28 January 2021.</ref>
+The first annual report (2016/17), published in July 2017 under [[Mark Sedwill|Sir Mark Sedwill]], detailed top programmes: Afghanistan (£90 million), Syria (£64 million), Somalia (£33.5 million), Jordan (£25.3 million) and Lebanon (£24 million), largely linked to Syrian refugee responses.<ref name="cssf-ar2017">UK Government, [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5b50a71ce5274a73013a8754/CSSF_Annual_Report_2017_to_2018.pdf Conflict, Stability and Security Fund: Annual Report 2017 to 2018], July 2018.</ref>
-In April 2024, the CSSF transitioned to the [[Integrated Security Fund]], expanding its remit to include domestic and cyber elements.<ref name="govuk-isf" />
+=== 2015/16 ===
 == Intelligence links and the Fusion Doctrine ==

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 === Government Information Cell ===
-The [[Government Information Cell]] ([[GIC]]), established in March 2022 during the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic, monitored and countered misinformation and disinformation relating to the virus and government policy.<ref name="parl-gic2023">UK Parliament, [https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-questions/detail/2023-02-21/149641 Government Information Cell], House of Commons, 21 February 2023.</ref> It operated within the [[Cabinet Office]] and coordinated rapid responses to false narratives across government departments.<ref name="parl-gic2023" /> The [[GIC]] was amalgamated into the [[Information Threats and Influence Directorate]] ([[ITID]]) along with the [[Counter Disinformation and Media Development Programme]] ([[CDMD]]) as part of the consolidation of counter-disinformation capabilities.
+The [[Government Information Cell]] ([[GIC]]), established in March 2022 to counter Kremlin disinformation following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, monitored and countered state-sponsored disinformation targeting the invasion.<ref name="parl-gic2023">UK Parliament, [https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-questions/detail/2023-02-21/149641 Government Information Cell], House of Commons, 21 February 2023.</ref> It operated within the [[Cabinet Office]] and coordinated rapid responses to false narratives across government departments.<ref name="parl-gic2023" /> The [[GIC]] was amalgamated into the [[Information Threats and Influence Directorate]] ([[ITID]]) along with the [[Counter Disinformation and Media Development Programme]] ([[CDMD]]) as part of the consolidation of counter-disinformation capabilities.
 === Information Threats and Influence Directorate ===

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 === Counter-Daesh Coalition Communications Cell ===
-The [[Counter-Daesh Coalition Communications Cell]] ([[CDCC]]), established in September 2015 and led by the UK, countered Daesh propaganda as part of the Global Coalition against Daesh.<ref name="globalcoalition-uk">The Global Coalition Against Daesh, [https://theglobalcoalition.org/en/partner/united-kingdom United Kingdom], accessed 14 February 2026.</ref> It used CSSF funding to undermine Daesh's narrative, reaching millions in the Middle East and reducing recruitment.<ref name="cssf-ar2023">UK Government, [https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/conflict-stability-and-security-fund-annual-report-2023-to-2024/conflict-stability-and-security-fund-annual-report-2023-to-2024 Conflict, Stability and Security Fund annual report 2023 to 2024], 5 December 2024.</ref> The [[CDCC]] continued operations through 2024.<ref name="cssf-ar2023" /> Funding through CSSF was ongoing, but specific annual amounts are not broken out; it formed part of broader counter-terrorism expenditures, with CSSF's Counter Terrorism Programme fund at £32.47 million in 2021/22.<ref name="cssf-ar202122">UK Government, [https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/conflict-stability-and-security-fund-annual-report-2021-to-2022/conflict-stability-and-security-fund-annual-report-2021-to-2022 Conflict, Stability and Security Fund: Annual Report 2021 to 2022], 22 May 2023.</ref>
+The [[Counter-Daesh Coalition Communications Cell]] ([[CDCC]]), established in September 2015 and led by the UK, countered Daesh propaganda as part of the Global Coalition against Daesh.<ref name="globalcoalition-uk">The Global Coalition Against Daesh, [https://theglobalcoalition.org/en/partner/united-kingdom United Kingdom], accessed 14 February 2026.</ref> It used CSSF funding to undermine Daesh's narrative, claiming to reach millions in the Middle East and reducing recruitment.<ref name="cssf-ar2023">UK Government, [https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/conflict-stability-and-security-fund-annual-report-2023-to-2024/conflict-stability-and-security-fund-annual-report-2023-to-2024 Conflict, Stability and Security Fund annual report 2023 to 2024], 5 December 2024.</ref> The [[CDCC]] continued operations through 2024.<ref name="cssf-ar2023" /> Funding through CSSF was ongoing, but specific annual amounts are not broken out; it formed part of broader counter-terrorism expenditures, with CSSF's Counter Terrorism Programme fund at £32.47 million in 2021/22.<ref name="cssf-ar202122">UK Government, [https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/conflict-stability-and-security-fund-annual-report-2021-to-2022/conflict-stability-and-security-fund-annual-report-2021-to-2022 Conflict, Stability and Security Fund: Annual Report 2021 to 2022], 22 May 2023.</ref>
 === Russian Language Programme ===