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# JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE GERMANY

JIC(Germany)(72)17 Final

23 May 1973

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## JIC (GERMANY) PROCEDURES IN A PERIOD OF TENSION AND AFTER THE BRITISH COMMANDERS IN CHIEF

### TAKE UP THEIR NATO COMMANDS AND HAVE LEFT JHQ RHEINDAHLLEN

#### INTRODUCTION

1. The Joint Intelligence Committee (Germany) agreed (1) at their Meeting on 23 June 1972 that their procedures during a period of tension both before and after the British Commanders in Chief take up their NATO Commands should be examined, with particular reference to:

- a. The ways in which political intelligence and political advice would be communicated to the Commanders in Chief.
- b. The location of the Commanders in Chief.
- c. The effect of b. above on the movement of the Minister at Bonn and on the residual work of JIC (Germany).

2. This report takes account of the Command and Control Paper (2) which sets out the responsibilities of the Commanders in Chief and their movement in a period of tension and after they take up their NATO appointments. The report assumes that throughout the period of tension and up to the outbreak of hostilities the JHQ at Rheindahlen and its communications will remain in being.

#### AIM

3. To examine the procedures of JIC (Germany) during a period of tension before and after the British Commanders in Chief take up their NATO Commands and have left JHQ Rheindahlen.

#### Notes:

1. JIC(Germany)(M)(72)6: Minute 6.
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FACTORSRESPONSIBILITIES OF JIC (GERMANY)

4. JIC (Germany) is responsible in Germany to HM Ambassador and the Commanders in Chief and in UK to the JIC (A) London. In a period of tension its task is to provide current political and military assessments of the situation within its area of competence for JIC(A) London and to brief the Commanders in Chief and their Deputies in accordance with the timetable of meetings set out in DC/P(71)11 Final. Assessments of the broader political and military situation will be provided by JIC (A) London. These will be passed simultaneously to the Embassy at Bonn and to JHQ and incorporated in the briefings to the Commanders in Chief.

RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE MINISTER BONN

5. The Minister at Bonn in addition to being the Chairman of JIC (Germany) becomes (1), in a period of tension, the political adviser to the Commanders in Chief and provides liaison between them and the Ambassador.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

6. The 2 Commanders in Chief are located in peace at JHQ Rheindahlen. Their responsibilities, and their war locations, after taking up their NATO appointments will be:-

- a. COMNORTHAG. From Simple Alert COMNORTHAG assumes operational command of assigned forces. At or about Reinforced Alert COMNORTHAG will move initially to the Joint Static Headquarters near the Dutch border or to NORTHAG Mobile HQ as the tactical situation demands.
- b. COMTWOATAF. In the initial stages of an alert the Commander in Chief RAF Germany will exercise command and control of his forces through the Royal Air Force Germany Operations Centre (RAFOC). As an alert progresses and operational units assume a war posture, operational command of those assigned units will pass to SACEUR. When all assigned units have been handed over, the Commander in Chief RAF Germany, as COMTWOATAF, will exercise operational control of assigned units through Joint Static Headquarters near the Dutch border.

The 2 Deputy Commanders change their responsibilities and appointments in conformity with the arrangements at a. and b. above as follows:

- c. Chief of Staff BAOR. When COMNORTHAG leaves JHQ Rheindahlen to take up his NATO duties, the Chief of Staff BAOR becomes General Officer Commanding (BR) Logistic Support Command, and assumes command of all British troops in the (BR) Rear Combat Zone and Communications Zone who are not under command of COMNORTHAG or Commander 1 (BR) Corps. He remains at HQ (BR) ISC at Rheindahlen.

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d. Deputy Commander in Chief RAF Germany. When COMTWOATAF exercises control of assigned units through Joint Static Headquarters, the Deputy Commander RAF Germany takes up the appointment of Air Officer Commanding RAF Germany Operations Centre (RAFGOC) at Rheindahlen. He will utilise the resources of RAF Germany to provide administrative and logistic support for all RAF Stations.

7. Conduct of Joint Business. The Commanders in Chief Committee, comprising the Commander in Chief BAOR and the Commander in Chief RAF Germany, will continue to function until the Commanders in Chief leave JHQ Rheindahlen. Their responsibilities in the Committee then devolve upon their senior national deputies in their National Headquarters. Thus the Committee will then consist of General Officer Commanding (BR) Logistic Support Command (previously Chief of Staff BAOR) and Air Officer Commanding RAF Germany Operations Centre (previously Deputy Commander RAF Germany).

#### LOCATIONS OF JIC (GERMANY) AND ITS MEMBERS

8. Peace Time. In peace time the Chairman of JIC (Germany), and the Embassy representative in attendance are located at the Embassy at Bonn. BGS Int & Sy HQ BAOR, CIO HQ RAF Germany, Director BSSO (Germany), and Secretary JIC (Germany) are at JHQ Rheindahlen. The representative of the GOC Berlin is located in Berlin. Formal meetings of JIC (Germany) are held once a month, alternatively at Bonn and JHQ; one meeting a year is held in Berlin. In addition the members at Rheindahlen meet weekly to prepare, inter alia, a review of the current situation for JIC (A) London.

9. During a Period of Tension. In a period of tension the frequency of meetings would be increased and, depending on the nature of the crisis, the Committee would meet either at Bonn or JHQ Rheindahlen. As, however, the situation developed and the inflow of military intelligence (ie about the enemy's military moves) began to outweigh the inflow of political intelligence (ie about the enemy's statements and political activities) it would be necessary for the Committee to meet at JHQ Rheindahlen. At this time the Minister at Bonn, as Chairman JIC (Germany), would move to Rheindahlen and take up his additional appointment as political adviser to the Commanders in Chief, probably about the time Military Vigilance was declared.

#### CHANGES OF APPOINTMENT AND MOVES FROM JHQ

10. The various stages of a period of growing tension are marked by the progressive declaration by NATO of the states of Military Vigilance, Simple Alert, Reinforced Alert and General Alert. At Simple Alert, Commander in Chief BAOR would assume command of assigned forces as COMNORTHAG; after Simple Alert, at a time to be decided by COMNORTHAG, NORTHAG Mobile HQ would deploy east of the Rhine and NORTHAG Static HQ near the Dutch border. In both peace and war, COMTWOATAF, has operational control of assigned air defence forces. At either Simple Alert or the declaration of a state of Counter Surprise, he assumes operational control of the assigned air forces of Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and RAF Germany. At a time not later than Simple Alert Joint Static HQ would be established near the Dutch border; TWOATAF Mobile HQ would deploy east of the Rhine and after Simple Alert at the same time as NORTHAG Mobile HQ. Thus in the initial stages of a period

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of tension the 2 Commanders in Chief would command their NATO assigned forces from Rheindahlen, receiving their directions and intelligence from NATO and SHAPE and continuing to be served with national intelligence from briefing and maintaining liaison with the Embassy through CICC (Germany) and through the JIC (Germany) with the Minister still in the Chair. This dual system would operate until the Commanders in Chief leave Rheindahlen, after that it would cease to function. Many officers of the staff of C Int HQ BAOR are earmarked to fill mobilisation appointments in HQ NORTHAG. They would assume these appointments from Simple Alert onwards. BCS Int & Sy HQ BAOR would move with COMNORTHAG as his COOS G2. The residual intelligence and security staff would serve HQ (BR) LSC under a ColonelCS Int & Sy. The CIO RAF Germany would accompany COMTWOATAF to the Joint Static Headquarters near the Dutch border as his national intelligence adviser, leaving DCIO and an augmented staff at Rheindahlen. Although the position of UK based civilians on the declaration of a tative service has not yet been clarified it is assumed that those in key specialist appointments, such as Director PSSO (Germany), and Secretary JIC (Germany), would continue in post.

#### COMMUNICATIONS

11. JHQ Rheindahlen is a key communications centre in peace-time serving HQ BAOR and HQ RAF Germany. In addition the secure speech communications system (Pickwick) links UK - Rheindahlen - Bonn - Bielefeld - Berlin.

When the Commanders in Chief leave the JHQ there will be special teleprinter links from JHQ to Joint Static Headquarters for both COMNORTHAG and COMTWOATAF, and to NORTHAG Mobile HQ for COMNORTHAG.

12. In addition a requirement has been stated (3) and provision is being made for secure speech communications from MOD London to COMNORTHAG at NORTHAG Mobile HQ. This is in implementation of the "Terms of Reference for Army Group Commanders in the Central Region" (4) in which CINCENT authorises his Principal Subordinate Commanders to deal directly with their Ministers of Defence, Chiefs of National Defence Staffs and other National military authorities, Chiefs of National Defence Staffs and other National military authorities on certain military matters pertaining to forces assigned to their respective Army Groups. Secure teleprinter links exist between JOC and Mobile HQ and the MODs at Bonn, Hague and Brussels. These are provided by National Liaison Detachments.

#### DISCUSSION

##### PEACE TIME OPERATION

13. Under normal peace-time arrangements JIC (Germany) provides military and political intelligence drawn from local and national conventional and special sources for Commander in Chief BAOR and Commander in Chief RAF Germany and through them for all British forces in Germany.

##### DISSEMINATION OF INTELLIGENCE IN PERIOD OF TENSION

14. As already explained in paragraph 10 above, the implementation of the war command structure caused Commander in Chief BAOR and Commander in Chief RAF Germany to become COMNORTHAG and COMTWOATAF, the Chief of Staff BAOR to become Commander (BR) Logistic Support Command, and the Deputy Commander

#### Notes:

3. COS 22/71
4. Encl 1 to HQ AFCENT 2210.1
- SEC 216/67 of 20 Apr 67

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RAF Germany to become AOC RAF Germany Operations Centre. When COMORTHAG and COMWOTAF leave Rheindahlen they give up their functions as British Commanders in Chief and from that moment will presumably receive their military and political reports and assessments through SHAPE and AFCEVT, although certain additional items of processed intelligence from JIC London and intelligence from special UK sources will be passed to their senior British intelligence officers over special communications circuits from Rheindahlen. When they leave the JHQ their respective principal intelligence officers, the BGS Int & Sy and the CIO will accompany them.

15. The Commander (BR) Logistic Support Command, and the AOC RAF Germany Operations Centre, still being British Commanders, will continue to need to be served by an intelligence committee similar to JIC (Germany), but it would necessarily have a somewhat lower level of representation and a reduced responsibility. The Committee would presumably consist of the senior service intelligence officers remaining at JHQ (BGS Int & Sy and the CIO having left with the 2 Commanders in Chief), the Director BSSO (Germany), an Embassy representative and the Secretary. The Minister at Bonn would presumably be available to act as chairman of this Committee, but he is also supposed to act, in a way which has yet to be defined, as political adviser to the Commanders in Chief and their deputies and to provide liaison between them and the Ambassador. By the time in question there would of course be no Commanders in Chief and no Deputy Commanders, the command structure having changed to the new circumstances, it might be considered appropriate for, say, a Counsellor from the Embassy to take over the Chairmanship of the rump JIC (Germany).

#### THE RESIDUAL INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

16. There should be few difficulties about the organisation and operation of the residual Committee. It would probably be composed as follows:

Chairman	-	A representative of HM Ambassador
Members	-	Col GS Int & Sy (in place of BGS Int & Sy - Alternative Chairman).
		Deputy CIO (in place of CIO)
		Command Provost and Security Officer (RAF).
		Director BSSO (Germany).

A member of the British Embassy.

Secretary.

The functions of the Committee would include hardly any element of assessment. Its main tasks would be:

- a. To edit and transmit operational intelligence from HQ NORTHAG and HQ TWCATAF and political intelligence from the Embassy at Bonn to Commander (BR) Logistic Support Command

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- and AOC RAF Germany Operations Centre and where necessary to JIC London;
- b. to edit and transmit intelligence from JIC London to Operations Centre;
- c. to evaluate and assess security intelligence received from national and allied agencies to the Commander (BR) Logistic Support Command and AOC RAF Germany Operations Centre;

- d. To monitor the transmission of special intelligence and other JIC London material by special communications links to the senior British intelligence officers at HQ NORTHAG and HQ TWOATAF.

The functions of this Committee would be so reduced by comparison with those of JIC (Germany) in peace-time that it would probably be desirable to distinguish it from the JIC (Germany) by giving it another name, such as Local Intelligence Committee (Germany) or Joint Intelligence Group (Germany) or even British Forces Intelligence Committee (Germany) (BFIC (G)). The list of functions given above could serve as the basis for developing specific terms of reference for the rump JIC (Germany).

#### POLITICAL REPORTING AND LIAISON

17. The arrangements in paragraph 16 above do not cover all the responsibilities discharged by JIC (Germany) in peace-time, nor all those which would arise from the special situation relating to a period of tension. As long as a war was impending in Germany, or while hostilities were in progress on German soil with a Federal German Government intact and in being at Bonn, it would be desirable for the British Embassy in Germany and not information about the activities of all British Forces in Germany and not simply about those under command of (BR) Logistic Support Command and RAF Germany Operations Centre. It might similarly be desirable for the senior British commanders to have a British interpretation of political events in Bonn and in the Federal Republic of Germany during a period of alert or the first hours and days of hostilities.

18. Machinery for this purpose has not hitherto been devised. The present arrangements set out in CINC/P(70)23 Final (paragraph 4k of Annex A) could operate only so long as a body comparable to the peace-time CICC (Germany) was in being, but CICC (Germany) also would have changed its character with the departure of the Commanders in Chief from Rheindahlen. It would no longer be capable of providing the basis for an exchange of information relating to the whole complex of military and political activity in Germany. It follows that study should now be given to the quantity, type and extent of the military and political information which should be exchanged between British Forces in Germany and the Embassy; and, subject to this assessment, what liaison machinery in addition to that provided by the national elements remaining at Rheindahlen would be required. From the Embassy's point of view the rump JIC (Germany) would be an inadequate instrument. A body on the lines of the present Deputy Commanders' Committee (Chief of Staff PAOR and Deputy Commander RAF Germany in association with the Minister at Bonn), might be adapted to this purpose, based

at Rheindahlen, which would be the focal centre for national communications. Liaison visits to and from Rheindahlen by representatives of all major British authorities in Germany, both military and political, could take place by mutual agreement as required.

#### CONCLUSIONS

19.
  - a. Up to the time the Commanders in Chief leave JHQ Rheindahlen the functions of JIC (Germany) are clearly defined. The early move of the Minister at Bonn to Rheindahlen - probably at Military Vigilance could facilitate the production of political and military assessments in the crucial period between Military Vigilance and Simple Alert.
  - b. After the Commanders in Chief leave JHQ, their need for military and political briefing will be satisfied by NATO agencies augmented by a certain amount of national intelligence from London and elsewhere, for which Rheindahlen would serve simply as a relay point.
  - c. When the Deputy Commanders became Commander (BR) Logistic Support Command and AOC RAF Germany Operations Centre respectively their need for military, political and security briefing could be satisfied by the remaining members of JIC (Germany), but the rump JIC (Germany) would be less authoritative and would be almost wholly deprived of an assessment function. This suggests that it should be renamed so that its new, reduced status would not be misunderstood.
  - d. The departure from Rheindahlen of the Commanders in Chief and their assumption of their NATO command functions in the field would make it impossible for the normal exchanges of views between the Commanders in Chief and HM Ambassador to continue within the framework of the CICC (Germany).
  - e. The arrangements for a rump JIC (Germany) would not cover the task normally carried out by the peace-time JIC (Germany) of providing a point of exchange for information and advice between the Embassy and all commanders of British Forces in Germany in which the Minister at the Embassy is supposed to play a key role; but the need for an exchange of this sort could be greater in a period of tension.
  - f. Study should now be given to the type and extent of the exchanges which, in the circumstances described, might continue to be needed and, subject to this assessment, means should be devised for appropriate liaison to be maintained.

Signed R A HIBBERT

Chairman  
on behalf of the  
Joint Intelligence  
Committee (Germany)