Colin Wallace: Questions and Criticism for Historical Institutional Abuse Inquiry (Northern Ireland)

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I am deeply concerned about the factual inaccuracies and misleading information contained in the HIA Inquiry’s Report.

The Report creates a para-narrative comprised largely of ‘alternative facts’, with regard to my knowledge or otherwise of William McGrath and others engaged in child-abuse at the Kincora Boys Home, and related matters.

The Inquiry ignored witnesses and evidence that might challenge its preferred no-intelligence-services-cover-up scenario. At least one witness, Fred Holroyd, was dissuaded from turning up. The Inquiry rehashed discredited and invented information from previous inquiries. Its Report on Kincora is a mess. I point out here some major inadequacies, principally as they concern me.

As part of this exercise I have set you eleven questions, which I hope you will be in a position to attempt to answer.

Introduction

After being initially willing, I refused to appear as a witness. This was for two reasons. First, your Inquiry, unlike its England-Wales equivalent, did not possess power to compel the production of evidential material, one consequence of which I address. Second, the Inquiry refused to provide my solicitor with a list of Government disclosed files relevant to my evidence. Nevertheless, I contributed material, initially in July, then in September 2016, correcting statements by Counsel for the Inquiry at public session.¹

As you are aware, I was not afforded adequate time to respond to a ‘Warning Letter’ and various attached documents sent to me on 8 December 2016. I told you then that I would be away working for the following two weeks. That left me but three days to access my material in a separate location and then to attempt a response. You were unimpressed with that practical difficulty, though you had previously granted others more time in which to complete a task. In itself that demonstrates your unserious approach. You appear to have regarded evidential material from me as an irritant, rather than as enhancing a search for truth.

In your haste to publish your Report on 20 January 2017, during the crowded news-day US President Donald Trump was inaugurated, you produced a flawed analysis as it concerns the Kincora Boys Home paedophile scandal. It is likely, given the material below, that you were intent on producing such an analysis in any case. My inability to respond within your unwavering and, in the circumstances unreasonable, deadline provided your opportunity.

Your Report appears to be more focused on discrediting individuals, or information on the record, conflicting with the Inquiry’s desired conclusion, than with establishing the truth.

That is why I accuse you of producing a para-narrative that gives a false impression of objectivity. A competent Inquiry would not face questions of the type posed below.

For purposes of brevity, I have limited this letter to only a few unacceptable anomalies. They cannot be explained other than as attempts to mislead the public.

Testing Documents

Section 484 of the Inquiry’s Report considers typed notes based on my extensive 1973 briefing to the press on the child-abuser William McGrath. In its effort to undermine the fact that the document demonstrates Army attempts to expose McGrath, and that I was its partial instrument, the report states:

The importance of the 8 November 1974 document/GC80\(^2\) when considering the accounts given by Mr Wallace over the years cannot be overstated. GC80 is not just an important element in the accounts given by Mr Wallace, it is at the very centre of those accounts, and is fundamental to the credibility of the allegations made by Mr Wallace about Kincora...

... We consider it surprising that [in his *Who Framed Colin Wallace?*] Mr [Paul] Foot made no reference to forensic tests on GC80 being carried out at his request, when the only reference to such tests on GC80 is to the inconclusive reports apparently obtained by *The Irish Times*.

As the Inquiry should be well aware, the latter statement is totally false.

Counsel to the Inquiry confirmed that the Inquiry was in possession of both the hardback and paperback versions of Paul Foot’s book. At page 234 of the hardback version,\(^3\) the author reported how he submitted my 1974 memo to Mr Derek Davis, a leading UK forensic document examiner of impeccable credentials, and asked him to see if he could find any evidence, as the RUC alleged, of the ‘possibility’ that more than one typewriter was used in its creation. In a report dated 29 March 1989, Mr Davis said:

I cannot find any evidence of more than one typewriter having been used as alleged. It is a poor photocopy, but all four pages are consistent.

Paul Foot also independently submitted the document to a second, equally reputable, expert. With no knowledge of the other test (and vice versa), Mr Robert Radley concluded:

I have been unable to find any significant differences in design or spacing characteristics nor have I found any significant differences in typographical layout features which would suggest more than one typewriter or more than one typist has been involved in its production.

Moreover, in a January 1990 response to a 6 November 1989 letter from the Shadow Spokesman on Northern Ireland Kevin McNamara MP to the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Peter Brooke MP had the good grace to admit:

In his book, Paul Foot does, as you say, address the question of the authenticity of the memorandum.\(^4\)

Mr Brooke clearly accepted the evidence provided by the two UK experts engaged by Paul Foot. The Inquiry now appears to have gone back on that admission by the Secretary of State, not on the basis of producing new information but by suppressing existing evidence.

**Question One:**
Why did the HIA Inquiry make a false allegation that a critical document had not undergone forensic testing when it is patently obvious, in that the record shows, such tests had been carried out?

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\(^2\) A degraded photocopy of the original, see in Appendix 1.

\(^3\) See in Appendix 2.

\(^4\) Emphasis added.
To compound its failure, the Inquiry descended to farce when it then criticised me for not providing it with the forensic reports compiled by Mr Radley and Mr Davis.

That criticism is a ‘red herring’, as the Inquiry full well knows.

The forensic examinations were initiated by Paul Foot and by the *Daily Mirror* newspaper. Although I was shown the reports at the time they were received, they were retained by Paul Foot.

Given the Inquiry’s stated view of ‘the importance of the 8 November 1974 document/GC80’ and the fact that the Inquiry possessed both the GC80 version of the document (supplied to the 1985 Hughes Inquiry by the Essex police), plus my own copy, from which the Essex police version was originally made: the Inquiry should have commissioned its own independent forensic expert to examine the document.

The Inquiry failed to carry out an elementary task concerning document authenticity. It preferred instead to publish patently false statements.

**Question Two:**

Why did the Inquiry fail to initiate its own forensic examination of a document which it stated was ‘at the very centre’, and was ‘fundamental to the credibility of the allegations made by Mr Wallace about Kincora’?

In its attempt to evade responsibilities fundamental to its credibility, the HIA Report refers to a 1985 report compiled by a RUC forensic officer and asserted:

At that time Donald Budd specialised in examining documents whose authenticity was in question. In his report of 14 February 1985 he pointed to the possibility that the first page of GC80 had been interfered with, giving three reasons.

1 A horizontal line on the first page “could indicate the addition of a piece of paper to the top of this document, possible to cover other information, at the time of photocopying.”

2 Differences in “the shape of the tail of the number “9” in the date of 8 November 1974 from that of 9s in the remainder of this document would appear to lend some weight to this possibility”.

3 The absence of “CONFIDENTIAL” from the bottom of page 1 of document 1 [GC80] yet present though obliterated at the top and bottom of the remaining 3 pages of this document, could be further evidence of interference to page 1.

I have two responses to this less than emphatic analysis.

**First:** Neither of the two UK forensic specialists who independently examined the memo accept that the document had been ‘interfered with’. Of course, I also refute the suggestion (though, let that not detain us).

**Second:** For the sake of argument, even if the anomalies referred to in the RUC report were there, they would not have altered one jot the overall content of the document. It is perverse, in the extreme, for the Inquiry Report not to make this point clear.

I have no doubt, whatsoever, that the RUC report was used to frighten off the 1985 Hughes Inquiry, into children’s homes and hostels in Northern Ireland, from giving due consideration to the memo. Either the whole document was forged, or it was not. To suggest that only these small and almost irrelevant anomalies were in any way significant to the overall content is simply not credible, and no fair-minded person would think otherwise.
Polygraph Test
The Inquiry was also aware that I willingly undertook, at Paul Foot’s request, a polygraph test in September 1987 covering various aspects of my story, including the November 1974 memo. One of the questions put to me during that test was:

[Question:] Did you cause in 1974 someone in Army Headquarters Northern Ireland to type this document, 'D', headed 'Tara' - Reports on criminal offences associated with the homosexual community in Belfast?5

[Answer:] Yes

The report of the test stated:

Mr Wallace has a tape recording of the questions which were measured by the polygraph and I am pleased to confirm that his responses were truthful.

It should go without assertion that I would not willingly have undertaken a polygraph test about the document in question if I had known it was not genuine.

I sent the Inquiry a full copy of the test and the result, and it is a matter of serious concern that the Report makes no mention of this.

Question Three:
Why did the Inquiry deliberately withhold information with regard to my polygraph test from its Report, even though there was a passing reference to it in the transcripts of the public hearings?

1973 Press Briefing on William McGrath

It is established beyond doubt that I briefed the press in August 1973 about William McGrath with the full knowledge and agreement of my superiors. That information referred to the fact that McGrath blackmailed people as a result of homosexual activities he initiated.

The briefing document that I used contained McGrath’s correct home address and telephone number, plus the address and telephone number of the Kincora Boys Home, where he worked.

It is sadly ironic that the transcripts of the Inquiry’s public hearings [Day 220 Page 34] record that MI5 officer Ian Cameron wrote a report in 1976 accusing me of ‘leaking’ that information to the press (despite the fact that my Army superiors had instructed me to do so and which I had been doing since 1973).

Clearly, then, the Army wished to attract the attention of the press to McGrath and his activities.

The point here though is that it was MI5 that considered my briefings with regard to McGrath’s sexual activities to be a breach of security. It is also on the record that Brian Gemmell, an Army Intelligence Corps Captain, was specifically told by Cameron not to pursue investigation into McGrath’s sexual activities.

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5 See in Appendix 3.
6 It should be stated that the term ‘paedophile’ was not widely known within civil society at that time, and that the reference to ‘the homosexual community’ would rightly be thought unacceptable today. At that time in Northern Ireland male homosexual sexual practices were illegal.
The question is, why did the Inquiry fail to inquire into Ian Cameron’s opposition to my ‘leaking’ information to the press about William McGrath and Tara (leaving aside that this was not ‘leaking’, since I was acting under instruction)?

Was that not clearly your job, at which you appear to have failed miserably.

**Question Four:**
Why did the Inquiry exclude Ian Cameron’s allegations about my ‘leaking’ information about McGrath’s sexual activities from its Report, when it put great emphasis on them at the public hearings?

Is it possible that Ian Cameron’s allegation was no longer helpful to the Inquiry’s version of events, requiring me not to have been briefing against McGrath, and that is why the allegation was discarded on the cutting room floor?

The Inquiry is also aware that in September 1975 I wrote to Tony Staughton, my former boss at Army HQ in Lisburn, and to Cliff Crook of the Institution of Professional Civil Servants (IPCS), both of whom potentially were witnesses at my disciplinary hearing that year. The letters to both addressees showed that I referred to Loyalist paramilitary figures involved in homosexual prostitution at a children’s home in Belfast.

The Inquiry is also aware, in that I informed it, that my letter to Tony Staughton was later subjected to forensic analysis by the makers of a comprehensive television documentary about the May 1974 Dublin and Monaghan bombings. A transcript of the programme, which is included in the Irish government’s Barron Report on the bombings, demonstrated that the forensic analysis confirmed that the letter was consistent with being written in 1974 or 1975.

**Question five:**
Why did your Inquiry’s report deliberately exclude reference to my letter to Mr Staughton and to the independent forensic examination carried out on that letter?

Yet again the Inquiry failed to refer to a forensic examination of a document that was also, assuredly, ‘fundamental’ to my ‘credibility’.

It is the Inquiry’s credibility that is in question at this stage.

It is true that my solicitor did not supply either of these letters to the Metropolitan Police when he asked the police to investigate the results of Sir David Calcutt’s report, i.e. that the MOD and MI5 defrauded me by rigging my disciplinary hearing.

There is a simple explanation.

As the Inquiry is well aware, the police investigation was focused solely only on evidence which was actually submitted to members of the Appeal Board. My letters to Tony Staughton and Cliff Crook were not given in evidence to the Appeal Board.

For the Inquiry to claim otherwise is simply mischief-making.

As the Inquiry is also aware, the DPP ruled that it would not be in the public interest for the police to investigate the alleged fraud. That was a remarkable decision by any standards.

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7 See ICPS letter in Appendix 4.
8 ‘Hidden Hand – The Forgotten Massacre’, *First Tuesday* series, Yorkshire TV, broadcast 6 July 1993, Channel Four. The HIA Inquiry Report allegation that Judge Barron rejected my evidence is yet another patent falsehood.
Clockwork Orange

At Section 601 of the Report, the Inquiry states:

Mr Wallace was not concerned about Clockwork Orange or Kincora at the
time of his dismissal; his concerns about Clockwork Orange surfaced later.

This is another totally false and quite bizarre statement.

I discussed the ‘Clockwork Orange’ project, an attempt to smear politicians, with a London solicitor, Graham Dodd of Blackheath, just a few weeks after my disciplinary hearing. For example, at page 168 of *Who Framed Colin Wallace?* Paul Foot wrote:

On 27 November 1975, he [Wallace] consulted a local solicitor in Blackheath, Graham Dodd. He told Dodd his story and asked if there was any way he could continue to challenge what had happened. Graham Dodd recalls the consultations with Wallace very clearly. Twelve years later he told Channel Four News:

‘Colin Wallace said he was involved in dirty tricks against politicians in Northern Ireland ['Clockwork Orange'] and he also said this had started to move over onto the mainland against mainland politicians - and in particular he mentioned Harold Wilson.’

Eleven years later, a mighty political row blew up over the allegation by a former MI5 officer, Peter Wright, that there had been an Intelligence plot against the elected Prime Minister, Harold Wilson. It is worth recalling that Colin Wallace’s statement, in confidence, to the Blackheath solicitor in November 1975 was the first time ever any such allegation had been put on the record.9

In other words, only a few weeks after my disciplinary hearing, I briefed a London solicitor and a Northern Ireland Minister, Roland Moyle, on ‘Clockwork Orange’. Moreover, the Inquiry is well aware from the documents I submitted to it that my ‘Clockwork Orange’ material contained references to prominent political figures including Edward Heath, Jeremy Thorpe, Cyril Smith, William van Straubenzee, the Rev. Ian Paisley, Sir Knox Cunningham, Harold Wilson, etc.

The Inquiry is also aware that the forensic examination carried out by Dr Julius Grant on those documents confirmed that they were consistent with being written in 1974 – see attached *Observer* report, dated 5 July 1987.10 Those notes also refer to William McGrath, John McKeague, and others.

**Question Six:**

Given the above information, why did the Inquiry claim falsely in its report that I ‘was not concerned about Clockwork Orange or Kincora’ at the time of my dismissal and that my ‘concerns about Clockwork Orange surfaced later’?

It is also clear that I referred in my letters to my former boss Tony Staughton and to the IPCS, prior to my disciplinary hearing, about ‘homosexual prostitution at a children’s home in Belfast’.

This is clearly a reference to Kincora.

In the interests of accuracy and contrary to what the Inquiry’s Report states, I was not dismissed from my job. The Appeal Board decided that I should be allowed the option of

9 Emphasis added.
10 See in Appendix 5.
resigning rather than being dismissed. While a minor point, it indicates again a slipshod method in what purports to be a forensic official inquiry into a very serious matter.

**Accepting Unsigned RUC Statements**

It is particularly worrying – and I believe totally unacceptable - that the Inquiry has relied on unsigned statements supplied by the RUC from interviews allegedly made in the early 1980s. These are from interviews with potential witnesses as part of the 1983 Terry Inquiry. I should not need to point out that the use by police in general of unsigned witness statements is highly questionable and has been the subject of abuse for many years.

We should bear in mind that when the unsigned statements were allegedly written, the RUC was investigating allegations of a cover-up of Kincora by its own officers.

Most reasonable people would regard the absence of a truly independent investigation as manifestly unfair to the victims.

It would also appear that the individuals who allegedly made those statements never saw what was written by the RUC, yet those documents were relied upon by the Inquiry without question.

The Inquiry should not have relied on statements produced using discredited practices.

To make matters even worse, it would appear that when Fred Holroyd, the former Special Military Intelligence Unit officer, asked to see a copy of the statement which the RUC had submitted to the Inquiry his request was apparently refused. His offer to give evidence was rebuffed on the basis the Inquiry had his unseen (by Holroyd) statement.¹¹

That is astonishing.

On 28 February 1986, The *New Statesman* published a report that included the following:

Holroyd also says that, while being trained for his Northern Ireland duties, he was told that the Tara organisation was in effect controlled by British intelligence, and was not a real security threat - implying that McGrath had indeed come under intelligence control before 1973.¹²

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<th>Question Seven: Why was Fred Holroyd not asked to give evidence to the Inquiry, though he offered to do so, and why was his correspondence with the Inquiry not published with the Inquiry’s Report?</th>
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<th>Question Eight: Why was Fred Holroyd not allowed to see a copy of the statement that he allegedly gave to the RUC in 1982 and upon which the Inquiry appears to have relied?</th>
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On 11 February 1990, the *Sunday Times* quoted Mike Taylor, a former Branch Security Officer with the Army Information Services at HQ Northern Ireland, as saying:

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¹¹ See Holroyd book extract in Appendix 6

¹² See in Appendix 7.
I saw a memo attached to the [Kincora] file where General Sir Peter Leng, Commander Land Forces [Northern Ireland], suggested action be taken by the police on our information.\textsuperscript{13}

A transcript of a tape-recorded interview in February 1990 by Barrie Penrose of the \textit{Sunday Times} with the former land forces commander, General Leng, contains the following exchange:

\begin{verbatim}
PENROSE : And on Kincora you come out absolutely as one would expect, saying there has got to be action on Kincora. Do you recall that?
LENG: No
PENROSE : You said in the memo according to [Mike] Taylor that the RUC and the social services I think ought to be brought in here because the file named men and boys who were obviously part of this abuse which we all know about since.
LENG: Yes, I recall that.
PENROSE: Do you? And you said take action. They waited because obviously there had been other members suggesting this from junior officers, but it was yours that finally convinced Taylor that this was going to happen, but of course it went on for another six or seven years, but again that wasn’t your fault. It was just to remind you that there were homosexual abuses taking place, namely by the housefather named McGrath...
LENG: Yes.
PENROSE: Who was also the leader of TARA, and of course eventually that was all proven in court some years afterwards, and also a man named McKeague, but I mean this is obviously outside…
LENG: Yes, I do remember the homosexual insinuations and I do remember saying this is a police business, not ours.\textsuperscript{14}
\end{verbatim}

It is clear from the above exchange that General Leng appears to confirm Mike Taylor’s assertion that he (General Leng) was aware of the ‘homosexual insinuations’ relating to William McGrath and that he wrote a memo in keeping with what Barrie Penrose paraphrased as:

\begin{verbatim}
The RUC and the social services I think ought to be brought in here because the file named men and boys who were obviously part of this abuse.
\end{verbatim}

It would appear that the Inquiry relied solely on a statement which the RUC claimed was obtained from Mr Taylor by Detective Inspector S R Mack in June 1982.

D I Mack was also involved in the investigation of Dr Morris Fraser during 1971-2. The RUC failed for over a year and a half to inform Belfast hospital authorities that their RVH-based child psychiatrist was an admitted, then convicted, child abuser (an omission the Inquiry was disinclined to investigate, for reasons best known to itself).

I am informed that Mr Taylor has no recollection of making the statement retained by Inspector Mack.

Setting that issue aside, it is perverse that the Inquiry did not ask Mr Taylor to give evidence.

\textsuperscript{13} See \textit{Sunday Times} report in Appendix 8.
\textsuperscript{14} Where indicated, emphasis added.
I make this point, because it would appear that various other obvious key witnesses, such as Valerie Shaw and a number of the social workers connected with Kincora and other homes, were also not asked to give evidence. I would submit that, given the allegations surrounding a cover-up of what happened at Kincora, the HIA Inquiry should have started afresh and obtained new statements from all relevant witnesses.

If you think about it, that was the reason why you were asked to investigate in the first place, due to inadequacies within previous investigations. By relying on flawed aspects of those inquiries it was inevitable that you would produce the same flawed result.

**Question Nine:**
Why was Mike Taylor, potentially a key witness, not invited to give evidence to the Inquiry?

It is clear that the Inquiry has gone to great lengths to play down the significance of what General Leng said to Barrie Penrose, especially the fact that he was aware of the ‘homosexual insinuations’ relating to Kincora and had written a memo about the matter. In its Report the Inquiry attempts to muddy the waters by raising the issue of St Patrick’s Training School, from which boys had also absconded – something General Leng made clear that he was also aware of. The Inquiry was, however, well aware that there was a major difference between Kincora and St Patrick’s Training School. The General did not refer to being aware of any homosexual insinuations relating to St Patrick’s School. I am sure that neither I nor anyone else at Army HQ in Lisburn was aware of any such insinuations during the 1973/74 period.

The Inquiry’s attempt to confuse the public over this matter is to be deplored.

**Colin Wallace Official Role**

I believe that it was clearly essential for your Inquiry to have had a thorough understanding of my role in Northern Ireland, if it was to investigate effectively the context and significance of what I was doing with regard to Intelligence about Kincora and related matters. This is why I have repeatedly stressed not only the importance of my job description as approved by Army HQ Northern Ireland and the MoD in 1974, but also the work that I had been doing in Psychological Operations prior to that.

The Inquiry’s Report states:

> On 21 October 2014 the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland also said that:

> ‘...there will be the fullest possible degree of co-operation by all of HM Government and its agencies to determine the facts.

> All Government departments, who receive a request for information or documents from the Inquiry will co-operate to the utmost of their ability in determining what material they hold that might be relevant to it, on matters for which they have responsibility in accordance with the terms of reference of the Inquiry........’

> ... During our examination of files originally identified to us we identified other files that we considered might be relevant, and asked that these files be produced as well. The department or agency concerned searched for every file the Inquiry asked for, and in the few cases where the file could not be found the reasons why it could not be found were explained to us...
... A senior officer of each department or agency has provided the Inquiry with a statement confirming that their department or agency has identified every file requested by the Inquiry, and produced those they have been able to find. Where they have not been able to find a file because they believe that it has been destroyed they have explained why that has been done, and, so far as they can, when the file may have been destroyed. ...

On 1 February 1990, Defence Secretary, Tom King, replied to a question put by Martin O’Neill, stating:

Although the [Wallace] job description is a classified document, Mr Calcutt will have access to it and he will be able to show it to Mr Wallace.

It is clear from the above comment made by the Secretary of State for Defence that a written copy of my job specification existed at that date.

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**Question 10:**
Did the Inquiry ask for a copy of the document to which the Secretary of State for Defence referred in Parliament? If not, why not?

During 1990 and 1991, the House of Commons Defence Select Committee attempted to discover the truth about my role in Northern Ireland and, in particular, what my secret job description entailed. On 12 December 1990, the Clerk to the Committee wrote to the MOD saying:

In response to the paragraph headed “General Requests”, the Committee would wish to be provided with a copy of the two following documents, with the principal references to them in Mr Heyhoe’s Report shown in brackets:

A. The original paper identified in July 1989, containing a reference to Clockwork Orange, and described by the Secretary of State on 1 February, HC Deb, col 467, as “a background paper seeking to justify expenditure on a further information officer in Northern Ireland Headquarters”: [Heyhoe 1, 9 &c]

B. The “source document” in 2 PUS folders, of which A was an extract, containing information on Mr Wallace’s job description and a reference to Clockwork Orange, stating that the project was not cleared [Heyhoe 1, 3, 9].

As mentioned in my letter of 14 February and as referred to in Question 1 as forwarded on 31 October, the Committee remains happy that the papers should be provided if necessary under the usual conditions governing the Committee’s access to classified papers.

The Ministry of Defence replied on 11 February saying:

As regards the particular papers referred to in your third paragraph, these are internal papers and moreover include sensitive material relating to security and intelligence matters lying outside the Committee’s inquiry. The provision of such papers, even under the conditions relating to the

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15 Emphasis added.
16 Where indicated emphasis added.
17 See in Appendix 7.
Committee’s access to classified information, would be inconsistent with the conventions.

Needless to say, the Committee were never shown the documents to which they sought access.

**Question 11:**
Given that I supplied the Inquiry with copies of the relevant correspondence between the Defence Select Committee and the MoD, did your Inquiry request a copy of the document withheld by the MoD from Select Committee? If not, why not?

Given the Inquiry’s apparent lack of detailed knowledge of how the Army and the Intelligence Services operated during the 1970s it appears to have been over-reliant on what the MoD and other government agencies have told it. As a result, the Report is littered with silly mistakes and false assumptions. This lack of appreciation has led to numerous assertions that are devoid of reality and are highly misleading. For example, at Section 344 of the Report, it states:

Whether or not Mr Wallace did know, or suspect, that the facts about Bill Fuller came from SIS, he played his part in preparing the information for dissemination to the journalist concerned. An SIS memo of 7/8 April 1975 contains the following reference to Mr Wallace’s efforts in this respect: “The sanitised write-up on Bill FULLER (copy attached) In handing this to [redacted], WALLACE photocopied on to the last page some of his own information, ie that contained in para 3 of our tel [SIS LONDON] of 7 June 74” 240 345 [Inquiry refs] The reference to Mr Wallace photocopying his own material onto the last page suggests that he may have put together the document he later passed to the journalist by using a photocopier to join two documents together, that which he received from G Int and some of his own information. That could of course have been a perfectly innocent means of compiling a document which would still clearly reveal that it had at least two distinct origins. The alternative is that that could be a device to conceal that the document had two distinct origins by making it appear that it was a single document. Whichever was the position, at best it is a possible example of the skills Mr Wallace clearly possessed in view of his own admission that he regularly created false documents.

These childish speculations constitute total nonsense.

I am absolutely certain that during my seven years at HQ Northern Ireland, I never personally photocopied a single document. To the best of my knowledge there was only one photocopier in the HQ and for good security reasons all photocopies had to be requisitioned or obtained through the Chief Clerk. Staff did not have direct access to that photocopier.

Moreover, I later re-wrote the whole SIS document referred to above, to protect the identity of its source, before releasing it to the press. A copy of the rewritten material is contained in the ‘Clockwork Orange’ update document of December 1974.

At Section 431, the Report states:

A further aspect of the Clockwork Orange matter that may be of some relevance to Kincora is whether Mr Wallace’s account of his involvement in Clockwork Orange has been consistent over the years. In Paul Foot’s
Who Framed Colin Wallace? at page 113 he describes how he became disenchanted with Clockwork Orange.

One afternoon early in October [1974] I saw “John Shaw” from MI5. I sat having a quiet drink with him at the White Gables Hotel, near Hillsborough. At one stage, I told him I didn’t want to go any further with Clockwork Orange without political clearance. He seemed surprised and suggested that I already had clearance. But I made it clear I wanted some proof that the whole programme had been seen and approved by a Minister.

Of course I was pretty certain that ‘Shaw’ couldn’t get a ministerial clearance for Clockwork Orange. I was pretty sure that no minister had a clue that Clockwork Orange even existed. But I knew I couldn’t go on doing it, and I wanted to get on with other things.  

433 We are satisfied that the proper inference to draw from these passages is that Mr Wallace did no more work on Clockwork Orange after October 1974. However, he told Mr Groves on 30 May 1975 that he still had six briefings for the press to do after he left Northern Ireland, and in his letter to the Inquiry of 17 October 2016 he said that he was still engaged on that work.

The Inquiry’s inference is totally incorrect.

I did not become disenchanted with ‘Clockwork Orange’ per se, my decision to withdraw from ‘Clockwork Orange’ related only to those parts of the project that were based on information from “John Shaw” and NIO sources. The Army did not have access to such political information – particularly information about UK politicians.

My concern was about the increasingly political smear content of some of the material I had been given by sources other than the Army. I believed that it was no part of my role to smear politicians. As I pointed out to the Inquiry, I was still working on some anti-terrorist aspects of ‘Clockwork Orange’ when I was moved from Northern Ireland and I agreed with Lt Colonel Railton that I would complete that work after I left the Province. As the MoD records show, neither the MoD nor Lt Colonel Railton disputed that fact.

The HIA Report includes a section of the December 1974 ‘Clockwork Orange’ update document which focuses on a number of issues: racketeering by both Loyalist and Republican paramilitaries; the role of William McGrath and Tara in attempting to destabilise the peace process; sources of IRA arms procurement, etc. I was quite content to continue working on all such activities because they did not involve Psy Ops directed at politicians.

As the Inquiry was aware, some of the ‘Clockwork Orange’ material I continued to work on – and referred to above - was published in the press in 1975, after I moved to HQ North West District at Preston. This was part of the ‘six briefings for the press’ to which I referred when I had a meeting with John Groves at the MoD on 30 May 1975 and was the reason why I retained the relevant material, including the Tara and McGrath press-briefing document.

The fact that the Inquiry appears to have possessed such a poor grasp of what was going on at that time should be a matter of very great concern and calls into question the reliability of its Report.

For example, the Army did not have the skill to carry out sophisticated forgeries such as bank accounts and similar documents. When we did have such documents, such as those contained in the ‘Clockwork Orange’ material, they were provided by external sources within

18 Emphasis added.
the Intelligence community. I sent a selection of such items to Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in November 1990 to highlight the point that such documents were not of Army origin. The Information Policy Branch did have a printing unit, which produced the Army’s newspaper, Visor. It also produced leaflets to encourage people to use the ‘Confidential Telephone’ and similar material. It is also true that the Army did produce ‘fake’ press identity cards and overprinted some Sinn Fein posters. Anonymous leaflets associating local terrorism with Communist revolutionary groups were also produced

Missing Documentation

In the official transcript of Day 217 (29 June 2016) Pages 157-8, counsel to the Inquiry stated:

24 Now the Army wasn’t in a position or is not yet in
25 a position to produce this document to the Inquiry.
1 That is because it has not yet been possible to find the
2 Army HQNI Tara file, which definitely did exist, or the
3 39 Brigade Tara file, which may be the one that Brian
4 Gemmell had and which this document may well have been
5 found on. Those files, according to Mr Rucker [MoD], who you
6 are aware did the report examining much wider issues,
7 but including looking at matters relating to Kincora and
8 the Army, according to Mr Rucker, they appear to have
9 last been with The Security Service in that he sent them
10 to The Security Service for them to reconsider matters
11 in them that he was looking at, but The Security Service
12 hasn't as yet been able to trace them in order to know
13 do they still have them, did they send them back to the
14 Army or have they been destroyed.”

The Inquiry does not appear to regard the loss of these files as significant.

For MI5 to lose Army files that are linked to the core subject under investigation appears to be quite acceptable to the Inquiry.

After all, a MoD official, Mr Rucker, who had read the missing files claimed that there was nothing of significance in them. So, that is OK then!! I wonder why he sent them to MI5 in the first instance?

Later in the Inquiry’s Report it says:

In a telex sent on 29/30 June 1982 by the MI5 Assistant Director and Coordinator of Intelligence (ADCI) he referred to the possibility of creating “false files” in anticipation of lines of enquiry which it was anticipated D/Supt Caskey would seek to follow in his Caskey Phase Three investigation into Kincora. 463 The use of the expression “false files” demonstrates that a senior MI5 officer considered the possibility of creating a “false”, that is a misleading or untrue, file to show to the police. This reference could be interpreted to mean either (a) that such a file would be composed of fabricated documents, or (b) that genuine documents would be brought together from other files but placed in a single file in a manner that would conceal sensitive material Whichever was in the officer’s mind when he used the expression, the use of the expression “false files” was at best unwise and at worst demonstrated a willingness to deceive the police...

... The context of the telex makes it clear that the idea was only raised to be discarded by the officer concerned, and we are satisfied the suggestion was not pursued in this instance.
Some people might have regarded this as a conspiracy to pervert the course of justice, but the Inquiry appears quite content because, in this instance, the conspiracy did not actually go ahead.

However, the Inquiry is at pains not to explain why a senior MI5 officer should wish to compile a fake file to mislead the police who were investigating Kincora.

If McGrath and Tara were of no interest to MI5, why consider this charade?

At the other end of the scale, the Inquiry falsely claimed that I was skilled in creating fake documents, even though there is good evidence to show that this claim is untrue.

In an interesting twist, the Inquiry also claimed that my 1974 memo on McGrath was likely to be a fake because it did not comply strictly with the normal format of Army documents.

Let us bear in mind that I had spent some 6 years at Army HQ in Lisburn and was very familiar with the layout of Army documents. If I had also been skilled at producing fake documents did no one at the Inquiry think that it was just a little odd that I did not create a fake memo in the correct style of normal Army documents?

Surely that would have been much more effective?

Nonsensical speculations, such as those sampled here, demonstrate your Inquiry to be worthless.

It is very clear from the foregoing examples that the Inquiry was in the possession of irrefutable information on Kincora related matters already in the public domain that supports what I have been saying over the years.

The Inquiry has either failed to refer to that information in its report, or has substituted false, inaccurate or misleading information in its place. This repeated inexplicable behaviour by the Inquiry is a matter of concern. It must raise serious questions about the integrity and impartiality of the Inquiry in terms of how it handled information relating to Kincora.

Moreover, throughout the Inquiry, it has become very clear that time after time when Government witnesses claimed that they cannot find or remember seeing a document, or of hearing any information about the alleged abuses at Kincora, their assertions were accepted without demur.

Given that the MoD lied repeatedly to the public, the press and Parliament for many years about my role in Northern Ireland and about even the existence of ‘Clockwork Orange’, the Inquiry’s unquestioning acceptance of even the most highly questionable assurances by Government sources displays a degree of bias that has been grossly unfair to those of us who challenge such claims, especially the abuse victims.

**Conclusion**

I believe I have demonstrated, objectively, that yours is not how a genuine Inquiry would have operated. It constitutes an abuse of the inquiry process. It is a smear on the official landscape that smears victims yet again.

I feel both angry and sorry that after 40 years of campaigning for a proper investigation of this matter, we are all further away from the truth than ever.

I would ask that you provide clear and unambiguous answers to the above questions as a matter of urgency. If such answers are not forthcoming, then the Inquiry’s handling of the Kincora sexual abuse allegations should either be withdrawn or subject of judicial review.

**Appendices, as indicated in footnotes, follow.**
Some 'Off the cuff' information on TARA for the Press.

TARA

TARA first came to notice in the late sixties when the group issued a statement to the press claiming to be "the hard core of Protestant resistance", and it is thought that the organisation was set up as a counter to the civil disturbances associated with the NICRA marches.

The name TARA is derived from the place where the ancient high kings of Ireland were crowned and is, therefore, an unusual choice of title for a loyalist paramilitary group.

Operating from its HQ at Clifton Street Orange Hall, Belfast, as 'The Orange Discussion Group', TARA was organised initially into platoons of 20 or so men and ran on military lines not unlike the old Ulster Special Constabulary ('B' Specials). Membership is drawn almost exclusively from the Orange Order and each platoon has a Sgt/OM (Quartermaster) and 10 (Intelligence Officer). Contributions: 50p per month - half to a central fund - half at pin level. Pins are able to draw on the central fund if the opportunity to buy stores arises. Training includes radio, weapons and guerrilla tactics.

The OC is William McGrath. He is a known homosexual who has conned many people into membership by threatening them with revealing homosexual activities which he himself initiated. He is a prominent figure in Unionist Party politics and in the Orange Order.

McGrath uses a non-existent evangelical mission as a front for his homosexual activities and also runs a home for children on the Upper Newtownards Road, Belfast (Tel: B'fast 657838). Also at __________ Newtownards Road (B'fast __________).

The TARA 2 i/c is Roy Garland, a close personal friend of McGrath and his former employer.

McGrath's 'ADC' is Frank Muller who comes from the Shore Road area of Belfast and who is also an active member of the Unionist Party. He is the author of a number of political pamphlets including one called 'Dangers and Sinister Realities'.

TARA's 'Intelligence Officer' is Clifford Smith who lives with McGrath, and the group's 'Admin Officer' is David Brown from Bangor Co Down. Brown is Deputy Editor of Rev Paisley's 'Protestant Telegraph'.

Other people closely associated with McGrath and aware of his activities are Thomas Passmore, Rev Paisley, Rev Martin Smith, James Molyneaux and Sir Knox Cunningham QC MP.

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Ulster's Children of Conflict. New Society 15 Apr 77

De W. Feasel?
including purported addressees, did not establish its authenticity. A forensic report raised the possibilities that the first page had been tampered with and that two typewriters had been used but was inconclusive as to authenticity. (Hughes Report, 4.85.)

In March and April 1989, I tried to discover from the RUC which forensic experts had examined the document, and concluded that there was a possibility that two typewriters had been used on it. No answer was forthcoming.

I consulted two top experts in Britain. Mr Derek Davis of Hemel Hempstead, Hertfordshire, wrote to me on 29 March 1989:

I cannot find any evidence of more than one typewriter having been used, as alleged. All four pages are consistent.

Mr Robert Radley of Reading wrote to me on 11 April 1989:

I have been unable to find any significant differences in design or spacing characteristics nor have I found any significant differences in typographical layout features which would suggest more than one typewriter or more than one typist has been involved in its production.

The key to all these questions of course was held by Colin Wallace himself. Several paragraphs are devoted to the committee’s explanation of how they tried to interview Colin Wallace and failed. ‘The purpose of our approach to him . . . and subsequent correspondence with him . . . was to remove all obstacles which might discourage him from volunteering a contribution to this enquiry.’

The report quoted the assurances given in the letter to Colin by General Garrett, and declared: ‘We were satisfied that the authorisation was sufficient for the purposes of the inquiry . . .’

The report also stated:

We pursued the file of papers which Mr Wallace had sent to the Prime Minister on 1st November 1984 . . . We subsequently examined the very limited number of documents which the NIO informed us had been retained by the Government. This did not advance our inquiries. (Hughes Report, p. 52.)

This was extraordinary. In November 1985, Mr Routh from the Ministry of Defence had written to Colin about the papers which had gone from the Prime Minister to the Hughes inquiry. ‘I should also add,’ he wrote, ‘that the Committee have a copy of the index to the file . . .’
Paul Foot Esq  
*Daily Mirror*  
Room 446  
Mirror Group Newspapers  
Holborn Circus  
London EC1 1DQ  

21st September 1987

Dear Mr Foot

**Reference John Colin Wallace**

On the 9th September 1987 Mr Wallace undertook Polygraph Examinations concerning various documents which he had in his possession, and events which took place at different times over the past fifteen years.

A Lafayette Polygraph instrument was used to carry out tests utilising the Backster Zone of Comparison Technique.

Mr Wallace has a tape recording of the questions and answers which were measured by the Polygraph, and I am pleased to confirm that his responses were truthful.

Yours sincerely,

Jeremy G Barrett  
Managing Director
Transcript of tape recording made during polygraph test. 9th September 1987

Colin WALLACE being polygraphed

Please keep absolutely still until I tell you that the test is over. Do not move at. all. Keep your feet flat on the ground and keep your arms still.

Answer each question, "Yes" or "No" - nothing more. If you don't wish to answer you need not because your body will give all the answers that the instrument requires.

So, your test is going to start now...

Question 1. Do most people call you Colin?
Answer. Yes

Question 2. Is today Wednesday, 9th September 1987?
Answer. Yes

Question 3. Are we in London?
Answer. Yes

Question 4. Is your full name John Colin WALLACE?
Answer. Yes

Question 5. Are you satisfied that I will ask you only those questions which we have discussed?
Answer. Yes

Question 6. Are you concerned that I may ask you any other questions on this test?
Answer. No

Question 7. Whilst serving as a Ulster Defence Regiment officer, were you ever asked to undertake security work in Northern Ireland by a senior M15 officer?
Answer. Yes

End of page 1
Question 8. Did you handwrite notes on lined pages numbered 119 - 152 referring to Dick VAYGAUSKAS and the vulnerabilities of various Westminster MPs?
Answer. Yes

Question 9. Did you amend or add anything to those notes between 1974 and November 1986?
Answer. No

Question 10. Did you prior to 1977 write this document, 'A', headed 'Ulster - A State of Subversion'?
Answer. Yes

Question 11. Did you prior to 1977 write this document, 'B', headed 'The Red Hand in Ireland'?
Answer. Yes

Question 12. Did you prepare this document, 'C', headed 'Background Notes' for Blackheath solicitor Graham Dodd?
Answer. Yes

Question 1. Did you cause in 1974 someone in Army Headquarters Northern Ireland to type this document, 'D', headed 'Tara' - Reports on criminal offences associated with the homosexual community in Belfast.
Answer. Yes

Question 14. Did you cause in 1974 a member of MI5 to type a 67-page document headed 'Clockwork Orange'.
Answer. Yes

Question 15. Is this document, 'E'; headed 'Clockwork Orange' a part of that 67-page document?
Answer. Yes

Question 16. Did you in 1977 have in your possession this document, 'F', headed 'Staff Sergeant Bernard DEARSLEY'?
Answer. Yes

Question 17. Did you in 1974 have in your possession this document, 'G' headed 'Economics - Master or Servant of Mankind'?
Answer. Yes

End of page 2
Question 18. Were you involved in any way in the creation of the 'Ulster Citizen Army'?
Answer. No.

Question 19. Did you ever in company with Keith Hamilton meet with the alleged commander of the UCA?
Answer. No.

That is the end of the test. Please keep still

End of the first test
Appendix 4 (Wallace to HIAI 23 Feb 2017)

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS
NORTH WEST DISTRICT

Cliff Crook Esq
The Institution of Professional Civil Servants
Northumberland Avenue
London
WC2H 9ZS

Date 29 September 1975

Dear Cliff,

Thank you very much for your letter of 26 September regarding the Appeal hearing on 6 October.

I am concerned that we have still not received a reply to my letter of 2 July to John Groves requesting access to the various documents listed. You will recall that when I had a brief interview with him on 22 February to seek guidance on what information I could give to the RUC about my work on psychological operations, he said that I should confine my comments to justifiable activities directed at the PIRA and not at loyalists. My concern now is that there may be an attempt by the Ministry to deny any form of official "dirty tricks" organisation existed within the Security Forces. For example, in the Ministry's summary of my oral representations made to John Groves and Mr Fairbairn on 10 May reference is made in paragraph 5 to "actions" which I was asked to launch during the UWC strike. The word "actions" appears to have been used by RUC to conceal the fact that I referred to the attempts made by the Security Service to discredit various Loyalist politicians, including the [redacted], by the use of forged documents and by linking the RUC with Loyalist paramilitary figures involved in homosexual prostitution at a children's home in Belfast. I can fully understand why the Ministry would not want to put such information on record, but I wonder if evidence of that nature will be made available to the Board sub committee. For example, will the Board have access to the statement I gave to [redacted]? 

The letter which I received from the Civil Service Board dated 10 July says: "Until we have seen the Department's case it is not possible for the Appeal Board to ask the Department to produce evidence that may or may not be relevant to your case". I assume the Appeal Board has now seen the Department's case and should therefore be in a position to ask for the relevant documents.

Other points for consideration:

- The Security Service officer who typed the anti-dixon draft is [redacted] She can be contacted on the Lisburn Military number

CONFIDENTIAL
Tests back MI5 dirty tricks plot 'allegations

by DAVID LEIGH and PAUL LASHMAR

MI5's disinformation schemes in Britain, including the 1974 'Wilson plot', have been condemned in a forensic breakthrough by international documents expert, Dr Julian Grant.

Dr Grant, the man who exposed the forged 'Hitler Diaries', has succeeded in a three-month investigation commissioned by The Observer, in verifying key documents claimed to be written by the Belize intelligence officer, Colin Wallace.

The Observer's find was the first independent confirmation of the conclusions by another MI5 dossier, that MI5 director Sir Pere Wright was in his several accounts that MI5 nemesis political right-wingers campaigned against Labour in 1974.

We asked Dr Grant to show whether the documents were forgeries. He concurred: 'I consider that the balance of probability favours the authentic origin of the writings attributed to 1974.'

As a result, we can now demonstrate the extraordinary role of subversives, leaks and disinformation that were set into the Labour-Press independence in 1972 and 1974, mainly aimed at the incoming Labour government of Harold Wilson.

These include:

- A hoax letter from the Observer's Then Secretary, Sir Pere Wright, which was being invented by Wallis
- A bizarre speech by a Tory spokesman, the late Arun Neave, about links between the IRA and left-wing MPs, the contents of which were also invented by Wallis
- The leak by Wilson of a plan to introduce 'community police' in Ulster, which deliberately thwarted then Northern Ireland Secretary, Merlyn Rees.
- The leak by Wallis of false MI5 files that Wilson and his colleagues were of Communist control.
- A building, subterfuge, within Northern Irish civil, which Wallis was serving as an Army public relations officer when the Irish troubles escalated in 1970. In rapid succession, he became a police at Army HQ, arsenals, with black munitions, and, as a newspaper, was secretly tracked by an embezzled Defence Ministry, and sold, a few years in jail, convicted of killing his girlfriend's husband.

Because of the escalation of the Ireland conflict, various secret service teams moved to Belfast in the 1970s. Some have been little ministerial control. Groups included Army intelligence, the SAS, MI5, MI6, and IRD secret propaganda unit. Wallis flourished as the well-informed local man. He was promoted and given a secret job description. (This has been confirmed by Peter Broderick, then head of information, and by former colleagues we have interviewed.)

He first used his power to plant stories in the media to persuade the public of non-existent Communist links with the Provisional IRA.

His finest hour came with the front page of the Times of 10 December 1972. This accompanied a grainy intelligence photograph of a Russian submarine, said to be off the island of Ireland, with the headline 'Russia in IRA plot.' Unnamed 'intelligence agents' were said to have revealed a complex plot to turn Ireland into a Kremiel-controlled Cuban-style republic.

On 23 July 1975, Wallis was behind a forested killer - more than a dozen handwritten documents from a letter-writing to TV producers who are giving him an increasingly respectful audience.

In a considerable feat, Dr Grant has managed to demonstrate that Wallis's paper and ink were, in fact, manufactured before 1976. By examining the woodpulp fibers, and the starch and the additives used, he found that the paper is characteristic of 1975-76 manufacture. The paper has some peculiar features of the period, based on the level of re-cycled paper on the mill.

But Dr Grant was not satisfied: 'This does not entirely exclude the possibility that some might somewhere have been made this kind of paper after 1974.'

His breakthrough was to use 'thin layer chromatography' of a pinhead-sized spec of the ink. He proved it had exactly the same components - a mixture of different dye as washable quilt made by Peter Finn in the early 1970s. In 1976, the Wink formula was changed to include mauve and pink dyes.

Wallis's secret 'psychological warfare' eventually went too far. The Army later claimed, in Desmond Ham- Illy's history of the Army in Ulster: 'He was promulgating a sort of disinformation policy of his own.' Waller means he was made a spokesman for disloyal MI5 officers who gave him orders.

Wallis was asked for giving a journalist an MI5 document. Later contact with Wallis was Arun Neave, who had a few links with MI6. Letters we have seen show that Neave immediately made an idiosyncratic speech, on 6 August 1976, on 'these evil aliens.' The Left and the IRA. The material was quickly from Wallis's disinformation notes.

In 1981, Wallis was convicted of manslaughter in Avondale, Sussex. Working as a publicist officer for the local council, he attempted to begin an affair with his assistant. After a tense meeting with her husband, his body was later found in a river.

Wallis says he is innocent. His strange history makes it a difficult witness to believe. But notes, at least, of what he says, have now proved to be true.
About a week later, they contacted me to tell me that Chief Constable Bunyard had come under pressure from MI5 not to take up my case. In response, he asked for someone from the Security Service to come down and talk to me personally. If this was not done, he would pass my material onto the RUC, where it should have gone in the first place, since the offences took place in their area.

In fact, no one from MI5 came to see me, and Bunyard could get no assurance that anyone would. As a result, he processed my complaints to the RUC. For the first time, and when I least expected it, someone was acting honourably on my behalf. But how far the RUC would be prepared to take matters I could only wonder.

What seemed like a strange coincidence happened then. In the previous year, Sir George Terry of the Sussex Police had headed an investigation into the Kincora Boy's Home, and the scandals surrounding it. I had known little about it at the time. My only connection with Kincora when I was in Ireland was a reference I had made in my police notebooks about rumours circulating that several leading Protestant politicians were using it for homosexual practices. Shortly after I had last spoken with Essex police I was visited by a Captain in the Royal Military Police Special Investigation Branch. Naturally, I thought he had come about my case so I invited him in. I began to burble on about it, when he stopped me and told me it was the Kincora Boys' Home he wanted to talk about—did I have any relevant information? I was taken aback by this, but I ferreted through my notebooks and showed him what I had written. Then I returned to the subject of my case.

I played the Captain the tape Bunny Dearsley had left me when he quit the province, which made reference to corruption within the RUC while speaking about the sources he was handing over. My visitor repeated that his brief was on Kincora, but that he was very intrigued and would return again with a policeman. When he came back, he was accompanied by an Inspector of the RUC. He too had been involved in the Kincora inquiry the year before. But that was not why he came to visit me now. I find it interesting that whenever Sir George Terry is questioned on the matter, he says that there was never any link between the security forces and the homosexual vice ring centered around Kincora. Yet I was visited by two officers, both of whom were involved in investigating Kincora, quizzing me what I knew about it, at the same time as they were looking into my allegations of dirty tricks.

The connections between those people who were involved in Kincora and those who subsequently dealt with me became even more apparent as the months went on. Once the RUC had officially received my complaints from Essex police and were forced to address them, they selected a team to talk to me. What I didn't know at the time was that these same three men were visiting Colin Wallace in Lewes Prison to investigate a completely different set of allegations which nonetheless dovetailed with mine. Had I known about them, the whole process of investigation could have been stepped up a gear, as it was later—though not by the authorities themselves.

As it was, I continued to feel isolated and frustrated, and began to suspect that the RUC team were simply milking me for everything I knew, without doing a thing about my allegations. They would make remarks like, 'Fred, you don't really want to prove this do you?' or 'He believed in what he was doing at the time'. One by one, they were trying to make me drop the charges I had made. After eighteen months of getting nowhere both the Essex police and I had little confidence left in the effectiveness of the RUC inquiry.

Not long after the team had first come to see me, they had taken me over to Ulster, and installed me at RUC HQ Knock for a week, so that they could debrief me at leisure. I cooperated fully with them. But once I had done this they made sure that all the loose ends I had unravelled were firmly tied up, and all the witnesses told to keep their mouths shut. Far more sinister than this was the fact uncovered by journalists that MI5 itself stepped in to make sure that anything the inquiry might turn up be conveniently overlooked. Bernard Sheldon, (referred to in Parliament as Bernard 'X') was MI5's legal advisor and reported to the Security Service Director General Sir John Jones. Sheldon approached the MOD at this time to ask for their assistance in having the RUC investigation blocked, if such became necessary. The Ministry had claimed to set up their own inquiry into the dirty tricks campaign, which if they were telling the truth produced no public results whatever. But they were reluctant to cooperate with Sheldon and MI5. Sheldon then went directly to the Northern Ireland Office, which ordered Sir Jack Hermon to make sure that any investigation was curtailed, in the interests of the safety of agents still at work in Ulster, an entirely spurious reason. I also learned that Clive Ponting, as a legal officer from MOD attended a meeting at Whitehall where it was generally conceded that my allegations were true and steps to prevent the press taking up the case were discussed. The meeting was chaired by Mr Tony Stephens, who had been the Director of the Army Legal Services when I tried to fight my case in the Army. Between them, the RUC, the Army, MI5 and its political masters, made sure that none of my allegations was addressed in the normal manner. I had got my so-called 'inquiry'—and little good it had done.

There were some of those in the Essex police who saw what was happening, and who shared my view on the whole business. One night, during the course of this charade, a small number came to my house, and told me they thought I was being hoodwinked. They were not able to approach me officially, but they had come privately to suggest that I go to see one of two journalists, and have the thing blown wide open. The first was a man called Chris Ryder, and the other Duncan Campbell. They recommended the latter, since, whenever the Essex police were sent on certain courses, Campbell was always portrayed as a dangerous left-wing journalist, who was prepared to uncover corrup-
tion without fear of the consequences. They left me with this advice.

I wrote two letters the following day. I can only be grateful that Chris Ryder was away at the time. For various reasons I don't think anything would have come from working with him, but Duncan Campbell replied immediately and arranged for us to meet.

As soon as I got the chance to tell him my story, he told me that it fitted with a lot of things he had already learned from other sources. As a result, he was personally prepared to undertake an in-depth investigation that would put the sham efforts of the RUC in a real perspective. I can't say that I was happy to have to resort to this kind of tactic, but I had exhausted all the official channels by now. The only course available to me was to carry out the threat I had made before I went to Rhodesia: that unless the authorities dealt with my case, I would have gone to the Press. In Duncan Campbell I had found someone who would have no qualms about making that threat effective. It was an uneasy alliance, politically, but it was one of the best I had ever had.

Duncan duly went across to Ulster, and started asking questions. In spite of warnings from the authorities many witnesses did come forward. Not only was he able to substantiate what I told him, he unearthed a large new area of evidence on other offences carried out at the same time.

In February 1984, while working on my allegations, Duncan was knocked off his bicycle while riding through central London. He was taken to hospital with head wounds. Documents from his panniers were seized under the Official Secrets Act and his home was raided while he lay in his hospital bed. I found this an extraordinary coincidence.

The three main articles based on my material were published in the New Statesman in the spring of that year. To coincide with their publication, a documentary television programme was broadcast by Diverse Reports on Channel 4. The propaganda machine went quickly into work on this side of the Irish Sea, and once the results of the RUC inquiry were made known (which concluded there was insufficient evidence to warrant initiation of criminal proceedings against any person), I realised that now, more than ever, I should have to hold firm to my conviction that I was doing the right thing, and not lose sight of my original motives. The fight went on.

It did so chiefly on two fronts. The first, and ultimately less productive, concerned the reaction in the Republic of Ireland to the Diverse Reports programme and the articles themselves. The Irish Ambassador to Britain, Noel Dorr, declared 'it is simply not acceptable that there should be security forces of any other state operating within our jurisdiction'. In Dublin itself, an internal Garda inquiry was set in motion into my allegations about cross-border activity in particular. The committee comprised Dan Murphy, Hubert Reynolds, and Jack Hennessy. I was never called to give evidence before it. Nothing was made public. In effect it died a death, but it showed at least that now I had resorted to the media, people on both sides of the water would be forced to make public gestures of concern, even if that was all they were. Quite why the Garda inquiry of 1984 met such a fate, I can only surmise. But certainly, the Badger was capable of implicating very senior officers. It would hardly have been in their interests to be seen working with the British in such an underhand manner.

More importantly, was the effect of the New Statesman articles had on a particular prisoner serving a ten year jail sentence for manslaughter in Lewes Prison, Sussex. The magazine received a letter which in the normal course of events would have been treated like so many others that were received at that time and banished to the 'nutter' file, if Duncan Campbell had not chanced to read it to me on one of my visits to the offices. As soon as I heard what Colin Wallace had to say, I realised he knew what he was talking about. He had been working for the Army's 'psy-ops' unit throughout the time I had been serving in Ireland, and wrote that he too had a welter of information on what was being done in Ulster by the security forces and the Intelligence agencies. I decided at once to go to visit him, to hear his story, and find out just what he was doing serving such a long sentence at Her Majesty's pleasure.

Within half an hour of our meeting, both Colin and I realised that the three RUC men who had been visiting both of us during the course of their inquiry, without telling either of the other's existence, had been involved in a cover up. It was not simply the details of my case but the whole issue of Kincora, and the connections with the Government and the security forces. The police - Uncle Tom Cobley and all! More than that, it was how the dirty tricks in Ulster connected with the activities of the Far Right in this country - how sections of MI6 were at the centre of an extraordinary abuse of power and disregard for the law. If I had been confused until now about just how I had become a victim of what went on in the province, Colin Wallace cleared my mind. So many things fell into place that I wondered how I had not seen them as they were before. Like Duncan Campbell, he was able to complement what I knew, and set it in the wider political context.

On that first meeting, Colin Wallace was also able to remind me that we had, in fact, come across one another once before. He asked me if I remembered a man in a UDR uniform who had come into Major Keith Farnes' office at HQNI, one day when we were holding a meeting - somewhat younger looking, inevitably, but recognisable nevertheless. Once he had mentioned it, I did recall seeing him, since I had taken the uniform at face value, and clammed up. We didn't trust the UDR. Farnes had told me not to worry, Wallace was 'one of us'. Now I was sitting with him in prison, discussing how we had both been 'shafted', and how we could best pool our resources to continue to fight back.
In the summer of 1974, a special RUC inquiry investigated Kincora "housefather" William McGrath, his homosexual activities and his extremist associates. The Hughes report says that "these original documents had not been in the possession of the Terry Inquiry investigators".

After McGrath and two other Kincora staff were jailed late in 1981, senior Ministry of Defence officials became alarmed about the activities of a former Ministry official, Colin Wallace. Wallace had been an employee of the Army's 'Psyops' (psychological operations) unit in Northern Ireland until 1975. He then left the civil service.

Wallace knew a lot about Kincora, having frequently briefed journalists at the time about McGrath and his paramilitary organisation called Tara. But in 1981, Wallace too was imprisoned at Lewes, Sussex, for 10 years for manslaughter of an antique dealer. About the same time a secret memorandum went to Defence Ministry Permanent Under Secretary Sir Frank Cooper, warning him that Wallace had both the information and the motive to reveal the story behind Kincora.

Bizarrely, the Sussex police team which was then appointed to investigate Kincora for the RUC comprised the same officers who had investigated the manslaughter case against Wallace. Wallace claims his conviction was a frame-up.

So, the information expressed to Sir Frank Cooper were well founded. With the aid of his wife, a former Secret Intelligence Service employee, Wallace has widely circulated a series of internal Army documents and summaries, including examples of propaganda about Kincora and other matters prepared by his unit.

Wallace's most important document, which was seen by the Hughes inquiry, is a four-page Northern Ireland Army Headquarters memorandum dated 8 November 1974. He referred to the army as "a recruitment agency for the Fascist organisations and its nationalist sister organisations in the area".

The Hughes inquiry scrupulously avoided finding out whether Wallace's document was genuine - the omission Archer (psychological operations) unit in Northern Ireland at the time was well founded. They merely report that an RUC enquiry "did not establish its authenticity". Similarly, a forensic report on Wallace's document was "inconclusive as to authenticity". The Hughes inquiry team did not ask the Defence Ministry itself, or the Army, or Wallace about the documents. Only Secretary Sir Frank Cooper was asked to comment, and the Hughes report says that "he was told that the Tara organisation was not a real security threat - implying that McGrath had indeed come under intelligence control long before 1974".

Late in 1984, Holroyd assisted Wallace to send this and other papers to the Prime Minister. The original documents have never come back. Photocopies were found, and a copy was substituted, and pencil markings on them show whoever made them was attentive to publicity that might affect the intelligence services. But both the Ministry of Defence and the Northern Ireland Office deny making, or even knowing about, the substitution.

The Hughes inquiry stresses that merely because McGrath's homosexuality was known to the Army, they did not necessarily know about Kincora. This is nonsensical. It is inconceivable that the intelligence services would not know where McGrath was a high priority intelligence target - was employed, or fail to draw the relevant conclusion.

It is also provably untrue because entries in intelligence notebooks kept during 1974 by former MI5 Intelligence Officer Captain Fred Holroyd (NS, 4 May, 1984) refer to the Kincora hostel by name, and say of leading Protestant politicians that they are 'all queers'. Although this is nothing more than gossip, it does show that Army and RUC intelligence officers had had no difficulty coupling information about McGrath and organisations extremists to the Kincora hostel.

Holroyd also says that, while being trained for his Northern Ireland duties, he was told that the Tara organisation was in effect controlled by British intelligence, and was not a real security threat - implying that McGrath had indeed come under intelligence control long before 1974.

Last week, BAC director Major General Chris Popham told the New Standards that he too had been a target of the Moonies. He became suspicious when he learnt that the conference was not being attended by senior NATO figures. But they admitted they were funded by the Moonies, otherwise known as the Unification Church.

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Appendix 6 (Wallace to HIAI 23 Feb 2017)
Appendix 8 (Wallace to HIAI 23 Feb 1970)

Kincora scandal cover-up alleged

by Barrie Penrose

THREE former Ministry of Defence officials have provided new evidence of a British intelligence cover-up of a homosexual scandal used to entrap Loyalist politicians in Ulster.

The men support one of the key allegations made by Colin Wallace, the former MoD information officer who claims he is the victim of "dirty tricks" by MI5 because he tried to expose the use of "black propaganda" against British politicians.

They said that classified MoD files about homosexual abuses at the Kincora boys' home in Belfast were withheld from government and police inquiries into the scandal.

The two inquiries, by Sir George Terry, former chief constable of Sussex, and Judge William Hughes, examined allegations that the intelligence services used their knowledge of criminal activities at the boys' home to blackmail and control prominent Loyalists.

Tom King, the defence secretary, told the Commons 11 days ago that no information had been found to substantiate Wallace's allegations of a cover-up relating to Kincora.

King also said there was nothing to call into question "the thoroughness of the major inquiries already made."

Taylor saw detailed documents

Four other senior army officers also added their initials to the papers.

Wallace says that while senior army officers wanted the Kincora scandal to be stopped, MI5 wanted the intelligence gathering operation to continue.

"The army were telling me to release details about Kincora to the press and MI5 were telling me to use Kincora to discredit Ulster political leaders like Ian Paisley," he said.

"MI5 wanted to break the power base which the Loyalist paramilitaries and Paisley had got after the Ulster workers' strike in 1974."

In 1983, Sir George Terry concluded there was no evidence of homosexual mispractice or involvement by British intelligence officials in the Kincora scandal.

Yesterday Terry said: "I'm sure that in the light of all that is now being said, any inquiry that can look at everything would be a very wise step."

William Hughes, a retired English judge who also headed an official inquiry into Kincora, said that a government file which Downing Street authorised in 1985 to be passed to Hughes, failed to reach the judge and his committee.

"Although they were sent by Number 10, they were not given to me," said Hughes.

Taylor's backing of Wallace's claims is confirmed by James Miller, a former MI5 agent in Northern Ireland in the 1970s.

He also says Kincora was used to entrap men who would be blackmailed into providing information.

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The information was detailed enough (in 1973) to name the boys and name the people who were committing the offences," said Taylor.

Taylor also said there was nothing to call into question "the thoroughness of the major inquiries already made."

Peter Broderick, another former MoD official, says he read the Wallace documents at the time and initialed them.

Wallace said that while senior army officers wanted the Kincora scandal to be stopped, MI5 wanted the intelligence gathering operation to continue.

"The army were telling me to release details about Kincora to the press and MI5 were telling me to use Kincora to discredit Ulster political leaders like Ian Paisley," he said.

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He also says Kincora was used to entrap men who would be blackmailed into providing information.

Miller says his first task for the intelligence services was to spy on McGrath.

"My MI5 case officer, Brian Dixon, who has since died, later told me to leave McGrath to them and I understand they used the information to recruit him as an informer," said Miller.
At its meeting today the Committee considered in detail your letter of 30 November answering the Committee's 31 October requests for information relating to the case of Mr Colin Wallace.

In response to the paragraph headed "Clockwork Orange", which was in response to Question 2 of the Committee’s 30 October questions, and Question 1 on the attachment to the letter of 14 February, the Committee would wish to make a further attempt to clarify the phrase in the Secretary of State’s letter of 2 February to Mr Livingstone (M0 19/3/19L) deposited in the Library of the House which reads:

"The initial examination of this material began in the early part of 1989..."

The Committee now understands that the material referred to included the General Staff Secretariat file on which the reference to Clockwork Orange was first found. But it is still not clear how the reference to initial examination "in the early part of 1989" relates to Mr Heyhoe's reference to work being undertaken in response to points raised by Mr Dalyell on 8 June.

In response to the paragraph headed "General Requests", the Committee would wish to be provided with a copy of the two following documents, with the principal references to them in Mr Heyhoe’s Report shown in brackets:

A. The original paper identified in July 1989, containing a reference to Clockwork Orange, and described by the Secretary of State on 1 February, HC Deb, col 467, as "a background paper seeking to justify expenditure on a further information officer in Northern Ireland Headquarters": [Heyhoe 1, 9 &c].

/cont...
B. The "source document" in 2 PUS folders, of which A was an extract, containing information on Mr Wallace's job description and a reference to Clockwork Orange, stating that the project was not cleared [Heyhoe 1, 3, 9].

As I mentioned in my letter of 14 February and as referred to in Question 1 as forwarded on 31 October, the Committee remains happy that the papers should be provided if necessary under the usual conditions governing the Committee's access to classified papers.

4. The Committee would like to be able to consider the response to this letter at its meeting on 6 February, so that I would be grateful to have it by noon on 4 February.

David Natzler
Clerk of the Committee

Miss S J Ambler-Edwards
Private Secretary to the Secretary of State
Room 6164
Ministry of Defence
Main Building
Whitehall SW1
Thank you for your further letter of 12th December last seeking clarification on several points arising from ours of 30th November about Mr Colin Wallace.

As regards your first question, the examination of papers beginning in the early part of 1989 reflected the need both to deal with inquiries about Mr Wallace’s case and to familiarise new staff with it. It was a continuing process, and the reference to "Clockwork Orange" was found in July 1989.

As regards the particular papers referred to in your third paragraph, these are internal papers and moreover include sensitive material relating to security and intelligence matters lying outside the Committee’s inquiry. The provision of such papers, even under the conditions relating to the Committee’s access to classified information, would be inconsistent with the conventions. The Parliamentary reply of 30th January by the Minister of State for the Armed Forces included all the information which, in the Government’s view, is necessary for a proper understanding of the issues. If, however, the Select Committee would provide a fuller statement of what information they are seeking through access to this material, the Government would be glad to consider further whether they can provide the Committee with such information.

Yours very truly,

W C Clark
Private Secretary

David Natzler Esq
Clerk to the Defence Committee