Islamophobia in Europe:
How governments are enabling the far-right ‘counter-jihad’ movement

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Public Interest Investigations (Pii) is an independent non-profit making organisation. Founded in 2004, Pii promotes greater understanding of the role of PR, propaganda and lobbying and of the power networks that they support, through its website Spinwatch (www.spinwatch.org) and its investigative wiki site Powerbase (www.powerbase.info). Spinwatch is a founder member of the Alliance for Lobbying Transparency and Ethics Regulation in the EU (ALTER-EU) and the Alliance for Lobbying Transparency UK (ALT-UK).

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Acknowledgements

The research for this report and related profiles on our investigative wiki website Powerbase.info was made possible by the generosity of the Open Society Foundations, Isvara Foundation, Islam Expo and general fundraising. We thank OSF for their patient support.

We would also like to thank Liz Fekete of the Institute of Race Relations (IRR) for valuable advice; Yasser Louatti, formerly of the Collectif Contre l’Islamophobie en France for his insights on France; Jawaab and MEND; Clementine Boucher for help with Powerbase profiles and who along with Riccardo Boscherini helped us trawl thousands of pages of US non-profit tax filings. Thanks also to PII colleagues and freelance associates Tom Griffin, Andy Rowell, Sarah Marusek, Tom Mills, Narzanin Massourni, Will Dinan, Eveline Lubbers and Tamasin Cave.


Editorial: Melissa Jones

Printed and bound in the UK.

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Executive summary

Chapter 1: Introduction

This report begins by defining Islamophobia and explaining why it should be understood as a form of racism. Unlike most other forms of racism in Europe today, Islamophobia has been institutionalised by government policies to varying extents in different countries. It has been rejuvenated by the ‘war on terror’, rendering Muslims an officially ‘suspect community’. Therefore, rather than examining the counter-jihad movement in isolation as most prior research has done, this report looks at its activities in relation to official counter-extremism policies. It does this because we are concerned with Islamophobia in general as opposed to the far-right per se.

The introduction briefly outlines the contents of each chapter that follows. Critically, it explains why each of the three country case studies examines counter-extremism policies first and then the counter-jihad movement in each national context. This structure serves to highlight the ways in which counter-jihad and counter-extremism actors legitimise each other.

Chapter 2: Understanding the counter-jihad movement

Chapter 2 provides an overview of the counter-jihad movement, beginning with an explanation of how – as its name suggests – it takes its cue from the ‘war on terror’. It emerged and began to coalesce after 9/11 especially in the USA and in north western Europe, where this report focuses. Reflecting a broader shift on the far-right away from ‘old’ anti-Semitism and towards Islamophobia, the counter-jihad movement can be seen as a ‘new’ form of racism – one that speaks in the language of ‘Western values’ and uses counter-extremism rhetoric as a cover for targeting Muslims.

Central to demonising Islam has been the invention of the concept of ‘Islamofascism’, through which far-right counter-jihad actors have perversely likened themselves to those who resisted the Nazis. We consider how this inversion may have been facilitated by the onset of ahistorical ‘counter-extremism’ frameworks which tend to equate far-left and far-right.

Counter-jihadists and the far-right more generally are willing and able to work through the state, rather than against it, which helps to explain why they are viewed as a public order problem rather than a strategic threat. Yet the elite support of the counter-jihad movement and the extent to which Islamophobic parties are winning political power is nonetheless extremely dangerous for minorities and for democracy – though key actors may use legitimate means such as the ballot box.

Both at the grassroots and elite level, the counter-jihad movement is organising across borders. One of its main rallying cries has been ‘free speech’, garnering it sympathy from the wider anti-‘political correctness’ lobby. Our analysis shows that US funding is extremely important to the European counter-jihad movement.

Chapter 3: United Kingdom

The first country case study begins by examining the UK government’s counter-extremism policy, Prevent. Even though the government’s definition of extremism does not single out one group, it has created a climate of suspicion and mistrust in which Muslims have been disproportionately targeted. Official efforts to mobilise public sector workers to spot supposed signs of ‘radicalisation’ has advanced a climate in which the Islamophobic paranoia of the counter-jihad movement has flourished. We examine parallels between the counter-jihad movement in the UK and state counter-extremism practices, noting that much of the language used – and several of the targets – closely overlap.

Looking carefully at interactions between counter-extremism and the counter-jihad movement, we note that while key figures like Stephen Yaxley-Lennon (aka Tommy Robinson) have sought to ‘go mainstream’, others – such as Lord Pearson, Gerard Batten and Baroness Cox – already hold positions within the political elite. This has helped counter-jihadists in the UK – especially those who frame their targeting of Muslims as ‘counter-extremism’, since it appears to provide a ‘legitimate’ cover for their racism. Key actors including Sharia Watch, Stand for Peace and Stephen Yaxley-
Lennon are examined. The latter epitomises the links between counter-extremism and counter-jihadism since in between his far-right organising with the English Defence League (EDL) and PEGIDA UK he was briefly offered a public platform and financial support by the formerly state-funded Quilliam Foundation. While the UK government has taken some very limited steps to counter Islamophobia, overall the state appears to be complacent about the counter-jihad movement. It does not classify groups like the EDL as ‘far-right’ and – despite the growing severity of Islamophobic violence – counter-extremism efforts remain overwhelmingly focused on policing rather than protecting Muslim communities.

Chapter 4: Germany

In Chapter 4 we note that greater emphasis is placed on tackling ‘right-wing extremism’ in Germany than in the UK or France. However, this is still very limited and is overwhelmingly focused on the ‘traditional’ neo-Nazi far-right and less so on the counter-jihad movement. Moreover, efforts to counter ‘Islamist’ terrorism – viewed as the greatest threat the country faces – display the same tendencies towards placing collective blame on Muslim communities as seen in the UK and France. Segments of the far-right in Germany have responded to the social unacceptability of anti-Semitism by turning towards Islamophobia and hostility towards migrants, both of which have fed the alarming electoral rise of the political party Alternative für Deutschland.

As seen in the UK, several counter-jihad groups in Germany frame their actions as ‘counter-extremism’. PEGIDA does so implicitly, while Bürgerbewegung Pax Europa and the Stresemann Stiftung do so explicitly, raising serious questions about why counter-extremism frameworks so often prove amenable to exploitation by the Islamophobic far-right. Meanwhile, the circulation of counter-jihad ideas in the mainstream – among some intellectuals and certain politicians – suggests that these actors (sometimes dubbed ‘Nazis in pinstripes’) enjoy a veneer of respectability which may make them all the more dangerous in the long run.

Chapter 5: France

The final country case study looks at France, first providing an overview of counter-terrorism measures that have intensified greatly following a number of attacks since 2015. It notes that increased efforts to counter ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ – such as the Stop Djihadisme campaign – have discriminated against Muslims. While these projects may not be helping to prevent terrorism, we argue that they have assisted the rise of far-right. Though we did not find counter-jihad groups in France borrowing the rhetoric of counter-extremism as much as in the UK and Germany, explicit Islamophobia, targeting of mosques and the weaponisation of laïcité, the French concept of secularism, have all become thoroughly mainstream.

The idea of Islamophobia as ‘free speech’ is particularly pronounced in France and counter-jihad ideas and tropes appear most deeply entrenched within intellectual circles and the political elite – the most notable example being former prime minister Manuel Valls’ usage of the term ‘Islamofascism’. The far-right Front National party has adopted the Islamophobia of the counter-jihad movement and claims to have abandoned its old anti-Semitism. It has undoubtedly been the biggest winner from the climate of Islamophobia fostered by both counter-extremism policies and the counter-jihad movement. Although the domestic security services have belatedly begun to realise the threat posed by the far-right, official counter-extremism measures form part of an increasingly authoritarian government approach which has included the imposition of a repressive state of emergency for two years. A continued pre-occupation with the perceived ‘threat’ of Islam potentially opens the backdoor for the rebranded Front National – recently renamed ‘Rassemblement National’ or ‘National Rally’ – and its politics to continue to flourish.

Chapter 6: Counter-jihad funders

In Chapter 6 we examine the importance of American money in sustaining the counter-jihad network in Europe. Our extensive investigation into non-profit tax filings between 2009-16 found that this funding is not only flourishing, but the scale of it is increasingly obscured by the use of
donor-advised funds which allow wealthy elites to mask their chosen controversial causes.

The chapter demonstrates how the US counter-jihad movement has been critical to facilitating flows of ideas, people and money into Europe via its transatlantic network. We discuss the core US activists and groups promoting anti-Muslim hate, their European activities and often inter-related funding relationships, as well as their ties to self-declared ‘counter-extremism’ organisations operating in Europe. Groups examined include the Gatestone Institute, Center for Security Policy, David Horowitz Freedom Center and the Middle East Forum. The latter’s financial backing, for example, of successful legal cases for key anti-Muslim figures such as Dutch MEP Geert Wilders and ex-English Defence League leader Stephen Yaxley-Lennon (Tommy Robinson), as well as the ‘Free Tommy’ protests in London in June and July 2018, illustrates the potent reach of these US backers.

Finally, at the end of this chapter we profile the billionaires and top US charitable foundations funding these groups. Their donations, which include many millions routed anonymously through US donor-advised funds, have proven a lifeline for the counter-jihad movement and underscore the transnational, and particularly transatlantic, nature of Islamophobia funding.

Conclusions and recommendations

Our conclusions suggest that counter-extremism policies which place blame and suspicion on Muslims collectively in the UK, Germany and France, are not only failing to prevent the rise of the counter-jihad strand of the far-right but may in fact be fostering and enabling it. Significant overlaps between government counter-extremism efforts and the targets, symbols and language used by the counter-jihad movement raise cause for concern, as does evidence – from the UK and Germany particularly – that counter-jihad actors are passing themselves off as ‘counter-extremists’ since this provides ‘legitimate’ cover for targeting Muslims. We argue that the French case, and to a lesser extent Germany, illustrate how the far-right thrives in a climate of officially sanctioned suspicion.

Our recommendations for government call for a fundamental re-think of the underlying assumptions of existing counter-extremism policies, given that they are not only failing to prevent political violence but also appear to be fomenting Islamophobia and aiding the far-right. We see anti-racism activists’ best strategy as campaigning against discriminatory government counter-extremism policies, rather than calling on government to be more ‘even-handed’ in their application. Legal strategies directed at the counter-jihad movement could also be pursued. We recommend more in-depth study by researchers of the counter-jihad movement and its relationship to government policies. Meanwhile, the media should treat so-called ‘counter-extremism’ bodies with greater scepticism, and help educate the public about the counter-jihad movement’s hateful anti-Muslim rhetoric and Islamophobic conspiracy theories.
Chapter 1: Introduction

Islamophobia, racism and the ‘war on terror’

The ‘war on terror’ has become deeply entrenched in the security infrastructure and political imagination of European societies. Leaders of the UK and other Western states claim that we face an unprecedented threat from ‘Islamist’ inspired ‘terrorism’. Yet official data shows that the numbers of ‘failed, foiled or successful’ attacks in Europe carried out by ‘Islamists’ has been a consistently tiny minority of all terrorist incidents: less than 1 per cent of all incidents in the years between 2006 and 2014, according to Europol.1 The proportion of attacks attributed to ‘Islamists’ increased to 8%, 9% and 16% of attacks in the EU in the years 2015-2017 respectively, though, as can be seen, this remains a small proportion of all attacks. It is clear though that in recent years the number of casualties attributable to these attacks has outstripped those caused by other kinds of ‘terror’ attacks. On the other hand, this is in a context where the numbers of civilians killed in western Europe by non-state terrorists has dramatically reduced since the 1970s and 1980s, while at a more international level the number of civilian deaths as a result of ‘terrorism’ has increased dramatically in recent years (after 2005 and surging from 2012-13).2 Nevertheless, Western leaders continue to insist that the threat from ‘Islamists’ is a generation-defining challenge and the media amplify these claims.

Despite, or perhaps because of the implausibility of these claims, counter-terrorism strategies have increasingly focused not on active or genuine plots to cause violence but on the potential for possible future plots. The belief that certain values, religious practices, beliefs or ideologies indicate a vulnerability to ‘radicalisation’ and may in future lead to violence has seen ‘counter-extremism’ policies and apparatus set up in many countries. There is, however, scant evidence that these practices effectively prevent political violence.3 Instead, a growing body of research suggests they have fostered a deeply Islamophobic climate.4 The net of suspicion has been widened from those engaged in planning

A poster promoting the Swiss ban on minaret construction which was voted for in a referendum in 2009. Source: RYTC/Flickr

“in contrast to most other forms of racism, several governments have, in effect, officially sanctioned Islamophobia”
or executing acts of violence to include the religiously devout, politically active Muslims, and those (whether Muslim or not) expressing criticism of British foreign or domestic policy.

We can point to numerous examples of those caught up in the web of suspicion to illustrate this. For example: the Muslim postgraduate student studying counter-terrorism at university who was interrogated after being spotted reading a book on terrorism in the library; the Muslim schoolboy questioned by police because of his support for Palestinian human rights; the Muslim child of just four-years-old suspected of ‘extremism’ by nursery school staff when he mispronounced the word ‘cucumber’ as ‘cooker bomb’; the environmental, anti-fracking or anti-nuclear campaigners deemed a potential threat. The situation has worsened as major attacks, such as those in France, Belgium and Germany in 2015 and 2016, and the UK and Spain in 2017 are interpreted as ‘proof’ that ‘Islamism’ – or sometimes just Islam – is ‘incompatible’ with ‘European values’ and poses an inherent security threat.

Islamophobia did not suddenly emerge after 9/11. It has a long history. Nevertheless its current manifestations owe much to the interests behind the ‘war on terror’, as opposed to expressing some essential and timeless form of prejudice. Some scholars fear that today Islamophobia may be at tipping point.9 In the US, Donald Trump won the Republican Party’s nomination and then the US presidential election in part by calling for a ban on Muslim immigration. Across the Atlantic, according to scholar Matti Bunzl, Islamophobia ‘threatens to become the defining condition of the new Europe’.10 The rise of Islamophobia in Europe is also linked to deepening anti-immigration sentiment and has been intensified by government responses to the so-called ‘migrant crisis’. ‘Nativist’ movements calling for tighter border controls and strict law and order have flourished on the streets and at ballot boxes across the continent.11 Neatly marrying this xenophobia with Islamophobia, the notion of ‘Islamisation’ has gained widespread traction. Meanwhile, trust in the European Union and mainstream political parties is declining across the continent, a symptom of growing polarisation which appears to have benefited the extreme right, especially those sections of it which have embraced Islamophobia.12

Some of the basic organising concepts central to Islamophobia can be summed up as follows:

- Islam is monolithic and cannot adapt to new realities
- Islam does not share common values with other major faiths
- Islam as a religion is inferior to the West. It is archaic, barbaric, and irrational
- Islam is a religion of violence and supports terrorism
- Islam is a violent political ideology.13

While none of these ideas are new, they have been given new life in the context of the war on terror. Yet despite widespread discrimination, the very existence of Islamophobia is sometimes questioned and even the term itself is intensely debated. Given this, we define it here:

fear, prejudice, hatred or hostility towards Islam or Muslims (real or perceived), perpetuated by stereotypes and resulting in discourse, behaviour or structures that discriminate, marginalise and exclude Muslims from social, economic, cultural, and political life.14

The oft-cited canard that ‘Islam is not a race, therefore Islamophobia is not racism’ rests on a misunderstanding (or wilful ignorance) of what racism is. The concept of ‘racialisation’ reminds us that ‘race’ is itself a social construct. As Nasar Meer and Tariq Modood put it, we should therefore:

guard against the characterization of racism as a form of single ‘inherentism’ or ‘biological determinism’, which leaves little space to conceive the ways in which cultural racism draws on physical appearance as one marker among others but is not solely premised on conceptions of biology in a way that ignores religion, culture and so forth.15

In the case of Islamophobia, particular practices – such as wearing a hijab – can ‘serve as signifiers of who belongs and who does not, in the same way that skin colour does’.16 Though there are important differences between anti-Semitism and Islamophobia, anti-Muslim prejudice has parallels with, and bears comparison to, the history of discrimination which ‘raced’ Jewish people.17
Like other racisms, Islamophobia manifests itself through hate-speech online or at street-level, physical violence targeting visibly Muslim people (or those perceived as such) and acts of vandalism including arson attacks on mosques – waves of which have occurred, for example, in the UK, France and Sweden. Yet in contrast to most other forms of racism, several governments have, in effect, officially sanctioned Islamophobia by passing anti-Islam legislation. For example, Switzerland enforced a minaret ban after a referendum in 2009; Austria implemented laws against foreign funding of mosques and Islamic centres; the French, Belgian, Bulgarian, Austrian, Dutch and German governments have implemented policies against the wearing of full Islamic face veils. Often, Islamophobic policies and practices are justified on tenuous security grounds linked to the war on terror. Such policies and practices of the state – which are a key element in the enactment of discrimination and marginalisation – range from stop-and-search, detention at ports and borders, pre-emptive detention, surveillance and intelligence-gathering, attempts to recruit informers and ‘de-radicalisation’ programmes. These have rendered Muslims an officially ‘suspect community’.

Why study the counter-jihad movement in the context of counter-extremism?

In 2012, academic Arun Kundnani pointed to an important gap in research on extremism. Many scholars, he observed, have asked which ‘counter-narratives’ governments should deploy to effectively undercut jihadist propaganda. Attention has also been paid to the relationship between jihadist messages and right-wing extremism; the notion of ‘cumulative extremism’, which suggests the two may be mutually reinforcing, emerged from these debates. By contrast, Kundnani noted, the third side of this triangle – the interaction between government narratives and the far-right – has rarely been examined. Most counter-extremism analysts have failed to consider which counter-narratives, or indeed counter-practices, might undermine and weaken the far-right. Fewer still have asked whether government counter-terrorism initiatives might be reinforcing the far-right. This report seeks to reduce this deficit by focusing on the neglected but important relationship between the state and a distinct strand of the far-right that specifically targets Muslims and migrants: the ‘counter-jihad’ movement.

After Anders Behring Breivik massacred 77 people in Norway in 2011, analysts began paying more attention to the counter-jihad movement. Breivik’s ‘manifesto’ showed he was steeped in online counter-jihad writings.

“Rather than studying Europe’s counter-jihad movement in isolation, we examine its growth set against the continent’s war on terror”

But while more research on this dangerous phenomenon is welcome – and although this report grew out of research focusing on this far-right current – we argue that examining the counter-jihad movement in a vacuum is analytically and politically inadequate. For the problem we want to address is not the far-right per se but Islamophobia, wherever it occurs. Two things are clear: firstly, grassroots anti-racism campaigners are far more concerned about the state’s role in fomenting Islamophobia than the counter-jihad movement; secondly, there are significant overlaps between the Islamophobia of the far-right and some government narratives and practices.

Rather than studying Europe’s counter-jihad movement in isolation, therefore, we examine its growth set against the continent’s war on terror. This approach contrasts with previous counter-jihad research, most of which scrutinises the movement without contextualising its rise. The result is a narrow account of Islamophobia which risks downplaying the extent of the problem. One example is the 2013 report by the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation at King’s College London, an institute that specialises in ‘radicalisation’ research and has received Home Office funding (perhaps helping to explain its reluctance to criticise the basic tenets of UK government counter-extremism policy). Its treatment of the counter-jihad movement largely relegates Islamophobia – a term not used once in its 68-page report – to a fringe phenomenon. In opposition to such analyses,
we not only acknowledge the damage done by counter-extremism policies themselves but also seek to scrutinise the ways in which – whether inadvertently or not – they may empower the far right.

**Scope and structure of this report**

We cannot tell the whole story of the impact of counter-extremism policies or other factors feeding the far-right (chief among these being anti-immigration policies); nor will we examine left-liberal forms of Islamophobia, neoconservatism or Zionism, overlapping movements we view as comprising three of the ‘five pillars of Islamophobia’. Instead this report focuses on the interaction between the final two pillars: the state (specifically government counter-extremism policies) and the counter-jihad strand of the far-right.

In **Chapter 2** we provide an overview of the counter-jihad movement in Europe – its beliefs, strategies, position within the wider far-right and transnational organising activities. Case studies from three countries – the United Kingdom, Germany and France – follow, in chapters three to five. These were chosen as case studies for several reasons: they are the most populous countries in Europe and have the largest Muslim populations; former and current leaders of all three (Cameron, Merkel and Sarkozy) have famously declared multiculturalism a failure; each has seen notable Islamophobic movements and/or waves of hate crime in recent years; and finally, all three have adopted counter-extremism and counter-radicalisation policies which share significant features in common but also provide interesting points of comparison. All three countries also held critical elections in 2017.

Each case study reviews national counter-extremism policy and then closely examines that country’s counter-jihad groups. This juxtaposition and ordering serves an important purpose. While it is common to speak of the ‘mainstreaming’ of far-right ideas, this preoccupation can obscure the fact that influence is not only one-way. In each case study, we consider instances in which motifs and rhetoric appear to be travelling in the opposite direction, in other words, examples of the counter-jihad movement appropriating elements from official counter-extremism policies and practices. In addition, we examine personnel – and, on occasion, funding flows – which link mainstream counter-extremism actors and counter-jihad activities. In the process, we show how the racialised discourse of counter-extremism has proved amenable to the racist agenda of this section of the far-right.

In **Chapter 6** we examine the movement’s funding sources, especially financial support coming into Europe from the US.

“To gain mainstream respectability, counter-jihadists contrast themselves favourably to neo-Nazi groups whom they dub the ‘real’ far-right”
The changing face of the far-right: extreme anti-extremists

The cultural turn in the war on terror saw a focus on violence give way to a broader assault on ideologies deemed to lead to violence. Governments now speak of ‘terrorist ideologies’ (as opposed to acts) and they emphasise the need to defend liberal ideas variously claimed as ‘British values’ or ‘French values’. Meanwhile, many on the far-right today also choose to focus on values and identity as opposed to ‘race’. One specific strand, the counter-jihad movement, began to galvanise in Europe in 2007 with what would become an annual ‘Counter-jihad conference’, first held in Brussels, and later in Vienna, Copenhagen, Zurich, London and Stockholm.

As a distinct current on the far-right, the counter-jihad movement ‘became visible and vocal after September 11’.

with religiously inspired violence. Counter-jihadists have adapted it to convey additional facets of what Matthias Ehrman calls the ‘green scare’, notably the idea of being threatened with ‘takeover’ by growing Muslim populations – ‘demographic jihad’ – and the notion of insidious Islamic influence in society – ‘stealth jihad’ (but also imaginary phenomena such as ‘rape jihad’, ‘welfare jihad’ and even ‘fecal matter jihad’).

The terminology of ‘demographic jihad’ links the issue of terrorism and generalised anti-Muslim feeling to broader anti-immigration sentiment and rejection of multiculturalism. The myth of ‘Islamisation’, popularised by books like Bat Ye’or’s Eurabia, has a similar purpose.

In this context, movements and organisations like Identity Ireland, Bloc Identitaire in France and the International Center for Western Values...
Public Interest Investigations

In the Netherlands (co-founded by Bat Ye’or) have emerged. Such groups frequently express their missions in terms of an implied or explicit threat from Islam and position themselves as defending liberal values. ICWV, for instance, says it is concerned with “fighting antidemocratic tendencies and ideologies in Europe and elsewhere”. As we will show, other groups like Résistance Républicaine and Bürgerbewegung Pax Europa, in France and Germany respectively, also claim to embody classical European values. But counter-jihad-inspired mass murderer Anders Behring Breivik, too, saw himself as attempting to ‘defend Western freedoms’ – a reminder of the racist, exclusionary and even murderous potential that lies therein.

To gain mainstream respectability, counter-jihadists contrast themselves favourably to neo-Nazi groups whom they dub the ‘real’ far-right, a category from which they exempt themselves. In 2010, for example, a group of far-right politicians associated with the counter-jihad movement, calling themselves the European Freedom Alliance (not to be confused with European Alliance for Freedom, explained later) visited Israel. Part of the purpose of the trip – participated in by leading figures from Belgium’s Vlaams Belang, the Austrian Freedom Party, Germany’s Die Freiheit and the Sweden Democrats – was to demonstrate that they were no longer anti-Semitic. While such claims remain highly dubious, scholars have recognised a clear strategic reorientation by certain elements of the far-right. Some analysts have begun to speak of ‘two fascisms in contemporary Europe’: one ‘old’ form committed to anti-Semitism, and another ‘new’ form – nurtured by the war on terror – fixated on Islam.

As we will show in later chapters, another disturbing tactic of this second current, the counter-jihad movement, is to use the war on terror discourse of ‘countering extremism’ as a cover for targeting Muslims and strengthening their own positions. Elements of official counter-extremism are being borrowed by the far-right from the mainstream, just as far-right ideas can sometimes be traced moving in the other direction. As this exchange occurs, the centre ground of politics is itself moving rightwards in many countries. Since ‘extremism’ is ultimately a relative concept, in these circumstances counter-jihadists – especially those who call themselves ‘anti-extremists’ – may appear less ‘extreme’ or dangerous themselves than they are in reality.

**Inventing ‘Islamofascism’, appropriating anti-fascist history**

Counter-jihadists have made inroads into the mainstream not only by donning suits, holding press conferences, producing glossy reports and contrasting themselves with jack-booted neo-Nazi skinheads. They have also popularised the idea of ‘Islamofascism’ as a label for the enemy they represent themselves as fighting.

Protests in 2007 against a proposed Islamic centre near New York’s Ground Zero, the site of the 2001 attack on the twin towers, included a ‘Rally Against Islamofascism Day’ organised by Christine Brim of the Center for Vigilant Freedom. The term portrayed Islam as a totalitarian political ideology, a classic counter-jihad trope. By 2015 it was being used by then French prime minister Manuel Valls. Implying that the ‘Islamic threat’ facing Europe constitutes a new fascism, this coinage has helped to nurture hyper-sensitivity to perceived dangers posed by Islamist movements. Moreover, the associated implication is that anyone who denies this ‘truth’ is engaging in ‘appeasement’. Thus, anti-racist solidarity from non-Muslim leftists who oppose Islamophobia is demonised as part of a sinister ‘red-green alliance’. Additionally, the term dhimmi is applied to those deemed to have subserviently surrendered to future Islamic rule. Above all, inventing ‘Islamofascism’, like the ostentatious condemnation of traditional far-right anti-Semitism, allows the counter-jihad movement to disguise its own fascistic tendencies.

History is mined for the same purpose. As Chetan Bhatt, a sociologist at the London School of Economics, observes:

> **“Elements of official counterextremism are being borrowed by the far-right from the mainstream, just as far-right ideas can sometimes be traced moving in the other direction”**

Christine Brim of the Center for Vigilant Freedom. The term portrayed Islam as a totalitarian political ideology, a classic counter-jihad trope.

As we will show in later chapters, another disturbing tactic of this second current, the counter-jihad movement, is to use the war on terror discourse of ‘countering extremism’ as a cover for targeting Muslims and strengthening their own positions. Elements of official counter-extremism are being borrowed by the far-right from the mainstream, just as far-right ideas can sometimes be traced moving in the other direction. As this exchange occurs, the centre ground of politics is itself moving rightwards in many countries. Since ‘extremism’ is ultimately a relative concept, in these circumstances counter-jihadists – especially those who call themselves ‘anti-extremists’ – may appear less ‘extreme’ or dangerous themselves than they are in reality.

**Inventing ‘Islamofascism’, appropriating anti-fascist history**

Counter-jihadists have made inroads into the mainstream not only by donning suits, holding press conferences, producing glossy reports and contrasting themselves with jack-booted neo-Nazi skinheads. They have also popularised the idea of ‘Islamofascism’ as a label for the enemy they represent themselves as fighting.

Protests in 2007 against a proposed Islamic centre near New York’s Ground Zero, the site of the 2001 attack on the twin towers, included a ‘Rally Against Islamofascism Day’ organised by Christine Brim of the Center for Vigilant Freedom. The term portrayed Islam as a totalitarian political ideology, a classic counter-jihad trope.

By 2015 it was being used by then French prime minister Manuel Valls. Implying that the ‘Islamic threat’ facing Europe constitutes a new fascism, this coinage has helped to nurture hyper-sensitivity to perceived dangers posed by Islamist movements. Moreover, the associated implication is that anyone who denies this ‘truth’ is engaging in ‘appeasement’. Thus, anti-racist solidarity from non-Muslim leftists who oppose Islamophobia is demonised as part of a sinister ‘red-green alliance’. Additionally, the term dhimmi is applied to those deemed to have subserviently surrendered to future Islamic rule. Above all, inventing ‘Islamofascism’, like the ostentatious condemnation of traditional far-right anti-Semitism, allows the counter-jihad movement to disguise its own fascistic tendencies.

History is mined for the same purpose. As Chetan Bhatt, a sociologist at the London School of Economics, observes:

> **“Elements of official counterextremism are being borrowed by the far-right from the mainstream, just as far-right ideas can sometimes be traced moving in the other direction”**

Christine Brim of the Center for Vigilant Freedom. The term portrayed Islam as a totalitarian political ideology, a classic counter-jihad trope.
Islamophobia in Europe: counter-extremism policies and the counterjihad movement

• 15

Illustrating what Bhatt calls ‘a reverence for myth, and masculine martial heroism’, the names of figures such as Richard the Lionheart and Vlad Tepes (‘Vlad the Impaler’) have been borrowed for counter-jihad blogs. Similarly, the Frankish king Charles Martel (‘Charles the Hammer’), who defeated an invading Muslim army in the year 732, was figuratively resurrected by counter-jihadists using the hashtag #JeSuisCharlesMartel – an adaptation of #JeSuisCharlie – following attacks on the Paris-based magazine Charlie Hebdo. The Gates of Vienna website, a central clearing house for news and comment run by American counter-jihad blogger and activist Ned May, is named after the 1683 battle in which the Ottoman empire’s forces were defeated. The counter-jihad movement thus mixes crusader imagery, such as the cross of the Knights Templar, with more recent slogans of extreme Ulster Loyalism like ‘No Surrender!’. Older clash-of-civilisations style motifs are combined with distorted re-readings of 20th century history. Most notably, in Germany the far-right has attempted to appropriate the language and symbols of anti-fascism in order to reinforce the idea of ‘Islamofascism’. Counter-jihad actors there claimed to have revived the White Rose movement – which resisted the Nazis – this time for the purposes of ‘resisting’ ‘Islamisation’ (see Chapter 4).

Such perverse historical re-interpretations may have been unwittingly assisted by ahistorical ‘anti-extremism’ frameworks propagated widely by both governments and some academics. At times, the discourse of counter-extremism seemingly invites us to view all ideologies besides liberalism as different expression of a single phenomenon called ‘extremism’. But, as Liz Fekete of the Institute of Race Relations points out:

The Left and the Right, Islamism and Fascism have different trajectories; any language that equates them prevents us from understanding the social (as opposed to the individual) provenance of violence. Thus, counter-extremism agendas may have facilitated a degree of ideological disorientation which can distract us from the increasing authoritarianism of state power. And, amidst this confusion, a clear message about which type of extremism poses the greatest threat is communicated to us daily. Former UK prime minister David Cameron, for instance, said the ‘struggle of our generation’ was to counter ‘Islamist’ extremism.

As Arun Kundnani points out, while European security officials view jihadist terrorism as a strategic threat, far-right violence is treated as a public order problem. Our case studies attest to this disparity. European governments rarely see counter-jihad actors as an inherent threat and are doing little to counter them. Instead of recognising it as a reincarnation of the European far-right, the counter-jihad movement is taken at face value as merely a response to the threat of terrorism (or ‘Islamofascism’), which is seen as pre-eminent. At times, even some leftist actors appear to perceive the potential for a backlash (provoking more ‘Islamist’ extremism) as the main risk posed by the counter-jihad movement.

Working through the state

Part of the reason that counter-jihadists have not been seen as particularly threatening is that they are not fundamentally opposed to the state. Although the hardcore of the movement argues that violent civil war is likely, or even inevitable, this belief is motivated by a commitment to ‘defending national identity’ at the expense of ethnic minorities, rather than a revolutionary fervour to challenge the state. On the contrary, counter-jihadists are more likely to engage in what’s been called ‘pro-state violence’. They tend to show support for foreign policy and, like the wider far-right, often have links to the military (for example the group Combined ex-Forces, or CxF). Partly for this reason, far-right violence is rarely written into a bigger storyline and is often deemed by the state to be ‘lone wolf’ terrorism. For instance Anders Breivik – despite his involvement in the ‘collective’ online counter-jihad movement – was described this way.

In the case of the counter-jihad movement, this is also because many right-wing Western governments to some extent share aspects of its analysis, albeit softer versions. In two major policy areas, immigration and counter-extremism,
there are significant overlaps in approach. No government has gone as far as the counter-jihadist movement would like: it believes political elites are naïve, complacent and must ‘wake up’ to the imminent ‘threat’ Islam poses to Europe. At the same time, the movement welcomes measures by many governments to limit immigration and institutionalise Islamophobia as steps in the right direction.

Counter-jihadists have sought to deepen and speed up such processes by pulling the centre of politics to the right. In pursuit of this aim, for example, the Counter-jihad Warsaw 2013 conference was scheduled to coincide with a meeting of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe on human rights. Likewise, the US ‘Defeat Jihad Summit 2015’ was set up to shadow then US President Barack Obama’s ‘Countering Violent Extremism’ event and advocated an even harder line on the issue. Three people then in the running to be Republican presidential candidate (Ted Cruz, Newt Gingrich and Bobby Jindal) attended, while British UKIP peer Lord Pearson, Dutch Party for Freedom leader Geert Wilders and Danish counter-jihad activist Lars Hedegaard delivered their talks via Skype. This illustrates an important and unique feature of the counter-jihad movement: namely that unlike any ‘Islamist’ or ‘jihadist’ movement – or (at least in north-western Europe) any neo-Nazi party – it has supporters in influential positions in Western governments and legislatures.

In the US, many senior political figures have links to the counter-jihad movement. Perhaps most disturbing is the revelation that Donald Trump himself attended the launch of a counter-jihadist group called the United West in Florida in 2011, where he posed for a picture with one of Europe’s leading anti-Muslim activists, Elisabeth Sabaditsch-Wolff. Another example of key figures linked to the counter-jihad movement include Steve Bannon and Walid Phares, respectively Donald Trump’s ex-strategist and former Middle East policy adviser. In addition, the Center for Security Policy’s Frank Gaffney, a former Reagan administration official who is now a leading counter-jihadist, has connections to several Trump officials including Attorney General Jeff Sessions. Sessions has received an award from another leading counter-jihad force, the David Horowitz Freedom Center, presented to him by Stephen Miller, who later became Trump’s senior policy adviser and advocated the ‘Muslim travel ban’. Here lies the counter-jihad movement’s alarming strength: it is a ‘spectrum’ with ‘street-fighting forces at one end’ (such as the English Defence League) and ‘cultural conservatives and neoconservatives writers at the other’ (from Daniel Pipes to Douglas Murray). As well as flourishing in the blogosphere, it has publishing houses (eg. Encounter Books) and newspapers (eg. Dispatch International), produces films (eg. Fitna and Obsession), establishes foundations and even ‘charities’ (eg. the short-lived outfit Victims of Islamic Cultural Extremism, or VOICE UK).

The counter-jihad movement’s elite wing helps lend an aura of respectability to its grassroots. One means is by offering access to important arenas of power. For instance, on at least one occasion a counter-jihad event has been held in the European Parliament building, courtesy of an MEP from Belgium’s far-right Vlaams Belang party. Similarly, Baroness Cox has hosted Anne Marie Waters of Sharia Watch UK in the House of Lords. Cox also sits on the board of the Gatestone Institute – until recently alongside fellow peer Lord Finkelstein and ex-US ambassador to the UN John Bolton. Their presence has offered significant legitimacy to this New York ‘think tank’ which publishes many counter-jihad writers cited in Breivik’s manifesto. These include Norwegian blogger Peder Jensen, aka ‘Fjordman’, whose writing contains ‘many of the tropes of fascism’, according to academic Paul Jackson. Another notable instance of support from an element of the state in Europe comes from the Czech Republic, where president Miloš Zeman spoke at a ‘Bloc Against Islam’ rally in November 2015.

Thanks in part to such powerful allies, the counter-jihad movement has carved out a niche within the mainstream. Often in the name of ‘security’, parliamentarians across Europe (and in the USA) with counter-jihadist allegiances or sympathies have advocated anti-Islam legislation, for example relating to sharia law, women’s clothing or mosque construction. They have succeeded in passing new laws in many jurisdictions. As Liz Fekete observes, far from opposing the state, the ‘realigned Right’ in
this way pursues its goals through official channels, ‘using state power to...put into place legal and administrative structures that discriminate against Muslims’.27

Its potential, however, is greater still. While some scholars suggest that the counter-jihad movement eschews electoral politics,28 this overlooks its links to parties in which its Islamophobic ideas have a strong foothold. Despite styling themselves as non-establishment ‘anti-parties’29 – and regardless of the deeply anti-democratic nature of their racist ideas – radical right parties with close links to counter-jihadists have long been seeking to seize power via elections. Several have become key players in European governments: for instance, the Danish People’s Party became the country’s second biggest in 2015 and the Party for Freedom (Pvv) became the second largest party in the Dutch House of Representatives following elections in March 2017. In France, the Front national was runner up in the 2017 presidential election. That same year, in Austria, the far-right Freedom Party entered government as part of a coalition with the centre-right People’s Party. Together with the power of the Law and Justice Party and Jobbik in nearby Poland and Hungary, respectively, this showed that, in addition to rampant Islamophobia, a clear strain of anti-Semitism was no barrier to political success in central Europe.

Some analysts argue that the existence of radical right parties in the mainstream in countries like the Netherlands and Denmark explains why street-protests like PEGIDA did not take root in those countries. On the other hand, they note, PEGIDA thrived in Germany when no such party existed. This so-called ‘pressure valve hypothesis’ appeals most to those with a managerialist view of politics, implying a preference for far-right ideas to be expressed at the ballot box rather than on the streets. However, a quasi-fascist party at the helm of a European government – even if such power was acquired through legitimate electoral means – could produce far more violence than any non-state actor. Moreover, the idea that street-movements and radical right parties are mutually exclusive appears to be false, given the rise of Alternative für Deutschland in Germany alongside – rather than in place of – the PEGIDA movement (see Chapter 5). The combined effects of these top-down and bottom-up forces may prove extremely effective for the far-right.

Transnational organising

The destructive potential of the far-right also increases when actors collaborate across borders. By including country case studies in this report, we assume that the nation state is still relevant in a globalised era. Islamophobia takes on different inflections in specific contexts, for example manifesting itself through laïcité (secularism) in France (see Chapter 4). However, although the counter-jihad movement is strongly associated with nationalist politics, structurally it is organised via ‘dispersed, decentralised, non-hierarchical networks’ of blogs, think tanks and protest groups, with ‘no set command and control hierarchy’ and few leaders.30 This versatility allows it to organise across borders.

The ideological basis for building counter-jihad unity lies in the ‘macro-nationalist’ politics of ‘Western values’ (through websites like Western Resistance and groups like United West), together with collective hostility to Islam. As Farid Hafez writes:

While the main focus on an exclusive identity politics in the frame of nation-states previously divided the far-right and complicated transnational cooperation, a shared Islamophobia has the potential to be a common ground for strengthening the transnational links of right-wing parties.31

Hafez points to the European Alliance for Freedom, a cross-continental far-right grouping in the European Parliament – comprising MEPs from the Dutch Party for Freedom (PvV), Sweden Democrats, France’s Front National (FN), Austria’s Freedom Party (FPÖ), Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) and others – which produced a manifesto suggesting that ‘Christian and humanistic roots are threatened by the rise of radical Islam’. At a meeting in Vienna in June 2016, party leaders including the FN’s Marine Le Pen, FPÖ’s Heinz-Christian Strache and AfD’s Frauke Petry were among those who sought to deepen this pan-European alliance, declaring that the climate was ripe for what they called ‘a patriotic spring’.32 Far-right leaders from across Europe met again in January 2017 in the German city of Koblenz,
seeking to capitalise on the surge in right-wing populism evidenced by Donald Trump’s election and the UK’s Brexit vote.33

Alongside attempts to build high-level political alliances, transnational counter-jihad organising also occurs at the grassroots. Under various names, the same ideas have been mobilised across borders: the Stop the Islamisation of Denmark movement spawned others, including SIO Europe, SIO Deutschland, SIO France, SIO England and SIO America, collectively known as Stop the Islamisation of Nations (SION); the English Defence League was replicated in Scotland, Germany and Norway, amongst others, and a European Defence League was launched in Aarhus, Denmark in 2012, though without much success. Most recently, the German movement PEGIDA has inspired copycat movements in many countries including Austria, Sweden and the UK.

Counter-jihadists’ attempts to organise transnationally are proving quite successful. The growth of Islamophobia in eastern Europe shows that the movement’s grand narrative does not even require the presence of a significant Muslim minority in order to resonate. Yet in contrast to the loud calls for greater intelligence sharing about jihadist movements after the March 2016 attacks in Brussels, European governments have faced little pressure to intervene or track transnational counter-jihad organising, despite the cross-border coordination described.

Islamophobia as ‘free speech’

Across the counter-jihad movement, in Europe and beyond, ‘freedom of speech’ is a key rallying cry.34 Somewhat ironically – given that Muslims’ freedom of speech has been subject to a ‘chilling effect’ as a result of counter-extremism policies – organisations such as the International Free Press Society and International Civil Liberties Alliance claim that free speech is under threat from Islam. This notion sits within a wider conservative struggle against ‘political correctness’, and a perceived ‘right’ to offend, often by demeaning minorities. Ever since Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten caused global uproar in the Muslim world in 2005, by publishing cartoons of the Islamic holy prophet Mohammed, this has become a favourite activity of counter-jihadists. Some analysts see such ‘Muslim baiting’ as a deliberate attempt to provoke tensions – and, ultimately, incite civil war.35 On occasion, there have indeed been violent responses. In 2015, Swedish artist Lars Vilks was targeted in an attack on a Copenhagen café which killed one; later that year a Texas ‘draw Mohammed’ contest hosted by Atlas Shrugs blogger Pamela Geller was attacked by gunmen, who were killed by police. In 2016, a plan by counter-jihad activist Anne Marie Waters to stage a similar UK event featuring Geert Wilders, was called off.

When offensive speech becomes incitement, European hate speech legislation applies. Yet counter-jihad actors – and at times a wider coalition of libertarians, liberals and some leftists – represent anti-racism campaigners’ ongoing attempts to strengthen laws against Islamophobia as stifling critiques of ‘Islamism’, or even as apologism for terrorism.36 They campaign instead for the dilution or complete removal of hate speech laws. But under existing statutes, several prosecutions have been launched against high profile far-right figures like Geert Wilders, Marine Le Pen and PEGIDA founder Lutz Bachmann.37 Charges have also been brought against small-time counter-jihadists such as Christine Tasin of French group Résistance Républicaine. The organised Islamophobia movement has pushed back – in the name of ‘free speech’ – with financial help that often comes from the USA. The final chapter of this report discusses the critical importance of this US backing in helping sustain and spread the counter-jihad movement in Europe.
Endnotes


13 Used to describe non-Muslims protected under early Muslim rulers, this term was popularised in the contemporary era by Bat Yé’or. See: Carr (2008) ‘You are now entering Eurabia’.


15 Ibid.


17 Ibid.


37 Le Pen was acquitted but both Wilders and Bachman were convicted.
Chapter 3: The United Kingdom

This case study begins by examining the British government’s counter-extremism policies and practices. It argues the government has created a climate of fear and mistrust, in which Muslims are an officially suspect community. We then examine the counter-jihad movement in the UK and show how it has thrived in this atmosphere.

Scrutinising the interactions between counter-extremism and the counter-jihad movement, we highlight three key issues. Firstly, we point to the existence of counter-jihad actors within the British political elite. Secondly, we note that some of these counter-jihad actors and their allies use ‘counter-extremism’ as a cover for waging anti-Muslim campaigns. This means that not only have certain far-right ideas been ‘mainstreamed’ but also that a section of the far-right has found mainstream counter-extremism discourse amenable to its racist agenda.

Finally, we look at official responses to the counter-jihad movement. We find that practical action to counter this strand of the far-right has been very limited. Indeed, some counter-jihad actors have not even been recognised by the state as ‘far-right’. Instead, those who position themselves as ‘centrist’ and claim to be countering ‘Islamic extremism’ have at times been taken seriously by both government and the press. Given these observations, we conclude that when – in January 2015 – the Muslim Council of Britain compared some of the government’s practices to those of ‘members of the far-right’, it was not being entirely outlandish.1

UK counter-extremism policies and practices

The first phase of Western governments’ ‘war on terror’, prompted by the 9/11 attacks in 2001, focused on military interventions in Middle Eastern countries notoriously dubbed the ‘axis of evil’ by George W. Bush in 2002. Reminded – partly by the 7/7 attacks in London in 2005 – that terrorism could be ‘homegrown’ too, attention shifted to the ideological plane.2 In the UK, the Prevent programme, first introduced by a Labour government in 2006 as one strand of its counter-terrorism strategy, said it aimed to prevent violence by ‘winning hearts and minds’.3 It targeted the Muslim community. As Arun Kundnani’s report Spooked! How not to prevent violent extremism showed, money allocated to local authorities for Prevent was based on a crude algorithm which took the size of the Muslim population in an area as a proxy for the threat of
extremism. This made Muslims, he noted, into an officially ‘suspect community’.4

The basic remit of Prevent has not changed. However, it was broadened in 2011 by the Coalition government with the revised strategy, aimed at ‘promoting shared values’, widening its focus to include non-violent extremism. Its rationale rested on models of ‘radicalisation,’ which imagined individuals moving from the thin end of a wedge of potential terrorist-sympathy along a conveyor belt, with a few going on to commit violent acts. Those behind such theories suggested interventions could and should be made before this final stage – in the ‘pre-criminal space’ – before any laws had been broken. The entire Muslim community – seen as the larger pool potentially vulnerable to (or guilty of) a vaguely defined ‘non-violent extremism’ – thus became increasingly subject to ideological policing. In the 2011 revision of Prevent, the Home office defined ‘extremism’ as:

vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs.5

In this abstract definition, no single group appears to be targeted. However, it was developed in order to counter what the government defined as the ‘greatest risk’ to the UK’s security: groups which it said have a “distorted interpretation of Islam”.6 In practice, the disproportionate numbers of Muslims referred under Prevent demonstrate that it has been applied in a discriminatory manner.7

Despite growing criticism of Prevent, government practices still appear to reflect the underlying belief that Muslims potentially pose the pre-eminent security threat. In early 2016 the Guardian revealed that the Home Office’s Research Information and Communications Unit had been covertly outsourcing the task of producing anti-extremist propaganda to a London PR firm, Breakthrough Media. The firm fed the ‘counter-narratives’ it designed to a network of Muslim civil society groups, essentially used as ‘sock-puppets’, because it believed that Muslim groups would have a level of credibility with its target audience which counter-extremism messages known to come from government would lack. The audience which the government hoped to target remained the same: British Muslims.8

“The climate of suspicion towards Muslims nurtured by government counterextremism policies has offered the counter-jihad movement in the UK opportunities to express its racism”

In January 2018 UK home secretary Amber Rudd announced the creation of a Commission for Countering Extremism to ‘stamp out extremist ideology in all its forms’, and the appointment of Sara Khan as ‘lead commissioner for countering extremism’. The choice of Khan has been widely criticised as demonstrating a continuation of the same approach from government. Not only is she an outspoken supporter of the Prevent agenda, but her close ties to the Home Office include co-authoring a book called The battle for British Islam with a consultant for Breakthrough Media, the firm which orchestrated the government’s propaganda campaign described above.8 Khan’s group, Inspire, had even delivered a campaign called ‘Making a Stand’ – which received support from the prime minister Theresa May – that was revealed to have been produced by the Home Office’s Research Information and Communications Unit.10

The Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 has exacerbated the situation further. Couched in ‘safeguarding’ language, it requires all public-sector bodies to ‘have due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism’.11 In practice, this means an unprecedented number of doctors, lecturers, prison officers and even primary school teachers and nursery staff are trained to be vigilant for signs of ‘radicalisation’. Critics argue it has encouraged ethno-religious profiling and surveillance, eroding trust in critical areas like health and education.12 Against this backdrop of mistrust, we now examine the Islamophobic far-right in Britain.

“while DCLG [the Department for Communities and Local Government] was slashing funding for Muslim charities, a counter-extremism body close to it was channelling money to an unrepentant far-right activist”
The UK counter-jihad movement

The climate of suspicion towards Muslims nurtured by government counter-extremism policies has offered the counter-jihad movement in the UK opportunities to express its racism.

At times, there have been clear overlaps between the rhetoric of UK prime ministers and leading British counter-jihad activists. For example, both ex-prime minister David Cameron and former English Defence League (EDL) leader Stephen Yaxley-Lennon (aka Tommy Robinson) – later head of Pegida UK and then a pundit for the far-right Rebel Media channel – view extremism as a predominantly Muslim problem. Both men therefore see it as vital that ‘moderate’ or ‘reforming’ Muslims speak out against extremism. Cameron has said:

This is how…we can win the struggle of our generation. Countering the extremist ideology by standing up and promoting our shared British values. Taking on extremism in all its forms – both violent and non-violent. Empowering those moderate and reforming voices who speak for the vast majority of Muslims that want to reclaim their religion.¹³

In similar terms, Lennon has argued:

There’s a big struggle going on… between decent modern Muslims and Salafist, Wahhabi extremist sects of Islam…To succeed in this country we have to support and stand with the Muslims that wish to take on this extremist ideology and political Islam.¹⁴

As well as affinities in language and logic, there are some crossovers in policy prescriptions. Both men see ideology as the problem, spread by certain individuals (predominantly from abroad) against whom harsh measures must be taken. Cameron stated: ‘We must make it impossible for the extremists to succeed…we must ban preachers of hate from coming to our countries’.¹⁵ Meanwhile, Lennon has claimed: ‘If someone wants to be an Islamist in this country we need to make it really difficult for them’.¹⁶

Though there are also many obvious differences between their thinking and practice, both men – albeit in different ways – cultivated harassment of Muslims in the UK.

We can go deeper than discursive parallels.

Downing Street – using figures from an opaque government unit called the Extremism Analysis Unit – is guilty of having presented correlation as causation. For example, it publicised a list of ‘radicalised foreign fighters who have studied in the UK’ to justify the demand for more stringent counter-extremism policies in the higher education sector, without providing any evidence of a causative connection.¹⁷ Stephen Yaxley-Lennon has mimicked this faulty logic still more crudely. After leaving the EDL and setting up Pegida UK, he told a newspaper in December 2015 that the group planned to protest in Birmingham – home to the UK’s biggest Muslim population – because the city ‘is where most of the terrorists have been from, it’s where six Muslims who wanted to blow us up were from’.¹⁸

In fact, the government appeared to have reached much the same conclusions about Birmingham five years before Lennon. In 2010, a unique project code-named Project Champion – according to police sources ‘the first of its kind in the UK that seeks to monitor a population seen as ‘at risk’ of extremism’ – saw hundreds of cameras installed in two Muslim areas of the city, Sparkbrook and Washwood Heath. Ostensibly to improve safety but secretly financed with £3 million in counter-terrorism funding, the scheme was only dropped after being exposed in the press.¹⁹ Thus, when Lennon declared Birmingham ‘the continued epicentre for terrorism’ he was, in a way, only echoing a diagnosis made by the authorities.

While both the government and the counter-jihad movement have eyed Muslim communities with suspicion, counter-jihadists have also taken note of government intervention in other issues said to be related to ‘extremism’. In December 2013, the prime minister, David Cameron, intervened in a row over gender segregation at events held on university campuses by student Islamic societies – though the evidence of a widespread problem was dubious at best.²⁰ Nonetheless, within months some UK counter-jihadists had taken up the issue. In May 2014, members of Britain First, a party with links to Christian fundamentalism, Ulster loyalism and the far-right British National Party, began a series of ‘mosque invasions’ across the country. Although not normally women’s rights advocates (the party
has opposed abortion, for example), when Britain First activists marched into Crayford mosque in London they declared their aim was to ‘demand removal of sexist mosque signs’ designating separate entrances for men and women. Police investigated, but no arrests were made.21

This was not the first time the Islamophobic far-right had taken its cue from government counter-extremism agendas. Despite limited evidence, the UK has witnessed several years of scaremongering from certain ministers and press outlets, about universities being ‘hotbeds of extremism’.22 By early 2013, counter-jihad groups had decided to take matters into their own hands. Student Rights, part of the neoconservative think tank the Henry Jackson Society, had been instrumental in the aforementioned gender segregation furore and again played a critical role here. (Its founder, Raheem Kassam, would later try to stand for leadership of UKIP, the United Kingdom Independence Party, while his successor, Elliot Miller, would be filmed delivering an Islamophobic rant)23. When Student Rights raised the alarm about several allegedly ‘extreme’ events planned at universities, Casuals United and the EDL intervened. ‘Concerned patriots’ from the football hooligan-linked Casuals ran a phone campaign against the University of Essex and in Nottingham demonstrated outside the university. In Reading, far-right activists appeared on campus and intimidated the student Islamic society. A number of events were cancelled for fear of violence.24 The links between counter-jihadists and neoconservatives – including transnationally – were confirmed in November 2017 when the Henry Jackson Society’s Alan Mendoza and Douglas Murray spoke at the David Horowitz Freedom Center’s ‘Restoration Weekend’.25 Also listed as speakers were former Trump White House strategist Steve Bannon and alt-righter Richard Spencer, who was banned from entering the UK in 2013 due to his anti-Muslim rhetoric.

Interactions between counter-extremism policy and the counter-jihad movement

Counter-jihadists within the political elite

Counter-jihadists in the UK often seek to work through the state. Stephen Yaxley-Lennon and his cousin and EDL deputy Kevin Carroll joined the British Freedom Party (BFP) in 2012. Later that year Carroll ran for office as Police and Crime Commissioner in Luton.29 The strategy has been to shake off the ‘far-right’ label they had been given by the media. For instance, BFP’s then chairman Paul Weston claimed the party was ‘central’ in orientation.30 And, after leaving the EDL, Lennon told an interviewer:

What I want to do is…to take this mainstream…what we’ve been saying was criticised or ignored and pushed to the margin because of [the] far-right extremist tag they managed to give us…Since leaving the EDL I believe people are listening now…rather than dismissing us after two minutes.’31

When Weston, Lennon and Anne Marie Waters (see below) formed (the now defunct) PEGIDA UK, they said in 2016 they aimed to make the group ‘something that is possible for Middle England to follow’.32

The mainstream already accommodates other counter-jihad actors; some are even members of the UK’s political elite. Importantly, the same
cannot be said of neo-Nazis, or any ‘Islamist’ activists. One example of this counter-jihad elite is Gerard Batten, a UKIP MEP. His long-standing links to the anti-Muslim movement include speaking at the inaugural Counter-jihad Brussels conference in 2007, and meeting with EDL donor and strategist Alan Ayling (aka Alan Lake) in 2011. In 2010, Batten called for a ban on the building of new mosques and in 2014 it emerged that he had commissioned a document described as a ‘Proposed Charter of Muslim Understanding’, suggesting Muslims be required to sign a five-point declaration including a rejection of violence. But the claim that many Muslims quietly tolerate violence without actively participating in it has also been made by leading politicians. In 2011, David Cameron condemned ‘organisations that, while non-violent, are certainly in some cases part of the problem’.33 Eric Pickles, the former communities secretary, wrote to a thousand Muslim leaders in England telling them they had ‘more work to do’ promoting ‘British values’ following the January 2015 attacks on Paris.34 Two months later Theresa May, as home secretary, claimed there was ‘increasing evidence that a small but significant number of people living in Britain – almost all of whom are British citizens – reject our values’, and emphasised the threat of ‘Islamic extremism’.35 Batten’s colleague Lord Malcolm Pearson (a former UKIP leader) is a counter-jihad actor even more deeply embedded in Britain’s political establishment. In 2013, he instigated a parliamentary debate during which he declared, ‘I fear the dark side is moving strongly within Islam.’ He justified his prejudice with a security rationale, claiming that ‘large and growing Muslim communities’ represented ‘thousands of home-grown potential terrorists’.36 In 2014 he said Muslims need to ‘address the violence in the Koran’,37 a claim similar to that made by far-right German politician Rene Stadtkewitz (see Chapter 4). Pearson has also attended and spoken at various counter-jihad conferences since 2007, most recently the 2015 Defeat Jihad Summit in Washington (see Chapter 2), where he spoke via Skype along with notorious US Islamophobes Robert Spencer and Pamela Geller – and not for the first time.38 Pearson has also twice attempted (once successfully) to host Dutch politician Geert Wilders – a key European counter-jihad figurehead – in the British parliament. His accomplice in both cases was Baroness Caroline Cox, a Christian Zionist crossbench peer with UKIP sympathies. As noted in Chapter 2, she sits on the board of the Gatestone Institute, an Islamophobic New York think tank, and promotes counter-jihad ideas from within the House of Lords.39

Counter-jihadists waging ‘counter-extremism’

Sharia Watch UK

Several UK counter-jihadists have used ‘counter-extremism’ as an excuse to target Muslims. Baroness Cox has been a powerful ally for some such groups, offering them a platform – and a dangerous veneer of legitimacy – in the House of Lords. One group, Sharia Watch UK, is led by Anne Marie Waters, who was nearly selected as a Labour party candidate for Brighton Pavilion in 2013 before she joined UKIP. Sharia Watch has pushed the bizarre Islamophobic conspiracy theory that sales of halal meat fund terrorism.40 Despite this, the group has been quoted by the Sunday Telegraph and Daily Mail newspapers as an authority on extremism, the latter promoting its claim that ‘Islamic extremists’ were ‘infiltrating’ scout groups.41 Baroness Cox dissociated herself from Sharia Watch after intense media scrutiny of the group’s plan to host a provocative ‘Mohammed cartoon exhibition’ in September 2015, which ultimately fell through. But Waters – as well as working with Stephen Yaxley-Lennon on PEGIDA UK – cooperated with him to launch yet another self-declared ‘counter-extremism’ group called VOICE (Victims of Islamic Cultural Extremism) which claimed it opposed ‘left and right-wing extremists’.42 Since losing her high-profile bid for the UKIP leadership in September 2017, Waters has set up her own anti-Islam political party, ‘For Britain’. This, she claims, aims to ‘reach the people who have been forgotten and left behind’.43 Waters has also been linked to members of the new UK branch of the pan-European Generation Identity movement (see Chapter 5).

Stand for Peace

Baroness Cox also hosted an organisation called Stand for Peace (SFP) in the House of Lords. Like Sharia Watch and VOICE, SFP styled
itself as a ‘counter-extremism’ body. But once again this professed mandate merely provided cover for targeting Muslims whilst obscuring the extreme views of its own staff. SFP founder Sam Westrop is also a ‘distinguished senior fellow’ at the Gatestone Institute, which reportedly funded SFP’s report *Don’t fund extremism*.44

Yet the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG), where a government drive to root out perceived ‘extremism’ was already underway, was receptive to Westrop’s claims – and once again the right-wing media was a key intermediary. In September 2014, SFP claimed member organisations of the Muslim Charities Forum (MCF) had links to the Union of the Good, a body designated a ‘sponsor of terrorism’ by the US government (but not the UK government).45 The next day the *Telegraph* picked up the ‘story’46 and although MCF steadfastly insisted that its work was purely humanitarian, before long DCLG had halted both its funding and that of MCF member Islamic Help.47 Communities secretary Eric Pickles said this decision ‘follow[ed] a formal review of the project, which included examination of allegations made in the press’.48 We filed a freedom of information request to DCLG in January 2015 and after 18 months of refusals, it eventually released documents which suggested SFP’s claims had been influential.49

In 2017 Westrop and SFP were sued for defamation by Mohamed Ali Harrath, a Tunisian dissident who had been tortured and imprisoned by the Ben Ali regime. The judge decided SFP’s description of Harrath as a ‘convicted terrorist’ was libellous. However, it was little more than a symbolic victory for the truth since Westrop’s lawyers said neither he nor his organisation had assets in the UK and therefore could not pay costs or damages.50 By that time, Westrop had moved to the US, where he now runs the Middle East Forum’s ‘Islamist Watch’ project.51

**Stephen Yaxley-Lennon and the Quilliam Foundation**

Equally noteworthy has been the willingness of some counter-extremism actors with close proximity to state power to associate with counter-jihadists. In October 2013, the Quilliam Foundation (which received almost £3 million from the British government between 2008 and 2012) and in 2016 was linked to Breakthrough Media’s state-funded propaganda campaign) held a joint press conference with Stephen Yaxley-Lennon, dramatically announcing his exit from the EDL. As author Hsiao-Hung Pai observed, by simply declaring himself ‘opposed to extremism’ at ‘both ends of the spectrum’ the ‘former leader of a far-right movement was suddenly a liberal’.53

On the same day this spectacle was staged, Quilliam’s Maajid Nawaz wrote to the DCLG to request funds for his organisation – and for Lennon – to ‘cut off [his] … dependency on EDL donors’ (funds were not forthcoming).54 He later also tried to arrange a speaking tour for Lennon in secondary schools.55 Just one month after, Lennon was in touch with US counter-jihadists Pamela Geller and Robert Spencer, confirming that his views had not in fact changed. Nonetheless, in December 2015 it transpired that Lennon – by this time involved in Pegida UK – had received around £8,000 from Quilliam over six months in 2013.56

Thus, while DCLG was slashing funding for Muslim charities, a counter-extremism body close to it was channelling money to an unrepentant far-right activist. And while the Home Office was demanding that educational establishments prevent the ‘radicalisation’ of young minds, the same body was attempting to secure Lennon a platform to speak in schools – all in the name of ‘countering extremism’.

**Official responses to the counter-jihad movement**

The British government has paid some attention to opposing Islamophobia and right-wing extremism. Actions taken to counter it, however, have been limited. Last year the former independent reviewer of the government’s terrorism laws, David Anderson QC, warned that far-right extremism in Britain could be ‘as murderous as its Islamist equivalent’. This was recently illustrated clearly when Darren Osborne – an avid consumer of counter-jihad content online who had declared his intention to ‘kill all Muslims’ – murdered 51-year old Makram Ali in Finsbury Park, north London, in June 2017.57 Despite Prime Minister Theresa May’s rhetoric after this attack, which stressed the need to counter ‘extremism of any kind, including Islamophobia’, it
has yet to be matched with policies that treat far-right ideology as seriously as radical ‘Islamism’. As we have seen, counter-jihadists often claim to abhor racism and the far-right, saying they oppose only ‘extremists’ and are not against ‘individual Muslims’. But they also condemn ‘Islam as an ideology’.58 David Cameron’s famous 2011 Munich speech criticised this view. He said:

the hard right ignore this distinction between Islam and Islamist extremism and just say Islam and the West are irreconcilable, this is a clash of civilisations…These people fuel Islamophobia. And I completely reject their argument.59

In addition, the 2013 Extremism Task Force report asserted, albeit in passing, opposition to ‘Islamophobia and neo-Nazism’.60 Both Labour and Conservative home secretaries have prevented counter-jihadists from entering the UK: Jacqui Smith stopped a planned visit by Dutch politician Geert Wilders in 2009 and Theresa May denied Pamela Geller and Robert Spencer in 2013. Other indicators that the authorities may appreciate the severity of the counter-jihad threat include the police decision to provide protection to radical Muslim activist Anjem Choudary after threats from Britain First.61 In late 2017, two Britain First leaders – including Jayda Fransen, who gained notoriety worldwide after Donald Trump shared her Islamophobic tweets – were arrested and charged in connection with speeches made at a rally in August called Northern Ireland Against Terrorism.62

However, the state has not targeted the far-right with anything near the level of propaganda and surveillance directed at the Muslim population. This is despite the emergence of new anti-Muslim groups – such as Generation Identity, which originated in France (see Chapter 4) but also surfaced in the UK in 2017 – and despite waves of Islamophobic violence which some have argued should be classified as political violence (rather than hate crime) when motivated by far-right nationalist politics.63 Most of the 2013 Extremism Task Force’s policy recommendations, for example, were geared towards policing – rather than protecting – Muslim communities. Perhaps the only comparable practices are those covert policing operations used to infiltrate and undermine left-wing groups, such as anti-racism campaigners, animal rights and environmental activists, who have also sometimes been labelled and monitored as ‘extremists’.64 While a unit monitoring the far-right reportedly exists, the few known cases of police covert infiltration appear to have targeted neo-Nazi groups like the BNP and not counter-jihadists like the EDL.65

In fact, since its emergence, the state has not categorised the EDL as far-right. When the group first surfaced in 2009, chanting ‘Muslim bombers off our streets’, it claimed to oppose only ‘Islamic extremism and terrorism’. That same year, the BBC reported that ‘four specialist national police units are investigating the EDL’ but in September, Metropolitan Police Commissioner Sir Paul Stephenson declared that the EDL and Stop the Islamisation of Europe were not extreme right-wing groups. His main concern, he said, was ‘how groups like that either willingly or unwillingly allow themselves to be exploited by very extreme right-wing groups like the National Front’.66 Even in 2016, the National Domestic Extremism Unit still reportedly classified the EDL in a unique category called ‘defence leagues’, and not as part of the far right.67

Not classifying the EDL as far-right seems to ignore its racism, nationalism and clear links to violence. Lennon himself has predicted civil war on more than one occasion, for example stating:

60 per cent of British people think that there’s going to be a bloody civil war between Muslims and non-Muslims. I think that… if that is the case, at which point do those 60 per cent start preparing for that war?

He has also confessed that Michael Rafferty of the Combined ex-Forces (CxF) wing of the EDL ‘talked about bombing the Muslim protests in London’.68 Meanwhile, at an EDL demo in Birmingham in October 2014, one speaker – who addressed his audience clad in full chain-mail – was introduced as a ‘Knights Templar’. Mass murderer Anders Breivik claimed to have re-founded this ancient crusading organisation with nine other people in London in 2002. Prosecutors at his trial said they did not believe the group existed, although Breivik insisted it had two more active cells that would continue his work.69

On 16 June 2016, a week before the UK referendum on EU membership (which itself
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• 27

sparked a wave of hate-crime), 53-year-old Thomas Mair murdered Labour MP Jo Cox. Mair was obsessed with Nazism, fascinated by Breivik, and screamed ‘Britain First’ before attacking Cox, a known supporter of migrants and anti-Islamophobia causes. A photo emerged of him reportedly protesting with Britain First’s Northern Brigade activists in the year prior. This brutally underlined the violent potential of the far-right, as well as the inter-mingling of neo-Nazi and counter-jihad ideas. Yet despite their close connection, the government continued to regard counter-jihadists as less dangerous. In December 2016, the viciously anti-Semitic group National Action was banned as a terrorist organisation but despite a call that same month from Labour MP Louise Haigh for Britain First to be similarly outlawed, neither it nor any other anti-Muslim group has been proscribed.

Equally indicative of mainstream political complacency about the far-right was how David Cameron while prime minister in 2013 invited MEPs from Germany’s Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) party to sit with a group he created in the European Parliament, despite AfD’s links to the anti-Islam Pegida movement (see Chapter 4). Although its MEPs were eventually expelled from Cameron’s group in 2016, this conferred respectability on what was then a fledgling party and likely helped it to grow. Illustrating the same complacency on a smaller scale was the Afzal Amin scandal, which came to light in early 2015. Aspiring Tory MP Amin was secretly filmed meeting with then EDL chief, Steve Eddowes, and its former head Stephen Yaxley-Lennon. Remarkably, in return for helping stage-manage a fake anti-mosque demonstration which he planned to take credit for calling off, Amin promised to be an ‘unshakeable ally’ to the EDL in parliament. In other words, he would take credit for a ‘counter-extremism’ coup while actually cooperating with and promoting the group.

In December 2017, the former independent reviewer of UK terrorism legislation, David Anderson QC, published a report on confidential internal reviews conducted into intelligence-handling leading up to the various attacks that year. It described an Operational Improvement Review by senior members of MI5 and counter-terrorism policing, which proposed a ‘step-change’ in handling of so-called ‘domestic extremism’ cases, intended to ‘ensure the equivalence of processes in analysing and dealing with all kinds of terrorism, irrespective of the ideology that inspires them’. While this recognised the ‘XRW’ (extreme right-wing) threat in particular and the need for it to be taken as seriously as other types of threat, it was also an acknowledgement that this was not currently happening.

Conclusion

We have argued in this chapter that the British government’s drive to turn public sector workers into informants has created an environment in which the Islamophobic paranoia of the counter-jihad movement thrives. The language of counter-extremism and its targets have suited the agenda of this strand of the far-right, which takes its cue from the ‘war on terror’. In the UK, some counter-jihadists exist within the political elite. Others, we have shown, even masquerade as ‘counter-extremists’, such is the flexibility and slipperiness of the concept of ‘extremism’. Moulded to suit the ideological agenda of the counter-jihad movement, ‘counter-extremism’ becomes a weapon allowing them to attack Muslims with impunity while masking their own extreme Islamophobia.

The government has historically been unwilling or unable to see the counter-jihad movement as extreme or far-right. This may be because the meaning of ‘extremism’ turns on what Arun Kundnani calls ‘the racial subtext to the entire discourse of counterterrorism’. In the UK context specifically, the counter-extremism apparatus and Prevent strategy were created with a particular threat in mind, hence the reference to so-called ‘British values’ against which extremism is to be defined.

Given this genealogy, we should not be surprised that the counter-jihad movement tends to slip through the net. While the ‘old’ far-right – traditional neo-Nazis – are recognised as extremists, the authorities appear to have taken the counter-jihadists’ distancing of themselves from such groups as evidence of a lesser threat. Underlying this assumption are the overlaps in the thinking of mainstream counter-extremists and counter-jihadists, recognised for example by Stephen Yaxley-Lennon, who in explaining his reasons for working with the Quilliam Foundation
said: ‘I realised our views were similar’.73 This should raise serious questions about the foundations of government counter-extremism policies as well as their effects. Despite repeated assertions that ‘all forms of extremism’ must be taken seriously, the recent controversial appointment of a Commissioner for Countering Extremism suggests that Muslims remain a suspect community while organised Islamophobia causes far less official concern.

Endnotes


8 Ben Hayes and Asim Qureshi (2016) We are completely independent: the Home Office, Breakthrough Media and the counter-narrative industry, CAGE: London.


Chapter 4: Germany

When a mosque in the west German city of Saarbrücken was vandalised in November 2015 – a few days after attacks in Paris, France, killed 130 people – the word ‘murderers’ was scrawled on the door. According to a report in Deutsche Welle, Aiman Mazyek, from the Central Council of Muslims responded by calling on politicians and the media to ‘stop asking us [Muslims] to distance ourselves from these attacks’, attributing rising Islamophobia to a culture of collective blame.¹

This case study suggests that Germany’s rapidly intensifying counter-extremism policies have started to institutionalise this culture of collective blame and suspicion. It also shows that these policies have shaped a climate in which the counter-jihad strand of the far-right has grown, both through parties like Alternative for Germany (AfD) and through street-movements like Pegida. While counter-extremism policies in Germany do target the far-right to some extent, they principally focus on traditional neo-Nazi organisations, from which counter-jihadists ostentatiously attempt to distance themselves. Several counter-jihad groups, we show, in fact style themselves as ‘counter-extremists’, finding the emphasis on Islam/ism useful. Though some signs suggest that neo-Nazi politics in Germany may be declining, the increasingly mainstream presence of counter-jihad ideas suggests the country cannot afford to be complacent about any form of far-right politics.

Government counter-extremism policies

Political violence in German history includes examples of attacks by leftist revolutionaries the Red Army Faction (aka Baader-Meinhof Gang) in the 1970s, and Palestinian political violence such as the Munich Olympics killings of 1972 and the Lufthansa flight hijacking of October 1977. Entrenched far-right violence is also a problem. A notable example was the series of racially motivated murders of mostly Turkish victims by the neo-Nazi National Socialist Underground (NSU).² One estimate of people killed by far-right violence since 1990 puts the total at 184.³ Another source claims a more recent (and higher) average of 17 race-related killings annually.⁴ Germany also admitted a million migrants in 2015. In the same year, there were 1,005 recorded attacks on asylum seekers’ shelters (a five-fold annual increase), 90 per cent of which were believed to have been committed by far-right activists.⁵

Germany had not, however, suffered any large-scale ‘Islamist’ terrorist attacks in the post-9/11 era until 2016. Prior to this, several plots were thwarted
including the so-called ‘Sauerland group’, who had reportedly planned a series of bombings. In the summer of 2016, four attacks – two carried out by asylum seekers – heightened the securitisation of the immigration issue in public debates and deepened the perception of terrorism as a ‘foreign’ threat. Then in December 2016, in an attack claimed by ISIS, a man killed 12 people by driving a truck into a crowded Christmas market. Although Germany has long had a decentralised intelligence gathering architecture – to prevent an entity such as the Nazi Gestapo or Stasi intelligence service of East Germany re-emerging – this spate of violence prompted the government to add unprecedented new surveillance laws to the country’s criminal code in June 2017.

Germany’s federal interior ministry defines extremist activities as:

those which oppose our democratic constitutional state and its fundamental values, norms and rules, and aim to overthrow the liberal democratic order and replace it with one in line with the ideas of the respective group.

It states that extremists ‘often accept, promote and actually use’ violence, but compiles statistics on non-violent ‘extremists’ too. The national internal intelligence agency, the Federal bureau for the Protection of the Constitution (BFV), conceptualises three types of extremism: right-wing, left wing and Islamist. In 2014, the BFV classified 43,890 people in Germany with ‘Islamist’ potential, around 7,900 of whom were deemed Salafists – ‘a new high-point’, according to agency chief Hans-Georg Maassen. But as journalist Ben Knight, writing in Deutsche Welle, observes, the definition of Salafist ‘remains somewhat nebulous’. The government argues that there is ‘no clear dividing line’ between Salafists who reject violence and those who favour it, because it holds the ideology to be a ‘breeding ground for ‘Islamist’ radicalisation towards…jihad’. Partly as a result of this vagueness, counter-extremism programmes have targeted Germany’s entire four million Muslim population.

In 2006, the government set up the annual German Islam Conference. But already by the second event, one of four major German Muslim organisations – the Central Council of Muslims in Germany – had pulled out, citing lack of Muslim representation and failure to prioritise discussion of Islamophobia. The German Islam Conference’s three priorities, in early 2017, were ‘promoting cooperation and integration’, ‘gender equality’ and ‘preventing extremism’. The government also launched two hotlines targeting Muslim communities: the first, in 2010, was HATIF (Arabic for ‘phone’ as well as a German acronym for ‘leaving terrorism and Islamist fanaticism’), followed in 2012 by the ‘Radicalisation Counselling Centre’. Friends and relatives were encouraged to inform on anyone believed at risk of ‘radicalisation’. However, a poster campaign to publicise the latter in Muslim neighbourhoods in Berlin, Hamburg and Bonn prompted four out of six Muslim organisations to withdraw cooperation, complaining that the campaign generalised suspicion of all Muslims.

Yet the underlying attitude of collective blame and collective suspicion has not changed since; in
July 2016 Chancellor Angela Merkel stated that Muslim community leaders should more clearly reject terrorism.22 Meanwhile a ‘de-radicalisation’ programme focused on Muslim extremists called Hayat (Arabic for ‘life’) is modelled on a similar scheme run by EXIT-Deutschland to de-radicalise neo-Nazis. But whereas individuals self-refer to EXIT’s programme, Hayat relies on informants among families, friends or employers of potentially ‘radicalised’ Muslims. And the decision on whether someone is ‘in danger of becoming violent or whether it’s a harmless case of increasing religiosity’ is also left to state officials.23

**Right-wing extremism and counter-measures**

We found that greater emphasis is placed on combatting ‘right-wing extremism’ in Germany than in either the UK or France. In February 2017, for instance, the regional counterterrorism chief in the state of Thuringia Stephan Kramer warned that far-right terror cells could pose a ‘serious risk’ to ‘democracy and our open society’.24 The BfV classified 21,000 people as right-wing extremist in 2014; of whom it estimated 10,500 might use violence. The government financially supports the not-for-profit EXIT-Deutschland (co-founded by former neo-Nazi, Ingo Hasselbach) which describes itself as ‘an initiative to help anyone who wants to break with right-wing-extremism start a new life’.25 Since 2001 the BfV has also run its own dropout programme, encouraging individuals to quit the far-right.

The BfV has noted the growth of Islamophobia, stating:

> In recent years, Islamophobia as a modern form of xenophobia has become increasingly important as a field of action for the right-wing extremist scene. Right-wing extremists try to arouse the population’s fear of ‘foreign domination’ and its prejudices against the religion of Islam and Muslims.26

Some plans for far-right violence motivated by this ideology have been thwarted. For example, in May 2015 members of a group called the Oldschool Society who planned to attack homes for asylum seekers and mosques were arrested and charged.27 For the most part, however, the government’s counter-extremism programmes targeted at the far-right remain heavily focused on neo-Nazism. For instance, besides ‘Islamist’ groups, most organisations banned by the state are neo-Nazi actors, with minimal attention paid to counter-jihadists.28 Even here, as was clear in the aftermath of the National Socialist Underground scandal, official counter-action is deeply flawed. Moreover, understanding of – and opposition to – newer far-right currents which promote Islamophobia while claiming to reject anti-Semitism, lags even further behind.

The next sections look at the counter-jihad movement in Germany. Firstly, we examine those actors seeking to work through the state within political parties, who are generally law-abiding – and therefore often fall outside the purview of counter-extremism programmes – but are nonetheless extremely dangerous.

**Counter-jihad movement**

The BfV states that membership of ‘right-wing extremist’ groups has suffered ‘years of decline’ (though its website also notes that this trend was bucked in 2015).29 Data showing falling support, over the long term, for the neo-Nazi National Democratic Party (NPD) is no cause for complacency, however. Right-wing extremism in Germany may merely be changing shape.

A closer look at the recent history of ‘Bürgerbewegung pro NRW’ (known simply as ‘Pro NRW’) illustrates this transformation. Founded in 2007, the far-right populist group (named after the North Rhine Westphalia region of Germany) is a party which grew out of the Pro Bürgerbewegung (‘citizens’ movement’) network. Specifically, it is linked to Pro Köln, based in the region’s biggest city Cologne (Köln). Pro Köln was itself founded in 1996 as an offshoot of the Nazi Deutsche Liga für Volk und Heimat by Markus Beisicht (a lawyer and ‘fascist activist’30) and Manfred Rouhs (a former NPD member). Despite this heritage, its offshoot Pro NRW has attempted to dissociate itself from anti-Semitism. Instead, it has embraced Islamophobia and campaigns against what it calls the ‘Islamisation’ of North Rhine Westphalia and against mosque construction. When US counter-jihad activist Robert Spencer was criticised over an invitation to speak to a Pro Köln event in
Cologne, he emphasised this shift, denying that the group was far-right by saying: ‘real neo-Nazis…despise and repudiate them for their pro-Israel stance’. As Chapter 2 explained, this realignment typifies a wider trend on the far right.

However, a new political force in Germany has more successfully managed to ‘avoid the Nazi label’. Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland, AfD) is a fast-growing, right-wing populist party founded in 2013. As Chapter 3 observed, the AfD was given an early boost by former UK prime minister David Cameron who conferred respectability on the fledgling party by inviting its MEPs to sit with a group he created in the European parliament (though they were later expelled). When Frauke Petry became AfD leader in July 2015, more moderate co-founders Bernd Lucke and Konrad Adam quit, because her ascendency signalled a move from the party’s original Euroscepticism towards a hard-line anti-refugee stance. In January 2016 Petry made world headlines by declaring ‘people must stop migrants from crossing illegally [into Germany]’, and ‘if necessary, [they] should use firearms.’ Despite this, the party made strong gains in regional German elections in March 2016, entering state parliament for the first time in three states. Soon after, it hardened its Islamophobic policies to complement its anti-immigrant stance, calling for a ban on minarets and the burqa. (A Bavarian faction of the party called for AfD to advocate a complete ban on all mosques.) In September 2016 AfD won 14 per cent of votes in Berlin and pushed Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union (CDU) party into third place in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania. AfD’s onward march continued with a historic shakeup of German national politics in 2017. Winning nearly 13 per cent of the vote and 94 seats in the Bundestag, this was the strongest showing by a far-right party in any post-war German election. Frauke Petry quit the party two days after this dramatic result to serve as an independent MP for Saxony and criticised AfD for holding views too far outside the mainstream. However, while its success was considered by some a sign of opposition to Merkel and other mainstream parties, its popularity has continued to grow. By February 2018, a poll commissioned by Bild newspaper suggested that the AfD had for the first time surpassed the centre left Social Democratic Party (SPD) in popularity.

The AfD has enjoyed such success partly because it has strongly denied the label ‘far-right’. Former leader Frauke Petry has insisted, for example, that ‘Right and left are terms that haven’t fitted for a long time’, declaring that instead politicians ‘either recognise that we need concepts that lead to solutions or not’. But the AfD is closely linked to the counter-jihad strand of the far-right. It has been called ‘the political arm of PEGIDA’, a grassroots counter-jihad movement examined below. Petry met with PEGIDA members and her successor as AfD leader Alexander Gauland attended one of its protests in December 2014 and declared his party ‘the natural allies’ of PEGIDA. Evidence supports this view. An Economist straw poll suggested that nine out of 10 PEGIDA supporters backed the AfD above Germany’s two major parties, the CDU and SPD. AfD officials openly wooed PEGIDA members just before the 2017 national elections at a joint rally in Dresden aimed at boosting the party’s vote and PEGIDA founder Lutz Bachmann explicitly told supporters to vote for the AfD. Importantly, just as Bachmann would be caught up in an anti-Semitism row (explained below), it emerged showing that AfD figures in at least one state (Saarland) sought to recruit known neo-Nazis to the party. This clearly undermines the AfD’s self-presentation as being separate from anti-Semitic currents. The evidence outlined in the next section demonstrates, however, that parties like the AfD and movements like PEGIDA have also flourished partly as a result of counter-extremism policies which encourage generalised suspicion of Muslims.

**Counter-jihadists waging ‘counter-extremism’**

We have examined the German government’s counter-extremism approach, which Islamic organisations have argued casts suspicion upon all Muslims, while the focus of the less strenuous efforts to counter far-right extremism is on neo-Nazism. We have also looked at the turn towards Islamophobia on the far-right and the growth of parties like the AfD which reject the label ‘far-right’. As was noted in the UK case study
(Chapter 3) some anti-Islam activists borrow aspects from mainstream counter-extremism frameworks. We look now at similar patterns among German counter-jihadists and how the so-called ‘counter-extremism’ they wage serves both to legitimise their politics and provides a powerful discourse with which to attack Muslims.

PEGIDA

PEGIDA – which derives its name from the German acronym Patriotiche Europäer Gegen die Islamisierung Des Abendlandes (‘Patriotic Europeans Against Islamisation of the West’) – initially attracted crowds in the dozens or hundreds, when it began holding weekly rallies in Dresden in October 2014. But by December 2014 it was drawing over 10,000 people to the city’s Schlossplatz square. Its 12 January 2015 demonstration, just after the Paris attacks, drew a record 25,000 crowd. The movement spawned many copycat efforts, both nationally – notably in Leipzig (LEGIĐA), Berlin (BERGIĐA), Cologne (KÖGIĐA), Düsseldorf (DÜGIĐA) and many other German cities – and internationally (including Pegida France, Pegida UK, Pegida Sverige, Pegida Danmark and Pegida Österreich). Although these have proved less successful, the size of the protests, and speed with which the meme and the message spread, prompted alarm in Germany, across Europe and beyond.

PEGIDA’s message was often packaged in the language of liberal counter-extremism. Its leaders declared that the movement was against ‘preachers of hate, regardless of what religion’ and ‘radicalism, regardless of whether religiously or politically motivated’. In a clear nod to the German government’s approach – rejection of left, right and ‘islamist’ extremism – Pegida’s logo depicts the Anti-Fascist Network logo, the Communist hammer and sickle, the Nazi Swastika and the ISIS flag being thrown in a dustbin all together. The accompanying slogan reads ‘Away with all the radical trash!’ Insofar as such positioning can be taken at face value, it illustrates the way counter-extremism frameworks which decontextualise political violence and equate ‘Islamism’, fascism and far-left politics are used by organised Islamophobes. They appear to have created space for the counter-jihad movement – which masks its racism in talk of liberalism, democracy, legality, free speech and civil liberties – to advance its goals.

PEGIDA’s rejection of anti-Semitism is questionable. German newspapers published photographs of founder Lutz Bachmann posing as Adolf Hitler in January 2015, forcing him to resign as leader. But he returned in March, claiming the photos had been doctored by the ‘lügenpresse’ (lying media), and despite being convicted of inciting hatred in May 2016, following derogatory comments about asylum seekers. (Bachmann later set up a new political party, the Liberal Direct Democratic People’s Party, in June 2016). PEGIDA’s ‘manifesto’ emphasises migrants and Muslims, calling for the immediate deportation of asylum seekers with criminal convictions and demanding the preservation of so-called ‘Judeo-Christian Western culture’. It has attracted support from groups like the far-right Hooligans Against Salafists (HoGeSa), whose chosen name echoes official concerns that this conservative strand of Islam is a domestic security threat, as outlined earlier. Ironically HoGeSa is itself known for violence.

Rene Stadtkewitz, who in 2010 founded the single-issue anti-Islam party Die Freiheit (‘Freedom’) has also welcomed PEGIDA. Speaking at its Dresden protest on 23 February 2015, Stadtkewitz portrayed the Islamic holy book as a direct cause of violence, saying:

I call on all Muslims: Stand up and tear the violence and the hatred out of the Koran. Write a new Koran 2.0. Only then can there be peaceful co-existence. Only you can do that.

“PEGIDA’s message was often packaged in the language of liberal counter-extremism. Its leaders declared that the movement was against ‘preachers of hate, regardless of what religion’...”
This recalls a remark made by the UK’s Lord Pearson for Muslims to ‘address the violence in the Koran’ (see Chapter 3). Both comments illustrate Rasmus Fleischer’s observation that:

anti-Muslim racism is typically articulated in an inductive way by generalising the behaviour of individuals, claiming that this behaviour is determined by ‘Islam’ and that it is emblematic for all persons coming from a Muslim background.  

But Stadtkeiwitz’s claim that Muslims can act to prevent political violence – which also implies that they are responsible for causing it – only echoes more bluntly the call made by Angela Merkel for German Muslims to ‘clearly reject terrorism’.

**Bürgerbewegung Pax Europa**

Like PEGIDA, Bürgerbewegung Pax Europa (BPE) – where Stadtkeiwitz is deputy chairman – presents itself as a counter-extremism body but promotes Islamophobia. Founded in 2008, the pressure group describes itself as a ‘human rights organisation’ which stands for ‘freedom and democracy’ and ‘against islamization’. In January 2015, BPE issued a press release in support of PEGIDA, declaring ‘Islamisation’ a real and existential threat to ‘liberal democratic societies’ in Europe. But beneath this veneer of democratic values and liberal rhetoric lies racism. BPE regularly lobbies at the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) – often represented by anti-Muslim activist called Elisabeth Sabaditsch-Wolff – where it has collaborated with the pan-European counter-jihad group the International Civil Liberties Alliance and the US-based Center for Security Policy run by Frank Gaffney. (Sabaditsch-Wolff and Gaffney, as Chapter 2 noted, were pictured with Donald Trump at a counter-jihad conference in 2011, before he became US president). BPE’s submissions to the OSCE include a 2014 statement recommending that member states ‘repeal all hate speech legislation’ and a 2013 paper which made unsubstantiated claims that ‘Sweden has the second highest rape rate in the world’ where ‘in most cases the perpetrator is a Muslim immigrant’.

BPE’s national secretary Conny Axel Meier is notable for a 2012 attempt to appropriate anti-fascist history for the far-right. With others, he claimed to have revived the anti-Nazi resistance Weiße Rose (White Rose) movement, for the purposes of resisting ‘Islamisation’ and ‘Islamofascism’. In an interview, Meier stated that ‘today through historical misrepresentation’ the original White Rose group (active between 1942-43) had been ‘pushed into proximity with so-called anti-fascists’ but was in fact, according to him, ‘a national-conservative, liberal movement’. At the Counter-jihad Brussels 2012 conference, Meier explicitly compared Germany’s Muslim minority to members of the Nazi party.

**Stresemann Stiftung**

Working closely with BPE in Germany and at the OSCE is the Stresemann Stiftung (foundation). It describes itself, in innocuous-sounding terms, as ‘committed to the preservation and advancement of the liberal-democratic legal system’ and calls its namesake Gustav Stresemann (leader of the German People’s Party between 1918-1929) a ‘great statesman’ who ‘understood the necessity of shielding Germany from extremist forces from the left as well as from the right’. In 2012 the organisation published a paper dismissing the idea of Islamophobia and in March 2013 launched a website called ‘Islam Debate Germany’. Another site, ‘Leftist Extremism in Germany’, followed. Both projects purported to give ‘information on ideologies which pose an acute danger to our democracy and liberal democratic constitution’.

This language closely echoes the German government’s definition of extremism, highlighting how counter-jihadists have used counter-extremism ideas to their own advantage. Using this rhetoric and backed by ‘regular’ funding from the US-based think tank Middle East Forum until at least 2013, Stresemann has gained some profile in mainstream arenas; for instance, its managing director Felix Strünig has spoken in the European Parliament.

“by placing ISIS in the same category as Nazism, the PEGIDA logo evokes the notion of ‘Islamofascism’”

**The German counter-jihad ideas in the mainstream**

Few major public figures in Germany would survive if they expressed support for ISIS, AI
Qaeda or a neo-Nazi group. Yet a key factor in the growing power of counter-jihad actors in Germany has been the articulation of aspects of counter-jihad ideology by several prominent personalities within the mainstream.

While much attention is paid to profiling young Muslim men, and investigating how and why a few may come to see violence as a legitimate response to grievances, little is said about another phenomenon: the tendency for some – typically white, male, middle-class conservatives – to turn towards racism and xenophobia in response to societal problems. Their trajectories suggest that not only do far-right ideas penetrate the mainstream, but that centrist or soft conservative journalists and politicians are also becoming attracted to far-right politics through a process that might well be called radicalisation.

One example was Udo Ulfkotte who died in 2017. Formerly a journalist with Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung he joined Stop Islamisation of Europe and then co-founded Bürgerbewegung Pax Europa. Ulfkotte later left BPE on bad terms but threw his weight behind Pegida and spoke at a rally for its Bonn variant (BogiDA) in December 2014, offering 16 arguments in favour of the ‘anti-islamisation’ movement. Another high profile journalist calling for an end to Muslim immigration to Germany – but retaining a mainstream public platform (writing for Der Spiegel and Die Welt) – is Henryk Broder, who also wrote the book Hurray! We capitulate: on the desire to cave in. As Liz Fekete of the Institute of Race Relations notes, this book’s premise is familiar: that ‘through omission, through naivety, through an unwillingness to act or even recognise the dangers ahead, liberal elites leave Europe vulnerable to Islamisation’. Germany abolishes itself by Thilo Sarrazin articulated the same themes. Published in 2010, it rapidly becoming the bestselling German-language political book in a decade. Sarrazin – a former senator of finance for the state of Berlin (January 2002 – April 2009) and a Deutsche Bundesbank executive board member – has also commented that ‘all Jews share a certain gene…that distinguishes these from other people’ and claimed that ‘no immigrant group other than Muslims is so strongly connected with claims on the welfare state and crime’. Yet he remains an influential figure.

Perhaps the most notorious case of radicalisation within officialdom is that of Rainer Grell, who once held high office in Baden-Württemberg’s interior ministry. He caused controversy by developing a ‘values test’ for migrants seeking German citizenship, that initially applied only to applicants from Organization of the Islamic Conference countries or those ‘appearing to be Muslims’. (Questions included: ‘Do you think women must obey their husbands, and if they don’t, should husbands be allowed to beat them?’ and ‘Do you think the September 11th attacks were committed by terrorists or freedom fighters?’). Grell later became a prominent figure within BPE.

These examples help to explain why some in the German government are ambivalent about condemning movements like PEGIDA. While Angela Merkel herself has strongly criticised PEGIDA, her vice-chancellor, the Social Democrat leader Sigmar Gabriel, admitted in January 2015 that he had attended a Dresden forum, and had talked with PEGIDA supporters. Some politicians even cite the ‘deeply middle-class’ background of many PEGIDA supporters and leadership and its sheer size as a reason to engage rather than condemn. Saxony interior minister Markus Ulbig of the CDU, for example, has said: We cannot label 10,000 people as right-wing extremists. That creates more problems than it solves…there are many middle-class citizens among them…and you can’t toss them all into the same neo-Nazi pot. According to Der Spiegel this same trait means that the far-right NPD view PEGIDA as ‘a chance to take their worldview directly to the middle class’ (recalling Paul Weston’s comments that PEGIDA UK seeks to be a movement for ‘middle England’; see Chapter 3). This veil of respectability arguably makes PEGIDA – whom some have labelled ‘Nazis in pinstripes’ – more dangerous than street-fighting skinheads. Indeed, the same ostensible respectability is helping the political wing of the counter-jihad movement, the AfD. As German novelist Konstatin Richter notes, the party retains ‘enough bourgeois respectability’ to attract mainstream conservatives.

A series of thefts and sexual assaults in front of Cologne’s central station on New Year’s Eve 2015 – allegedly carried out by migrants, many said to be Muslims – raised the intensity of xenophobia
and Islamophobia in Germany. The incident influenced migration legislation which has become more exclusionary, as well as hardening public opinion: one poll from May 2016 suggested that two-thirds of Germans did not believe that Islam ‘belongs’ in the country.60 In December 2016, chancellor Angela Merkel called for a ban on the burqa ‘wherever legally possible’ and the run-up to the 2017 German elections saw the centre-ground of political debate dragged sharply to the right. Brexit News, the so-called ‘alt-right’ website previously headed by ex-Trump adviser Steve Bannon, was accused of spreading inflammatory fake news about events in Germany.61 Similarly, the US-based Gatestone Institute heavily promoted AfD politician Bjørn Höcke.62

Ultimately, Merkel’s party failed to halt the meteoric success of the AfD at the ballot box that saw it gain seats in 14 of Germany’s 16 regional parliaments. From becoming the country’s third largest party in the 2017 election, one poll in early 2018 suggested the party might even have beaten the social democrats into second place. The AfD’s political power will make it increasingly difficult for other parties to ignore and there are no obvious signs that the party is softening its counter-jihadist stance.

Conclusion

Although German government counter-extremism policies exist to target the far-right as well as ‘Islamism’, only the latter has produced sweeping initiatives that foster a generalised suspicion of Muslims – even though most statistics suggest racist violence claims more lives in Germany than ‘Islamist’-linked terrorism. This, together with an understanding of ‘far-right’ politics that uses a group’s professed attitude to anti-Semitism as the key litmus test, has allowed room for organised Islamophobic groups to make gains. Evidence that some such groups have become ostensibly respectable through expressing their ideas in terms of liberal values and echoing the rhetoric and symbolism of official ‘counter-extremism’, suggests that these government policies may in fact be strengthening the counter-jihad movement, rather than offering counter-narratives to it.

Helped by mainstream figures showing support for its ideas, the counter-jihad movement has not only altered the face of the far-right, it is changing and challenging the mainstream of German politics. Thousands of Germans have protested against the PEGIDA movement. But it retains much support and recent events show that its politics are increasingly finding voice at the ballot box through parties like the AfD. Unless government policies problematising Islam are radically re-thought, it may be difficult to halt the counter-jihad movement’s progress.

Endnotes

7 Guy Chazan and Sam Jones, ‘History hangs over German counter-terrorism effort’, Financial Times, 21 December 2016. [https://www.ft.com/content/ab2194a7-c77a-11e6-8f29-9445cad39661] - accessed 21 February 2018.
9 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
17 Helmuth, ‘Germany’s experience’.
Chapter 5: France

France is thought to be home to five million Muslims, more than any other country in Europe. However, since France does not collect data on ethnicity or religion – because of the foundational republican myth of a colour-blind society – this figure is only an estimate of French citizens of North African heritage, used as a proxy for assumed Muslim faith. We can be certain, though, that Islamophobia has been widespread for many years and continues to grow. Between 2013 and 2014, the Collectif Contre l’Islamophobie en France (CCIF) recorded a 10 per cent rise in Islamophobic acts; in 2015 this rose by 19 per cent.2

Islamophobia has also been institutionalised through legislation. Its specific contextual inflection in France is often marked by what has been called ‘weaponised laïcité’ – the use of secularism as a tool to enforce assimilation in exclusionary ways.2 Female clothing is a prominent example: in 2004, it became illegal for schoolgirls to wear headscarves; a law banning the face veil (burqa or niqab) followed in 2011 (upheld by the European Court of Human Rights in 2014 and extended to the right of companies to ban religious symbols at work in 2017)4. The extent to which Muslims had come to be considered a threat to the French Republican or ‘Jacobin’ tradition was revealed by an Ipsos poll in 2013, which suggested that 75 per cent of French people viewed Islam as incompatible with French society.5

Islam, then, and by extension Muslims in France, were already suspect. But this situation has worsened greatly since 2015, a year book-ended by two major terror attacks in the country. The atmosphere deteriorated further after the July 2016 Nice truck attack killed 80 people and, soon after, a Catholic priest was murdered. This case study examines the counter-terrorism and counter-extremism policies that France has adopted, arguing that they have been shaped by – and shape – the climate of Islamophobia. It looks at the activities of the counter-jihad movement as well as Islamophobia within intellectual and political elites in the country, showing how the rise of the far-right Front National (renamed Rassemblement National, ‘National Rally’ in March 2018) has been enabled, rather than undermined, by official responses that opened the back door to extreme nationalism.
French counter-extremism policies and practices

Political violence in France has a long history. Indeed, the term ‘terrorism’ itself stems from the fearsome violence of the state following the 1789 revolution.6 During decolonisation, the National Liberation Front of Algeria engaged in violent attacks against French rule, while the French army used brutal violence, including torture. In France itself, the Vitry-le-François train bombing of 18 June 1961 by the far-right Organisation de l’Armée Secrète (OAS) – which opposed Algerian independence – killed 28 people. Later that year in October, Paris witnessed the massacre by the police of ‘perhaps as many as 250 Algerians peacefully protesting against a curfew placed on the entire north African population of the city’. 7 The November 2015 attack in Paris which killed 130 people – for which ISIL claimed responsibility – was, thus, the second most deadly atrocity on French soil.

It has been observed that terrorism’s biggest impact ‘is usually the government’s response, not the attack itself’.8 Some scholars explain terrorism as ‘blowback’ from a nation state’s foreign policies,9 while others point to high rates of youth unemployment, social exclusion, and racism experienced by residents of the deprived banlieues (working class estates) as factors in so-called ‘home-grown’ terrorism. The French government, however, has largely ignored these factors. Apparently unconcerned about the possible re-emergence of far-right terrorism, it emphasises an ideology dubbed ‘radical Islam’.

To counter the perceived threat, the government has passed new laws and carried out large-scale security operations. In 2014 new anti-terrorism laws gave wider surveillance powers to intelligence agencies. Following the attacks on magazine Charlie Hebdo and a Jewish supermarket in January 2015, another new law – dubbed a ‘French PATRIOT Act’ – again extended their power.10 French authorities also announced an extra 425 million euros would be spent creating 2,600 more counterterrorism jobs.11

After the November 2015 attacks President François Hollande declared a state of emergency. France’s borders were temporarily closed and an internal crackdown ensued. Police searched 4,000 houses and within two months had placed 382 people under house arrest, suspected of links to terrorism, although not tried or convicted of any crime.12 A plan to potentially revoke the French citizenship of dual-nationals convicted of involvement in terrorism was eventually dropped – soon after justice minister Christiane Taubira resigned in protest13 – but the state of emergency was extended six times over two years.14 According to analyst Yasser Louati, formerly of CCIF; 2016 was thus ‘the year of state-sponsored Islamophobic violence under the state of emergency’.15 These measures not only discriminated against Muslims but also undermined liberty, equality, and fraternity more broadly – the very ‘French values’ they were ostensibly intended to protect.16 When the official state of emergency ended in November 2017 it was replaced with new anti-terrorism legislation that enshrined elements of the state of emergency into law, albeit with some modification.17

“The French government’s ‘Stop Djihadisme’ campaign uses strikingly similar terminology to the far-right actors who self-identify as the ‘counter-jihad’ movement”

The government has also launched several ‘counter-radicalisation’ initiatives.18 Francesco Ragazzi of Sciences Po notes that this represents ‘a departure from a counter-terrorism policy justified mainly by a judicial approach’ and a move towards UK practice (see Chapter 3).19 Whereas the UK’s counter-extremism policy does not nominally target a single ethno-religious community (though in practice Muslims have been disproportionately affected), elements of the French programme explicitly focus on Muslims.

In January 2015 the French government launched a propaganda campaign called ‘Stop Djihadisme’.20 Along with a video exposing myths propagated by ISIL, it published a chart displaying ‘possible indicators’ of radicalisation, apparently including ‘changes in diet’, ‘rejection of certain family members’, ‘no longer listening to music’ and ‘changes in clothing (especially girls wearing clothes to cover their bodies)’.21 The chart was published soon after the introduction of the Numero Vert (Green Number), an anonymous hotline which families, friends, neighbours
or colleagues of any person suspected of ‘radicalisation’ were encouraged to call to inform authorities of their suspicions. Anti-racism campaigner Yasser Louati says he has ‘dealt with various cases of people being informed on by their neighbours’ for no good reason. The hotline, he claims ‘led to an open door to denunciation – you don’t like your neighbour, call the police on them’.

Academic Francesco Ragazzi argues French counter-radicalisation policies have created ‘an atmosphere of suspicion’ and ‘a sense of discrimination’. Of around 20,000 people who have had a ‘Fiche S’ (S card) – designating them a threat to state security – attached to their police record, 10,500 are Muslims. Fear of terrorism had been used, Ragazzi warns, to ‘legitimise the extension of police action beyond its usual purview’ into areas such as education and religion. Schools were already seen as a battleground for ‘French values’, when in April 2013, the education minister Vincent Peillon announced a plan for schools to hold compulsory weekly classes on morale laïque (secular morality) from September 2015.

In the sphere of religion, the French government has been seeking for some time to ‘manage’ Islam. The French Council of Islam was created in 2003 with government backing and remains close to the state. In 2015 its president Anouar Kbibi called for imams to be tested on their adherence to ‘French values’, required to sign a charter agreeing to abide by the law, and issued with a certificate to preach ‘like a driving licence’ (a similar idea to the proposed ‘charter of Muslim understanding’ in Britain – see Chapter 3 – or the German ‘values test’ for migrants – see Chapter 4). After the November 2015 attacks, the interior minister Bernard Cazeneuve shut down three mosques, the first time religious institutions had been closed on grounds of ‘radicalisation’.

In August 2016 the interior ministry stated that 20 Muslim places of worship had been shut since December 2015. Four further allegedly ‘extremist’ mosques were closed down in November 2016.

There are doubts whether this raft of measures will be effective in preventing political violence; some argue they could even be counter-productive. The first of a clutch of new government ‘de-radicalisation’ centres opened in September 2016; the outcomes remain to be seen. What is clear is that the scrutiny of Muslims in the name of counter-extremism has certainly not hindered, and may in fact have assisted, the far-right.

The French counter-jihad movement

The French government’s ‘Stop Djihadisme’ campaign uses strikingly similar terminology to the far-right actors who self-identify as the ‘counter-jihad’ movement. Semantic overlaps can also be seen in the names chosen by two militant French groups within this anti-Islam movement: ‘Résistance Républicaine’ and ‘Riposte Laïque’ clearly signal their affiliation to ‘French values’, demonstrating that the concepts of Republicanism and laïcité (secularism) can be put to work in the service of an Islamophobic agenda. On the surface, therefore, such groups appear to speak the same language as the state and frame the causes of – and solutions to – ‘Islamist’ political violence in a very similar way.

There also appears to be a degree of convergence in terms of government and far-right policy solutions. Résistance Républicaine and Riposte Laïque – led respectively by Christine Tasin and Pierre Cassen – jointly organised an ‘anti-Islamisation’ demonstration in January 2015, shortly after the attacks on Paris (and in part also inspired by the success of the Pegida movement in neighbouring Germany). At the protest, activists demanded ‘Salafists / Islamists out!’. Another counter-jihad group, calling itself LUCIDE (Luttons Unis Contre l’Islamisation de l’Europe) was even more explicit in linking terrorism and the Islamic faith, saying: ‘no more deaths: Islam out of Europe!’. Less than a year later, following the November attacks, such policy prescriptions hurtled into the mainstream at an alarming pace. Marine Le Pen, leader of the far-right yet increasingly mainstream Front national party, called for deportations of ‘Islamists’; then Hollande promised to speed up deportation of foreigners who pose a ‘grave threat to the security of the nation’.

Other analogies between the French government’s counter-radicalisation efforts and counter-jihad activities can be seen in the spotlight placed on mosques. As we have seen,
France's interior ministry has administratively closed down more than 20 Muslim places of worship between 2015-17, arguably a form of collective punishment. Meanwhile, the far-right direct action group Génération Identitaire (GI) protested against the public funding given a mosque in Lyon days after the July 2016 attack in Nice, as if holding all Muslims responsible. This was not the group's first such action. In November 2012, GI activists occupied a mosque in Poitiers – the site where Frankish king Charles Martel had defeated an invading Muslim army during the crusades in the year 732. (Martel was referenced by the far-right again in January 2015 when the hashtag #JeSuisCharlie went viral on social media following the Charlie Hebdo murders. In an attempt to tap into this outrage and translate it into a more hardline anti-Muslim attitude, far-right tweeters used the hashtag #JeSuisCharlesMartel.)

Génération Identitaire began life as the youth wing of Bloc Identitaire, which promotes anti-immigration politics and takes inspiration from French figures of the ‘nouvelle Droit’ such as Alain de Benoist and Guillaume Faye. At one Bloc protest in 2010, activists gathered at the Arc de Triomphe to eat pork and drink wine. These symbols of ‘French-ness’ used by the far-right to signal and enact Muslim exclusion have more recently been adopted by elements of the state. Regional governments in some French towns introduced new menus to school canteens and Muslim children have reportedly been told their options are ‘pork or nothing’. Bloc chairman Fabrice Robert – a former elected representative of the Front national (discussed later) – marched alongside Christine Tasin and Pierre Cassen’s groups at the January 2015 anti-Islamisation’ demonstration. Another key counter-jihad figure at the rally was American Daniel Pipes, who heads the Philadelphia-based Middle east Forum (MEF) introduced in Chapter 2. A key funder of European counter-jihad actors, MEF covered legal costs for Christine Tasin when she appealed a conviction for inciting hatred against Muslims (see Chapter 6). She had called Islam a ‘cesspit’ when demonstrating at an abattoir, but with MEF’s backing, Tasin won her appeal, calling the decision a ‘victory for free speech’, and adding proudly ‘I claim my Islamophobia’.

It would be wrong to portray this US funding as the main reason Islamophobia in France has spread, however. We have argued that government counter-extremism policies were both informed by and exacerbate Islamophobia; the ideas of the counter-jihad movement have also been amplified by elite intellectual figures and mainstream French politicians.

Islamophobia within the elite

Islamophobia in France has not grown on the far-right in isolation. As Daniel Pipes correctly observed, street activists’ growing boldness ‘fits into a much larger pattern’, which he characterised as ‘French social conservatives finding their voice’. Some liberals and leftists have also promoted Islamophobia.

Intellectuals

A continuing thread of Islamophobia links the radical right fringe groups to the heart of government, via cultural and political elites. Islamophobia is not a working-class phenomenon or necessarily related to education levels. As sociologist Raphaël Liogier notes, a collective of French intellectuals who ‘portray themselves as defenders of European culture’ have long been gaining prominence in the country. The so-called nouveaux réactionnaires (new reactionaries) include figures like Alain Finkielkraut, former professor at the École Polytechnique, now a member of the Académie Française and author of The unhappy identity; Eric Zemmour, a former adviser to ex-president Nicolas Sarkozy, now associated with the Front National, who wrote the book France’s suicide and has been prosecuted for racism; and Renaud Camus, who spoke at the above-mentioned anti-Islamisation rally and whose book The great replacement argued that France is being colonised by Muslims. (In anticipation of last year’s French elections, Camus published a series of interviews with Philippe Karsenty in a book entitled ‘2017: Last chance before the great replacement’).

“Of around 20,000 people who have had a ‘Fiche S’ (S card) – designating them a threat to state security – attached to their police record, 10,500 are Muslims”
The bestselling novel *Submission* by Michele Houllebecq imagined a future French caliphate, nodding to the themes of Bat Ye'or's *Eurabia*. Meanwhile *Le Figaro* journalist Ivan Rioufol's latest book *The coming civil war* articulated the common counter-jihad trope of an inevitable, bloody 'clash of civilisations'. Another mainstream journalist, Yves Mamou, formerly of major French daily *Le Monde* has claimed in an article for the US Gatestone Institute (see Chapter 2) that ‘the civil war has already begun’. Cultural products like these have helped to popularise islamophobic ideas and push the mainstream further to the right. But these intellectuals have not acted alone.

**Politicians**

Key members of France’s political elite have also used language of the counter-jihad movement. After a June 2015 attack inspired by Al-Qaeda, the mayor of Nice, Christian Estrosi – a close associate of ex-president Sarkozy – tweeted: ‘this dramatic attack in isere reminds us of the presence of a fifth column in FR [France].’ Soon after, former government minister Nadine Morano also used the phrase ‘fifth column’, catching on to a trend originally set by the former Front national politician Aymeric Chauprade who first used the term following the January 2015 attacks, when he accused French Muslims of being ‘sympathetic to terrorism’.

Former Parti Socialiste prime minister Manuel Valls, too, has used the language of the right and far-right. In June 2015, he referred to a ‘clash of civilisations’ and, after the November 2015 massacres, declared that France had an ‘enemy within’. He has stated that France needs to fight a phenomenon he insisted on labelling ‘islamofascism’ – perhaps the first time a serving European political leader has used this term. Valls said, too, that he refuses to use the word ‘islamophobia’, claiming it is used to ‘silence’ critics of ‘Islamist ideology’.

This type of rhetoric has long been more familiar within the counter-jihad movement. All these phrases and concepts can be found, for instance, in posts by US activist Edward May who runs the website Gates of Vienna and blogs under the pseudonym Baron Bodissey. He spoke in 2005 of the need for the west to fight ‘the enemy within’, has used the term ‘Islamofascism’ for at least a decade, and in 2011 attacked ‘the pedigree of the word Islamophobia’, claiming its function was “to delegitimise the opponents of Islam”.

May also approvingly posted a speech given by Geert Wilders who quipped that the ‘war’ between Islam and the Netherlands was less a ‘clash of civilisations’ and more ‘a clash between barbarism and civilisation’.

**The rise of the Front National**

Far-right rhetoric from intellectuals and politicians has been a gift to the Front National (FN). The party is not limited to counter-jihad style politics but its views on Islam and migration chime with the movement perfectly. Its recent transformation also reflects the rise of this strand of the far-right.

The FN’s roots are anti-Semitic. The country was shocked when former leader Jean Marie Le Pen, a convicted Holocaust-denier, made the second (and last) round of the French presidential election in 2002. He was expelled in 2015 as part of his daughter Marine Le Pen’s quest to sanitise and re-brand the party. Under her leadership, the FN has taken the conscious, strategic decision to talk more of culture and less of race, and to exploit widespread Islamophobia whilst claiming to reject anti-Semitism. Marine Le Pen has attracted more female voters to the party – generally less likely to support the far-right. The party has also benefited from significant Russian funding, enjoying a good relationship with figures in the Kremlin and receiving loans of at least 9.4m Euros (£7.4m) from a Moscow bank. It also reportedly sought funding from the United Arab Emirates. Above all, Le Pen’s message has gradually begun to appear less extreme as far-right ideas have been normalised by the mainstream.

Just as former Prime Minister Valls has spoken of ‘Islamofascism’, Marine Le Pen has herself associated Islam and fascism, using the phrase ‘green fascism’ to do so. She was also prosecuted for comparing Muslims praying in the street to the Nazi occupation of France. The favourite counter-jihad phrase ‘Islamofascism’ was also behind the use of the slogan ‘La sharia ne passera pas’ (Sharia will not pass) at the aforementioned Riposte Lâque / Résistance Républicaine demonstration. By appropriating the Spanish anti-fascist slogan ‘No pasaran’, the counter-jihadists associated Islam with fascism,
making themselves more credible in ‘resisting’ it and undercutting accusations of racism. For the FN, the notion of ‘green fascism’ helpfully obscures the neo-fascism of its own political history and policies.

The FN has roots in the right-wing networks that resisted Algerian decolonisation, some of whom, as we noted earlier, were involved in acts of terrorism via the OAS. Not only have French counter-extremism policies apparently overlooked this history, instead crudely focusing on Muslim communities, but the FN has been allowed to break into the mainstream in recent years. In March 2014, the party won control of a dozen local authorities. It topped the polls in European elections in May 2014, winning 25 per cent, and won 6.8 million votes in regional elections in December 2015 elections – its largest ever score. Le Pen emerged as a serious presidential contender in the 2017 election and while candidates from France’s two main parties were eliminated, she won over 10 million votes and made it to the second round, but eventually lost to the independent centrist Emmanuel Macron, who won two-thirds of the final vote in May. Macron had succeeded partly by tacking right in line with the political climate, for instance pledging to re-introduce compulsory youth military service. In February 2018, he declared his intention of ‘restructuring’ Islam in France, including the aforementioned French Council of Islam. The FN, meanwhile, won fewer seats in the 2017 legislative elections that it had hoped to but received a boost in February 2018 when it was revealed that Marine Le Pen’s niece Marion – a darling of the French far-right – would be a headline speaker at a prominent gathering of US conservatives, set to include US Vice President Mike Pence and President Donald Trump.

**Official responses to the far-right**

Despite Valls’ rejection of the word, both former president François Hollande and former prime minister Bernard Cazeneuve used the term ‘Islamophobia’, recognising it as a specific form of prejudice and discrimination based on religious affiliation. Anti-Semitic and Islamophobic hate crimes are recorded as such in France and the data is published. Following attacks on Muslim and Jewish communities, both mosques and synagogues have been provided with extra security. After one such attack on a mosque in Strasbourg, both the local mayor and Cazeneuve, then interior minister, issued explicit condemnations.

However, Cazeneuve notably called it an ‘isolated’ incident. In fact, attacks on mosques and on Muslims in France form part of worrying pattern: CCCF recorded a 400 per cent increase in acts of mosque degradation in the six months after the January 2015 Charlie Hebdo attacks. The problem is merely low on the government’s list of priorities. It has engaged in very few efforts to deploy ‘counter-narratives’ to combat Islamophobia or the far-right. Instead, as we have seen, government counter-extremism policies stigmatise and blame Muslims while several mainstream actors indulge in Islamophobic rhetoric that overlaps with that of the far-right. French authorities have finally noticed the threat posed by the counter-jihad movement. Patrick Calvar, head of the domestic security service Direction Générale de la Sécurité Intérieure (DGSI) warned of the danger several times in 2016. In February, for instance, he said: ‘far-right extremists are just waiting for more terrorist attacks to engage in violent confrontation’. In May he told parliamentarians that his agency was not only looking at ISIL and Al-Qaeda linked terrorism but was also turning its attention to ‘far-right movements who are preparing a confrontation’ for fear that ‘one or two more terrorist attacks and we may well see a civil war’. In July he warned French parliamentarians once more of the threat. Clearly the DGSI has become aware, albeit somewhat belatedly, of the far-right’s violent potential – at least at street level.

On the political level, though, now that the FN has successfully punctured the cordon sanitaire which previously kept it quarantined, it may prove far more dangerous. Part of former president Nicolas Sarkozy’s response to the rise of the far-right was to attempt to ‘woo’ FN supporters by shifting his own party’s stance to the right. This strategy appears to have backfired and rather than hindering the far-right, seems to have benefited it by re-defining ‘moderate’ and ‘extreme’. (The same re-labelling of far-right positions was visible when author and intellectual Renaud Camus, mentioned earlier, declared ‘there is nothing
right-wing about me’ – before announcing that he planned to vote for the FN.\(^6\)

The FN’s politics have not changed merely by virtue of its proximity to power. Instead, as Jim Wolfreys points out, ‘when Sarkozy declared that the FN, hitherto considered beyond the pale, was now “compatible with the Republic”, [it] said more about the drift of Republican values than any progressive evolution on the part of the FN’.\(^7\)

But the so-called ‘Lepenisation’ of Sarkozy’s Les Republicains party is, as we have seen, not the only problem. As Parti Socialist rebel Pascal Cherki observed, the centre-left cannot effectively oppose the far-right while it too is ‘appropriating measures from its programme’.\(^8\)

In other words, the far-right’s rise to apparent respectability evolved all the more smoothly because of a genuine shift in the centre-ground in French politics. This has both partly created, and is partly a symptom of, a ‘rapid shift in French public opinion’ – what seems to be a radicalisation of the mainstream. A Guardian journalist analysing opinion polls explains:

The change in mood has been primarily in the acceptance of ideas that previously were considered dangerous – in other words, not simply a greater polarisation but at the same time, the values of previously marginalised ideas now compete with the mainstream.\(^9\)

Preventative action to stop the FN politically has so far been limited to electoral withdrawals and vote-swapping between the two centrist parties, a tactic that allows the FN to pose as a victim. Therefore, although groups like Bloc Identitaire to target the same institutions. A shift to the right of the ‘centre-ground’ has opened the backdoor to the FN. In the long run, even though it is currently using the legitimate means of the ballot box, the far-right may pose a much greater threat to the fabric of society than the still-small number of violent Islamists with whom government and media remain preoccupied.

Conclusion

Islamophobia in France, as well as a series of recent attacks, have shaped French counter-extremism policies in a way that almost exclusively focuses on Muslims. The resulting climate of suspicion has in turn helped to further mainstream Islamophobia. Significant numbers of French intellectuals and politicians – from both left and right – have legitimised counter-jihad language and ideas, the only winner from this process being the Front National, despite its own historic links to networks that waged terror from the far-right.

Just as the European Network Against Racism reports that France’s law against the veil may have encouraged hostility,\(^7\) heavy-handed actions to shut down mosques – effectively endorsing collective blame for the attacks – have to some extent granted social license to the likes of Bloc Identitaire to target the same institutions. A shift to the right of the ‘centre-ground’ has opened the backdoor to the FN. In the long run, even though it is currently using the legitimate means of the ballot box, the far-right may pose a much greater threat to the fabric of society than the still-small number of violent Islamists with whom government and media remain preoccupied.
Chapter 6: Counter-jihad movement funders

While the case studies in this report focus on three countries in western Europe, the US counter-jihad movement is critical to facilitating flows of ideas, people and money into Europe via its transatlantic network. Closely examining the funding of the movement – ‘following the money’ – helps us to see where power lies in the network and the extent of its reach. Many in the counter-jihad movement go to great lengths to keep their benefactors secret, and vice versa. Unpicking their finances is no easy task. Even those registered as non-profits in Europe and in the US are not obliged to reveal who funds them. Charitable donors must declare who they are giving money to, however, many don’t. In addition, a lack of real time disclosure means it can be years before we are able to learn who is funding whom. Many of the hundreds of tax records of the groups and foundations reviewed here are only available up until 2014, with patchy coverage of 2015 and 2016.

This chapter first examines the growing importance of shadowy non-profit finance in fuelling Islamophobia in both the US and Europe. It then discusses the core US counter-jihad activists and groups promoting anti-Muslim hate, their European activities and their ties to self-declared ‘counter-extremism’ organisations operating in Europe. Finally, we profile the top US charitable foundations and billionaires who are funding these key groups linked to Europe.

The shadow giving system fuelling Islamophobia across the Atlantic: donor-advised funds

US philanthropy has experienced an unprecedented boom in ‘donor-advised’ funds (DAFs) over the past decade. These funds offer higher tax breaks than private foundations1 and allow people to anonymously route their dollars to preferred non-profits – a key selling point for anyone keen to support controversial groups, including those targeting Islam.2 An upsurge in the use of DAFs ‘for politicised giving by donors of all stripes is a prime example of the transparency problem in philanthropy today’ notes Inside Philanthropy editor David Callahan, who has called for reform of this $14 billion a year shadow giving system.3

Our research found this trend has greatly bolstered the finances of the transatlantic Islamophobia network in recent years, and increasingly helps to shield its funders from public scrutiny. In the following section, we examine the key donor-advised funds whose anonymous donations are helping amplify anti-Muslim feeling across the US and Europe.

Donors Capital Fund and DonorsTrust

Two major league donor-advised funds are the DonorsTrust and its Donors Capital Fund (DCF) offshoot. Dubbed the ‘dark money ATM of the conservative movement’, they most famously have been used by the libertarian billionaire Koch brothers to cloak their financing of many divisive causes, from climate denial and anti-union projects to charter schools.4 They are also the biggest sponsor of right-wing anti-Islam propaganda in the US, having first emerged in the decade after 9/11. DCF in 2008 most famously channelled nearly $17 million to the Clarion Fund to distribute the fearmongering 2005 film Obsession: Radical Islam’s war with the West to 28 million voters in swing states ahead of US presidential elections.5 (An accountant’s error on the tax filings shows the donor as industrialist Barre Said, a big Republican donor;6 though he and DCF issued a denial7 and others have speculated that casino magnate Sheldon Adelson was involved.) Produced by Clarion’s founder Raphael Shore, Obsession compared the threat of Islam with Nazism and was cited approvingly by Norwegian mass killer Anders Breivik.8

Our investigation of US non-profit tax filings found that, since 2009, these twin slush funds have funnelled another US$14.8 million to a handful of anti-Muslim groups with links to Europe. We discovered, too, that their reach directly extends to Britain, with the neoconservative Henry Jackson Society (HJS) think tank – which played an important role in some of the incidents discussed in Chapter 3 – accepting US$40,000
from DonorsTrust via its US fundraising arm between 2014-15.

The biggest beneficiary of DCF’s largesse – pocketing USD$11.375 million between 2009 and 2015 – was Daniel Pipes’ Middle East Forum (MEF) which, as we will discuss in the next section, both finances and works with European counter-jihad activists. This sum, we calculated, is almost five times what the twin funds gave MEF in the decade prior and represents over a third of MEF’s total income over that period. Given that MEF’s financial accounts list substantial programme spending in the Middle East and Europe, and that Daniel Pipes advocates for political leaders to work with far-right groups such as the Austrian Freedom Party, it seems likely this secret money plays a part in influencing the debate over Islam well beyond US shores.

Anti-Muslim conspiracy theorist Frank Gaffney’s Center for Security Policy, which also works with activists in Europe, received $2.08 million from DCF. The David Horowitz Freedom Center (DHRC), which funds anti-Muslim Dutch MP Geert Wilders and recently hosted British ‘freedom fighter’ Katie Hopkins and HJS’ director Douglas Murray at his exclusive annual Islamophobic weekend fundraiser in Florida, received $802,000. Other controversial grantees include the aforementioned Clarion Fund ($425,000), Pamela Geller and Robert Spencer’s American Freedom Defense Initiative ($45,000) and their related Jihad Watch website ($20,000), which operates under the umbrella of Horowitz. Former Dutch MP Ayaan Hirsi Ali, who has described Islam as a ‘destructive, nihilistic cult of death’ that needs to be ‘defeated’, was gifted $100,000 via DCF for her New York-based AHA Foundation in 2015.

Altogether, this handful of groups received USD$14.8 million from DonorsTrust/DCF between 2009-15. It is impossible for the public to know exactly whom is behind this clandestine financing. While the twin funds do disclose who receives grants from their coffers they don’t divulge the link between a client and their chosen causes. ‘Even the IRS doesn’t know where a particular donor’s money goes after it gets to DonorsTrust’, notes the Center for Responsive Politics. So unless the donor chooses to declare this themselves, it remains secret.

**Donor-advised Jewish community funds**

The picture grows murkier in that DonorsTrust / DCF grantees are often themselves donor advised and money can be transferred between DAFs in both directions. The Jewish United Fund/Federation of Metropolitan Chicago (JUF), in particular, has been criticised by the US-based Jewish Voice for Peace for receiving USD$5.1 million in contributions via Donor’s Trust/DCF in 2013 and also using DonorsTrust/DCF to make over $100,000 in donations since 2010. Despite a commitment to ‘stand together to say “no” to all forms of hate’, JUF also contributed funds to the Middle East Forum ($668,850 between 2011-2016) and the Investigative Project on Terrorism ($26,000). In doing so, critics argue that JUF is ‘contributing to the political and ideological trends that have helped to mainstream Islamophobia’ and create a ‘climate of intolerance and bigotry.’ JUF executive vice-president Jay Tcath, however, rejects that grants to either DonorsTrust or counter-jihad groups violate JUF’s mission.

Another intermediary, the donor-advised Jewish Communal Fund (JCF) stands similarly accused of investing in Islamophobia. By our calculations it channelled $1.58 million between 2009-10/2015/6 to groups with a focus on Europe. It notably gave $165,000 to Pamela Geller’s American Freedom Defense Initiative (AFDI) group. Geller, who is banned from entering Britain, calls Islam ‘the most anti-Semitic, genocidal ideology in the world’. She helped raise funds for the family of ex-English Defence League founder Stephen Yaxley-Lennon (aka Tommy Robinson) while he was in prison. Other core counter-jihad actors regularly receive JCF money: grantees in this period include Middle East Forum ($252,770), Clarion Fund ($304,642), David Horowitz ($215,870), Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT) ($419,010) and Gatestone Institute $180,536.

Further afield, the British Henry Jackson Society’s US charitable arm accepted $45,000 in anonymous grants for ‘unrestricted support’ via JCF between 2014-15, plus $25,000 for ‘public/society benefit’ from the donor-advised Jewish Community Federation of San Francisco, a key contributor to the core counter-jihad groups. Between 2009-16 it gave $322,100 to
MEF, $177,000 to Clarion, $550,000 to Steve Emerson’s IPT, $76,000 to Horowitz and $50,000 to Gatestone Institute. Another community-based donor, the Combined Jewish Philanthropies of Greater Boston also funded the Middle East Forum ($36,600) and IPT ($221,000) between 2010-15. The Jewish Community Foundation of Los Angeles also gave $215,610 to MEF in this period.

**Fidelity, Vanguard and Schwab Charitable donor-advised funds and trusts**

Several other giant corporate donor-advised funds are used to inject millions into the counter-jihad network. The self-declared ‘terrorism expert’ Steve Emerson, whose ‘Investigative Project on Terrorism’ (IPT) aims to ‘investigate, analyse and expose Muslim infiltration in the US’ received an unusually disclosed US$3 million from the Eugene and Emily Grant Foundation via Fidelity Charitable, one of the three biggest US non-profit DAFs. Ex-journalist Emerson’s activities include claiming Europe is riddled with ‘no-go zones’ which non-Muslims dare not visit. In 2015 he earned global ridicule, including from British prime minister David Cameron, after falsely claiming on Fox News that all of Birmingham and parts of London were such zones.

Another big counter-jihad donor, ‘Dr Bob’ Shillman who has funded Dutch MP Geert Wilders’ US trips and ex-English Defence League founder Stephen Yaxley-Lennon and Katie Hopkins’s roles as Rebel Media’s ‘Shillman Fellows’, also uses Fidelity Charitable (Gift Fund). Tax filings show that he transferred $10 million – the bulk of his private foundation’s donations – via Fidelity to unnamed groups and individuals from 2010-2015.

The giant Vanguard Charitable Endowment Program has provided the Henry Jackson Society with US$317,500 (2013-16) – the think tank’s biggest total US grants from a single source that we found. Vanguard is another favoured conduit for shady counter-jihad donors – also giving Gaffney’s Center for Security Policy $899,000 in anonymous grants between 2009-2016. David Horowitz’s think tank received $744,186 in this period too, and Robert Spencer’s Jihad Watch project a one-off $250,000 in 2012. Other Vanguard grantees from 2009-16 include Middle East Forum ($276,500), IPT ($175,270), AFDI ($50,000), Clarion ($202,000) and American Freedom Alliance.

The Schwab Charitable Fund is another right-leaning DAF processing over $1 billion a year for charitable purposes. In the five years from 2011-2016 it passed $2.7 million of secret donors’ money to the key US counter-jihad groups: nearly $1.5 million to Horowitz, $573,600 to Gaffney, $439,080 to Middle East Forum, $110,000 to Clarion and $100,360 to Emerson’s IPT. It also contributed $151,000 to British counter-extremism think tank Quilliam Foundation.

In conclusion, such donor-advised grants, and the many others examined in this chapter, represent just a fraction of the counter-jihad movement’s global funding. It is important to note that despite exhaustive trawling of many hundreds of IRS tax filings for both known and new private foundations and donor-advised funds, often we could only identify much less than half of the US core players’ total grants from all donors.

And while three of the seven US foundations identified as financial lynchpins in the 2011 expose ‘Fear Inc: The roots of the Islamophobia network in America’ – the Russell Berrie Foundation, Fairbrook Family Foundation, and Newton and Becker Charitable Foundations – seem to have ceased direct donations to Islamophobic groups, tax filings do show them using donor-advised funds. The Beckers’ tax filings for example reveal $1.6 million in recent grants to Schwab Charitable and $340,000 from 2011-16 to the Jewish Community Federation of San Francisco. As we have shown, Schwab gives large sums to Horowitz, Pipes, Gaffney and Clarion, and JCSF also funds Pipes, Gatestone and Clarion. Billionaires Aubrey and Joyce Chernick’s Fairbrook Foundation is housed under the donor-advised California Community Foundation (CCF). Fairbrook’s filings show many millions in grants to CCF and to the Jewish Federation of Los Angeles, both of which fund Steve Emerson’s organisations. Nevertheless, there’s no way of linking these grants for certain unless a donor declares them in their own filings.
Transatlantic funding flows and in-kind alliances: the key players

American donor money coming into Europe has aided the expansion and visibility of the counter-jihad movement and helped sustain its transatlantic reach over the past decade. Smaller European groups relying upon American largesse have, for instance, lamented how hard it is to raise funds at home. George Igler, a British financier and a self-described ‘counter-jihad fixer’, mothballed his Discourse Institute ‘think tank’ in 2016 after six years of supporting ‘individuals who dared to criticise Islam’, among them the UK’s Stephen Yaxley-Lennon, France’s Christine Tasin, and Germany’s Heidi Mund and Michael Stürzenberger, both associated with the anti-Islam Pegida.

‘Europeans are not really that interested in paying money for their own survival… I had to spend a lot of time crossing the Atlantic, and a lot of time talking to Americans,’ Igler told a US radio show. ‘I’d like […] to thank the Legal Project of the Middle East Forum (MEF), who were astonishingly helpful.’

Right-wing US donors have similarly propped up two mainstream British counter-extremist think tanks, the Quilliam Foundation and Henry Jackson Society (HJS). Quilliam’s abrupt loss of UK government funds after 2010/11 saw it seek donations stateside,27 reaping $2.3 million from 2012-16 from the Tea Party-backing John Templeton Foundation, another $1.08 million from the conservative Stuart Family Foundation, and $75,000 from the Bradley Foundation, which stands accused of fanning anti-Muslim hysteria by funding Horowitz and Gaffney. HJS’ income likewise soared after it turned to US donors, whom it has refused to divulge, even to Britain’s parliamentary commissioner for standards.28 Our latest research has uncovered $890,000 from US donors in recent years, almost all of them also funding other counter-jihad-linked groups.

Meanwhile, the closely-tied Middle East Forum (MEF) and Gatestone Institute focus heavily on Europe in their outreach strategies, emphasising the importance in their estimation of encouraging European anti-Islam sentiment. Gatestone, in particular, has increased its spending on the region seven-fold since 2012 according to its tax returns, and employs more European-based contractors than in the US. Dutch government disclosures dating back to 2013 also reveal Gatestone has twice paid the far-right MP Geert Wilders’ US tour expenses.29 MEF grantee David Horowitz Freedom Center (DHRC) emerged as another one of Wilders’ largest known funders, donating ‘at least €150,000’ – around US$175,000 – between 2013-2015 and $25,000 in 2016.30 DHRC board member billionaire Trump donor Robert Shillman also funds Wilders’ US activities via the ‘International Freedom Alliance Foundation’, which in 2016 also received $25,000 from another big counter-jihad donor, real estate mogul Myron Zimmerman. Shillman recently funded the counter-jihadist Stephen Yaxley-Lennon – Britain’s loudest anti-Muslim voice – for half of his year-long stint at Rebel Media, a far-right Canadian online platform run by MEF grantee Ezra Levant. Shillman also funds fellowships at MEF and the Clarion Project. No direct funding of these could be found in tax filings.

Frank Gaffney’s infamous Center for Security Policy (CSP) and the high-profile grassroots Act for America network, whose radical leader Brigitte Gabriel conflates Muslims with terrorists and claims ‘Europe has already become Eurabia’,31 have close European links too, though little traceable funding data exists. Both CSP and ACT, which have multi-million dollar budgets and boast of a ‘direct line’ to President Trump, regularly collaborate with German NGO Burgerbewegung Pax Europa activist Elizabeth Sabaditsch-Wolff, holding joint events at OSCE hearings in Brussels and issuing statements challenging definitions of free speech and Islamophobia. Gaffney has also run conferences in Washington and Europe with the Danish-based International Free Press Society’s Lars Hedegaard and Ingrid Carlqvist, a counter-jihad Gates of Vienna blogger and Gatestone fellow. Recently, his ‘Secure Freedom’ radio show hosted a four-part interview with British anti-Muslim pundit Katie Hopkins on ‘the death of Europe’ – the same theme as Gaffney’s interview with US white nationalist Jared Taylor in 2015.32 The following section explains how these four interrelated US think tanks – MEF, Gatestone, CSP and DHRC – backed by a wealthy web of neoconservative and pro-Israel donors, have
increasingly helped fund and promote fear of Islam in Europe over the past decade.

**Middle East Forum (MEF)**

Founded by Daniel Pipes in 1990, the Philadelphia-based MEF is one of the key think tanks ‘primarily responsible for orchestrating the majority of anti-Islam messages polluting … national discourse today’. It is a crucial source of funds for the counter-jihad movement in the US and beyond, spending US$11.2 million in total between 2011 and 2015 via a ‘MEF Education Fund’ (MEFED) set up to support writers, researchers, investigators, ‘moderate Muslims’ and activists working on ‘the Middle East and Islam’. Altogether, MEF says it has supported over 80 domestic and overseas organisations and individuals since it created the fund in 2008, which by 2012 accounted for 71 per cent of its programme services spend. Although select MEFED grantees are named on MEF’s website, some past European recipients such as the German Stresemann Foundation are not listed.

A few groups like the now defunct Discourse Institute have received support under both MEFED and a separate MEF Legal Project strand, which arranges for ‘pro bono and reduced rate counsel for victims of Islamist lawfare’. The latter helps fund ‘free speech’ cases in Europe, most famously for Dutch MP Geert Wilders, whom Pipes in 2015 called ‘the most important European alive today’. The importance of the MEF’s Legal Project in reclaiming free expression and political discourse … cannot be overestimated,’ Wilders declared when acquitted of hate speech in 2011.

Although MEF rarely reveals specific case costs, its public audited accounts show that it disbursed $140,000–$177,000 a year via the Legal Project between 2011–2014. In Wilders’ case, Pipes told Reuters MEF had sent money direct to his lawyer Bram Moscovitz. Other successes cited include a 2014 appeal overturning the conviction of Christine Tasin, the president of French anti-Islam Riposte Laïque/Résistance Républicaine, after she was fined and sentenced for inciting hatred against Islam (see Chapter 5). Another grantee is Philippe Karsenty, an ex-stockbroker and one-time deputy mayor of Neuilly France. He sits on the International Free Press Society’s advisory board and runs a French media watchdog that focuses on ‘the rise of militant Islam in France’. In 2013, MEF paid Karsenty’s legal fines of $13,500 (€10,000) arising from his infamous libel case over France 2 TV’s reportage of the shooting of a Palestinian child, Muhammed al-Dura in 2000.

Peder Jensen, aka Fjordman – the blogger Norwegian killer Anders Breivik cited as a great source of inspiration – also received MEF Legal Project ‘help with my legal bills (and only that)’, during the Breivik trial. So too did Oslo-based American writer Bruce Bawer who said MEF funds helped him retain a lawyer to get his name dropped from the Breivik witness list. Bawer nowadays blogs for both Gatestone and Horowitz’s FrontPage magazine. Jensen later received a ‘generous’ MEF grant for a 2013 trip to Jerusalem, Greece and Rome.

French journalist Veronique Chemla, who has published favourable interviews with Eurabia ideologue Bat Ye’or also receives MEFED grants (which Chemla described as ‘scholarships’), most recently in 2016.

The MEF educational fund pays for European conferences too. For example, it co-hosted the October 2016 ‘Dangerous Words 250’ conference in Stockholm with MEF grantee the Danish Free Press Society. Ostensibly held to celebrate the 250th anniversary of the Swedish Freedom of the Press Act, it featured talks from Sharia Watch UK’s Anne Marie Waters and HJS director/ Gatestone fellow Douglas Murray, who spoke alongside MEF’s Daniel Pipes.

One MEFED grantee making big inroads into Europe is Canadian ex-tabloid editor Ezra Levant, whose far-right, xenophobic Rebel Media/Rebel Edge website broadcasts a litany of anti-Muslim views. He set up a British Rebel outpost in 2017, hiring counter-jihadist Stephen Yaxley-Lennon ahead of the UK general election. The ex-EDL and failed Pegida UK leader used the Rebel Media platform opportunistically to whip up Islamophobia after ISIS-inspired attacks, including filming at Pegida protests and an Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) conference in Germany in early 2018.

MEF’s president Daniel Pipes, who earned $254,000 in 2016, has also appeared on Rebel
TV to warn of the danger Islam poses to Europe, notably after the Nice attack in July 2016, in a video that also featured Gatestone’s logo.\(^{54}\) The extent of MEF’s past or current financial relationship with Levant, however, is unknown as MEF’s accounts do not list specific grants. Rebel Media sells itself as ‘100% user-funded’ via subscriptions and direct donations.\(^{55}\) Former insiders told Vice News that while this pulls in $1 million a year, Levant still relies on mega-donors, especially tech billionaire Robert Shillman. In August 2017, Stephen Yaxley-Lennon proudly tweeted he had become a ‘Shillman Fellow’. Levant, who claims no donor contributes over 2% of Rebel’s annual income\(^{56}\) refused to say how much Shillman paid towards Lennon and a co-presenter’s salaries.

In September 2017 Lennon, whose team includes his ex-EDL cousin Kevin Carroll, announced a £100,000 crowdfunding for a new TV studio to host a daily chat show. By mid-February 2018 though, the crowdfunding webpage was gone and Rebel’s paywall for his high-traffic videos removed.\(^{57}\) Soon after, Lennon revealed he had left Rebel to set up his own ‘Tommy Robinson.com’ outlet.\(^{58}\) In June, however, he was jailed for 13 months after breaking contempt of court laws by Facebook livestreaming outside a Leeds Crown Court rape trial. His arrest sparked violent ‘Free Tommy’ protest marches in the UK, including two in London organized, staffed and funded by MEF, one of which was headlined by Geert Wilders and Gerard Batten MEP and drew over 15,000 supporters.\(^{59}\) Other protests were held as far afield as New Zealand, demonstrating the counter-jihad movement’s potent online reach. In Canada, ex-boss Ezra Levant also launched a Rebel crowdfunding to pay for a legal appeal despite Lennon’s guilty plea, which remarkably led to his dramatic release on bail, (pending a new hearing) in August.\(^{60}\)

Notorious ex-Daily Mail columnist Katie Hopkins is now Rebel Media’s sole Shillman Fellow. Shillman also ‘generously support[ed]’ MEF’s ‘Shillman-Ginsburg writing fellow programme’, (part-funded by Stan and Arlene Ginsberg) which paid out $233,482 to a number of fellows between 2012-14.\(^{61}\) European recipients have included Raheem Kassam, the ex-Breitbart London editor and author of ‘No-go zones: how sharia law is coming to a neighbourhood near you’ (2017). Kassam co-founded the Henry Jackson Society’s Student Rights project, and is an ex-aide to UKIP leader Nigel Farage (see Chapter 3). He reportedly organised the ‘Free Tommy’ London protest.\(^{62}\)

Another Shillman-Ginsburg fellow, Michel Gurlinkiel, runs the neocon Jean-Jacques Rousseau Institute in France. He’s an advocate of Renaud Camus’ Eurabian ‘grand replacement theory’, explained in Chapter 5. Meanwhile US fellows like Phyllis Chesler (also listed as a MEF grantee) write of their sojourns in Europe, for example an op-ed about a 2016 London visit entitled ‘How long until Arabs and Muslims rule, Britannia?’. Replete with anti-Muslim imagery such as women in ‘black burqa-like body bags’, the piece claimed that ‘certain British government offices are run as Sharia enterprises’.\(^{63}\) Although MEF does not disclose what it pays each fellow, its tax filings do show Chesler’s company was paid $125,750 from 2010-15.\(^{64}\)

MEF also funds ‘fact-finding’ tours of Europe that bring counter-jihad activists into contact with the region’s politicians and policymakers. In September 2016, Gatestone fellow and Clarion Project advisory board member Raheel Raza joined Pipes and ‘33 activists, academics and ordinary citizens’ from the US, Australia, Canada and the UK on a six-day trip to Paris, Berlin and Stockholm. Their itinerary included meetings with academics and officials in both Sweden and France’s ministries of interior. Raza’s post-trip prognosis was that ‘Europe is like a keg ready to blow’.\(^{65}\)

The following month Raza was invited to speak in the House of Lords by her Gatestone associate, Baroness Caroline Cox, who has also facilitated similar platforms for UK counter-jihad activists as Chapter 3 discussed. Raza later blogged that ‘interested and supportive’ British politicians had attended, including Fiona Bruce MP, Lord West, Lord Dholakia and Lord Tebbit.\(^{66}\) Days later she attended a conference organised by UK Mothers Against Radical Islam and Sharia (MARIAS). Her own Canadian group ‘Muslims Facing tomorrow’ is listed as a supporting member of Baroness Cox’s UK-based ‘Equal and Free’ organisation, which campaigns against Shariah law.\(^{67}\)

Aside from its donations to Gatestone, which we will examine shortly, MEF passed often large sums between 2009 and 2015 to collaborators
such as Steve Emerson’s Investigative Project (US$1.4 million), Gaffney’s Center for Security Policy ($485,000), David Horowitz’s Freedom Center ($26,000) and its Jihad Watch project run by Robert Spencer ($20,000) – further demonstrating the interconnectedness of the US counter-jihad constellation. MEF also gave $115,000 up until 2016 to Charles Jacob’s Zionist outfit Americans for Peace and Tolerance, whose ‘counter-extremism arm’ MEF ‘absorbed’ in early 2017 into its ‘Islamist Watch’ project. The latter is now headed by Samuel Westrop, whose British ‘counter-extremism’ outfit Stand for Peace we examined in Chapter 3.

Another group receiving MEF funds is the California-based American Freedom Alliance (AFA), which Geert Wilders declared as paying for his expenses to speak at its Heroes of Conscience conference in May 2017, and for a speech on the ‘future of Europe’ in 2013.69 AFA, which ‘promotes, defends and upholds Western values and ideals’ mainly through Islamophobic propaganda, is designated as a hate group by the Southern Poverty Law Center. European speakers at AFA conferences have included Gatestone/AFA fellow Guy Milliere and Philippe Karsenty from France, and Pax Europa’s Elizabeth Sabaditsch-Wolff in September 2016, alongside Robert Spencer, Pamela Geller and Frank Gaffney.70

Donors to the Middle East Forum itself include a mixture of donor-advised funds, and pro-Israel and neoconservative foundations. We identified $22.9 million in grants out of MEF’s total $34.9m grant income reported between 2009-16. While the Donors Capital Fund and DonorsTrust funneled $11.2 million – the largest slice of MEF’s known grants between 2009-2016 (figure 1), another $6.1m of contributions from Nina Rosenwald’s Abstraction Fund and two related family funds (Anchorage Charitable and William Rosenwald Family Fund, both now dissolved) dwarfed those of any other private donors. Altogether they accounted for half – $17.3m – of MEF’s total $34.9m grant income to 2016. Four key Jewish community donor-advised funds acted as a conduit for an extra $1,412,780. All four, while not specifically Zionist in outlook, are generally supportive of Israel, but fund diverse causes, many of them secular and non-political, probably indicating a wide range of ultimate donors.

Figure 1: Middle East Forum donors breakdown 2009-16

Our analysis of hundreds of US non-profit tax records identified many other MEF donors, many of them pro-Israel, who similarly bankroll other Islamophobic activists with links to Europe. These include the Lynde & Harry Bradley Foundation, Eugene and Emily Grant Foundation, Edgerly Foundation, MZ Foundation, Helen Diller Family Foundation, Koret Foundation and the Ed Snider Foundation. Although tax filings for two other big-name MEF donors identified in Fear Inc, the Fairbrook Foundation and Newton and Rochelle Becker Foundation reveal no direct grants since 2012 to either MEF, Horowitz, AFA or CSP, the Beckers gifted the Henry Jackson Society $7,000 in 2015 for ‘educational programs on foreign affairs’ and have funnelled money since 2010 to unknown groups via the Jewish Community Federation of San Francisco, which as detailed earlier in this chapter funds counter-jihad groups such as MEF and Clarion among others.71

Gatestone Institute

Sitting alongside MEF at the epicentre of this US-European counter-jihad network is Sears Roebuck heiress Nina Rosenwald, a major funder of US neocon and Islamophobic advocacy groups. As Chapter 2 noted, her Gatestone Institute think tank is a key clearing house for anti-Muslim propaganda online, with powerful political links. In April 2018 Gatestone’s chairman, former UN ambassador John R Bolton, became President Trump’s new national security adviser.

Gatestone’s latest public tax filings show it
received $2.3 million in contributions in 2016 and held $347,077 in total assets. It spends more on Europe than anywhere else, including the US. Its annual programme spend in the region has increased more than seven-fold since Gatestone was founded in 2012 – up from $47,804 to nearly $397,072 in 2015 and $362,847 in 2016. Altogether, it spent $1.25 million in the five years from 2012 – six times its US programme costs.

Much of this goes on paying overseas contributors to its multilingual website; Gatestone tax returns show just four European employees/contractors in 2013 rising to 26 in 2016 (albeit down from a peak of 32 in 2015). In contrast, it employs just five US-based contractors.

Gatestone also has a European ‘board of governors’ comprised of two writers and ‘distinguished fellows’, Amir Taheri and Ann-Elisabeth Moutet, and numerous other European fellows. They include France’s Guy Milliere, a University of Paris VIII professor who also posts at the far-right Riposte Laïque website, and a bunch of Britons: Douglas Murray of HJS, right-wing activist Denis MacEoin, ex-British Army colonel Richard Kemp, ex-UKIP senior aide/ex-Breitbart editor Raheem Kassam, Telegraph journalist Con Coughlin and MEF’s Sam Westrop. Another Gatestone fellow, German/Spanish political analyst Soeren Kern, was paid US$130,000 in 2016 as ‘head writer’.

In early 2017, Gatestone set up a new European site in the Netherlands with four Dutch contributors. ‘Gatestone EU’ web editor and ‘distinguished fellow’ Timon Dias told the Washington Post the aim was ‘to swing the debate ahead of European elections … to deliver a tide of anti-immigrant leaders to office in the Netherlands, France, Germany and elsewhere’.


Yet Rosenwald’s funding of Wilders’ flights and hotel bills for US speaking tours dates back to 2008, whilst a board member of the neoconservative Hudson Institute. From 2012 onward she hosted him at special ‘Gatestone Briefing Council’ events for ‘members’ who had given $10,000 or more. Before the Dutch election, Rosenwald expressed hope that Trump’s
success would play out in similar European victories. ‘Everyone is finally breathing freely after eight nightmarish years,’ she told POLITICO, adding she’d happily support Wilders ‘in any way legally permissible’. By mid-March 2017 though, Gatestone EU was inexplicably offline, its social media accounts locked. By May’s French presidential runoff, no trace remained. It is unknown whether Rosenwald fell afoul of the Dutch or US authorities, or changed tack. Gatestone US continued publishing Europe-focused articles, and its inflammatory fake news stories stoking anti-Muslim fears were syndicated ahead of Germany’s September 2017 elections across counter-jihad-linked sites such as Politically Incorrect, and heavily promoted by far-right AfD politicians.

In Britain, Gatestone held an event on 2 March 2017 titled ‘In Conversation at The House of Lords’, headlined by key figures from its elite board of governors: John R. Bolton, former UK Conservative Party policy adviser and Times political columnist Lord Finkelstein, and Baroness Caroline Cox. No public record exists of what was discussed, who attended or whether the speakers were paid. Finkelstein, who attended another ‘in conversation’ event at the Lords in February 2018 with Gatestone senior fellow Khaled Abu Toameh, has previously declared four Gatestone speaking events in the Lords’ Register of Interests as remunerated above the £500 threshold.

Gatestone’s tax filings also show John Bolton as earning $310,000 as an ‘event speaker’ over three years (2014-16); its events list shows he did just one ‘Council Briefing’ a year in 2015 and 2016. Curiously neither Cox nor Finkelstein have ever declared their Gatestone governor roles – both previously listed on Gatestone’s website as ‘in formation’ since late 2014. Nor is there any record of whether Cox was paid for a 2014 Gatestone talk on ‘Islamic Extremism in Europe and Africa’. (Gatestone’s filings do show, then however, a one-off $10,000 grant that same year to Cox’s US charity arm Humanitarian Relief Aid Trust Inc..) In total, the filings show Gatestone spent $561,816 on speakers from 2014 to 2016. One panel event held in Paris in 2014 featured Lord David Trimble, Friends of Israel Initiative’s Madrid-based director Rafael Bardaj and Gatestone’s Soeren Kern. Gatestone’s expenses that year show nearly $393,000 went on conferences and meetings, $120,000 on travel and $172,000 on outreach.

Gatestone itself is mostly bankrolled by the Abstraction Fund, Rosenwald’s own private foundation. The Middle East Forum initially acted as a conduit for nearly $3 million in grants to Gatestone from 2012-13. Since 2013 though, Abstraction has paid Gatestone over $2 million directly. This coincides with Gatestone becoming tax exempt in 2013. Grants to MEF concurrently dropped to $335,000 in 2014 and $260,000 in 2015, with only a fraction of these sums – $28,000 – then being paid out by MEF back to Gatestone over those two years. MEF and Abstraction are identified as ‘related’ tax exempt organisations on Gatestone’s 2013 and 2014 tax filings; only Abstraction is listed in 2015 and 2016.

Gatestone’s most politically significant donations have come from Republican mega-donors Robert and Rebekah Mercer. Dubbed the masterminds of the Trump presidential campaign and the money behind Breitbart News, this libertarian, hedge fund billionaire father and daughter duo have given Gatestone US$250,000 via their Mercer Family Foundation. Rebekah joined Gatestone’s board of governors in March 2017 and Breitbart often cross-posts Gatestone’s material. While on Trump’s transition team, Rebekah lobbied (unsuccessfully) for Gatestone chair John Bolton to be US deputy secretary of state in 2016 – her role in his appointment as national security adviser in 2018 is not known. The Mercers are reportedly ‘good friends’ with ex-UKIP leader Nigel Farage too.

Other donors we identified after 2014 are linked to Rosenwald’s own neocon and pro-Israel circles. Four counter-jihad network donors contributed $50,000 each – the Emerson Family Foundation, MZ Foundation, Shillman Foundation and Gatestone/MEF governor Robert Immerman through his namesake foundation (he also funds MEF). Edward Sugar, whose wife Rebecca is also a Gatestone governor also gave $50,000 though it is not known if he funds other groups. Other notable counter-jihad donors are the Jewish Communal Fund ($180,536) and Diana Davis Spencer Foundation ($25,000). US hedge fund billionaire Israel Englander gave Gatestone
$10,000 in 2015 and MEF $15,000 in 2012. Rosenwald personally donated $384,680 in 2015. Overall, we identified almost two-thirds ($5,957,445) of Gatestone’s total $9.1 million grant income between 2012-16. 94

**David Horowitz Freedom Center**

Founded in 1988 by David Horowitz and Peter Collier, this Los Angeles-based think tank was originally called the Center for the Study of Popular Culture. It ‘combats the efforts of the radical left and its Islamist allies to destroy American values and disarm this country’. Horowitz, aka the ‘godfather of the anti-Muslim movement’, boasts of receiving the financial support of ‘over 100,000 donors’ for his Freedom Center and assorted projects. Among them are some of the largest neoconservative and pro-Israel donors in the US, who provide a sizeable chunk of DHRC’s yearly income of $6.2-$7.5 million.

Horowitz is the highest paid of his counter-jihad peers; DHRC tax returns show that in 2015 alone he received an astonishing $583,000 salary package.95 Employees include Robert Spencer who has run the Jihad Watch website since 2003 and was paid $170,000 by DHRC in 2015. Although part of DHRC, Jihad Watch is set up as a separate non-profit. Its tax returns name Pamela Geller as its vice president and her American Freedom Defense initiative as a ‘related organisation’, which received $447,313 in grants from Jihad Watch between 2011-15. Banned along with Geller in 2013 from entering the UK to speak at an EDL demonstration, Spencer has described Europe as besieged by an ‘Islamic invasion’.

Horowitz is a close friend of ex-UKIP leader Nigel Farage. Days after Trump was elected President in 2016, Farage – as ‘Mr Brexit’ – received a standing ovation as he took the stage at Horowitz’s annual Restoration Weekend fundraiser in Florida. The latest summit in
November 2017 included four equally controversial anti-Muslim British speakers: media pundit Katie Hopkins, who tweeted herself hugging ex-Trump terrorism adviser Sebastian Gorka; alt-righter Milo Yiannopoulos; and Douglas Murray of HJS (also joined by HJS colleague Alan Mendoza). Past speakers at Horowitz’s fundraisers include Dutch MP Geert Wilders in 2014 and dozens of prominent US conservatives, among them vice-president Mike Pence and attorney general Jeff Sessions. As Chapter 2 noted, these link Horowitz closely to the Trump White House. Such fundraisers are lucrative – tax filings show Horowitz raised $351,000 at his 2015 Restoration Weekend.

Horowitz, like Nina Rosenwald, has sponsored Geert Wilders since at least 2008, including at a US fundraiser worth $75,000 in 2009. The Dutch MP calls him a ‘dear friend and ally’. Just how much Horowitz has paid him is unknown – Dutch authorities have only required Wilders to declare his donations since 2013. These show multiple payments totalling $134,000 (£126,354) in 2014 and 2015 from Horowitz to Wilders’ Dutch political party’s fundraising arm ‘Friends of the PVF Foundation’. The Dutch press flagged a discrepancy between the figures Wilders disclosed and those of DHRC. The Intercept website also pointed out DHRC had failed to declare any foreign grants in its 2014 tax return – possibly violating IRS non-profit rules – and argued that donations to a foreign political campaign were also a violation. (DHRC confirmed the donations, though ignored the Intercept’s request for clarification).

Since then, newer PVF parliamentary disclosures reveal that DHRC also paid for Wilders’ US flight and hotel in August 2017, though no amounts are given. This tallies with Wilders speaking at a gala event that month honouring DHRC board member Bob Shillman, who also chairs Wilders’ US fundraising arm, the International Freedom Alliance Foundation (IFAF), Wilders’ own records also show a May 2017 trip paid by the American Freedom Alliance (a MEF grantee). Neither IFAF, whose purpose is ‘education about multiculturalism’ nor Horowitz declare who gives them the money for Wilders. Our investigation discovered, however, that his secret financiers include the well-respected Helen Diller Family Foundation in California. Its tax filings reveal two payments of $25,000 earmarked for Wilders – one via DHFC for his legal defence fund in 2014/15 and another via IFAF in 2015.

We calculated too that Diller is now one of Horowitz’s top three known donors, contributing $975,000 between 2009-15. The foundation, whose mission states that it operates ‘exclusively for charitable, educational or religious purposes by conducting or supporting activities for the benefit of, or to carry out the purposes of the Jewish Community Federation of San Francisco Marin Peninsula & Sonoma Counties’, also funds Pamela Geller, Daniel Pipes, Frank Gaffney, Steve Emerson, and the Tea Party. Another top donor similarly funding both Horowitz and Wilders is the MZ Foundation, which gave Horowitz $501,600 up to 2016.

Horowitz is bankrolled by a mixture of neoconservatives and pro-Israel foundations and donor-advised funds. Chief among these are the neoconservative Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation, which contributed $2.29 million between 2009-2016, and Sarah Scaife/Allegheny Foundations, which gave $3.8m to 2015. Anonymous donors funnelled $1.413m via Donors’ Trust/DCF ($802,000 to 2015) and Vanguard Charitable. ($611,686). More anonymous grants came via the Jewish Communal Fund ($216,500) and Jewish Community Federation of San Francisco ($76,500). While both these funds give to Zionist and pro-Israel groups they also support a multitude of secular and non-political causes.

Republican (and Trump) mega-donor Sheldon Adelson gave Horowitz $50,000 in 2015 via his family foundation, which gives millions to Zionist and pro-settlement causes and has previously funded Steve Emerson. Other big Horowitz pro-Israel benefactors similarly funding counter-jihad activists from 2009-15 are the Snider Foundation ($831,041), Claws Foundation ($250,000), Harry and Jeannette Weinberg Foundation ($300,000), Sandra and Lawrence Post Foundation ($269,000), Abstraction Fund ($128,750 to 2016) and Emerson Family Foundation ($105,000).

In total, we could only identify US$11.5 million of Horowitz’s $41.8m in grants received between 2009-16.
Center for Security Policy

The Washington-based Center for Security Policy (CSP) brings together a number of hardline neoconservatives, led by Frank Gaffney, a Reagan-era Pentagon official. Former CIA director James Woolsey and Trump’s new security adviser John Bolton have long advised CSP, and Gatestone’s Nina Rosenwald has served on CSP’s board. During the US presidential campaign Trump used a widely discredited CSP poll, which claimed that 25 per cent of American Muslims agreed violence against Americans is justified as part of the global jihad, to argue for his immigration plan.104

As Chapter 2 explained, CSP in 2015 sponsored an invitation-only ‘Defeat Jihad Summit’ in Washington at which several European counter-jihadists spoke via Skype, including Geert Wilders MP, Lars Hedegaard and British UKIP peer Lord Pearson. In the year after this summit, CSP’s grant income soared to $7.057 million by June 2016 – up from $4.5 million. Its expenditure of nearly $6.5 million that year included hefty consultancy fees of $150,000 each to the Middle East Forum and CSP counsel David Yerushalmi’s own American Freedom Law Center. Gaffney’s salary package was $353,441.105

CSP discloses no financial information for its collaborations with European activists or overseas spending on its tax filings. But it has worked for years with German NGO Pax Europa, which – as Chapter 4 explained – lobbies against definitions of free speech and Islamophobia at OSCE Human Dimension Implementation meetings. In 2017 Pax’s Elizabeth Sabaditsch-Wolff and CSP’s senior vice president Clare Lopez held a joint event in Warsaw and a panel on free speech in Washington. Sabaditsch-Wolff, who was convicted of hate speech in Austria in 2011, also runs the international chapter of anti-Muslim group ACT for America which has links to the Christian Coalition.106 She is a regular face at US counter-jihad-aligned events and enjoys access to high-level US politicians like Kansas secretary of state Kris Kobach. Aside from a blog donate button, it is unclear who funds her transatlantic trips. (The Gates of Vienna blog says ACT gives financial support.107)

In total, we identified $12.1 million of CSP’s $25.7 million in grants between 2009-15. Like Horowitz, Gatestone and MEF, Gaffney’s funders encompass neocons, pro-Israel/Zionist and donor-advised funds. They also include billionaires like controversial junk bond investor Ira Rennert and his wife Ingeborg (a Gatestone governor), Texas oil tycoon financier T. Boone Pickens (chair of BP Capital) and the late John Templeton, whose private foundation is British counter-
extremist group Quilliam Foundation’s biggest donor, and has strong ties to right-wing Christian networks and the US Tea Party. A rare glimpse into CSP’s non-redacted tax filings posted online by journalist Eli Clifton reveals that, in 2013 alone, CSP received $50,000 contributions from Rennert and Pickens, and that Templeton personally gave CSP $150,000 directly and another $450,000 via his Templeton Giving Fund. It is not known whether these billionaires are regular donors, but this tiny insight into usually opaque tax records sheds some light on Gaffney’s elite and powerful backers. The US’s largest pro-Israel lobby group AIPAC was also recently exposed by Eli Clifton as a CSP donor, contributing $60,000 via its spin-off Citizens for Nuclear Free Iran.

Clariion Project

The Clarion Project (officially Clarion Fund Inc) describes itself as a 501(c)3 non-profit media organisation that educates ‘both the public and policymakers about the growing phenomenon of Islamic extremism’ and the ‘dangers of radical Islam’. Although Washington-based, its focus extends ‘to Islamic extremism in Europe and the Middle East’. Founded in 2006 by Rabbi Raphael (Robert) Shore of the radical Zionist group Aish HaTorah, Clarion received millions of dollars two years later via the Donors Capital Fund to distribute the incendiary film Obsession, as discussed earlier. Founding advisory board members include Frank Gaffney and Daniel Pipes.

Clarion claims 85-million people have seen its ‘award-winning’ propaganda films. Some have even been ‘screened on Capitol Hill and in the UK, Canadian and European Parliaments’ and at the UN. One short film hosted by Clarion spokeswoman and advisory board member Raheel Raza, on the topic of Muslim opinions and demographics, was shown in the British House of Lords in 2016. Raza, who is also a Gatestone fellow, has close links to British Baroness Caroline Cox, and the now defunct, Gatestone-backed Stand for Peace. Clarion’s British editor-in-chief David Harris, an ex-BBC and Reuters journalist, hosts Clarion’s Facebook Live updates, covering issues such as French schools banning pork, and publishes slick e-newsletters with articles about the Islamisation of Europe, for example ‘Belgium – Europe’s first Islamic state?’.
Clarion’s annual grant income has more than doubled since 2010 to more than $2.49 million in 2016. However, we could only identify $1.82m of its total $13.89m income between 2009-16. Most of this came via opaque donor-advised funds as detailed earlier; DonorsTrust/DCF, Jewish Communal Fund, JCF San Francisco, Schwab Charitable and Vanguard Charitable. Other notable counter-jihad donors included the Newton D. & Rochelle F. Becker Foundation ($65,000 from 2010-12) and the Abstraction Fund ($20,000). Clarion’s (now removed) crowdfunding page for its soon-to-be-released 2018 film, *The Jihad Generation*, stated that donations would be matched by ‘generous’ (unnamed) funders while a June 2018 e-fundraiser announced that all donations would be tripled.

Counter-extremism groups: transatlantic funding and in-kind alliances

Four self-declared European ‘counter-extremism’ organisations and associated individuals are linked to the aforementioned US counter-jihad think tanks and individuals either through overlapping donors, personnel or advisers. Such connections, however, appear to pose little hindrance to their movement within government and academic circles within Europe (or indeed in the US), and their influence on counter-extremism policy in the region.

Stand for Peace/ Sam Westrop

As Chapter 3 described, Samuel Westrop is a ‘senior fellow’ of the Gatestone Institute. It helped fund his British ‘counter-extremism’ / ‘Jewish-Muslim interfaith organisation’ Stand for Peace (SFP) to produce a report and campaign called ‘Don’t Fund Extremism’ in November 2013. Although Nina Rosenwald has denied directly funding SFP, archived web pages clearly state the campaign had Gatestone ‘support’. A fellow since 2008, Westrop was also described on BBC TV as a Gatestone analyst whilst promoting Stand for Peace work. Faced with a UK libel action in 2015, Westrop moved stateside to join anti-Muslim Zionist outfit, Americans for Peace and Tolerance (APT) in Boston, which both Rosenwald and the Middle East Forum (MEF) have funded. In March 2017, MEF appointed Westrop director of its Islamist Watch project after it “absorbed” APT’s counter-extremism arm. With a yearly budget of circa $180,000,1 Islam Watch uses similar smear tactics to SFP, lobbying for grassroots Muslim groups to be de-funded by private foundations and government, for instance the Homeland Security Department’s Countering Violent Extremism programme. It is not known who paid Westrop’s defence costs in the libel case he lost against Islam Channel founder Mohamed Ali Harrath in early 2017 (see Chapter 3). It is worth noting that MEF’s Legal Project supports European ‘Islamist lawfare’ cases. Although Stand for Peace’s website remains online, UK company records show that Westrop resigned as its sole director in August 2016 and it was dissolved June 2017.

Student Rights/Henry Jackson Society

Another Gatestone and MEF senior fellow is ex-Breitbart editor Raheem Kassam, a controversial ex-aide to former UKIP party leader and MEP, Nigel Farage. Kassam has extensive links within counter-jihad and neoconservative circles in Europe and the US. In 2009, he set up Student Rights, the ‘counter-extremism watchdog’ arm of the Henry Jackson Society (HJS) think tank, a crucial intermediary between counter-jihadists and counter-extremists as Chapter 3 observed. HJS has also hosted London events for high-profile Republican politicians like Louisiana governor Bobby Jindal, who claimed certain immigrants were seeking to ‘colonise’ the West. Current Students Rights director Rupert Sutton asserted in 2014 that his campaign fundraises independently of HJS but no separate accounts substantiate this. Despite HJS’s refusal to name its financiers in Europe or elsewhere, our research indicates an ever-increasing reliance on US donors, most of whom also happen to fund US counter-jihad groups. In total, we have uncovered $890,500 in new grants to HJS from US donors since 2013/14. The largest amount, as detailed earlier, came as anonymous grants totalling $317,500 via Vanguard Charitable.

New important HJS backers include the Bodman & Achelis Foundation, which is chaired by the
Hudson Institute’s Russell Pennoyer. It gave HJS $80,000 for operating costs in 2016 and funds various counter-jihad organisations. The Emerson Family Foundation gave HJS $50,000 in 2015 – it also funds Gatestone, MEF, Horowitz and the Clarion Project – as does another new controversial donor, Myron Zimmerman. His MZ Foundation gave HJS $50,000 in 2016.

Notably, HJS has accepted $20,000 from Nina Rosenwald’s Abstraction Fund, plus $7000 in 2015 from the Newton and Rochelle Becker Charitable Trust, both named as top Islamophobia donors in Fear Inc in 2011. The latter’s grant was for ‘educational programs on foreign affairs’.118 Other pro-Israel HJS donors also financing counter-jihad groups were the Hertog Foundation, which gave $30,000 in 2014-15 and has funded Pipes, Gaffney and Horowitz’s think tanks, as has the Koret Foundation, which gave HJS $4000. Additional grants came from the Libitzky Family Foundation chaired by Moses Libitzky, which contributed $87,000 between 2013-16; Goodman Family Supporting Foundation ($105,000 from 2013-15); Rosenblatt Charitable Trust ($50,000 from 2013-2015); Lisa and Michael Leffell Family Foundation ($15,000); Meidar Family Charitable Trust ($15,000) and the Tina and Steven Price Foundation ($5000).

In the UK, HJS donors have included the Atkin Charitable Foundation (which also funds groups active in settlement related activities in the Occupied West Bank);119 former UK Conservative Party treasurer Lord Stanley Kaln’s Traditional Alternatives Foundation; and the Stanley Kalms Foundation. Lord Kalms is chairman of Henry Jackson Society’s strategy committee.

Quilliam Foundation
The British-headquartered Quilliam Foundation which pitches itself as the world’s first counter-extremism think tank, worked closely with HJS’ Student Rights project in its early years. As Chapter 3 explained, it also linked itself to the Gatestone Institute when two senior Quilliam directors co-signed a statement published by Gatestone in a New York Times advert in 2015 that called upon all Muslims to condemn violence after the Paris terrorist attacks. Evidence emerged too of how EDL founder Stephen Yaxley-Lennon received £8,000 from Quilliam after he quit the EDL in 2013.120

Quilliam has accepted money from several counter-jihad network funders. These include the US conservative Bradley Foundation ($75,000 in 2013), which stands accused of fuelling anti-Muslim hatred via its financing of Horowitz, Pipes and Gaffney. It has received US$2.1 million since 2011 from the John Templeton Foundation, which has close ties to right-wing Christian networks and the US Tea Party,121 and whose founder, as detailed earlier in this chapter, donated to Frank Gaffney’s think tank in 2013.122 Another Gaffney funder, the conservative Stuart Family Foundation, has contributed $1.08m to Quilliam.

Quilliam has also received US$40,000 from controversial new-atheist Sam Harris, who argues ‘there is a direct link between the doctrine of Islam and Muslim terrorism’,123 and funds the counter-jihad activist and ex-Dutch MP Ayaan Hirsi Ali. Other non-financial counter-jihad ties include the Clarion Project which says it ‘backs’ Quilliam and has published favourable interviews with Quilliam staff, whom it describes as progressives.124 Clarion’s Raheel Raza and Quilliam’s Maajid Nawaz have shared platforms with HJS’ Douglas Murray, including in 2016 at the UK National Secular Society’s 150th anniversary conference in London.

Counter Extremism Project
Another American outfit working in Europe, almost exclusively focused on Islamic extremism, is the Counter Extremism Project (CEP). With offices in London and Brussels, CEP is embedded within Europe’s political elite, boasting several European ex-ministers and strong alignment with US and European government counter-extremism efforts. It is co-run by ex-US senior government homeland security adviser Frances Townsend and former Bush-era UN diplomat and lobbyist Mark Wallace, also an ex-homeland security official. Former British Foreign Office minister Mark Simmonds was CEP’s chief operating officer from 2015-16.125 CEP’s European advisory board includes luminaries like former Northern Ireland first minister Lord
Trimble (also a founding signatory of the Henry Jackson Society), British Conservative MEP Charles Tannock, former UK diplomat and counter-terrorism chief Sir Ivor Roberts, and the ex-head of Germany’s federal intelligence service August Hanning, among others. Its US advisers include neocon ex-senator Joseph Lieberman and Raymond Kelly, the ex-New York Police Department head who presided over deeply controversial and discredited racial profiling and spying on American-Muslims.

CEP shields the identity of its financial backers, citing security issues but was set up as a 501(c3) non-profit as ‘a fundraising technique’ to encourage wealthy patrons. ‘Keeping our donors secret inspires them to give,’ Wallace explained at CEP’s launch in September 2014. Exactly how much of its US$5.5 million in grants that year; $6m in 2015 or $7.5m in 2016 might have originated from counter-jihad donors is thus impossible to gauge.

Clues as to their identities though can be gleaned from CEP’s tax filings under its non-profit ‘doing business as’ (DBA) name, Green Light Project Inc. These reveal CEP/Green Light as a spin-off from the hawkish United Against a Nuclear Iran (UANI), an American advocacy outfit also run by CEP bosses Mark Wallace and David Ibsen. Its advisory board includes militarists like Trump’s national security adviser ex-Gatestone chairman John Bolton alongside HJ’s chairman Lord Stanley Kalms, plus several ex-British security services and military top brass: Baroness Pauline Neville-Jones, Sir Richard Dearlove, Sir Graeme Lamb and Lord Charles Guthrie. In 2016, UANI’s main donors were exposed by Lobelog as casino billionaire Sheldon Adelson and mining magnate Thomas Kaplan. As detailed earlier, Adelson gave counter-jihadist David Horowitz $50,000 in 2015 via his Adelson Family Foundation and is a known past funder of Steve Emerson. The Jewish Communal Fund directs anonymous money into UANI too. More recently, Lobelog reported that leaked emails revealed discussions of potential funding from the United Arab Emirates to both CEP and UANI.

We also know that, just as the British Quilliam Foundation benefited from state funding in its early years, CEP gets US government grants. These include a two-year US$298,760 grant ‘for building capacity’ from the US Homeland Security department in 2016 under the Obama administration’s Countering Violent Extremism programme, which works with grassroots Muslim groups.

US tax filings show that CEP/Green Light tripled its spend on its European ‘education and advocacy’ programme services from $250,000 when it first started in 2014 to $750,000 by 2015. Its latest available tax filings for 2016 show a similar $755,000 payment albeit marked as a grant for ‘consulting and operations’. Funds are wired to CEP Brussels, a Belgian non-profit that Green Light ‘helped form’ in order to expand its projects to Europe.

CEP Brussels is headed by Roberta Bonazzi. She also runs her own neocon think tank, the European Foundation for Democracy (EFD), which is named jointly with CEP on conferences and publications and espouses similar views. EFD itself is partially funded by pro-Israel foundations routed via its US-based philanthropic arm, the Friends of the European Foundation for Democracy (FDD), which is named jointly with CEP on conferences and publications and espouses similar views. EFD itself is partially funded by pro-Israel foundations routed via its US-based philanthropic arm, the Friends of the European Foundation for Democracy (FDD), which is named jointly with CEP on conferences and publications and espouses similar views. EFD itself is partially funded by pro-Israel foundations routed via its US-based philanthropic arm, the Friends of the European Foundation for Democracy (FDD), which is named jointly with CEP on conferences and publications and espouses similar views.
US donors funding counter-jihad and counter-extremism groups with links to Europe

This section profiles a selection of the US private foundations and billionaires who between 2009-16 contributed more than $100,000 to the European and US counter-jihad activists and counter-extremism think tanks examined in this chapter. Their donations, which include the millions of dollars routed anonymously through US donor-advised funds, have proven a lifeline to such groups, and underscore the transnational, and particularly transatlantic, nature of Islamophobia funding. It should be noted however that many of these donors fund widely varied causes across the political spectrum, not just those detailed in this report.

1. DONORS CAPITAL FUND & DONORS TRUST: Contributed $15 million

Set up in 1999 by libertarian activist Whitney Ball as a spinoff from the conservative Philanthropy Roundtable, the Virginia-based non-profit Donorstrust (DT) and its sister outfit Donors Capital Fund (DCF) were ‘formed to safeguard the charitable intent of donors who are dedicated to the ideals of limited government, personal responsibility and free enterprise’.

In 2015, DT’s income was $85.5 million and DCF’s was $61.4m. As mentioned earlier, these two funds bankroll the US conservative movement, channelling hundreds of millions from anonymous donors to aid the right’s assault on unions, climate scientists, public schools and economic regulation. According to DonorsTrust, 80 per cent of its grants ‘go to groups that advance liberty’.

The funds also offer the biggest source of cash for the core anti-Muslim US and European activists and groups examined in this report, contributing nearly $15 million between 2009-15. As noted, most of this – $11.3m – went to Daniel Pipes’ Middle East Forum. Given MEF’s funding of counter-jihadists in Europe, this money has likely influenced the debate on Islam beyond America. British think tank Henry Jackson Society also accepted $40,000 from unknown sources via DCF in 2014-2015. Ex-Dutch MP and counter-jihadist Ayaan Hirsi Ali similarly received $100,000 via this route for her US foundation.

2. ROBERT AND REBEKAH MERCER: Amount unknown – likely $10million +

Billionaire Robert Mercer, whose Renaissance Technologies hedge fund is one of world’s most profitable, set up the Mercer Family Foundation in 2004. He and daughter Rebekah went on to bankroll the rise of the anti-Muslim Breitbart News, spending at least $10 million from 2011. They also invested $15m into setting up Cambridge Analytica, the online data mining firm hauled before a UK parliamentary inquiry in 2018 after it was exposed as a propaganda and disinformation machine used by, among others, the Brexit Leave.EU campaign.140 This highlights the transnational (and particularly transatlantic) nature of Islamophobia funding.

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As Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign backers, the duo wield huge political clout. ‘The Mercers laid the groundwork for the Trump revolution,’ ex-adviser Steve Bannon boasted in 2016.

‘Irrefutably, when you look at donors during the past four years, they have had the single biggest impact of anybody, including the Kochs’.

Set up with just $500,000, the Mercer foundation’s early donations were mostly to medical research and general charities. By 2008, under Rebekah’s direction, it was funding a network of ultraconservative ‘interconnected and politically tinged’ groups, writes the New Yorker. Its backing for conservative think tanks such as the Heritage Foundation, Heartland Institute and anti-Democrat watchdog Media Research Center widened after 2010 to embrace anti-Islam initiatives, including $1 million for political ads supporting a New York gubernatorial candidate fighting the so-called ‘Ground Zero mosque’.

The Mercers are now the Gatestone Institute’s third biggest donor, granting $250,000 since 2014 ($50,000 in 2014, $100,000 in 2015, $100,000 in 2016). Rebekah, who was on Trump’s election transition team, joined British peers Lord Finkelstein and Baroness Cox on Gatestone’s board in 2017, alongside former chairman John Bolton (now US national security adviser).

Other counter-jihad-related grants include $50,000 to Encounter (2013-14), publishers of anti-Muslim books such as Londonistan by British columnist Melanie Phillips and Robert Spencer’s Islam unveiled. Another grantee, the Young America’s Foundation, has controversially sponsored talks by Spencer and David Horowitz on US campuses, and also receives Abstraction Fund grants.

The foundation is however but one cog in the Mercers’ influence machine. Robert Mercer is also the biggest donor to Secure America Now (SAN), a ‘social welfare’ non-profit previously chaired by John Bolton and recently exposed for running a conspiratorial anti-Islam Facebook campaign ahead of the 2016 US election. He gave SAN $2 million in 2016; (although SAN says Mercer’s funding was for Israel and Iran-related work, not the ads).

In the same year, Mercer also donated $2.5m to the John Bolton Super PAC, which reportedly hired Cambridge Analytica.

In late 2017 an expose of ex-Breitbart columnist Milo Yiannopoulos’ links to white nationalists and neo-Nazis saw Robert Mercer sever ties with the British alt-righter. Mercer, 71, has since sold his Breitbart stake to his daughters, and retired as Renaissance CEO in January 2018. Rebekah recently faced calls to quit her American Museum of Natural History board role over her funding of climate denialists, and Trump and Steve Bannon.

3. THE ABSTRACTION FUND: Contributed $6.47 million

Founded in 2006, Abstraction is one of several private tax-exempt foundations linked to Nina Rosenwald (notably the William Rosenwald Family Fund and Anchorage Charitable Fund) and has a long history of funding anti-Muslim groups. While Rosenwald calls herself a human rights advocate; others accuse her of being embedded in a network of far-right extremists who sympathise with Donald Trump’s white supremacist American Dream.

As outlined earlier, her sponsorship of Dutch MP Geert Wilders and promotion of far-right leaders and European parties like Germany’s AfD and France’s Marine Le Pen has provoked much unease.

In 2015, Abstraction held $4.1 million in assets and disbursed $971,565 in charitable grants. Rosenwald herself was the only contributor, gifting $211,800 in non-cash shares to Abstraction.

Top Abstraction counter-jihad grantees include those profiled earlier: Middle East Forum, Investigative Project on Terrorism, David Horowitz’s Freedom Center and Rosenwald’s own Gatestone Institute. All are fervent advocates of the ‘stealth jihad’ threat Islam supposedly poses to Europe. Geert Wilders’ International Freedom Alliance Foundation received $25,000 in 2016 while British think tank Henry Jackson Society accepted $20,000 between 2012-16.

Abstraction initially used the Middle East Forum as a conduit to inject millions into Gatestone. In 2014-2015 grants to MEF dropped sharply and direct grants to Gatestone increased. Other US counter-jihad grantees include Clarion advisory board member and Gatestone senior fellow Zuhdi Jasser’s American Islamic Forum for Democracy, CSP, Clarion Fund, Jihad Watch and anti-shariah mastermind David Yerushalmi’s legal outfit.

Critics say Rosenwald ‘uses her millions to cement the alliance between the pro-Israel lobby..."
4. ROBERT SHILLMAN: Amount unknown, reportedly $1 million+

Another high-profile counter-jihad financier is ‘Dr Bob’ Shillman, who runs Cognex Corp, a publicly traded US tech firm worth $4 billion. An avid Trump fan, he was a big donor to the Make America Great Again campaign and funded outlandish video ads of ‘Superman Trump’.153 His private grantmaking Shillman Foundation had $17.9 million in assets in 2016.

Shillman, like Nina Rosenwald, is one of the counter-jihad elite and a staunch backer of conservative, pro-Israel and Zionist causes. He claims not to be anti-Muslim. He sits on the David Horowitz Freedom Center board and is sole director and chairman of the California-based International Freedom Alliance Foundation154 (IFAF), which funds Dutch MEP Geert Wilders’ US speaker tours, notably the provocative 2015 ‘Draw Mohammad’ cartoon contest in Dallas held by Horowitz and Spencer’s Jihad Watch project and Pamela Geller’s American Freedom Defense Initiative. Back then, Shillman refused to confirm if he had sponsored the event.155 Wilders has since declared receipt of expenses payments from ‘IFAF’156 and Shillman’s 990 tax forms show a grant to IFA in the same period for $16,463.157 As Chapter 2 noted, two Muslim gunmen stormed the contest and were killed; Shillman called it ‘a terrorist attack on the American way of life’.158

Shillman has donated over $10 million in recent years to unknown groups under the generic heading ‘to support the community’ via the donor-advised Fidelity charitable trust – $5 million of this in 2016 alone. He also gave Gatestone $50,000 in 2014.

### ABSTRACTION FUND

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>GRANTS 2009-16</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Americans for Peace and Tolerance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Freedom Law Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Islamic Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Islamic Forum for Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center for Islamic Pluralism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center for Security Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clarion Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Horowitz Freedom Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encounter for Culture and Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gatestone Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Freedom Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry Jackson Society</td>
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<tr>
<td>Investigative Project on Terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jihad Watch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ALSO FUNDS:** Americans for Peace and Tolerance, Americans for Peace and Tolerance, American Islamic Congress, American Islamic Forum for Democracy, Center for Islamic Pluralism, Center for Security Policy, Clarion Fund, David Horowitz Freedom Center, Encounter for Culture and Education, Gatestone Institute, International Freedom Alliance, Henry Jackson Society, Investigative Project on Terrorism, Jihad Watch, Middle East Forum, Americans for Peace and Tolerance, American Islamic Congress, American Islamic Forum for Democracy, Center for Islamic Pluralism, Center for Security Policy, Clarion Fund, David Horowitz Freedom Center, Encounter for Culture and Education, Gatestone Institute, International Freedom Alliance, Henry Jackson Society, Investigative Project on Terrorism, Jihad Watch, Middle East Forum, Friends of Israel, Israeli Democracy Institute, Jewish National Fund, American Friends of UN Watch, Coalition for Tolerance on Campus, Congregation Beth AM, Christians United for Israel, American Friends of Israel Initiative, Friends of Ira David, Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, JINSA, MEMRI, REPORT Inc, StandWithUs, Young America’s Foundation, ZOA.

### SHILLMAN FOUNDATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>GRANTS 2009-15</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fidelity Charitable Gift Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gatestone Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Freedom Alliance Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebel Media fellows and general costs (reportedly $1 million plus)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Horowitz Freedom Center and Middle East Forum Shillman fellows</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ALSO FUNDS:** Friends of the IDF, CAMERA, Christians United for Israel, American Friends of UN Watch, Coalition for Tolerance on Campus, Congregation Beth AM, Jewish National Fund, Zionist Organisation of America.

The billionaire has long backed Islamophobic reporting.159 He ‘underwrites’ four fellowships for journalists on FrontPage Magazine, Horowitz’s ‘online journal for news and political commentary’ and sponsored several Middle East Forum ‘Shillman-Ginsberg’ fellows, including ex-Breitbarter Raheem Kassam and French writer Michael Gurfinkel. Another Shillman fellow is Clarion Project ‘national security analyst’ Ryan Mauro, whom the Southern Poverty Law Center designates an anti-Muslim extremist (a charge Mauro
In August 2017, Rebel Media’s Stephen Yaxley-Lennon and Laura Loomer were appointed ‘Shillman Fellows’; boss Ezra Levant confirmed Shillman contributed to their salaries. Another Brit, Katie Hopkins has since become Rebel’s latest Shillman fellow in January 2018.

Curiously, no direct grants to MEF or Horowitz appear on Shillman’s non-profit tax records; how he funds these fellowships is unclear, especially as neither group publicly discloses their donors on their charitable tax filings. Nevertheless, it is clear that Shillman’s money is helping to sustain European counter-jihad activists like Stephen Yaxley-Lennon, Katie Hopkins and Geert Wilders.

5. EUGENE & EMILY GRANT FAMILY FOUNDATION: $4.91million

This private grantmaking foundation was established in New York in 1998. Presided over by American real estate mogul and WWII veteran fighter pilot Eugene Grant, in 2015 it held $1.87m in assets and gave out $8.99m in grants. Since 2009, the foundation has given nearly $5 million to the counter-jihad network.

Now aged in his 90s, Grant is a founding member of the Center for Security Policy’s Board of Regents, alongside Nina Rosenwald. Set up in 2003, the board is responsible for CSP’s financial development. In 2007 it presented Grant with a ‘Sacred Honour award’ in recognition of those who support CSP to fulfill its mission. In his acceptance speech, Grant made special reference “to the perils we face today posed by the global threat of militant Islam, an enemy every bit as ruthless as the Nazis and Imperial Japan that we … face[d] so many years ago.”

The foundation’s philanthropy covers a range of free market think tanks, notably the Manhattan Institute, and support for Zionist and pro-Israel settlement organisations.

In recent years the Grants’ greatest generosity – USD$3 million – has been for Steve Emerson’s Investigative Project on Terrorism. This outstripped all other counter-jihad grants including the $1,646,350 it gave Gaffney’s think tank, and $265,000 to Middle East Forum between 2009-2015. The foundation also gave small funding to UK-based charity Spiro Ark, which hosted a MEF speaker in 2012 and ‘Eurabia’ conspiracy theorist Bat Ye’or in 2015.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EUGENE AND EMILY GRANT FAMILY FOUNDATION</th>
<th>GRANTS 2009-15</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Center for Security Policy</td>
<td>1,646,350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Horowitz Freedom Center</td>
<td>5500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investigative Project on Terrorism (via Fidelity Charitable)</td>
<td>3,000,020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East Forum</td>
<td>265,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spiro Ark (UK)</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>$4,917,870</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ALSO FUNDS: American Friends of Leket Israel, American Friends of NGO Monitor/ REPORT, American Jewish Committee, Anti-Defamation League, Birthright Israel, CAMERA, Central Fund of Israel, Friends of the IDF, Hudson Institute, Israel Project, Jewish National Fund, JINSA, Manhattan Institute, MEMRI, One Israel Fund, Secure America Now, StandWithUs, WINEP, London Center for Policy Research, UJA, ZOA.

6. LYNDE & HARRY BRADLEY FOUNDATION: $3.45 million

One of the top 20 conservative non-profit funders in the US, the Bradley Foundation is a long-standing top donor to the Islamophobia network. With assets of over US$300 million in 2016, this legacy foundation focuses on the desire of its industrialist namesakes, the Bradley brothers, to promote ‘limited government, free enterprise and constitutional ideals’.

Known for its stalwart funding of hardline neocon think tanks, including the American Enterprise Institute, and Hoover and Hudson Institutes, it has faced strong criticism for supporting groups pushing anti-Muslim hatred in the US and beyond. ‘Bradley laid the groundwork for Republican voters to embrace a demagogic candidate like Donald Trump,’ says Brendan Fischer of the Center for Media and Democracy.

Bradley’s biggest counter-jihad beneficiary by far is the David Horowitz’s Freedom Center, to which it contributed $2.29 million between 2009-2016. The Middle East Forum received $345,000 in the same period, some of it specified for its Islamist Watch and Legal Project. Bradley also gives many millions to its own publisher, Encounter Books, which exists at the nexus of the neocon and counter-jihad movements, and
whose European authors include HJS’ Douglas Murray and Times columnist Melanie Phillips. The latter’s Eurabia-themed book Londonistan argues Britain is ‘sleepwalking into Islamisation’ and is oft-quoted by counter-jihadists. Billionaire Gatestone donors Robert and Rebekah Mercer also fund Encounter.169

Bradley president Michael Grebe rejects ‘the notion that we are Islamophobic’, as charged by the Center for American Progress and Council for Islamic-American Relations since 2011. He argued in 2013 that while Bradley funds some groups critical of radical Islam, ‘we don’t promote… Islamophobia, and indeed we provide grants to a number of groups that would be described as moderate Muslims’.170 Yet Grebe admitted that ‘we know also we are in a war with radical elements of Islam’ ‘and we actively support groups that are engaged in counterterrorism’. In 2013 Bradley gave the UK-based Quilliam Foundation $75,000.171 The other ‘moderate Muslims’ are presumably the controversial American Islamic Congress (AIC) to whom it gave $185,000 from 2010-2016. Ex-Dutch MP Ayaan Hirsi Ali, whom Grebe has called ‘a model of courage’, also received a $250,000 stipend as a 2015 Bradley Prize recipient.172

LYNDE & HARRY BRADLEY FOUNDATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Foundation</th>
<th>GRANTS 2009-2016</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>American Islamic Congress</td>
<td>185,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Center for Security Policy</td>
<td>330,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Horowitz Freedom Center</td>
<td>2,295,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East Forum</td>
<td>345,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Quilliam Foundation</td>
<td>75,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ayaan Hirsi Ali</td>
<td>250,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>$3,480,000</strong></td>
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Bradley has cut off the Center for Security Policy, whom it had funded since 1988 and gave $330,000 from 2009-2013.173 (Observers cite Gaffney’s anti-Sharia hysteria.174) More recently, it has funded the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace’s ‘Working Group on Islamism and the International Order’ and Hudson’s ‘Center on Islam, Democracy, and the Future of the Muslim World’ ($150,000 in 2016), which hosted Steve Bannon as a speaker in late 2017.

7. ADELSON FAMILY FOUNDATION: Amount unknown but likely $2 million +

The private foundation of Las Vegas Sands casino magnate and Republican mega-donor Sheldon G Adelson and his physician wife Miriam was set up in 2007 to ‘strengthen the State of Israel and the Jewish people. It gives tens of millions each year to pro-settlement, Zionist and anti-Muslim causes.175 In 2015 it disbursed grants worth $48.7million.

Adelson, who is a close friend and benefactor of Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu, is said to have influenced Trump’s recent choice of ex-Gatestone chairman John Bolton as his national security adviser.176 He is also one of two key funders of United Against Nuclear Iran, which included Bolton as an advisory board member and whose IRS tax forms link it to the US/Brussels-based Counter Extremism Project.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ADELSON FAMILY FOUNDATION</th>
<th>GRANTS 2009-15</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>American Islamic Congress</td>
<td>95,500</td>
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<tr>
<td>Combined Jewish Philanthropies</td>
<td>6,800,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>David Horowitz Freedom Center</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fidelity Charitable Gift Fund</td>
<td>350,000</td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>$7,295,500</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>


In 2015 Adelson gave David Horowitz Freedom Center $50,000 via his family foundation177 and has previously gifted large sums to Steve Emerson’s Investigative Project on Terrorism. Despite a hostile record towards Muslims –describing Palestinians as ‘an invented people’ – Adelson also has funded the American Islamic Congress, which has close ties to anti-Muslim groups.178 He pumps many millions through donor-advised funds like Fidelity Charitable and Combined Jewish Philanthropies.
in 2015 alone for example he gave unknown organisations $350,000 via Fidelity and between 2010-15 a total of $6.5million via CJP. So it's incredibly difficult to know who else Adelson funds in the counter-jihad movement and how much he gives – although the Investigative Project notably receives regular contributions from CJP ($221,000 since 2009), which also funded MEF, CSP and Clarion in 2015.179

8. HELEN DILLER FAMILY FOUNDATION: Contributed $1.76 million

This private foundation is a well-respected benefactor for cancer and medical research, universities and the arts. It made headlines in 2017 for donating US$500 million to the University of California.180 With an income of $59.2m and assets of $4.1m in 2015/6, its stated mission is to conduct supporting activities for the charitable, educational and religious purposes of the donor-advised Jewish Community Federation of San Francisco.181

The foundation’s wealth comes from real estate billionaire Sanford Diller’s Prometheus Group empire. Named after and headed by his philanthropist wife Helen before she died in January 2015, it’s now run by their daughter, Prometheus president Jaclyn Safier.182

Our investigation uncovered its grants totalling $1.76 million since 2009 to the inner US counter-jihad sanctum, including $50,000 in grants earmarked for far-right Dutch MP Geert Wilders.182 Diller’s top grantees include David Horowitz Freedom Center ($975,000 for 2009-15 which included $25k for Wilders’ legal defence fund), anti-sharia legal mastermind David Yerushalmi’s centre ($175,000) and Pamela Geller’s AFDI ($160,000). Other beneficiaries were Gaffney’s CSP ($285,000 – including $25,000 for ‘the work of Daniel Pipes’), Middle East Forum and Steve Emerson’s Investigative Project on Terrorism.

It’s not known whether the initial Wilders donation arrived after Jaclyn Safier took the helm, but a second $25,000 grant to ‘support’ his work was given to the International Freedom Alliance Foundation post-June 2015, plus $25,000 more for ‘general purposes’. Safier also sits on the advisory board of Taube Family Foundation & Philanthropies,183 which has funded both David Horowitz and Steve Emerson’s think tanks (and was until recently connected to the Koret Foundation through its president Tad Taube).184 Safier personally donated $244,000 to the Republican National Committee in 2016. The Diller Foundation also gave $250,000 to the Tea Party Patriots Foundation in 2015.

Although the Helen Diller Foundation gives millions to Jewish education and teen leadership awards globally, it also directly funds pro-Israel and Zionist causes as shown in the table below, many controversial. These include the AMCHA Initiative, which stands accused of spying on and intimidating US students and publishing a ‘target list’ of “anti-Israel professors.185

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HELEN DILLER FAMILY FOUNDATION</th>
<th>GRANTS FOUNDATION</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2009-16</td>
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<tr>
<td>American Freedom Defense Initiative</td>
<td>160,000</td>
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<td>American Freedom Law Center</td>
<td>175,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Center for Security Policy</td>
<td>285,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>David Horowitz Freedom Center</td>
<td>975,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>International Freedom Foundation</td>
<td>50,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Investigative Project on Terrorism</td>
<td>35,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Middle East Forum</td>
<td>80,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>$1,760,000</td>
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9. BECKER FAMILY FOUNDATIONS: Amount unknown but possibly $1 million+

The Newton D. & Rochelle F. Becker Foundation, and affiliated Newton and Rochelle Charitable Trust and Becker Family Foundation are key funders of anti-Muslim, right-wing Zionist and neoconservative causes. They were identified in the Center for American Progress’ report Fear Inc report as having given over a million dollars to Islamophobic groups during the 2000s.

Founder and president Newton Becker, a prolific pro-Israel philanthropist, died in 2012 but ensured his legacy of support for the pro-Israel community through the Newton and Rochelle Charitable Trust. Run by his son David, in 2016 the trust held $126 million in total assets. Its stated mission is to direct funds ‘to the Jewish community, particularly
Jewish organisations and programs that combat media bias against Israel and the Jewish people, Israel advocacy, and democracy defense. Several of its board members are closely linked to the Jewish Community Foundation of Los Angeles, including its president Marvin Schotland.

Although the Beckers’ direct contributions to core counter-jihad groups appear to have stopped after 2012, the trust does pass grants through various donor-advised funds that contribute to such groups. In particular it has given large sums in recent years to Schwab Charitable Fund ($1,150,000 in 2016 and $450,000 in 2015) and the Jewish Community Federation of San Francisco ($340,000 from 2011-16). Both have passed hundreds of thousands of dollars to the David Horowitz Freedom, Middle East Forum, Center for Security Policy and Clarion Fund since 2009, although as previously discussed it is impossible to link such donations due to the lack of public disclosure.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NEWTON AND ROCHELLE BECKER FAMILY FOUNDATIONS</th>
<th>GRANTS 2009-16</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clarion Fund</td>
<td>55,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Center for Security Policy</td>
<td>95,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Horowitz Freedom Center</td>
<td>23,000</td>
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<td>Henry Jackson Society</td>
<td>7,000</td>
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<td>Investigative Project on Terrorism</td>
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<td>Middle East Forum</td>
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<td>Jewish Federation of San Francisco</td>
<td>340,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Schwab Charitable Fund</td>
<td>1,600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>$2,349,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ALSO FUNDS:** Birthright Israel Foundation, Central Fund of Israel, Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, Friends of ELNET, Israel Emergency Alliance, Jerusalem Foundation, MEMRI, Scholars for Peace in the Middle East, Washington Institute for Near East Policy

10. MZ FOUNDATION: $1.45 million

Californian real estate magnate Myron Zimmerman’s philanthropic backing of a medley of anti-Muslim, pro-Israel and Zionist groups is unusually advertised on his private foundation’s website. ‘Committed to combatting anti-Semitism in the United States and across the globe’, the MZ Foundation ‘partners with more than 70 different organisations across several continents’. In 2016, its income was close to $50 million and it held $63.7m in assets.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MZ FOUNDATION</th>
<th>GRANTS 2009-2016</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Act! for America</td>
<td>10,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>American Freedom Law Center</td>
<td>75,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Congress for Truth</td>
<td>10,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>AHA Foundation</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Americans for Peace and Tolerance</td>
<td>80,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>American Freedom Defense Initiative</td>
<td>60,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Center for Security Policy</td>
<td>125,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>David Horowitz Foundation</td>
<td>501,600</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gatestone Institute</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry Jackson Society</td>
<td>50,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>International Freedom Alliance (IFAF)</td>
<td>25,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Investigative Project on Terrorism</td>
<td>181,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East Forum 2010-16</td>
<td>282,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>$1,470,100</strong></td>
</tr>
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</table>

**ALSO FUNDS:** AMCHA Initiative, American Friends of Ariel Inc, CAMERA, Central Fund of Israel, Christians United for Israel, Im Tirtzu, Imagination Productions, Irish4Israel, Israel Emergency Alliance, Lawfare Project, MEMRI, Report Inc, StandWithUs, Students Supporting Israel, United Nations Watch – USA.

The website list of grantee logos and declared recipients on MZ’s tax records are a veritable who’s who of the counter-jihad network. They include Middle East Forum ($282,500 since 2010 for research), Steve Emerson’s IPT ($181,000 to 2014), Gaffney’s CSP ($135,000 since 2013), Gatestone ($50,000 from 2015-16), Pamela Geller’s American Freedom Defense Initiative, ($75,000 for ‘civil liberties advocacy’) and Ayaan Hirsi Ali’s AHA Foundation ($20,000, split evenly for women’s rights and ‘foreign affairs’). David Yerushalmi’s central legal office, Zimmerman’s favourite grantee though is David Horowitz, whom he gave $501,600 from 2011-2016 towards ‘education for the next generation’. European grantees include Henry Jackson Society, which accepted $50,000 in 2016 for ‘education’ purposes, and Geert Wilders’ US-based IFAF funding vehicle run by Robert Shillman, which received $25,000 for ‘general purposes’. The grassroots ACT for America, which backs Pax Europa’s Elizabeth Sabaditsch-Wolff, received $10,000 in 2014.

Zimmerman has reportedly given over $1 million since 2012 to non-profits that support settlers
in the West Bank, including the far-right extra parliamentary Im Tirtzu youth movement. Zionist grantees include Christians United For Israel, led by Islamophobic pastor John Hagee. Another is Charles Jacobs’ group Americans for Peace and Tolerance, which employed Stand for Peace’s Sam Westrop in 2016 after he left Britain.

11. JEWISH COMMUNAL FUND: $1.58m
The New-York-based Jewish Communal Fund (JCF) bills itself as America’s largest and most active Jewish donor-advised fund, managing $1.3 billion in charitable assets for over 1300 funds. Its mission is simply ‘to facilitate and promote philanthropy through donor-advised funds’, and works across secular and religious causes.

In 2015 Lobelog revealed that JCF was passing grants ‘to groups that largely exist to spread Islamophobic and anti-Muslim messages’, including Pamela Geller. Her American Freedom Defense Initiative group received $165,000 via JCF from 2012-2015. Ironically Geller has waged a campaign against JCF president Karen Adler since 2015 for JCF’s grants to the New Israel Fund, which backs boycott and divestment campaigning. As detailed earlier in this chapter, most of the core counter-jihad groups with links to Europe have received funds via JCF. Grantees between 2009-2015 included Middle east Forum, Clarion Project, David Horowitz Freedom Center, Investigative Project on Terrorism and Gatestone Institute as shown below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JEWISH COMMUNAL FUND</th>
<th>GRANTS 2009-2015</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>American Freedom Defense Initiative</td>
<td>$165,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clarion Project</td>
<td>$304,642</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Horowitz Freedom Center</td>
<td>$215,870</td>
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<td>Gatestone Institute</td>
<td>$180,536</td>
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<tr>
<td>Henry Jackson Society Inc</td>
<td>$45,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Investigative Project on Terrorism</td>
<td>$419,010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East Forum</td>
<td>$252,770</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>$1,582,828</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

12. KORET FOUNDATION: $1.05 million
Founded in 1979, the Koret Foundation gives money to education, arts and culture, and Jewish causes. The San-Francisco grantmaker manages the $304 million fortune of clothing manufacturer Joseph Koret, who died in 1982. It was run until recently by his widow Susan Koret and real estate mogul Tad Taube, whose fallout led to a high-profile lawsuit that was settled in June 2017. Both have now resigned from the board. The foundation had an income of over $118 million in 2015.

Writer Richard Silverstein noted in 2013 that Koret, alongside the Fairbrook and Irving Moskowitz foundations, was part of a group of radical foundations leading ‘a drive toward the increasing politicisation of Jewish philanthropy’ and funding an array of ‘far-right Jewish groups’.

Indeed, foundation chair Susan Koret had accused longtime president Taube, of funnelling funds to conservative causes at odds with Koret’s original mission. Taube, 86, is known for his hard-right conservative politics. He is a Hoover Institute board member and runs the Taube Philanthropies foundations, which have also funded David Horowitz and Steve Emerson’s groups. Koret has also previously funded the Middle East Forum’s ‘Legal Project’ and ‘Islamist Watch’.

Our analysis of Koret’s tax filings from 2009-2015, found sizeable donations to the Center for Security Policy ($450,000) and Middle East Forum ($350,000) as well as the Investigative Project, David Horowitz and Henry Jackson Society. None received grants after 2013.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KORET FOUNDATION</th>
<th>GRANTS 2009-15</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Center for Security Policy</td>
<td>$450,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>David Horowitz Freedom Center</td>
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<td>Investigative Project on Terrorism</td>
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<tr>
<td>Middle East Forum</td>
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<tr>
<td>Henry Jackson Society</td>
<td>$4000</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>$1,049,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


13. EMERSON FAMILY FOUNDATION: Contributed at least $500,000
This foundation was set up in 2005 by husband and wife Rita Emerson and J Steve Emerson, key figures in the pro-Israel US establishment. It held $4.6 million in assets in 2015. Although its direct donations to core counter-jihadists only appear
from 2012 onward, the foundation is listed as supporting a 2008 Rome conference held under the auspices of the European Freedom Alliance, a group of far-right politicians linked to counter-jihadists as discussed in Chapter 2. In that same year Emerson’s tax filings show it gave $174,000 to unknown organisations via the donor-advised Jewish Community Foundation (Los Angeles) and another $390,000 a few years later in 2011.

EMERSON FAMILY FOUNDATION GRANTS 2009-16

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Foundation</th>
<th>Grants 2009-16</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>American Congress for Truth/Act for America Education</td>
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<tr>
<td>American Freedom Alliance</td>
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<tr>
<td>American Islamic Forum for Democracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Clarion Project</td>
<td>10,300</td>
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<td>Citizens for National Security</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Horowitz Freedom Center</td>
<td>115,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gatestone Institute</td>
<td>5,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Henry Jackson Society Inc</td>
<td>50,000</td>
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<td>Investigative Project on Terrorism</td>
<td>20,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Middle East Forum</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish Community Foundation (Los Angeles)</td>
<td>920,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vanguard Charitable</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>$1,327,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ALSO FUNDS: Central Fund of Israel, StandWithUs, Shurat HaDin, Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Friends of Elnet, American Friends of NGO Monitor, American Friends of IDF, Electric Infrastructure Security, Palestinian Media Watch. Proclaiming Justice to the Nations, REPORT PMB.

The 2008 event, ‘Identity crisis: Can European civilisation survive?’, was co-sponsored by the Middle East Forum and held in collaboration with the European University of Rome and the Lepanto Foundation. It brought together ‘over 35 academics, journalists, political commentators and government leaders from around the world to address issues relevant to Europe’s political, cultural and social survival’. Moderators included Islam critics Bruce Bawer (these days a Gatestone blogger) and John Marks; panelists were Daniel Pipes and Robert Spencer, and key anti-Muslim European activists and ideologues Baroness Caroline Cox, Douglas Murray, Melanie Phillips, Bat Ye’or and [then] Dutch MEP Johannes Jansen. Attendees included Philippe Karsenty and Marcello Pera, founder member of the Friends of Israel Initiative lobby group, and several academics.

More recently, the foundation’s tax filings show grants to Henry Jackson Society of $50,000 and Gatestone Institute $5,000 in 2014. The foundation’s most regular giving has been to David Horowitz ($115,000) and the American Islamic Forum for Democracy ($110,000), which claims to fight ‘Islamofascism’. Smaller sums went to ACT and American Freedom Alliance, which has hosted Geert Wilders and Austria’s Elizabeth Sabaditsch-Wolff. Emerson funds many pro-Israel groups and has also passed grants to unknown organisations via Vanguard Charitable.

14. BODMAN & ACHELIS FOUNDATION: Contributed $320,000

The long associated and recently merged Bodman and Achelis Foundations are big donors in the conservative US public policy arena, backing think tanks such as the Council on Foreign Relations, Atlas Network and Hudson Institute to name a few. Based in New York City, they have combined assets of $105 million. Wall Street investment banker George Bodman and his wife set up their foundation in 1945; it was at one point headed by former CIA director William Casey. The Achelis Foundation was founded in 1940 by Elisabeth Achelis, whose father was president of the American Hard Rubber Company. A lesser known donor to Islamophobic groups, the foundation unusually publishes grants on its website. These show that in 2016 it gave the Henry Jackson Society $80,000 for operating costs, and $15,000 to Gatestone Institute in 2015. Controversial Gatestone fellow Zuhdi Jasser’s American Islamic Forum on Democracy received $25,000 in 2017 to support ‘a social media campaign’. The Bradley Foundation’s Encounter Books received $50,000 in 2017. Bodman also gave the Middle East Forum $50,000 in 2012.

In 2016, Bodman notably gave the Hudson Institute USD $75,000 via Achelis ‘to support’ its Center on Islam, Democracy and the Future of the Muslim World. In October 2017, Hudson hosted a conference focused on violent extremism, Iran, Qatar and the Muslim Brotherhood, at which Steve Bannon was a keynote speaker.

12 JUFF annual reports 2011-2016 (fiscal year ends June 2016).


16 Jewish Communal Fund, IRS Form 990, 2009-2015.


20 Jewish Community Federation of San Francisco IRS Form 990s, 2009-10-15/6.

21 Grants were declared by Eugene and Emily Grant Family Foundation on its form 990s: $3,000,000 in two tranches of $1million (11/6/2014) and $2million $2,000,000 (Fidelity Charitable Gift Fund) on 21/11/2014.

22 Shillman Foundation IRS Form 990s, 2009-2015.

23 Vanguard Charitable Trust Endowment Program IRS Form 990s, 2009-2016.

24 Schwab Charitable Trust IRS Form 990s 2011-2016.

25 Newton & Becker Charitable Foundation, Form 990s, 2012-2016.


35 This phrase only appears in 2013-2012 audited financial statements.

185 Helen Diller Family Foundation, Form 990s.
186 Newton & Becker Charitable Foundation, Form 990s, 2015-2016.
187 MZ Foundation Form 990, 2016.
189 AHA Foundation Form 990, 2014. ($10k in 2014 marked for “foreign affairs, national security service, 2015 was for women’s rights).
190 MZ Foundation Form 990, 2016.
192 Electronic Intifada https://electronicintifada.net/tags/john-hagee
193 MZ Foundation, IRS Form 990s 2009-2016.
194 Eli Clifton, “The Jewish Communal Fund invests in Islamophobia”...
195 Jewish Communal Fund, IRS Form 990s, 2009-2015.
201 Emerson Family Foundation Form 990s, 2008-2016.
Conclusions

1. This report has documented how some counter-jihad actors present themselves as ‘counter-extremism’ bodies. That Islamophobic groups borrow this moniker suggests that, as well as the mainstreaming of some far-right ideas, official counter-extremism policies, practices and narratives have proved amenable to the far-right’s agenda, by providing a ‘legitimate’ cover for targeting Muslims.

2. As a result, European counter-extremism regimes are not only failing to prevent the growth of the counter-jihad strand of the far-right: their rhetoric and practices may in some ways be fostering and enabling it. There are significant overlaps in the underlying assumptions of governments and the counter-jihad movement about the causes of and solutions to political violence; at times there are practical synergies in their respective counter-extremism efforts including similar targets, symbols and language.

3. Understanding and challenging Islamophobia today therefore requires a critical interrogation of both state counter-extremism practices and the far-right, including the symbiotic relationship between them. Counter-extremism policies which place blame and suspicion collectively on Muslims are a major part of the problem.

4. As state power is wielded in increasingly authoritarian and discriminatory ways for the purposes of ‘counter-extremism’, the far-right is also gaining power. A degree of convergence is taking place as the counter-jihad movement, with the help of allies in intellectual and political elites, is able to work through the state and exert a radicalising influence on the mainstream.

Recommendations

1. **Government:** Governments need to ask serious questions about the effects of their counter-extremism regimes. The evidence presented here that counter-jihad actors are using ‘counter-extremism’ as a cover for propagating racism ought to prompt reflection on the extent to which existing policies, practices and narratives may be empowering this strand of the far-right. This report suggests that if governments wish to halt the rise of Islamophobia, a fundamental re-think of the ideas underpinning counter-extremism will be needed; this must entail interrogation of basic concepts and terminology, and a reassessment of the underlying assumptions about the causes of and solutions to political violence. In countering the twin threats of political violence and racism, much greater transparency is also required.

2. **Anti-racism campaigners:** Since counter-extremism policies are part of the problem, governments cannot offer effective solutions to Islamophobia while these remain in place. Seeking a more balanced authoritarianism by calling on government to be more even-handed in its application of counter-extremism regimes may only serve to increase state power at a time in which the far-right is gaining political influence and could potentially seize power in a western European country for the first time in decades. Instead of looking to governments to oppose the counter-jihad movement therefore, anti-racism campaigners should oppose it directly as well as campaigning against discriminatory government counter-extremism policies. Despite their limitations, legal strategies should also be pursued.

3. **Researchers:** More attention should be paid to researching the far-right counter-jihad movement but examining it in isolation is less useful since Islamophobia is a mainstream problem, not a fringe issue. The findings here point to the need to understand the interactions between government-sanctioned counter-extremism policies, practices and narratives and the activities of the counter-jihad movement – thus far a largely overlooked relationship.

4. **Media:** Press and broadcast media should treat self-declared ‘counter-extremism’ bodies with more caution. It has been too easy, especially in the UK, for actors with close links to the counter-jihad movement to target Muslims in the media without journalists questioning the validity of the claims or the motives of the messenger, in effect colluding with groups seeking to exclude Muslims from public life. Instead, the press could and should play an important role in educating the public about the growing threat of the counter-jihad movement, highlighting its absurd Islamophobic conspiracy theories and hateful anti-Muslim rhetoric.