BUILDINGS. WE CANNOT CHOOSE WHICH BUILDINGS THE RUSSIANS WILL OCCUPY, BUT WE CAN POSSIBLY PREVENT THEM FROM OCCUPYING CERTAIN PREMISES WHICH WOULD CAUSE PARTICULAR DIFFICULTIES FOR US.

7. CONCLUSIONS.

WE FEEL THEREFORE THAT THE DANGERS REFERRED TO IN MISS MACGLASHAN'S LETTER AND ITS ENCLOSES CAN BE CONTAINED WITH REGARD TO THE SETTING UP OF SOVIET OFFICES IN THE WESTERN SECTORS OF BERLIN. IN MANY CASES, THE NECESSARY RESTRICTIONS HAVE BEEN WRITTEN INTO THE PROPOSED ALLIED COMMUNICATION TO THE RUSSIANS ON THIS SUBJECT. IN ADDITION, WE CAN MAKE USE OF LEGAL MEASURES IN BERLIN, SUCH AS BK/O (62) 5, WHICH MAY HAVE NO EXACT PARALLELS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM. IN PARTICULAR, WE DO NOT SEE THAT THE PROPOSED "OFFICE OF FOREIGN TRADE ASSOCIATIONS" COULD CAUSE AS MUCH DIFFICULTY IN BERLIN AS THE SOVIET TRADE DELEGATION DOES IN LONDON. NOT ONLY WOULD THE OFFICE, AS EXPLAINED ABOVE BE A GREAT DEAL SMALLER AND HAVE NO DIPLOMATIC STATUS, BUT IT OPPORTUNITIES WOULD BE GREATLY CIRCUMSCRIBED IN THE CLOSED COMMUNITY OF BERLIN WHERE THE NUMBER OF INDUSTRIAL SECRETS IS LIMITED.

2. I WILL SHOW THIS TELEGRAM TO H.M. AMBASSADOR AFTER DESPATCH AND LET YOU KNOW IF HE HAS ANY FURTHER COMMENTS.

CATHCART

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
W.E.D.
W.O.D.
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NORTH AMERICAN DEPT
I.R.D.
RESEARCH DEPT (W.E.
AMERICAN AND SOVIET SECTIONS)
MOD INTERNAL

SECRET
5. CONSULATE-GENERAL

IF A CONSULATE-GENERAL WERE TO BE ESTABLISHED, THE ALLIES COULD INSIST ON THE FOLLOWING POINTS:-

A) NUMBERS. THESE WOULD CERTAINLY BE LIMITED. THE RUSSIANS INITIALLY ASKED FOR 30-35, BUT HAVE ALREADY INDICATED THAT THEY MIGHT CUT THEIR REQUEST DOWN TO 20 OR LESS.

B) APPLICABLE REGIME. THIS IS STILL SUBJECT TO DISCUSSION, BUT AT THE 21 JULY MEETING THE RUSSIANS INDICATED THEY COULD ACCEPT THE LOCAL LAW IN FORCE, I.E. THE VIENNA CONSULAR CONVENTION AS APPLIED BY BK/O(74)B AND BK/L(74)27 (SEE BERLIN TEL NO 267 PARAGRAPH 8 AS CORRECTED BY NO 269). THE CONSEQUENCES OF THIS WOULD BE:-

1) THE ACCREDITATION OF THE CONSUL-GENERAL AND THE APPOINTMENT OF THE CONSULAR STAFF WOULD BE UNDER ALLIED CONTROL IN EACH CASE, BY VIRTUE OF ARTICLES 12 AND 19.2 WITH 23.2 RESPECTIVELY OF THE CONVENTION.

2) THE THREE POWERS WOULD HAVE THE ABILITY TO DECLARE CONSULAR OFFICERS PERSONA NON GRATIA (ARTICLE 23). PERSONS ENJOYING PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES WOULD BE OBLICED TO RESPECT LOCAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS (ARTICLE 55.1).

3) ARTICLES 31 AND 55.2 AND 3 ALSO MAKE A CLEAR DISTINCTION BETWEEN QUOTE PREMISES USED EXCLUSIVELY FOR THE PURPOSE OF THE WORK OF THE CONSULAR POST UNQUOTE AND OTHER PREMISES, INCLUDING ONES IN THE SAME BUILDING, AS FAR AS INVIOABILITY IS CONCERNED: THIS WOULD PREVENT ANY OF THE OTHER OFFICES REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH 4 ABOVE TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THIS.

C) COMPETENCE. WE WOULD FURTHERMORE PROPOSE TO STIPULATE THAT THE CONSULATE-GENERAL WOULD HAVE NO POLITICAL OR DIPLOMATIC FUNCTIONS, AND IN PARTICULAR NO COMPETENCE TO DEAL WITH MATTERS RELATING TO FOUR-POWER RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES.

6. SITING OF PREMISES.

THE ALLIED AMBASSADORS’ LETTERS OF AUGUST 1963 GIVE SOME CONTROL OVER THE SITING OF OFFICE AND ACCOMMODATION PREMISES, SINCE THE RUSSIANS MUST OBTAIN FROM THE ALLIES PERMISSION FOR USE, ACQUISITION AND DISPOSAL OF PROPERTY. WE COULD USE THIS TO SOME DEGREE TO HELP IN CONCENTRATING THE SOVIET COLONY IN A FEW, EASILY OBSERVED BUILDINGS.
SECRET

2. WE HAVE THEREFORE LOOKED AGAIN AT THE PROVISIONS OF THE QUOTE WORKING PAPER UNQUOTE ON SOVIET INTERESTS OF 21 JULY (BERLIN TEL. NO. 228) TO SEE WHAT PROTECTION IS GIVEN AGAINST THE OUTSTANDING DANGERS. THE FOLLOWING POINTS EMERGE.

3. SOVIET TRADE ASSOCIATIONS, ETC.

A) NUMBERS. THE NUMBER OF SOVIET NATIONALS PERMITTED FOR EACH OFFICE IS STIPULATED IN EVERY CASE. AT PRESENT THIS AMOUNTS TO A TOTAL OF 26, MADE UP OF 20 IN THE OFFICE OF FOREIGN TRADE ASSOCIATIONS, 1 EACH IN THREE BONDED WAREHOUSES AND 3 EXTRA IN INTOURIST. A FURTHER 5 MIGHT BE ADDED IF AN AEROFLOT OFFICE IS PERMITTED. THE RISK OF UNCONTROLLABLE INCREASING AS IN THE CASE OF THE SOVIET TRADE DELEGATION IN LONDON, WOULD CLEARLY BE AVOIDED. (THE NUMBERS QUOTED ARE TOTAL NUMBERS, I.E. THEY INCLUDE SECRETARIES, DRIVERS, ETC).

B) STATUS.

THE OFFICE OF FOREIGN TRADE ASSOCIATIONS AND ITS MEMBERS, AS WELL AS THE OTHER OFFICES, WOULD NOT HAVE DIPLOMATICS OR CONSULAR STATUS. THEY WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO CLAIM INVOLATABILITY OF PREMISES. RELEVANT ALLIED AND GERMAN LEGISLATION WOULD APPLY. THIS WOULD INCLUDE NOT ONLY VARIOUS GERMAN COMMERCIAL REGULATIONS, BUT ALSO BK/O(62)5 WHICH STATES THAT QUOTE ANY ENTERPRISE OF AN ECONOMIC, PUBLICITY OR CULTURAL NATURE DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY PROMOTING THE INTERESTS OF A NON-GERMAN STATE ... AND WHOSE ACTIVITIES ARE CAPABLE OF IMPAIRING THE ECONOMIC, CULTURAL OR POLITICAL LIFE OF WEST BERLIN IS SUBJECT TO THE SUPERVISION AND CONTROL OF THE SENAT UNQUOTE. COPIES OF GERMAN PAPERS ON COMMERCIAL REGULATIONS AND OF THE BK/O ARE BEING SENT SEPARATELY BY BAG.

C) CONTROL OVER STAFF.

THE 21 JULY PAPER STIPULATES THAT SOVIET NATIONALS EMPLOYED IN THE VARIOUS OFFICES AND PERMITTED TO RESIDE IN THE WESTERN SECTORS WILL BE AUTHORISED CASE BY CASE AND WILL HAVE NO PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES. INTER ALIA, THEY WOULD REQUIRE WORK PERMITS ISSUED BY THE BERLIN LOCAL AUTHORITIES.
IMMEDIATE
CGER/CAT A
FROM BERLIN
SECRET

3014152

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TEL NO 247 OF 30 JULY INFO BONN.

FROM AUDLAND FOR UNWIN.

SOVIET PRESENCE IN WEST BERLIN,

1. MISS MACGLASHAN'S LETTER TO BAYNE OF 16 JULY AND ITS ENCLOSURES DREW ATTENTION TO SECURITY PROBLEMS WHICH HAVE ARISEN FROM THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SOVIET OFFICES IN LONDON, AND SUGGESTED THAT WE MIGHT HAVE EQUAL TROUBLE FROM SUCH OFFICES IN THE WESTERN SECTORS.

2. THE BRITISH SERVICES SECURITY ORGANISATION HAVE BEEN LOOKING INTO THE PARTICULAR PROBLEMS RAISED FOR WEST BERLIN AND ESPECIALLY THE BRITISH SECTOR. WE ARE SENDING YOU BY BAG COPIES OF A SECRET AND PERSONAL LETTER TO JACKSON FROM CAMERON, HEAD OF BS50 IN BERLIN, WHICH REVIEWS THE THREATPOSED BY AN ENLARGED SOVIET PRESENCE AND COVERS A NUMBER OF THE POINTS RAISED IN MISS MACGLASHAN'S LETTER. CAMERON CALCULATES THAT 50-60 PER CENT OF ALL SOVIET OFFICIALS POSTED TO WEST BERLIN WOULD BE INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS AND TWO-THIRDS OF THESE WOULD HAVE AN AGGRESSIVE AS OPPOSED TO A PROTECTIVE ROLE. IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO ASSESS HOW MUCH EXTRA LOAD WOULD BE PLACED ON OUR OWN RESOURCES IN KEEPING TRACK OF THESE UNTIL WE KNOW, FOR EXAMPLE, HOW MANY OF THE SOVIET OFFICES WOULD BE IN THE BRITISH SECTOR, AND HOW MANY IN THE U.S. OR FRENCH SECTORS. BUT, IN ORDER TO KEEP DOWN FUTURE PROBLEMS, IT IS SUGGESTED THAT NUMBERS, PRESENT AND FUTURE, SHOULD BE KEPT AS SMALL AS POSSIBLE.

USUAL RULES FOR ACCREDITATION AND POSTING OF OFFICIALS SHOULD APPLY: AND ACCOMMODATION AND OFFICES FOR SOVIET PERSONNEL SHOULD BE CONCENTRATED IN THE MINIMUM NUMBER OF BUILDINGS, IF POSSIBLE OF OUR OWN CHOOSING, WHILE THE SECURITY ASPECTS SHOULD ALWAYS BE CONSIDERED BEFORE THE RUSSIANS ARE ALLOWED TO OCCUPY ANY PROPERTY.

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13. WE HAVE

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10. Our fourth plea is that, in order to give us a reasonable chance of keeping them under surveillance, we should invariably be given an opportunity to put the security case before the Soviets are allowed to acquire or occupy any particular premises. This refers in particular to the premises likely to be selected by the Russians to house the KGB and GRU residentura. Broadly speaking our interest in this context is to have the Soviets accommodated in buildings:

   a. access to which is such that movement can be observed from a single CP in secure conditions,

   b. the characteristics and layout of which offer opportunity for technical attack,

   c. where the telephone arrangements are such that monitoring can be undertaken.

(Recently, as you know, we lost our telephone coverage on Novosti because the agency was able to move its offices to a building where the telephone arrangements are such that unless we are prepared to undertake a major technical operation and commit nearly the whole of our monitoring staff to this one target, we cannot monitor their telephone conversations).

11. I have copied this letter to John Jones and to Liaison Section.

[Signature]
6. Although from the Soviets' own figures we can get some idea of the size of the intelligence community they would like to introduce, we are still not in a position to estimate what we ourselves would require to contain the threat. There are still too many imponderables. We do not know, for instance, how many of the offices to be established will in fact be located within the British Sector; nor do we know to what extent the other Allies will be prepared to act jointly with us in investigating this particular target; the support role of the LfV (which must in any case, for constitutional reasons, be limited) has not yet been defined. These and several other questions in regard to how and where the Soviet community is to be accommodated must be answered before we shall be in a position to produce anything like a realistic estimate of our investigative and surveillance commitments. What we can do, however, at this stage is to put to you certain suggestions for imposing restrictions and conditions on the Soviets which would, in our view, make for a curtailment of their intelligence activities and consequently reduce the scope of our own commitments.

7. Our first plea is for the size of the resident community to be kept to a minimum, on the simple hypothesis that the smaller the community, the smaller the likely size of the intelligence element within it and consequently the smaller the surveillance commitment. I should like to emphasise that what we are asking for here is not only that the community as established should be as small as may be but also that it should not thereafter be allowed to grow. In this connection you may recall that in the late sixties staff increases in the Soviet Trade Delegation in London (and with them the scope of intelligence activity) had reached such proportions that it became necessary to take what I think was the unprecedented step of putting an upper ceiling on the strength of the Delegation.

8. Our second plea is that the usual rules in regard to the accreditation of diplomats and the posting of officials should apply in order to afford the Allies the opportunity to withhold agreement or refuse entry in those cases in which security or other considerations call for such action. There is no doubt that our inability to apply these procedures to Iron Curtain military missions already established in West Berlin has added to the difficulties of investigating and containing their intelligence activities. In this connection I hope it will be possible to resist any argument to the effect that the imposition on the Russians of regulations not applicable to the satellite missions would be unacceptable politically and would, in the absence of immigration controls (between East and West Berlin), in any case, be ineffective. I am not qualified to comment on the first count but on the second I think I am correct in making the general comment that the Soviets' record in respecting agreements they enter into is not unsatisfactory.

9. Our third plea is that in so far as it may be possible, Soviet housing and office accommodation should be concentrated in a minimum number of buildings of our choosing. This will help us to conserve our surveillance resources and use them to the best advantage.

/10 ......
Your ref.

J E Jackson Esq
Political Adviser
British Military Government
HQ BERLIN (British Sector)
British Forces Post Office 45

22 July 1971

Dear Teddy,

1. In September of last year I sent you a copy of a letter I had written to John Jones drawing his attention to the fact that the Berlin talks had by that time reached a stage at which it seemed advisable at least to take note of the fact that one of the outcomes of the talks might be the establishment of a Soviet presence in West Berlin and that such a presence would add significantly to the security threat to the city. Since then the negotiations have made considerable progress and, although there is still no agreement about what the Russians will in fact get in the way of representation in West Berlin, we now know what they want.

2. The situation at present is that 8 non-resident Soviet officials occupy office accommodation in 4 buildings in West Berlin. They represent Tass, Novosti, Sovexportfilm and Intourist.

3. At the Counsellors' meeting on the 30 June, the Soviets asked for facilities to post up to an additional 81 officials to West Berlin and for the acquisition of at least 3 additional offices as well as other buildings. Acceptance of this demand could in effect mean the establishment in West Berlin of a resident Soviet community of 89 officials working in 7 or more different locations and occupying an indeterminate number of dwellings.

4. Although in the exceptional conditions pertaining in West Berlin, where we are already exposed to a heavy intelligence attack directed at us from across the Wall, it is difficult to assess with any precision what additional threat such a community would in fact pose I think it is nevertheless possible, on the basis of figures now available to us, to produce at least a cockshy estimate of the number of intelligence officers the community would include.

5. Having regard to what we know about the composition of Soviet official communities in other parts of the world, we can, I think, take it that at least 50% (but probably nearer 60%) of the officials posted to West Berlin would be intelligence officers. We could also, I think, reasonably assume that two-thirds or more of those so identified would have an aggressive intelligence as opposed to a protective security role. Consequently if the Soviets got what they are asking for (and got it within the British Sector) we, in BSSO, could be faced with the task of identifying a hard core intelligence community of, say 30 to 36 officers and of keeping them under constant surveillance - while at the same time keeping a sharp eye on the rest of the intelligence element and a weather eye on the community as a whole.

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