Powerbase - User contributions [en]

Globalisation:Atlantic Partnership

2010-11-17T13:59:57Z

Kelsey McDonald:

--[[User:Martin Ferguson|Martin Ferguson]] 13:57, 17 November 2010 (UTC) --[[User:Laura O'Donnell|Laura O'Donnell]] 13:58, 17 November 2010 (UTC)--[[User:Kelsey McDonald|Kelsey McDonald]] 13:59, 17 November 2010 (UTC)

==Introduction==

The Atlantic Partnership is a bipartisan organisation, striving to create strong networks between elites at either side of the Atlantic. Through Atlanticism it strives to develop relationships between politics and industry creating a powerful transatlantic relationship. Its main force has derived from pro United States forces in Great Britain, including those linked to other political bodies like [[NATO]] and other Atlanticist groups. The Atlantic Partnership attempts to achieve these relationships through its members regularly writing articles and speaking on behalf of the organisation to ensure its momentum continues and allows for a stronger transatlantic rapport.

*[[Globalisation:Atlantic Partnership: Background]]

*[[Globalisation:Atlantic Partnership: People]]

*[[Globalisation:Atlantic Partnership: Connections]]

*[[Globalisation:Atlantic Partnership: Atlanticism and it's Critics]]

==Conclusion==

Over the years the Atlantic Partnership has sought to foster relationships on both sides of the Atlantic. This has been done through the bringing together of world leaders, Business leaders, and high ranking military officials. As we have seen these people are brought together at various business activities, which are held with the aim of giving major figures the chance to deliver their views to an invited audience. In addition to this the group has published many documents which have strong relations to what the Atlantic Partnership stands for.

Through its members the organisation has a great number of links to the world of politics and industry. These connections include links to political organisations such as [[NATO]], [[United Nations]] and the [[European Union]]. In addition to this, the company has links to major defence contractors and suppliers such as Lockheed Martin UK Ltd; and also to many consultancy firms, which all have the aim of brokering deals and partnerships globally.

A recurrent theme in the organisation is Atlanticism. This is evident through its activities which are aimed at bringing together Europe and the United States. Many of the companies affiliated with the organisation also share this Atlanticist view.

==Contact==

Atlantic Partnership Website <ref>"[http://www.atlanticpartnership.org/ Atlantic Partnerhip Homepage]", Atlantic Partnership Website, accessed 12 October 2010</ref>

Contact Atlantic Partnership

'''In the United States''':

Anne L.H. Gantén
Executive Director,
Atlantic Partnership Address:

Atlantic Partnership
1717 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Suite 525
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 663.7779

'''In Europe''':

Address: Atlantic Partnership
Vanessa Arkell
Director, UK

==Notes==
<references/>

Globalisation:Atlantic Partnership: Atlanticism and it's Critics

2010-11-17T13:26:51Z

Kelsey McDonald:

==Atlanticism==

Atlanticism became the foundation of British foreign and security policy for the duration of the [[Cold War]]. The uniqueness of being a trustworthy ally in the circumstance of a hostile international system produced a union of interests across a variety of security and defence issues. Following the tragedy of [[9/11]], international relations imply a very dissimilar context. Conscious of its principal position in the unipolar order, the “imperial public” has verified that it is not satisfied to act as a status quo power.<ref>"[http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/7/0/7/3/pages70731/p70731-1.php "FIghting For Values": Atlanticism, Internationalism and the Blair Doctrine]" allacademic research. Accessed 15 November, 2010.</ref>

In order to recover ground with the United States the [[EU]] is suggesting improving transatlantic relations further than the traditional Atlanticism one to one that is more orientated around results and lead by tactical precedence, such as the Atlantic Partnership.<ref>"[http://www.euractiv.com/en/priorities/eu-wants-new-atlanticism-news-391583 EU wants a new Atlanticism]" EurActiv. Accessed 16 November, 2010.</ref>

In the 21st century, Atlanticism has undergone important adjustments due to terrorism and [the 2003 war in Iraq], the main consequence being a new inquiring of the idea itself and a new insight that the security of the particular countries quite possibly need alliance action outwith the North Atlantic terrain. Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, [[NATO]] -which has strong links to the Atlantic Partnership through individuals such as [[John Gilbert]] - for the first time invoked Article 5, stating that any attack facilitated on a member country will be seen as an attack on the entire group of members.<ref>"[http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-124e.htm Statement by the North Atlantic Council]" NATO. Accessed 15 November, 2010.</ref>

==Critics==

On the 24th of June, 2005, the [[Streit Council for a Union of Democracies]] prearranged a panel on Atlanticism in 20th century U.S. Foreign Policy at the Annual Meeting of the [[Society of Historians of American Foreign Relations]]. The panel tackled the question of whether American foreign policy could resolve some popular contrasts, particularly the European soft power versus American hard power choice offered by [[Robert Kagan]] - who has been linked with the Atlantic Partnership <ref>"[http://www.atlanticpartnership.org/?p=110 Still the Colossus]" Atlantic Partnership website. Accessed 16 November, 2010.</ref> - and discovered that the Atlantic integrationist approach had supplied an efficient blend during much of the twentieth century.

Also, the panellists analysed the reason why the Atlanticist postwar strategy of combining an initial grouping of democratic countries succeeded in attracting other countries to democratize and join, opposing to the observation that much of the academic and activist worlds had taken that it would cause other countries to unite against it. They disputed that the Atlanticist approach had united universalism with regionalism in two ways: a “nucleus” tactic of moving from the regional toward the universal by persuading others to join, and a concentric circles approach supporting both inner (Atlantic) and outer (global) levels of international organisation, with the inner circle offering direction and enthusiasm, and the outer circle offering global legal standards and authenticity. The complexity of this approach materialized out of the disturbing experiences of the [[World War I]] and [[World War II]] generations. The internationalists of the period became well aware of the insufficiency of every basic form of internationalism and developed a more sophisticated one. After 1947 they were capable of applying, in a biased, Euro-Atlantic structure, both strategies-- concentric circles and open nucleus – raising their notion to the level of the core project of the 20th century American foreign policy.<ref>"[http://streitcouncil.org/index.php?page=atlanticism-in-20th-century-u-s-foreign-policy Atlanticism in 20th Century U.S. Foreign Policy]" Streit Council for a Union of Democracies. Accessed 16 November, 2010.</ref>

As the end of 2005 was drawing in, the officials of Europe and America are stimulated over how, for trans-Atlantic relations, it has been a good year. The undersecretary of state for political affairs , [[Nicholas Burns]] - who has attended conferences held by the Atlantic Partnership<ref>"[http://www.atlanticpartnership.org/?p=141 Healing the Rift - London Conference]" Atlantic Partnership website. Accessed 16 November, 2010.</ref>- says “Europe and the United States have rebuilt bridges across the Atlantic, ended the war of the words sparked by discord over Iraq and recognized the fundamental truth that the trans-Atlantic partnership is a long-term marriage not susceptible to separation or divorce.” There are two large structural disjunctions that are expected to be the roots of future trouble. The first is said to be that trans-Atlantic relations presently have little focus upon Europe, in the view of the Europeans; these relations are still very much focused on the United States. The analysis which Burns makes was regularly repeated in Washington at that time. It is a gracious declaration about how Europe is not at the centre of U.S. geopolitical strategy. “Now that the process of postwar European construction has largely been achieved, the question is no longer what Washington thinks about Europe, but what the United States and Europe can do together to promote their interests and values, and spread democracy, in the rest of the world.” Collectively with acknowledgment of the increasing role of the [[EU]], this new approach was intentionally highlighted by President [[George W. Bush]]’s visit to the European Commission in Brussels in February 2005, which was the first by a U.S. president. To those of the Brussels-orientated European elite who would like to trust that the EU is on the edge of becoming an equal partner to the United States on the world level, this approach is seductive. However, this idea is, for the most part, based on self-delusion. While the United States still wants Europe as a source of help for a variety of reasons, Washington does not often put the word “equal” ahead of “partner”. The essential trouble is that regardless of Washington’s blandishments, most of the European intelligentsia, the news media and the political classes deem the United States, especially under Bush, as overbearing and unsafe. They seize upon every supposed transgression, from professed “torture flights” they carry suspected terrorists to undisclosed prisons to alleged violations of American civil liberties, as keenly as Bush’s most potent rivals in the United States. “This distorted view of America is fed by widespread envy of U.S. power. As long as it persists, many Europeans will be reluctant to commit themselves to a stronger Atlantic partnership.” The second large structural disjunction is stemmed from the variety of ways in which Europeans and Americans think the world should be controlled. The truth is that [[EU]] and U.S. officials frequently stress that the [[EU]] is making key donations to peace in such places as Yugoslavia and Afghanistan and working on the matter of Iran’s nuclear predicament with Washington. However, the model European outlook of how Western influence and especially military force should be put forth in the 21st century, is fundamentally contrasting to America’s and is liable to remain as such. In spite of the indisputable developments on the surface, these deep, underlying trans-Atlantic pressures are not likely to have been resolved within the next few years.<ref>Reginald Dale (2005) Behind the smiles, trans-Atlantic bile; Europe and the U.S. The International Herald Tribune. December 29, 2005 Thursday.</ref>

==Notes==

<references/>

Globalisation:Atlantic Partnership: Atlanticism and it's Critics

2010-11-17T13:26:08Z

Kelsey McDonald:

==Atlanticism==

Atlanticism became the foundation of British foreign and security policy for the duration of the [[Cold War]]. The uniqueness of being a trustworthy ally in the circumstance of a hostile international system produced a union of interests across a variety of security and defence issues. Following the tragedy of [[9/11]], international relations imply a very dissimilar context. Conscious of its principal position in the unipolar order, the “imperial public” has verified that it is not satisfied to act as a status quo power.<ref>"[http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/7/0/7/3/pages70731/p70731-1.php "FIghting For Values": Atlanticism, Internationalism and the Blair Doctrine]" allacademic research. Accessed 15 November, 2010.</ref>

In order to recover ground with the United States the [[EU]] is suggesting improving transatlantic relations further than the traditional Atlanticism one to one that is more orientated around results and lead by tactical precedence, such as the Atlantic Partnership.<ref>"[http://www.euractiv.com/en/priorities/eu-wants-new-atlanticism-news-391583 EU wants a new Atlanticism]" EurActiv. Accessed 16 November, 2010.</ref>

In the 21st century, Atlanticism has undergone important adjustments due to terrorism and [the 2003 war in Iraq], the main consequence being a new inquiring of the idea itself and a new insight that the security of the particular countries quite possibly need alliance action outwith the North Atlantic terrain. Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, [[NATO]] -which has strong links to the Atlantic Partnership through individuals such as John Gilbert - for the first time invoked Article 5, stating that any attack facilitated on a member country will be seen as an attack on the entire group of members.<ref>"[http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-124e.htm Statement by the North Atlantic Council]" NATO. Accessed 15 November, 2010.</ref>

==Critics==

On the 24th of June, 2005, the [[Streit Council for a Union of Democracies]] prearranged a panel on Atlanticism in 20th century U.S. Foreign Policy at the Annual Meeting of the [[Society of Historians of American Foreign Relations]]. The panel tackled the question of whether American foreign policy could resolve some popular contrasts, particularly the European soft power versus American hard power choice offered by [[Robert Kagan]] - who has been linked with the Atlantic Partnership <ref>"[http://www.atlanticpartnership.org/?p=110 Still the Colossus]" Atlantic Partnership website. Accessed 16 November, 2010.</ref> - and discovered that the Atlantic integrationist approach had supplied an efficient blend during much of the twentieth century.

Also, the panellists analysed the reason why the Atlanticist postwar strategy of combining an initial grouping of democratic countries succeeded in attracting other countries to democratize and join, opposing to the observation that much of the academic and activist worlds had taken that it would cause other countries to unite against it. They disputed that the Atlanticist approach had united universalism with regionalism in two ways: a “nucleus” tactic of moving from the regional toward the universal by persuading others to join, and a concentric circles approach supporting both inner (Atlantic) and outer (global) levels of international organisation, with the inner circle offering direction and enthusiasm, and the outer circle offering global legal standards and authenticity. The complexity of this approach materialized out of the disturbing experiences of the [[World War I]] and [[World War II]] generations. The internationalists of the period became well aware of the insufficiency of every basic form of internationalism and developed a more sophisticated one. After 1947 they were capable of applying, in a biased, Euro-Atlantic structure, both strategies-- concentric circles and open nucleus – raising their notion to the level of the core project of the 20th century American foreign policy.<ref>"[http://streitcouncil.org/index.php?page=atlanticism-in-20th-century-u-s-foreign-policy Atlanticism in 20th Century U.S. Foreign Policy]" Streit Council for a Union of Democracies. Accessed 16 November, 2010.</ref>

As the end of 2005 was drawing in, the officials of Europe and America are stimulated over how, for trans-Atlantic relations, it has been a good year. The undersecretary of state for political affairs , [[Nicholas Burns]] - who has attended conferences held by the Atlantic Partnership<ref>"[http://www.atlanticpartnership.org/?p=141 Healing the Rift - London Conference]" Atlantic Partnership website. Accessed 16 November, 2010.</ref>- says “Europe and the United States have rebuilt bridges across the Atlantic, ended the war of the words sparked by discord over Iraq and recognized the fundamental truth that the trans-Atlantic partnership is a long-term marriage not susceptible to separation or divorce.” There are two large structural disjunctions that are expected to be the roots of future trouble. The first is said to be that trans-Atlantic relations presently have little focus upon Europe, in the view of the Europeans; these relations are still very much focused on the United States. The analysis which Burns makes was regularly repeated in Washington at that time. It is a gracious declaration about how Europe is not at the centre of U.S. geopolitical strategy. “Now that the process of postwar European construction has largely been achieved, the question is no longer what Washington thinks about Europe, but what the United States and Europe can do together to promote their interests and values, and spread democracy, in the rest of the world.” Collectively with acknowledgment of the increasing role of the [[EU]], this new approach was intentionally highlighted by President [[George W. Bush]]’s visit to the European Commission in Brussels in February 2005, which was the first by a U.S. president. To those of the Brussels-orientated European elite who would like to trust that the EU is on the edge of becoming an equal partner to the United States on the world level, this approach is seductive. However, this idea is, for the most part, based on self-delusion. While the United States still wants Europe as a source of help for a variety of reasons, Washington does not often put the word “equal” ahead of “partner”. The essential trouble is that regardless of Washington’s blandishments, most of the European intelligentsia, the news media and the political classes deem the United States, especially under Bush, as overbearing and unsafe. They seize upon every supposed transgression, from professed “torture flights” they carry suspected terrorists to undisclosed prisons to alleged violations of American civil liberties, as keenly as Bush’s most potent rivals in the United States. “This distorted view of America is fed by widespread envy of U.S. power. As long as it persists, many Europeans will be reluctant to commit themselves to a stronger Atlantic partnership.” The second large structural disjunction is stemmed from the variety of ways in which Europeans and Americans think the world should be controlled. The truth is that [[EU]] and U.S. officials frequently stress that the [[EU]] is making key donations to peace in such places as Yugoslavia and Afghanistan and working on the matter of Iran’s nuclear predicament with Washington. However, the model European outlook of how Western influence and especially military force should be put forth in the 21st century, is fundamentally contrasting to America’s and is liable to remain as such. In spite of the indisputable developments on the surface, these deep, underlying trans-Atlantic pressures are not likely to have been resolved within the next few years.<ref>Reginald Dale (2005) Behind the smiles, trans-Atlantic bile; Europe and the U.S. The International Herald Tribune. December 29, 2005 Thursday.</ref>

==Notes==

<references/>

Globalisation:Atlantic Partnership: Atlanticism and it's Critics

2010-11-17T13:25:21Z

Kelsey McDonald:

==Atlanticism==

Atlanticism became the foundation of British foreign and security policy for the duration of the [[Cold War]]. The uniqueness of being a trustworthy ally in the circumstance of a hostile international system produced a union of interests across a variety of security and defence issues. Following the tragedy of [[9/11]], international relations imply a very dissimilar context. Conscious of its principal position in the unipolar order, the “imperial public” has verified that it is not satisfied to act as a status quo power.<ref>"[http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/7/0/7/3/pages70731/p70731-1.php "FIghting For Values": Atlanticism, Internationalism and the Blair Doctrine]" allacademic research. Accessed 15 November, 2010.</ref>

In order to recover ground with the United States the [[EU]] is suggesting improving transatlantic relations further than the traditional Atlanticism one to one that is more orientated around results and lead by tactical precedence, such as the Atlantic Partnership.<ref>"[http://www.euractiv.com/en/priorities/eu-wants-new-atlanticism-news-391583 EU wants a new Atlanticism]" EurActiv. Accessed 16 November, 2010.</ref>

In the 21st century, Atlanticism has undergone important adjustments due to terrorism and [the 2003 war in Iraq], the main consequence being a new inquiring of the idea itself and a new insight that the security of the particular countries quite possibly need alliance action outwith the North Atlantic terrain. Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, [[NATO]] -which has strong links to the Atlantic Partnership through individuals such as John Gilbert - for the first time invoked Article 5, stating that any attack facilitated on a member country will be seen as an attack on the entire group of members.<ref>"[http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-124e.htm Statement by the North Atlantic Council]" NATO. Accessed 15 November, 2010.</ref>

==Critics==

On the 24th of June, 2005, the [[Streit Council for a Union of Democracies]] prearranged a panel on Atlanticism in 20th century U.S. Foreign Policy at the Annual Meeting of the [[Society of Historians of American Foreign Relations]]. The panel tackled the question of whether American foreign policy could resolve some popular contrasts, particularly the European soft power versus American hard power choice offered by [[Robert Kagan]] - who has been linked with the Atlantic Partnership <ref>"[http://www.atlanticpartnership.org/?p=110 Still the Colossus]" Atlantic Partnership website. Accessed 16 November, 2010.</ref> - and discovered that the Atlantic integrationist approach had supplied an efficient blend during much of the twentieth century.

Also, the panellists analysed the reason why the Atlanticist postwar strategy of combining an initial grouping of democratic countries succeeded in attracting other countries to democratize and join, opposing to the observation that much of the academic and activist worlds had taken that it would cause other countries to unite against it. They disputed that the Atlanticist approach had united universalism with regionalism in two ways: a “nucleus” tactic of moving from the regional toward the universal by persuading others to join, and a concentric circles approach supporting both inner (Atlantic) and outer (global) levels of international organisation, with the inner circle offering direction and enthusiasm, and the outer circle offering global legal standards and authenticity. The complexity of this approach materialized out of the disturbing experiences of the [[World War I]] and [[World War II]] generations. The internationalists of the period became well aware of the insufficiency of every basic form of internationalism and developed a more sophisticated one. After 1947 they were capable of applying, in a biased, Euro-Atlantic structure, both strategies-- concentric circles and open nucleus – raising their notion to the level of the core project of the 20th century American foreign policy.<ref>"[http://streitcouncil.org/index.php?page=atlanticism-in-20th-century-u-s-foreign-policy Atlanticism in 20th Century U.S. Foreign Policy]" Streit Council for a Union of Democracies. Accessed 16 November, 2010.</ref>

As the end of 2005 was drawing in, the officials of Europe and America are stimulated over how, for trans-Atlantic relations, it has been a good year. The undersecretary of state for political affairs , [[Nicholas Burns]] - who has attended conferences held by the Atlantic Partnership<ref>"[http://www.atlanticpartnership.org/?p=141 Healing the Rift - London Conference]" Atlantic Partnership website. Accessed 16 November, 2010.</ref>- says “Europe and the United States have rebuilt bridges across the Atlantic, ended the war of the words sparked by discord over Iraq and recognized the fundamental truth that the trans-Atlantic partnership is a long-term marriage not susceptible to separation or divorce.” There are two large structural disjunctions that are expected to be the roots of future trouble. The first is said to be that trans-Atlantic relations presently have little focus upon Europe, in the view of the Europeans; these relations are still very much focused on the United States. The analysis which Burns makes was regularly repeated in Washington at that time. It is a gracious declaration about how Europe is not at the centre of U.S. geopolitical strategy. “Now that the process of postwar European construction has largely been achieved, the question is no longer what Washington thinks about Europe, but what the United States and Europe can do together to promote their interests and values, and spread democracy, in the rest of the world.” Collectively with acknowledgment of the increasing role of the [[EU]], this new approach was intentionally highlighted by [[President George W. Bush]]’s visit to the European Commission in Brussels in February 2005, which was the first by a U.S. president. To those of the Brussels-orientated European elite who would like to trust that the EU is on the edge of becoming an equal partner to the United States on the world level, this approach is seductive. However, this idea is, for the most part, based on self-delusion. While the United States still wants Europe as a source of help for a variety of reasons, Washington does not often put the word “equal” ahead of “partner”. The essential trouble is that regardless of Washington’s blandishments, most of the European intelligentsia, the news media and the political classes deem the United States, especially under Bush, as overbearing and unsafe. They seize upon every supposed transgression, from professed “torture flights” they carry suspected terrorists to undisclosed prisons to alleged violations of American civil liberties, as keenly as Bush’s most potent rivals in the United States. “This distorted view of America is fed by widespread envy of U.S. power. As long as it persists, many Europeans will be reluctant to commit themselves to a stronger Atlantic partnership.” The second large structural disjunction is stemmed from the variety of ways in which Europeans and Americans think the world should be controlled. The truth is that [[EU]] and U.S. officials frequently stress that the [[EU]] is making key donations to peace in such places as Yugoslavia and Afghanistan and working on the matter of Iran’s nuclear predicament with Washington. However, the model European outlook of how Western influence and especially military force should be put forth in the 21st century, is fundamentally contrasting to America’s and is liable to remain as such. In spite of the indisputable developments on the surface, these deep, underlying trans-Atlantic pressures are not likely to have been resolved within the next few years.<ref>Reginald Dale (2005) Behind the smiles, trans-Atlantic bile; Europe and the U.S. The International Herald Tribune. December 29, 2005 Thursday.</ref>

==Notes==

<references/>

Globalisation:Atlantic Partnership: Atlanticism and it's Critics

2010-11-17T13:21:53Z

Kelsey McDonald:

==Atlanticism==

Atlanticism became the foundation of British foreign and security policy for the duration of the [Cold War]. The uniqueness of being a trustworthy ally in the circumstance of a hostile international system produced a union of interests across a variety of security and defence issues. Following the tragedy of [9/11], international relations imply a very dissimilar context. Conscious of its principal position in the unipolar order, the “imperial public” has verified that it is not satisfied to act as a status quo power.<ref>"[http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/7/0/7/3/pages70731/p70731-1.php "FIghting For Values": Atlanticism, Internationalism and the Blair Doctrine]" allacademic research. Accessed 15 November, 2010.</ref>

In order to recover ground with the United States the [EU] is suggesting improving transatlantic relations further than the traditional Atlanticism one to one that is more orientated around results and lead by tactical precedence, such as the Atlantic Partnership.<ref>"[http://www.euractiv.com/en/priorities/eu-wants-new-atlanticism-news-391583 EU wants a new Atlanticism]" EurActiv. Accessed 16 November, 2010.</ref>

In the 21st century, Atlanticism has undergone important adjustments due to terrorism and [the 2003 war in Iraq], the main consequence being a new inquiring of the idea itself and a new insight that the security of the particular countries quite possibly need alliance action outwith the North Atlantic terrain. Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, [NATO] -which has strong links to the Atlantic Partnership through individuals such as John Gilbert - for the first time invoked Article 5, stating that any attack facilitated on a member country will be seen as an attack on the entire group of members.<ref>"[http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-124e.htm Statement by the North Atlantic Council]" NATO. Accessed 15 November, 2010.</ref>

==Critics==

On the 24th of June, 2005, the [Streit Council for a Union of Democracies] prearranged a panel on Atlanticism in 20th century U.S. Foreign Policy at the Annual Meeting of the [Society of Historians of American Foreign Relations]. The panel tackled the question of whether American foreign policy could resolve some popular contrasts, particularly the European soft power versus American hard power choice offered by [Robert Kagan] - who has been linked with the Atlantic Partnership <ref>"[http://www.atlanticpartnership.org/?p=110 Still the Colossus]" Atlantic Partnership website. Accessed 16 November, 2010.</ref> - and discovered that the Atlantic integrationist approach had supplied an efficient blend during much of the twentieth century.

Also, the panellists analysed the reason why the Atlanticist postwar strategy of combining an initial grouping of democratic countries succeeded in attracting other countries to democratize and join, opposing to the observation that much of the academic and activist worlds had taken that it would cause other countries to unite against it. They disputed that the Atlanticist approach had united universalism with regionalism in two ways: a “nucleus” tactic of moving from the regional toward the universal by persuading others to join, and a concentric circles approach supporting both inner (Atlantic) and outer (global) levels of international organisation, with the inner circle offering direction and enthusiasm, and the outer circle offering global legal standards and authenticity. The complexity of this approach materialized out of the disturbing experiences of the [World War I] and [World War II] generations. The internationalists of the period became well aware of the insufficiency of every basic form of internationalism and developed a more sophisticated one. After 1947 they were capable of applying, in a biased, Euro-Atlantic structure, both strategies-- concentric circles and open nucleus – raising their notion to the level of the core project of the 20th century American foreign policy.<ref>"[http://streitcouncil.org/index.php?page=atlanticism-in-20th-century-u-s-foreign-policy Atlanticism in 20th Century U.S. Foreign Policy]" Streit Council for a Union of Democracies. Accessed 16 November, 2010.</ref>

As the end of 2005 was drawing in, the officials of Europe and America are stimulated over how, for trans-Atlantic relations, it has been a good year. The undersecretary of state for political affairs , [Nicholas Burns] - who has attended conferences held by the Atlantic Partnership<ref>"[http://www.atlanticpartnership.org/?p=141 Healing the Rift - London Conference]" Atlantic Partnership website. Accessed 16 November, 2010.</ref>- says “Europe and the United States have rebuilt bridges across the Atlantic, ended the war of the words sparked by discord over Iraq and recognized the fundamental truth that the trans-Atlantic partnership is a long-term marriage not susceptible to separation or divorce.” There are two large structural disjunctions that are expected to be the roots of future trouble. The first is said to be that trans-Atlantic relations presently have little focus upon Europe, in the view of the Europeans; these relations are still very much focused on the United States. The analysis which Burns makes was regularly repeated in Washington at that time. It is a gracious declaration about how Europe is not at the centre of U.S. geopolitical strategy. “Now that the process of postwar European construction has largely been achieved, the question is no longer what Washington thinks about Europe, but what the United States and Europe can do together to promote their interests and values, and spread democracy, in the rest of the world.” Collectively with acknowledgment of the increasing role of the [EU], this new approach was intentionally highlighted by [President George W. Bush]’s visit to the European Commission in Brussels in February 2005, which was the first by a U.S. president. To those of the Brussels-orientated European elite who would like to trust that the EU is on the edge of becoming an equal partner to the United States on the world level, this approach is seductive. However, this idea is, for the most part, based on self-delusion. While the United States still wants Europe as a source of help for a variety of reasons, Washington does not often put the word “equal” ahead of “partner”. The essential trouble is that regardless of Washington’s blandishments, most of the European intelligentsia, the news media and the political classes deem the United States, especially under Bush, as overbearing and unsafe. They seize upon every supposed transgression, from professed “torture flights” they carry suspected terrorists to undisclosed prisons to alleged violations of American civil liberties, as keenly as Bush’s most potent rivals in the United States. “This distorted view of America is fed by widespread envy of U.S. power. As long as it persists, many Europeans will be reluctant to commit themselves to a stronger Atlantic partnership.” The second large structural disjunction is stemmed from the variety of ways in which Europeans and Americans think the world should be controlled. The truth is that [EU] and U.S. officials frequently stress that the [EU] is making key donations to peace in such places as Yugoslavia and Afghanistan and working on the matter of Iran’s nuclear predicament with Washington. However, the model European outlook of how Western influence and especially military force should be put forth in the 21st century, is fundamentally contrasting to America’s and is liable to remain as such. In spite of the indisputable developments on the surface, these deep, underlying trans-Atlantic pressures are not likely to have been resolved within the next few years.<ref>Reginald Dale (2005) Behind the smiles, trans-Atlantic bile; Europe and the U.S. The International Herald Tribune. December 29, 2005 Thursday.</ref>

==Notes==

<references/>

Globalisation:Atlantic Partnership: Atlanticism and it's Critics

2010-11-17T13:11:42Z

Kelsey McDonald:

==Atlanticism==

Atlanticism became the foundation of British foreign and security policy for the duration of the Cold War. The uniqueness of being a trustworthy ally in the circumstance of a hostile international system produced a union of interests across a variety of security and defence issues. Following the tragedy of 9/11, international relations imply a very dissimilar context. Conscious of its principal position in the unipolar order, the “imperial public” has verified that it is not satisfied to act as a status quo power.<ref>"[http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/7/0/7/3/pages70731/p70731-1.php "FIghting For Values": Atlanticism, Internationalism and the Blair Doctrine]" allacademic research. Accessed 15 November, 2010.</ref>

In order to recover ground with the United States the EU is suggesting improving transatlantic relations further than the traditional Atlanticism one to one that is more orientated around results and lead by tactical precedence, such as the Atlantic Partnership.<ref>"[http://www.euractiv.com/en/priorities/eu-wants-new-atlanticism-news-391583 EU wants a new Atlanticism]" EurActiv. Accessed 16 November, 2010.</ref>

In the 21st century, Atlanticism has undergone important adjustments due to terrorism and the war in Iraq, the main consequence being a new inquiring of the idea itself and a new insight that the security of the particular countries quite possibly need alliance action outwith the North Atlantic terrain. Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, NATO -which has strong links to the Atlantic Partnership through individuals such as John Gilberts - for the first time invoked Article 5, stating that any attack facilitated on a member country will be seen as an attack on the entire group of members.<ref>"[http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-124e.htm Statement by the North Atlantic Council]" NATO. Accessed 15 November, 2010.</ref>

==Critics==

On the 24th of June, 2005, the Streit Council for a Union of Democracies prearranged a panel on Atlanticism in 20th century U.S. Foreign Policy at the Annual Meeting of the Society of Historians of American Foreign Relations. The panel tackled the question of whether American foreign policy could resolve some popular contrasts, particularly the European soft power versus American hard power choice offered by Robert Kagan - who has been linked with the Atlantic Partnership <ref>"[http://www.atlanticpartnership.org/?p=110 Still the Colossus]" Atlantic Partnership website. Accessed 16 November, 2010.</ref> - and discovered that the Atlantic integrationist approach had supplied an efficient blend during much of the twentieth century.

Also, the panellists analysed the reason why the Atlanticist postwar strategy of combining an initial grouping of democratic countries succeeded in attracting other countries to democratize and join, opposing to the observation that much of the academic and activist worlds had taken that it would cause other countries to unite against it. They disputed that the Atlanticist approach had united universalism with regionalism in two ways: a “nucleus” tactic of moving from the regional toward the universal by persuading others to join, and a concentric circles approach supporting both inner (Atlantic) and outer (global) levels of international organisation, with the inner circle offering direction and enthusiasm, and the outer circle offering global legal standards and authenticity. The complexity of this approach materialized out of the disturbing experiences of the World War I and II generations. The internationalists of the period became well aware of the insufficiency of every basic form of internationalism and developed a more sophisticated one. After 1947 they were capable of applying, in a biased, Euro-Atlantic structure, both strategies-- concentric circles and open nucleus – raising their notion to the level of the core project of the 20th century American foreign policy.<ref>"[http://streitcouncil.org/index.php?page=atlanticism-in-20th-century-u-s-foreign-policy Atlanticism in 20th Century U.S. Foreign Policy]" Streit Council for a Union of Democracies. Accessed 16 November, 2010.</ref>

As the end of 2005 was drawing in, the officials of Europe and America are stimulated over how, for trans-Atlantic relations, it has been a good year. The undersecretary of state for political affairs , Nicholas Burns - who has attended conferences held by the Atlantic Partnership<ref>"[http://www.atlanticpartnership.org/?p=141 Healing the Rift - London Conference]" Atlantic Partnership website. Accessed 16 November, 2010.</ref>- says “Europe and the United States have rebuilt bridges across the Atlantic, ended the war of the words sparked by discord over Iraq and recognized the fundamental truth that the trans-Atlantic partnership is a long-term marriage not susceptible to separation or divorce.” There are two large structural disjunctions that are expected to be the roots of future trouble. The first is said to be that trans-Atlantic relations presently have little focus upon Europe, in the view of the Europeans; these relations are still very much focused on the United States. The analysis which Burns makes was regularly repeated in Washington at that time. It is a gracious declaration about how Europe is not at the centre of U.S. geopolitical strategy. “Now that the process of postwar European construction has largely been achieved, the question is no longer what Washington thinks about Europe, but what the United States and Europe can do together to promote their interests and values, and spread democracy, in the rest of the world.” Collectively with acknowledgment of the increasing role of the EU, this new approach was intentionally highlighted by President George W. Bush’s visit to the European Commission in Brussels in February 2005, which was the first by a U.S. president. To those of the Brussels-orientated European elite who would like to trust that the EU is on the edge of becoming an equal partner to the United States on the world level, this approach is seductive. However, this idea is, for the most part, based on self-delusion. While the United States still wants Europe as a source of help for a variety of reasons, Washington does not often put the word “equal” ahead of “partner”. The essential trouble is that regardless of Washington’s blandishments, most of the European intelligentsia, the news media and the political classes deem the United States, especially under Bush, as overbearing and unsafe. They seize upon every supposed transgression, from professed “torture flights” they carry suspected terrorists to undisclosed prisons to alleged violations of American civil liberties, as keenly as Bush’s most potent rivals in the United States. “This distorted view of America is fed by widespread envy of U.S. power. As long as it persists, many Europeans will be reluctant to commit themselves to a stronger Atlantic partnership.” The second large structural disjunction is stemmed from the variety of ways in which Europeans and Americans think the world should be controlled. The truth is that EU and U.S. officials frequently stress that the EU is making key donations to peace in such places as Yugoslavia and Afghanistan and working on the matter of Iran’s nuclear predicament with Washington. However, the model European outlook of how Western influence and especially military force should be put forth in the 21st century, is fundamentally contrasting to America’s and is liable to remain as such. In spite of the indisputable developments on the surface, these deep, underlying trans-Atlantic pressures are not likely to have been resolved within the next few years.<ref>Reginald Dale (2005) Behind the smiles, trans-Atlantic bile; Europe and the U.S. The International Herald Tribune. December 29, 2005 Thursday.</ref>

==Notes==

<references/>

Globalisation:Atlantic Partnership: Atlanticism and it's Critics

2010-11-17T13:06:02Z

Kelsey McDonald:

==Atlanticism==

Atlanticism became the foundation of British foreign and security policy for the duration of the Cold War. The uniqueness of being a trustworthy ally in the circumstance of a hostile international system produced a union of interests across a variety of security and defence issues. Following the tragedy of 9/11, international relations imply a very dissimilar context. Conscious of its principal position in the unipolar order, the “imperial public” has verified that it is not satisfied to act as a status quo power.<ref>"[http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/7/0/7/3/pages70731/p70731-1.php "FIghting For Values": Atlanticism, Internationalism and the Blair Doctrine]" allacademic research. Accessed 15 November, 2010.</ref>

In order to recover ground with the United States the EU is suggesting improving transatlantic relations further than the traditional Atlanticism one to one that is more orientated around results and lead by tactical precedence, such as the Atlantic Partnership.<ref>"[http://www.euractiv.com/en/priorities/eu-wants-new-atlanticism-news-391583 EU wants a new Atlanticism]" EurActiv. Accessed 16 November, 2010.</ref>

In the 21st century, Atlanticism has undergone important adjustments due to terrorism and the war in Iraq, the main consequence being a new inquiring of the idea itself and a new insight that the security of the particular countries quite possibly need alliance action outwith the North Atlantic terrain. Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, NATO -which has strong links to the Atlantic Partnership through individuals such as John Gilberts - for the first time invoked Article 5, stating that any attack facilitated on a member country will be seen as an attack on the entire group of members.<ref>"[http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-124e.htm Statement by the North Atlantic Council]" NATO. Accessed 15 November, 2010.</ref>

==Critics==

On the 24th of June, 2005, the Streit Council for a Union of Democracies prearranged a panel on Atlanticism in 20th century U.S. Foreign Policy at the Annual Meeting of the Society of Historians of American Foreign Relations. The panel tackled the question of whether American foreign policy could resolve some popular contrasts, particularly the European soft power versus American hard power choice offered by Robert Kagan - who has been linked with the Atlantic Partnership <ref>"[http://www.atlanticpartnership.org/?p=110 Still the Colossus]" Atlantic Partnership website. Accessed 16 November, 2010.</ref> - and discovered that the Atlantic integrationist approach had supplied an efficient blend during much of the twentieth century.

Also, the panellists analysed the reason why the Atlanticist postwar strategy of combining an initial grouping of democratic countries succeeded in attracting other countries to democratize and join, opposing to the observation that much of the academic and activist worlds had taken that it would cause other countries to unite against it. They disputed that the Atlanticist approach had united universalism with regionalism in two ways: a “nucleus” tactic of moving from the regional toward the universal by persuading others to join, and a concentric circles approach supporting both inner (Atlantic) and outer (global) levels of international organisation, with the inner circle offering direction and enthusiasm, and the outer circle offering global legal standards and authenticity. The complexity of this approach materialized out of the disturbing experiences of the World War I and II generations. The internationalists of the period became well aware of the insufficiency of every basic form of internationalism and developed a more sophisticated one. After 1947 they were capable of applying, in a biased, Euro-Atlantic structure, both strategies-- concentric circles and open nucleus – raising their notion to the level of the core project of the 20th century American foreign policy.<ref>"[http://streitcouncil.org/index.php?page=atlanticism-in-20th-century-u-s-foreign-policy Atlanticism in 20th Century U.S. Foreign Policy]" Streit Council for a Union of Democracies. Accessed 16 November, 2010.</ref>

As the end of 2005 was drawing in, the officials of Europe and America are stimulated over how, for trans-Atlantic relations, it has been a good year. The undersecretary of state for political affairs , Nicholas Burns - who has attended conferences held by the Atlantic Partnership<ref>"[ http://www.atlanticpartnership.org/?p=141 Healing the Rift - London Conference]" Atlantic Partnership website. Accessed 16 November, 2010.</ref>- says “Europe and the United States have rebuilt bridges across the Atlantic, ended the war of the words sparked by discord over Iraq and recognized the fundamental truth that the trans-Atlantic partnership is a long-term marriage not susceptible to separation or divorce.” There are two large structural disjunctions that are expected to be the roots of future trouble. The first is said to be that trans-Atlantic relations presently have little focus upon Europe, in the view of the Europeans; these relations are still very much focused on the United States. The analysis which Burns makes was regularly repeated in Washington at that time. It is a gracious declaration about how Europe is not at the centre of U.S. geopolitical strategy. “Now that the process of postwar European construction has largely been achieved, the question is no longer what Washington thinks about Europe, but what the United States and Europe can do together to promote their interests and values, and spread democracy, in the rest of the world.” Collectively with acknowledgment of the increasing role of the EU, this new approach was intentionally highlighted by President George W. Bush’s visit to the European Commission in Brussels in February 2005, which was the first by a U.S. president. To those of the Brussels-orientated European elite who would like to trust that the EU is on the edge of becoming an equal partner to the United States on the world level, this approach is seductive. However, this idea is, for the most part, based on self-delusion. While the United States still wants Europe as a source of help for a variety of reasons, Washington does not often put the word “equal” ahead of “partner”. The essential trouble is that regardless of Washington’s blandishments, most of the European intelligentsia, the news media and the political classes deem the United States, especially under Bush, as overbearing and unsafe. They seize upon every supposed transgression, from professed “torture flights” they carry suspected terrorists to undisclosed prisons to alleged violations of American civil liberties, as keenly as Bush’s most potent rivals in the United States. “This distorted view of America is fed by widespread envy of U.S. power. As long as it persists, many Europeans will be reluctant to commit themselves to a stronger Atlantic partnership.” The second large structural disjunction is stemmed from the variety of ways in which Europeans and Americans think the world should be controlled. The truth is that EU and U.S. officials frequently stress that the EU is making key donations to peace in such places as Yugoslavia and Afghanistan and working on the matter of Iran’s nuclear predicament with Washington. However, the model European outlook of how Western influence and especially military force should be put forth in the 21st century, is fundamentally contrasting to America’s and is liable to remain as such. In spite of the indisputable developments on the surface, these deep, underlying trans-Atlantic pressures are not likely to have been resolved within the next few years.<ref>Reginald Dale (2005) Behind the smiles, trans-Atlantic bile; Europe and the U.S. The International Herald Tribune. December 29, 2005 Thursday.</ref>

==Notes==

<references/>

Globalisation:Atlantic Partnership: Atlanticism and it's Critics

2010-11-17T13:00:10Z

Kelsey McDonald:

==Atlanticism==

Atlanticism became the foundation of British foreign and security policy for the duration of the Cold War. The uniqueness of being a trustworthy ally in the circumstance of a hostile international system produced a union of interests across a variety of security and defence issues. Following the tragedy of 9/11, international relations imply a very dissimilar context. Conscious of its principal position in the unipolar order, the “imperial public” has verified that it is not satisfied to act as a status quo power.<ref>"[http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/7/0/7/3/pages70731/p70731-1.php "FIghting For Values": Atlanticism, Internationalism and the Blair Doctrine]" allacademic research. Accessed 15 November, 2010.</ref>

In order to recover ground with the United States the EU is suggesting improving transatlantic relations further than the traditional Atlanticism one to one that is more orientated around results and lead by tactical precedence, such as the Atlantic Partnership.<ref>"[http://www.euractiv.com/en/priorities/eu-wants-new-atlanticism-news-391583 EU wants a new Atlanticism]" EurActiv. Accessed 16 November, 2010.</ref>

In the 21st century, Atlanticism has undergone important adjustments due to terrorism and the war in Iraq, the main consequence being a new inquiring of the idea itself and a new insight that the security of the particular countries quite possibly need alliance action outwith the North Atlantic terrain. Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, NATO -which has strong links to the Atlantic Partnership through individuals such as John Gilberts - for the first time invoked Article 5, stating that any attack facilitated on a member country will be seen as an attack on the entire group of members.<ref>[http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-124e.htm Statement by the North Atlantic Council]" NATO. Accessed 15 November, 2010.</ref>

==Critics==

On the 24th of June, 2005, the Streit Council for a Union of Democracies prearranged a panel on Atlanticism in 20th century U.S. Foreign Policy at the Annual Meeting of the Society of Historians of American Foreign Relations. The panel tackled the question of whether American foreign policy could resolve some popular contrasts, particularly the European soft power versus American hard power choice offered by Robert Kagan - who has been linked with the Atlantic Partnership <ref>"[http://www.atlanticpartnership.org/?p=110 Still the Colossus]" Atlantic Partnership website. Accessed 16 November, 2010.</ref> - and discovered that the Atlantic integrationist approach had supplied an efficient blend during much of the twentieth century.

Also, the panellists analysed the reason why the Atlanticist postwar strategy of combining an initial grouping of democratic countries succeeded in attracting other countries to democratize and join, opposing to the observation that much of the academic and activist worlds had taken that it would cause other countries to unite against it. They disputed that the Atlanticist approach had united universalism with regionalism in two ways: a “nucleus” tactic of moving from the regional toward the universal by persuading others to join, and a concentric circles approach supporting both inner (Atlantic) and outer (global) levels of international organisation, with the inner circle offering direction and enthusiasm, and the outer circle offering global legal standards and authenticity. The complexity of this approach materialized out of the disturbing experiences of the World War I and II generations. The internationalists of the period became well aware of the insufficiency of every basic form of internationalism and developed a more sophisticated one. After 1947 they were capable of applying, in a biased, Euro-Atlantic structure, both strategies-- concentric circles and open nucleus – raising their notion to the level of the core project of the 20th century American foreign policy.<ref>"[http://streitcouncil.org/index.php?page=atlanticism-in-20th-century-u-s-foreign-policy Atlanticism in 20th Century U.S. Foreign Policy]" Streit Council for a Union of Democracies. Accessed 16 November, 2010.</ref>

As the end of 2005 was drawing in, the officials of Europe and America are stimulated over how, for trans-Atlantic relations, it has been a good year. The undersecretary of state for political affairs , Nicholas Burns says “Europe and the United States have rebuilt bridges across the Atlantic, ended the war of the words sparked by discord over Iraq and recognized the fundamental truth that the trans-Atlantic partnership is a long-term marriage not susceptible to separation or divorce.” There are two large structural disjunctions that are expected to be the roots of future trouble. The first is said to be that trans-Atlantic relations presently have little focus upon Europe, in the view of the Europeans; these relations are still very much focused on the United States. The analysis which Burns makes was regularly repeated in Washington at that time. It is a gracious declaration about how Europe is not at the centre of U.S. geopolitical strategy. “Now that the process of postwar European construction has largely been achieved, the question is no longer what Washington thinks about Europe, but what the United States and Europe can do together to promote their interests and values, and spread democracy, in the rest of the world.” Collectively with acknowledgment of the increasing role of the EU, this new approach was intentionally highlighted by President George W. Bush’s visit to the European Commission in Brussels in February 2005, which was the first by a U.S. president. To those of the Brussels-orientated European elite who would like to trust that the EU is on the edge of becoming an equal partner to the United States on the world level, this approach is seductive. However, this idea is, for the most part, based on self-delusion. While the United States still wants Europe as a source of help for a variety of reasons, Washington does not often put the word “equal” ahead of “partner”. The essential trouble is that regardless of Washington’s blandishments, most of the European intelligentsia, the news media and the political classes deem the United States, especially under Bush, as overbearing and unsafe. They seize upon every supposed transgression, from professed “torture flights” they carry suspected terrorists to undisclosed prisons to alleged violations of American civil liberties, as keenly as Bush’s most potent rivals in the United States. “This distorted view of America is fed by widespread envy of U.S. power. As long as it persists, many Europeans will be reluctant to commit themselves to a stronger Atlantic partnership.” The second large structural disjunction is stemmed from the variety of ways in which Europeans and Americans think the world should be controlled. The truth is that EU and U.S. officials frequently stress that the EU is making key donations to peace in such places as Yugoslavia and Afghanistan and working on the matter of Iran’s nuclear predicament with Washington. However, the model European outlook of how Western influence and especially military force should be put forth in the 21st century, is fundamentally contrasting to America’s and is liable to remain as such. In spite of the indisputable developments on the surface, these deep, underlying trans-Atlantic pressures are not likely to have been resolved within the next few years.<ref>Reginald Dale (2005) Behind the smiles, trans-Atlantic bile; Europe and the U.S. The International Herald Tribune. December 29, 2005 Thursday.</ref>

==Notes==

<references/>

Globalisation:Atlantic Partnership: Atlanticism and it's Critics

2010-11-17T12:54:35Z

Kelsey McDonald:

==Atlanticism==

Atlanticism became the foundation of British foreign and security policy for the duration of the Cold War. The uniqueness of being a trustworthy ally in the circumstance of a hostile international system produced a union of interests across a variety of security and defence issues. Following the tragedy of 9/11, international relations imply a very dissimilar context. Conscious of its principal position in the unipolar order, the “imperial public” has verified that it is not satisfied to act as a status quo power.<ref>"[http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/7/0/7/3/pages70731/p70731-1.php "FIghting For Values": Atlanticism, Internationalism and the Blair Doctrine]" allacademic research. Accessed 15 November, 2010.</ref>

In order to recover ground with the United States the EU is suggesting improving transatlantic relations further than the traditional Atlanticism one to one that is more orientated around results and lead by tactical precedence, such as the Atlantic Partnership.<ref>"[http://www.euractiv.com/en/priorities/eu-wants-new-atlanticism-news-391583 EU wants a new Atlanticism]" EurActiv. Accessed 16 November, 2010.</ref>

In the 21st century, Atlanticism has undergone important adjustments due to terrorism and the war in Iraq, the main consequence being a new inquiring of the idea itself and a new insight that the security of the particular countries quite possibly need alliance action outwith the North Atlantic terrain. Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, NATO -which has strong links to the Atlantic Partnership through individuals such as John Gilberts - for the first time invoked Article 5, stating that any attack facilitated on a member country will be seen as an attack on the entire group of members.<ref>[http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-124e.htm Statement by the North Atlantic Council]" NATO. Accessed 15 November, 2010.</ref>

==Critics==

On the 24th of June, 2005, the Streit Council for a Union of Democracies prearranged a panel on Atlanticism in 20th century U.S. Foreign Policy at the Annual Meeting of the Society of Historians of American Foreign Relations. The panel tackled the question of whether American foreign policy could resolve some popular contrasts, particularly the European soft power versus American hard power choice offered by Robert Kagan, and discovered that the Atlantic integrationist approach had supplied an efficient blend during much of the twentieth century.

Also, the panellists analysed the reason why the Atlanticist postwar strategy of combining an initial grouping of democratic countries succeeded in attracting other countries to democratize and join, opposing to the observation that much of the academic and activist worlds had taken that it would cause other countries to unite against it. They disputed that the Atlanticist approach had united universalism with regionalism in two ways: a “nucleus” tactic of moving from the regional toward the universal by persuading others to join, and a concentric circles approach supporting both inner (Atlantic) and outer (global) levels of international organisation, with the inner circle offering direction and enthusiasm, and the outer circle offering global legal standards and authenticity. The complexity of this approach materialized out of the disturbing experiences of the World War I and II generations. The internationalists of the period became well aware of the insufficiency of every basic form of internationalism and developed a more sophisticated one. After 1947 they were capable of applying, in a biased, Euro-Atlantic structure, both strategies-- concentric circles and open nucleus – raising their notion to the level of the core project of the 20th century American foreign policy.<ref>"[http://streitcouncil.org/index.php?page=atlanticism-in-20th-century-u-s-foreign-policy Atlanticism in 20th Century U.S. Foreign Policy]" Streit Council for a Union of Democracies. Accessed 16 November, 2010.</ref>

As the end of 2005 was drawing in, the officials of Europe and America are stimulated over how, for trans-Atlantic relations, it has been a good year. The undersecretary of state for political affairs , Nicholas Burns says “Europe and the United States have rebuilt bridges across the Atlantic, ended the war of the words sparked by discord over Iraq and recognized the fundamental truth that the trans-Atlantic partnership is a long-term marriage not susceptible to separation or divorce.” There are two large structural disjunctions that are expected to be the roots of future trouble. The first is said to be that trans-Atlantic relations presently have little focus upon Europe, in the view of the Europeans; these relations are still very much focused on the United States. The analysis which Burns makes was regularly repeated in Washington at that time. It is a gracious declaration about how Europe is not at the centre of U.S. geopolitical strategy. “Now that the process of postwar European construction has largely been achieved, the question is no longer what Washington thinks about Europe, but what the United States and Europe can do together to promote their interests and values, and spread democracy, in the rest of the world.” Collectively with acknowledgment of the increasing role of the EU, this new approach was intentionally highlighted by President George W. Bush’s visit to the European Commission in Brussels in February 2005, which was the first by a U.S. president. To those of the Brussels-orientated European elite who would like to trust that the EU is on the edge of becoming an equal partner to the United States on the world level, this approach is seductive. However, this idea is, for the most part, based on self-delusion. While the United States still wants Europe as a source of help for a variety of reasons, Washington does not often put the word “equal” ahead of “partner”. The essential trouble is that regardless of Washington’s blandishments, most of the European intelligentsia, the news media and the political classes deem the United States, especially under Bush, as overbearing and unsafe. They seize upon every supposed transgression, from professed “torture flights” they carry suspected terrorists to undisclosed prisons to alleged violations of American civil liberties, as keenly as Bush’s most potent rivals in the United States. “This distorted view of America is fed by widespread envy of U.S. power. As long as it persists, many Europeans will be reluctant to commit themselves to a stronger Atlantic partnership.” The second large structural disjunction is stemmed from the variety of ways in which Europeans and Americans think the world should be controlled. The truth is that EU and U.S. officials frequently stress that the EU is making key donations to peace in such places as Yugoslavia and Afghanistan and working on the matter of Iran’s nuclear predicament with Washington. However, the model European outlook of how Western influence and especially military force should be put forth in the 21st century, is fundamentally contrasting to America’s and is liable to remain as such. In spite of the indisputable developments on the surface, these deep, underlying trans-Atlantic pressures are not likely to have been resolved within the next few years.<ref>Reginald Dale (2005) Behind the smiles, trans-Atlantic bile; Europe and the U.S. The International Herald Tribune. December 29, 2005 Thursday.</ref>

==Notes==

<references/>

Globalisation:Atlantic Partnership: Atlanticism and it's Critics

2010-11-17T12:51:25Z

Kelsey McDonald:

==Atlanticism==

Atlanticism became the foundation of British foreign and security policy for the duration of the Cold War. The uniqueness of being a trustworthy ally in the circumstance of a hostile international system produced a union of interests across a variety of security and defence issues. Following the tragedy of 9/11, international relations imply a very dissimilar context. Conscious of its principal position in the unipolar order, the “imperial public” has verified that it is not satisfied to act as a status quo power.<ref>"[http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/7/0/7/3/pages70731/p70731-1.php "FIghting For Values": Atlanticism, Internationalism and the Blair Doctrine]" allacademic research. Accessed 15 November, 2010.</ref>

In order to recover ground with the United States the EU is suggesting improving transatlantic relations further than the traditional Atlanticism one to one that is more orientated around results and lead by tactical precedence, such as the Atlantic Partnership.<ref>"[http://www.euractiv.com/en/priorities/eu-wants-new-atlanticism-news-391583 EU wants a new Atlanticism]" EurActiv. Accessed 16 November, 2010.</ref>

In the 21st century, Atlanticism has undergone important adjustments due to terrorism and the war in Iraq, the main consequence being a new inquiring of the idea itself and a new insight that the security of the particular countries quite possibly need alliance action outwith the North Atlantic terrain. Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, NATO, for the first time invoked Article 5, stating that any attack facilitated on a member country will be seen as an attack on the entire group of members.<ref>[http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-124e.htm Statement by the North Atlantic Council]" NATO. Accessed 15 November, 2010.</ref>

==Critics==

On the 24th of June, 2005, the Streit Council for a Union of Democracies prearranged a panel on Atlanticism in 20th century U.S. Foreign Policy at the Annual Meeting of the Society of Historians of American Foreign Relations. The panel tackled the question of whether American foreign policy could resolve some popular contrasts, particularly the European soft power versus American hard power choice offered by Robert Kagan, and discovered that the Atlantic integrationist approach had supplied an efficient blend during much of the twentieth century.

Also, the panellists analysed the reason why the Atlanticist postwar strategy of combining an initial grouping of democratic countries succeeded in attracting other countries to democratize and join, opposing to the observation that much of the academic and activist worlds had taken that it would cause other countries to unite against it. They disputed that the Atlanticist approach had united universalism with regionalism in two ways: a “nucleus” tactic of moving from the regional toward the universal by persuading others to join, and a concentric circles approach supporting both inner (Atlantic) and outer (global) levels of international organisation, with the inner circle offering direction and enthusiasm, and the outer circle offering global legal standards and authenticity. The complexity of this approach materialized out of the disturbing experiences of the World War I and II generations. The internationalists of the period became well aware of the insufficiency of every basic form of internationalism and developed a more sophisticated one. After 1947 they were capable of applying, in a biased, Euro-Atlantic structure, both strategies-- concentric circles and open nucleus – raising their notion to the level of the core project of the 20th century American foreign policy.<ref>"[http://streitcouncil.org/index.php?page=atlanticism-in-20th-century-u-s-foreign-policy Atlanticism in 20th Century U.S. Foreign Policy]" Streit Council for a Union of Democracies. Accessed 16 November, 2010.</ref>

As the end of 2005 was drawing in, the officials of Europe and America are stimulated over how, for trans-Atlantic relations, it has been a good year. The undersecretary of state for political affairs , Nicholas Burns says “Europe and the United States have rebuilt bridges across the Atlantic, ended the war of the words sparked by discord over Iraq and recognized the fundamental truth that the trans-Atlantic partnership is a long-term marriage not susceptible to separation or divorce.” There are two large structural disjunctions that are expected to be the roots of future trouble. The first is said to be that trans-Atlantic relations presently have little focus upon Europe, in the view of the Europeans; these relations are still very much focused on the United States. The analysis which Burns makes was regularly repeated in Washington at that time. It is a gracious declaration about how Europe is not at the centre of U.S. geopolitical strategy. “Now that the process of postwar European construction has largely been achieved, the question is no longer what Washington thinks about Europe, but what the United States and Europe can do together to promote their interests and values, and spread democracy, in the rest of the world.” Collectively with acknowledgment of the increasing role of the EU, this new approach was intentionally highlighted by President George W. Bush’s visit to the European Commission in Brussels in February 2005, which was the first by a U.S. president. To those of the Brussels-orientated European elite who would like to trust that the EU is on the edge of becoming an equal partner to the United States on the world level, this approach is seductive. However, this idea is, for the most part, based on self-delusion. While the United States still wants Europe as a source of help for a variety of reasons, Washington does not often put the word “equal” ahead of “partner”. The essential trouble is that regardless of Washington’s blandishments, most of the European intelligentsia, the news media and the political classes deem the United States, especially under Bush, as overbearing and unsafe. They seize upon every supposed transgression, from professed “torture flights” they carry suspected terrorists to undisclosed prisons to alleged violations of American civil liberties, as keenly as Bush’s most potent rivals in the United States. “This distorted view of America is fed by widespread envy of U.S. power. As long as it persists, many Europeans will be reluctant to commit themselves to a stronger Atlantic partnership.” The second large structural disjunction is stemmed from the variety of ways in which Europeans and Americans think the world should be controlled. The truth is that EU and U.S. officials frequently stress that the EU is making key donations to peace in such places as Yugoslavia and Afghanistan and working on the matter of Iran’s nuclear predicament with Washington. However, the model European outlook of how Western influence and especially military force should be put forth in the 21st century, is fundamentally contrasting to America’s and is liable to remain as such. In spite of the indisputable developments on the surface, these deep, underlying trans-Atlantic pressures are not likely to have been resolved within the next few years.<ref>Reginald Dale (2005) Behind the smiles, trans-Atlantic bile; Europe and the U.S. The International Herald Tribune. December 29, 2005 Thursday.</ref>

==Notes==

<references/>

Globalisation:Atlantic Partnership: Atlanticism and it's Critics

2010-11-17T12:49:46Z

Kelsey McDonald:

==Atlanticism==

Atlanticism became the foundation of British foreign and security policy for the duration of the Cold War. The uniqueness of being a trustworthy ally in the circumstance of a hostile international system produced a union of interests across a variety of security and defence issues. Following the tragedy of 9/11, international relations imply a very dissimilar context. Conscious of its principal position in the unipolar order, the “imperial public” has verified that it is not satisfied to act as a status quo power.<ref>"[http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/7/0/7/3/pages70731/p70731-1.php "FIghting For Values": Atlanticism, Internationalism and the Blair Doctrine]" allacademic research. Accessed 15 November, 2010.</ref>

In order to recover ground with the United States the EU is suggesting improving transatlantic relations further than the traditional Atlanticism one to one that is more orientated around results and lead by tactical precedence, such as the Atlantic Partnership.<ref>"[http://www.euractiv.com/en/priorities/eu-wants-new-atlanticism-news-391583 EU wants a new Atlanticism]" EurActiv. Accessed 16 November, 2010.</ref>

In the 21st century, Atlanticism has undergone important adjustments due to terrorism and the war in Iraq, the main consequence being a new inquiring of the idea itself and a new insight that the security of the particular countries quite possibly need alliance action outwith the North Atlantic terrain. Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, NATO, for the first time invoked Article 5, stating that any attack facilitated on a member country will be seen as an attack on the entire group of members.<ref>[http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-124e.htm Statement by the North Atlantic Council]" NATO. Accessed 15 November, 2010.</ref>

==Critics==

On the 24th of June, 2005, the Streit Council for a Union of Democracies prearranged a panel on Atlanticism in 20th century U.S. Foreign Policy at the Annual Meeting of the Society of Historians of American Foreign Relations. The panel tackled the question of whether American foreign policy could resolve some popular contrasts, particularly the European soft power versus American hard power choice offered by Robert Kagan, and discovered that the Atlantic integrationist approach had supplied an efficient blend during much of the twentieth century.

Also, the panellists analysed the reason why the Atlanticist postwar strategy of combining an initial grouping of democratic countries succeeded in attracting other countries to democratize and join, opposing to the observation that much of the academic and activist worlds had taken that it would cause other countries to unite against it. They disputed that the Atlanticist approach had united universalism with regionalism in two ways: a “nucleus” tactic of moving from the regional toward the universal by persuading others to join, and a concentric circles approach supporting both inner (Atlantic) and outer (global) levels of international organisation, with the inner circle offering direction and enthusiasm, and the outer circle offering global legal standards and authenticity. The complexity of this approach materialized out of the disturbing experiences of the World War I and II generations. The internationalists of the period became well aware of the insufficiency of every basic form of internationalism and developed a more sophisticated one. After 1947 they were capable of applying, in a biased, Euro-Atlantic structure, both strategies-- concentric circles and open nucleus – raising their notion to the level of the core project of the 20th century American foreign policy.<ref>"[http://streitcouncil.org/index.php?page=atlanticism-in-20th-century-u-s-foreign-policy Atlanticism in 20th Century U.S. Foreign Policy]" Streit Council for a Union of Democracies. Accessed 16 November, 2010.</ref>

As the end of 2005 was drawing in, the officials of Europe and America are stimulated over how, for trans-Atlantic relations, it has been a good year. The undersecretary of state for political affairs , Nicholas Burns says “Europe and the United States have rebuilt bridges across the Atlantic, ended the war of the words sparked by discord over Iraq and recognized the fundamental truth that the trans-Atlantic partnership is a long-term marriage not susceptible to separation or divorce.” There are two large structural disjunctions that are expected to be the roots of future trouble. The first is said to be that trans-Atlantic relations presently have little focus upon Europe, in the view of the Europeans; these relations are still very much focused on the United States. The analysis which Burns makes was regularly repeated in Washington at that time. It is a gracious declaration about how Europe is not at the centre of U.S. geopolitical strategy. “Now that the process of postwar European construction has largely been achieved, the question is no longer what Washington thinks about Europe, but what the United States and Europe can do together to promote their interests and values, and spread democracy, in the rest of the world.” Collectively with acknowledgment of the increasing role of the EU, this new approach was intentionally highlighted by President George W. Bush’s visit to the European Commission in Brussels in February 2005, which was the first by a U.S. president. To those of the Brussels-orientated European elite who would like to trust that the EU is on the edge of becoming an equal partner to the United States on the world level, this approach is seductive. However, this idea is, for the most part, based on self-delusion. While the United States still wants Europe as a source of help for a variety of reasons, Washington does not often put the word “equal” ahead of “partner”. The essential trouble is that regardless of Washington’s blandishments, most of the European intelligentsia, the news media and the political classes deem the United States, especially under Bush, as overbearing and unsafe. They seize upon every supposed transgression, from professed “torture flights” they carry suspected terrorists to undisclosed prisons to alleged violations of American civil liberties, as keenly as Bush’s most potent rivals in the United States. “This distorted view of America is fed by widespread envy of U.S. power. As long as it persists, many Europeans will be reluctant to commit themselves to a stronger Atlantic partnership.” The second large structural disjunction is stemmed from the variety of ways in which Europeans and Americans think the world should be controlled. The truth is that EU and U.S. officials frequently stress that the EU is making key donations to peace in such places as Yugoslavia and Afghanistan and working on the matter of Iran’s nuclear predicament with Washington. However, the model European outlook of how Western influence and especially military force should be put forth in the 21st century, is fundamentally contrasting to America’s and is liable to remain as such. In spite of the indisputable developments on the surface, these deep, underlying trans-Atlantic pressures are not likely to have been resolved within the next few years.<ref>Reginald Dale (2005) Behind the smiles, trans-Atlantic bile; Europe and the U.S. The International Herald Tribune. December 29, 2005 Thursday.</ref>

==Notes==

<references/>

Globalisation:Atlantic Partnership: Atlanticism and it's Critics

2010-11-17T12:47:22Z

Kelsey McDonald:

Globalisation:Atlantic Partnership: Atlanticism and it's Critics

2010-11-17T12:41:33Z

Kelsey McDonald:

Globalisation:Atlantic Partnership: Atlanticism and it's Critics

2010-11-17T12:41:01Z

Kelsey McDonald:

Globalisation:Atlantic Partnership: Atlanticism and it's Critics

2010-11-17T12:37:15Z

Kelsey McDonald:

Globalisation:Atlantic Partnership: Atlanticism and it's Critics

2010-11-17T12:32:44Z

Kelsey McDonald:

Globalisation:Atlantic Partnership: Atlanticism and it's Critics

2010-11-17T12:30:48Z

Kelsey McDonald: New page: Atlanticism became the foundation of British foreign and security policy for the duration of the Cold War. The uniqueness of being a trustworthy ally in the circumstance of a hostile inter...

Atlanticism became the foundation of British foreign and security policy for the duration of the Cold War. The uniqueness of being a trustworthy ally in the circumstance of a hostile international system produced a union of interests across a variety of security and defence issues. Following the tragedy of 9/11, international relations imply a very dissimilar context. Conscious of its principal position in the unipolar order, the “imperial public” has verified that it is not satisfied to act as a status quo power.<ref>"[http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/7/0/7/3/pages70731/p70731-1.php "FIghting For Values": Atlanticism, Internationalism and the Blair Doctrine]" allacademic research. Accessed 15 November, 2010.

Cambridge Energy Research Associates

2010-11-17T12:13:47Z

Kelsey McDonald: Cambridge Energy Research Associates moved to Globalisation:Cambridge Energy Research Associates

#REDIRECT [[Globalisation:Cambridge Energy Research Associates]]

Globalisation:Cambridge Energy Research Associates

2010-11-17T12:13:47Z

Kelsey McDonald: Cambridge Energy Research Associates moved to Globalisation:Cambridge Energy Research Associates

Cambridge Energy Research Associates (CERA) is one of the world’s top advisors, as it offers essential information to worldwide energy corporations, governments, financial establishments and providers of technology.

<ref>”[http://www.cera.com About IHS CERA]" Cambridge Energy Research Associates website, accessed 20 October 2010</ref>

==Notes==

<references/>

Globalisation:Cambridge Energy Research Associates

2010-11-17T12:13:21Z

Kelsey McDonald:

Globalisation:L.M.Tilman & Co

2010-11-17T12:12:33Z

Kelsey McDonald:

L.M. Tilman & Co is a tactical consultative firm serving governments, financial organizations and investors globally, helping these businesses obtain profitable value for money.

<ref>”[http://www.financialdarwinism.com Financial Darwinism]” L.M. Tilman & Co website, accessed 20 October 2010</ref>

==Notes==

<references/>

L.M.Tilman & Co

2010-11-17T12:11:51Z

Kelsey McDonald: L.M.Tilman & Co moved to Globalisation:L.M.Tilman & Co

#REDIRECT [[Globalisation:L.M.Tilman & Co]]

Globalisation:L.M.Tilman & Co

2010-11-17T12:11:51Z

Kelsey McDonald: L.M.Tilman & Co moved to Globalisation:L.M.Tilman & Co

Globalisation (Atlantic Partnership): L.M. Tilman & Co is a tactical consultative firm serving governments, financial organizations and investors globally, helping these businesses obtain profitable value for money.

<ref>”[http://www.financialdarwinism.com Financial Darwinism]” L.M. Tilman & Co website, accessed 20 October 2010</ref>

==Notes==

<references/>

Globalisation:Millgate Capital

2010-11-17T12:10:31Z

Kelsey McDonald:

Millgate Capital is a hedge fund backer which is privately owned. Millgate Capital was founded in 1997 and is based in New York with a supplementary office in London. The firm invests in the value of companies stocks.

Millgate Capital

2010-11-17T12:09:59Z

Kelsey McDonald: Millgate Capital moved to Globalisation:Millgate Capital

#REDIRECT [[Globalisation:Millgate Capital]]

Globalisation:Millgate Capital

2010-11-17T12:09:59Z

Kelsey McDonald: Millgate Capital moved to Globalisation:Millgate Capital

[[Globalisation: Atlantic Partnership]] Millgate Capital is a hedge fund backer which is privately owned. Millgate Capital was founded in 1997 and is based in New York with a supplementary office in London. The firm invests in the value of companies stocks.

Globalisation:Atlantic Partnership: DRAMLA SA

2010-11-17T12:08:59Z

Kelsey McDonald: Globalisation:Atlantic Partnership: DRAMLA SA moved to Globalisation:DRAMLA SA

#REDIRECT [[Globalisation:DRAMLA SA]]

Globalisation:DRAMLA SA

2010-11-17T12:08:59Z

Kelsey McDonald: Globalisation:Atlantic Partnership: DRAMLA SA moved to Globalisation:DRAMLA SA

Back to [[Globalisation: Atlantic Partnership]]

DRAMLA SA is a consultancy company directed and founded by [[Meg Allen]] in Geneva in 1995.

The Scowcroft Group

2010-11-17T12:07:55Z

Kelsey McDonald: The Scowcroft Group moved to Globalisation:The Scowcroft Group

Globalisation (Atlantic Partnership): The Scowcroft Group is a worldwide advisory firm which provides aid for businesses to grow and be successful in the fast developing international market place.

<ref>"[http://www.scowcroft.com What We Do]" The Scowcroft Group website, accessed 19 October 2010</ref>

==Notes==

<references/>

Atlantic Partnership: Background

2010-11-16T15:47:15Z

Kelsey McDonald: /* Activities */

[[Globalisation: Atlantic Partnership]]

==History==

The Atlantic Partnership was founded by the former leader of the British Conservative Party Michael Howard in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11 2001. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks there was a fear that as America pursued the war on terror, it risked drifting apart from Europe which was pursuing monetary and political unification, and expansion in the form of Europe wide institutions. This organisation was formed to ensure this was not the case.<ref>"[http://www.atlanticpartnership.org/?page_id=2 About AP]" Atlantic Partnership Website, Accessed 2 November 2010</ref> This objective can be seen in two quotes from a statement on the organisations website in which Lord Powell of Bayswater states that the:

:“Atlantic Partnership’s role is to argue the case for setting major policy decisions in the context of their impact on transatlantic relations. That should apply as much to the way America pursues the global war against terrorism as to the European Union’s ambition to build stronger, Europe-wide institutions.” <ref>"[http://www.atlanticpartnership.org/?page_id=2 About AP]" Atlantic Partnership Website, Accessed 2 November 2010</ref>

And also that:

:“Governments on both sides of the Atlantic have recognised how much we all stand to lose if we allow our continents to drift apart. Quite apart from the material damage we would do ourselves, such separation would weaken the values which we want to see adopted more widely throughout the world.”<ref>"[http://www.atlanticpartnership.org/?page_id=2 About AP]" Atlantic Partnership Website, Accessed 2 November 2010</ref>

Both these quotes show that the Atlantic Partnership was created to bridge the gap between America and Europe by using the

The organisation has sought over the years to continue the strong influence of America in the development of the European Union. This has been done by using the United Kingdom as the spokesman for American interests. It also represents a continuation of American policy towards Europe which was established during the Second World War and the Cold War.

As can be seen in the people section, this organisation is linked to very powerful individuals from the world of politics, business and the military. Through its many connections with these individuals the organisation has been influential in fostering relationships and influencing decision making at the highest level. This has largely been done through the many breakfast meetings that the company hosts each year in the United Kingdom France, Germany, Spain and the United States. These meetings have been held with the aim of giving major figures the chance to deliver their views to an invited audience, made up of leading businessmen, political and military leaders, and people from the media world such as newspaper editors. These speakers have included the current British Prime Minister, David Cameron; the governor of the Bank of England, Dr. Mervyn King; the President of the World Bank, Ambassador Robert Zoellick; and also General James Jones, United States National Security Advisor. All of these men are very influential in the decision making of their respective countries.

==Aims and Objectives==

The Atlantic Partnership’s main aim is to create a relationship between America and Europe. The governments within these transatlantic areas have different goals and initiatives, the Atlantic partnerships role is therefore to ensure the continents do not drift apart and become weaker as lone entities. Acting together allows the separate continents to share values and spread the Atlantic Partnerships values and aims. The Atlantic partnerships role between the different nations is its attempt to set major policy decisions and agreements, keeping in mind the impact these decisions will have on the transatlantic nations. These policies can vary from the War on Terror which followed 9/11 and the European Union’s (EU) ambitions to create Europe-wide institutions. <ref>"[http://www.atlanticpartnership.org/?page_id=2 Aima & Objectives]" Atlantic Partnership Website, Accessed 2 November 2010</ref>

The Atlantic Partnership website states the ways in which it achieves these aims and objectives:

*We have formed a high level network of high profile opinion formers on both sides of the Atlantic who are willing to use their influence to further the European American relationship – they are our Atlantic Partnership panel, our Vice Chairmen and Patrons.

*We identify issues of concern and activate opinion formers.

*We host high level breakfast meetings giving major figures the opportunity to air their views to a select group of leading decision makers and opinion formers. The breakfasts now take place in London, Paris, Berlin, Frankfurt, Madrid, New York and Washington DC. We intend to extend them to Hamburg and Rome.

*We ‘drip feed’ the national and international press with articles and interviews promoting the cause of the partnership, with the aim of developing a defined profile in the media in the longer term.

*We aim to contribute to programmes on the electronic media bringing attention to the values of the partnership and the importance of not allowing particular points of friction to undermine it.

*We monitor issues relating to the relationship from both sides of the Atlantic. Atlantic Partnership’s website contains keynote articles and speeches.

*We aim to ensure that supporters are fully briefed on the issues and current debates through a regular newsletter as well as regular publications of articles and speeches written by our panelists.

*We have a website to keep supporters informed of the work of the partnership.

*We have offices in London and Washington, DC.

*We are establishing ‘cells’ of Atlantic Partnership supporters elsewhere in Europe, namely Paris, Berlin and Rome and Madrid.

*We operate as a central point from which supporters of the partnership can network with each other.<ref>"[http://www.atlanticpartnership.org/?page_id=2 Aims & Objectives]" Atlantic Partnership Website, Accessed 2 November 2010</ref>

==Activities==

AP Breakfast with Mark Hoban MP

Monday, 27th of September 2010

8:00 am-9:00 am Breakfast Discussion

Mark Hoban MP, Financial Secretary to Her Majesty’s Treasury, was AP’s special guest at a breakfast discussion on regulatory reform in the US and the EU, and the importance of international cooperation going forward. The event was held in New York City at the British Consul General’s private residence.

AP/Center for Transatlantic Relations Luncheon Discussion with the Rt. Hon. Michael Howard, QC MP
Thursday, 13th of May 2010
12pm Luncheon Discussion
The Rt. Hon. Michael Howard, QC MP, Atlantic Partnership’s Founding Chairman and former Leader of the Conservative Party, was a special guest of AP and the Center for Transatlantic Relations at a luncheon discussion on the outcome of the British elections and how the changing power paradigms influence transatlantic relations. The event was hosted at Morton’s in
Washington, DC.

AP Dinner Discussion with Congressman Robert Wexler and Congresswoman Shelley Berkley
Wednesday, 16th of December 2009
7:00pm-9:00pm Dinner Discussion
Congressman Robert Wexler, Senior Member, House Foreign Affairs Committee, and Congresswoman Shelley Berkley, Chair, Transatlantic Legislators’ Dialogue, were the special guests of the Atlantic Partnership and H.E. Mr. Guilio Terzi di Sant’Agata, Italian Ambassador to the United States. Commentary focused on the practical issues to address in achieving peace between Israelis and Palestinians. The event was hosted by Ambassador Terzi di Sant’Agata at the Villa Firenze in Washington, D.C.

AP Luncheon with H.E. Mr. Sergey Kislyak
Monday, 9th of February 2009
1:00pm-2:30pm Lunch Discussion
H.E. Mr. Sergey Kislyak, Ambassador of the Russian Federation to the United States, was a special guest at a high-level lunch discussion about the future of U.S. relations with the Russian Federation. The event was hosted at the Cohen Group in Washington, D.C.

AP Dinner with Sen. Robert Casey
Wednesday, 17th of September 2008
8:00pm-9:30pm Dinner Discussion
U.S. Senator Robert P. Casey, Jr. (D-Pennsylvania), member of the Committee on Foreign Relations, was a special guest at the high-level diner discussion on the ‘Key Questions Defining Pakistan’s Future.’ The dinner was hosted by Ambassador Castellaneta, Italian Ambassador to the United States, at Villa Firenze in Washington, DC

Young Leaders Book Series with Suzanne Goldenberg, New York
Thursday, 1st of February 2008
7:00pm-8:30pm Book Discussion
Suzanne Goldenberg discussed her new book “Madam President: Is America Ready to Send Hillary Clinton to the White House?” Margaret Cannella hosted the event in New York.

AP Breakfast with James Rubin, London
Friday, 14th of December, 2007
8:00am-9:15am Breakfast Discussion
Former Assistant Secretary of State in the Clinton Administration and Atlantic Partnership Trustee James Rubin spoke at breakfast on European-American Relations. The event was held at the Mandarin Oriental Hyde Park Hotel in London.

AP Defense Discussion Breakfast, London
Thursday, 17th of May, 2007
8:00am-9:15am Defense Breakfast Discussion
The Discussion took place at the Mandarin Oriental Hyde Park Hotel. Guests included:
Lord Powell of Bayswater, Chairman of Atlantic Partnership,
James Arbuthnot MP, Chairman, H of C Defence Committee
Mr. Robert Fox, Journalist
Dr. The Lord Gilbert, Former Labour Defence Min of State for Labour
Lord Howell of Guildford, Lords Foreign Affairs Spokesman & Opposition Deputy Leader
Field Marshal Lord Inge, Former CDS
Mr. Bill Jeffrey, PUS, MOD
Mr. Anton la Guardia, Defence Editor, The Economist
Sir Peter Ricketts, PUS FCO
Major General Charles Vyvyan, Defence Advisor to B of A

AP Breakfast with David Cameron, London
Tuesday, 31st of October, 2006
8:00am-9:15am Breakfast Discussion
The Rt. Hon. David Cameron, Leader of the Opposition in the UK, spoke over breakfast at the Mandarin Oriental Hyde Park Hotel in London.

AP Breakfast with H.E. Sir Emry Jones Perry, New York
Thursday, 6th of April, 2006
8:00am-9:15am Breakfast Discussion
H.E. Sir Emry Jones Perry, UK Ambassador to the UN spoke at breakfast on “The Transatlantic Relationship: Effective Responses to Global Issues” at the University Club in New York.

==Notes==
<references/>

Sam Nunn

2010-11-09T16:20:41Z

Kelsey McDonald: Sam Nunn moved to Globalisation:Sam Nunn

==Globalisation:Sam Nunn==
[[Globalisation:Sam Nunn]]

Sam Augustus Nunn, Jr. (Date of birth 8th September 1938, Georgia USA). Nunn is married to Colleen O’Brien and has two children.

===Education===

He attained an undergraduate degree in 1960 at Emory University. He then continued his studies and graduated with a law degree from Emory University’s School of Law.<ref>"[http://www.bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=N000171 Sam Nunn]" Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, accessed 16/10/2010</ref> <ref>"[http://www.nndb.com/459/000031366/ Sam Nunn]" NNDB, accessed 16/10/2010</ref>

===Career/Positions Held===

He began his political career in 1972 with the Democratic Party when he was made Senator for Georgia; he retained this position until 1997.
He is currently Chief Executive Officer of the charitable body: Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) an organisation attempting to reduce the threat of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.<ref>"[http://www.nti.org/b_aboutnti/b_index.html About NTI]" Nuclear Threat Initiative, accessed 16/10/2010</ref>

He is known to be an informal advisor to President Barack Obama.<ref>"[http://www.msnbs.msn.com/id/27675375/ Former Georgia Senator Nunn to aid Obama]" MSNBC, accessed 16/10/2010</ref> Both men share an ideal of securing nuclear weapons. Many people, including Jimmy Crater, believed he would be chosen as Vice President in Obama’s presidency, although it was Joe Bidden who gained this position.

===Notes===
<references/>

Atlantic Partnership: Background

2010-11-02T16:36:24Z

Kelsey McDonald:

Atlantic Partnership: Background

2010-11-02T16:34:56Z

Kelsey McDonald:

Meg Allen

2010-10-26T15:36:52Z

Kelsey McDonald:

[[Globalisation: Atlantic Partnership]]

Meg Allen is the current Director of consultancy firm, DRAMLA S.A, in Geneva.

Her qualifications include a BSc. Degree in Accounting and Finance, and an Investment Management Certificate.

In 1984 she was responsible for co-founding DRAMLA Consulting U.K. In this role she was responsible for financial management and also acted as a liaison for companies wishing to establish joint ventures in China.

Similarly in 1995 she co-founded DRAMLA S.A in Geneva where she currently holds the post of Director and is responsible for portfolio management.
She is a trustee of the Atlantic Partnership and the [[Heritage Foundation]]; and is also a supporter of [[Open Europe]].<ref>"[http://www.zoominfo.com/people/Allen_Meg_254338898.aspx]", Zoominfo Website accessed 19 October 2010</ref>

Meg is also co-manager of a charitable foundation which supports various sports, health, education and arts projects. She also has many interests and commitments in the arts and also in transatlantic politics. <ref>"[http://www.atlanticpartnership.org/?p=193 give me a title]", Atlantic Partnership Website, Accessed 19 October 2010</ref>

==Notes==

<references/>

Globalisation:William Cohen

2010-10-26T15:35:36Z

Kelsey McDonald:

===Background===

William Sebastian Cohen, (date of birth 28th August 1940, Maine USA). Divorced in 1987 and re-married Janet Langhart on the 14th February 1996.

===Education===

In 1962 after completing high school, Cohen attained a Bachelor of Arts degree in Latin at Bowdoin College. He the attended the law school at Boston University and achieved further by attaining an LLB degree in 1965.

===Career/ Positions Held===

Most notable:
*Secretary of Defense (1997-2001)
*Senator (1979-1997)
*Congressman (1973-79)<ref>"[http://www.cohengroup.net/about About]", Cohen Group, accessed 16/10/2010</ref>

He was congressman of Maine’s 2nd congressional district. He then went on to serve as Senator for 18 years.
He became the 20th Secretary of Defense under Bill Clintons Presidency.<ref>"[www.defense.gov Bios]" US Department of Defense, accessesed 16/10/2010</ref> During this time he directed military operations against Iraq and Kosovo; most notably Operation Desert Fox.<ref>"[www.defense.gov Desert Fox]" US Department of Defense, accessesed 16/10/2010</ref> and Operation Allied Force<ref>"[www.parliament.uk Research]" UK Parliament, accessed 16/10/2010</ref>

===Notes===
<references/>

Globalisation:Millgate Capital

2010-10-26T15:32:50Z

Kelsey McDonald:

Atlantic Partnership: People

2010-10-26T15:29:33Z

Kelsey McDonald:

[[Globalisation:Atlantic Partnership]]

--[[User:Kelsey McDonald|Kelsey McDonald]] 15:29, 26 October 2010 (UTC)
===Chairmen===
*[[Lord Powell of Bayswater]] – Chairman
*Ambassador [[Richard Burt]] – Managing Director
*The Right Honourable Lord [[Michael Howard]] of Lympne - President and Founding Chairman
*The Honorable [[James Rubin]] – Vice Chairman
*Secretary [[William Cohen]] – Co-Chairman
*Senator [[Sam Nunn]] – Co-Chairman
*[[Pierre Lellouche]] – Vice Chairman
*Ambassador [[Francois Bujon de l’Estang]] – Vice Chairman

===Patrons===

*The Honorable Dr. [[Henry Kissinger]] – Chairman of [[Kissinger Associates]]
*Senator [[John McCain]] – United States Senator for Arizona
*General [[Colin L Powell]] – Former United States Secretary of State
*The Rt Honorable [[John Major]] CH – Former United Kingdom Prime Minister
*The Rt Honorable [[Lord Robertson of Port Ellen]] – Former Secretary General of [[NATO]]
*[[Alain Juppé]]
*The Rt Honorable Lord [[John Gilbert]] – Life Peer, House of Lords
*Sr. [[Eduardo Serra]] – Former Defense Minister of Spain
*Senator [[Antonio Martino]] – Minister of Defense of Italy

===Trustees===

*The Rt Honorable [[Michael Howard]] QC MP
*Lord [[Jonathan Marland]] of Odstock
*[[Lord Powell of Bayswater]] – Chairman
*Lord Chadlington of Dean [[Peter Gummer]] – Life Peer, House of Lords
*[[Meg Allen]] – Director of [[DRAMLA SA]], Geneva
*Sir [[Evelyn de Rothschild]] – E.L. [[Rothschild Ltd]]
*Sir [[David Manning]] GCMG, CVO
*Ambassador [[Richard Burt]] – [[McLarty Associates ]]
*General [[Brent Scowcroft]] – [[The Scowcroft Group]]

===Friends of Atlantic Partnership US===

*Ambassador [[Richard Burt]] – [[McLarty Associates]]
*[[John R. Drexel IV]] – Sage Advisors
*[[James Lyle]] – [[Millgate Capital]]
*[[James Rubin]] - Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs
*General [[Brent Scowcroft]] – [[The Scowcroft Group]]
*[[Leo Tilman]] – [[L.M.Tilman & Co]]
*[[Daniel Yergin]] – [[Cambridge Energy Research Associates]]

===Directors===

*[[Anne Gantén]] – Executive Director
*[[Vanessa Arkell]] – Director

==Notes==
<references/>

Atlantic Partnership: People

2010-10-26T15:28:36Z

Kelsey McDonald: New page: ===Chairmen=== *Lord Powell of Bayswater – Chairman *Ambassador Richard Burt – Managing Director *The Right Honourable Lord Michael Howard of Lympne - President and Foun...

===Chairmen===

*[[Lord Powell of Bayswater]] – Chairman
*Ambassador [[Richard Burt]] – Managing Director
*The Right Honourable Lord [[Michael Howard]] of Lympne - President and Founding Chairman
*The Honorable [[James Rubin]] – Vice Chairman
*Secretary [[William Cohen]] – Co-Chairman
*Senator [[Sam Nunn]] – Co-Chairman
*[[Pierre Lellouche]] – Vice Chairman
*Ambassador [[Francois Bujon de l’Estang]] – Vice Chairman

===Patrons===

*The Honorable Dr. [[Henry Kissinger]] – Chairman of [[Kissinger Associates]]
*Senator [[John McCain]] – United States Senator for Arizona
*General [[Colin L Powell]] – Former United States Secretary of State
*The Rt Honorable [[John Major]] CH – Former United Kingdom Prime Minister
*The Rt Honorable [[Lord Robertson of Port Ellen]] – Former Secretary General of [[NATO]]
*[[Alain Juppé]]
*The Rt Honorable Lord [[John Gilbert]] – Life Peer, House of Lords
*Sr. [[Eduardo Serra]] – Former Defense Minister of Spain
*Senator [[Antonio Martino]] – Minister of Defense of Italy

===Trustees===

*The Rt Honorable [[Michael Howard]] QC MP
*Lord [[Jonathan Marland]] of Odstock
*[[Lord Powell of Bayswater]] – Chairman
*Lord Chadlington of Dean [[Peter Gummer]] – Life Peer, House of Lords
*[[Meg Allen]] – Director of [[DRAMLA SA]], Geneva
*Sir [[Evelyn de Rothschild]] – E.L. [[Rothschild Ltd]]
*Sir [[David Manning]] GCMG, CVO
*Ambassador [[Richard Burt]] – [[McLarty Associates ]]
*General [[Brent Scowcroft]] – [[The Scowcroft Group]]

===Friends of Atlantic Partnership US===

*Ambassador [[Richard Burt]] – [[McLarty Associates]]
*[[John R. Drexel IV]] – Sage Advisors
*[[James Lyle]] – [[Millgate Capital]]
*[[James Rubin]] - Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs
*General [[Brent Scowcroft]] – [[The Scowcroft Group]]
*[[Leo Tilman]] – [[L.M.Tilman & Co]]
*[[Daniel Yergin]] – [[Cambridge Energy Research Associates]]

===Directors===

*[[Anne Gantén]] – Executive Director
*[[Vanessa Arkell]] – Director

==Notes==
<references/>

Globalisation:Atlantic Partnership

2010-10-26T15:27:53Z

Kelsey McDonald: /* People */

Laura O'Donnell, Martin Ferguson, Kelsey McDonald

Atlantic Partership is an organisation created in order to make the US and Europe coherent.

==Background==
===History===
===Aims and Objectives===

*[[Globalisation:Atlantic Partnership: People]]

==Connectons==
===To Politics===
===To Industry===

==Atlanticism and it's Critics==

==Contact==
Atlantic Partnership Website <ref>"[http://www.atlanticpartnership.org/ Atlantic Partnerhip Homepage]", Atlantic Partnership Website, accessed 12 October 2010</ref>

==Notes==
<references/>

Globalisation:Atlantic Partnership

2010-10-26T14:14:30Z

Kelsey McDonald: /* Friends of Atlantic Partnership US */

Laura O'Donnell, Martin Ferguson, Kelsey McDonald

Atlantic Partership is an organisation created in order to make the US and Europe coherent.

==Background==
===History===
===Aims and Objectives===

==People==

===Chairmen===

*[[Lord Powell of Bayswater]] – Chairman
*Ambassador [[Richard Burt]] – Managing Director
*The Right Honourable Lord [[Michael Howard]] of Lympne - President and Founding Chairman
*The Honorable [[James Rubin]] – Vice Chairman
*Secretary [[William Cohen]] – Co-Chairman
*Senator [[Sam Nunn]] – Co-Chairman
*[[Pierre Lellouche]] – Vice Chairman
*Ambassador [[Francois Bujon de l’Estang]] – Vice Chairman

===Patrons===

*The Honorable Dr. [[Henry Kissinger]] – Chairman of [[Kissinger Associates]]
*Senator [[John McCain]] – United States Senator for Arizona
*General [[Colin L Powell]] – Former United States Secretary of State
*The Rt Honorable [[John Major]] CH – Former United Kingdom Prime Minister
*The Rt Honorable [[Lord Robertson of Port Ellen]] – Former Secretary General of [[NATO]]
*[[Alain Juppé]]
*The Rt Honorable Lord [[John Gilbert]] – Life Peer, House of Lords
*Sr. [[Eduardo Serra]] – Former Defense Minister of Spain
*Senator [[Antonio Martino]] – Minister of Defense of Italy

===Trustees===

*The Rt Honorable [[Michael Howard]] QC MP
*Lord [[Jonathan Marland]] of Odstock
*[[Lord Powell of Bayswater]] – Chairman
*Lord Chadlington of Dean [[Peter Gummer]] – Life Peer, House of Lords
*[[Meg Allen]] – Director of [[DRAMLA SA]], Geneva
*Sir [[Evelyn de Rothschild]] – E.L. [[Rothschild Ltd]]
*Sir [[David Manning]] GCMG, CVO
*Ambassador [[Richard Burt]] – [[McLarty Associates ]]
*General [[Brent Scowcroft]] – [[The Scowcroft Group]]

===Friends of Atlantic Partnership US===

*Ambassador [[Richard Burt]] – [[McLarty Associates]]
*[[John R. Drexel IV]] – Sage Advisors
*[[James Lyle]] – [[Millgate Capital]]
*[[James Rubin]] - Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs
*General [[Brent Scowcroft]] – [[The Scowcroft Group]]
*[[Leo Tilman]] – [[L.M.Tilman & Co]]
*[[Daniel Yergin]] – [[Cambridge Energy Research Associates]]

===Directors===

*[[Anne Gantén]] – Executive Director
*[[Vanessa Arkell]] – Director

==Connectons==
===To Politics===
===To Industry===

==Atlanticism and it's Critics==

==Contact==
Atlantic Partnership Website <ref>"[http://www.atlanticpartnership.org/ Atlantic Partnerhip Homepage]", Atlantic Partnership Website, accessed 12 October 2010</ref>

==Notes==
<references/>

Globalisation:Millgate Capital

2010-10-20T12:27:23Z

Kelsey McDonald:

Globalisation:Millgate Capital

2010-10-20T12:25:57Z

Kelsey McDonald:

Globalisation (Atlantic Partnership): Millgate Capital is a hedge fund backer which is privately owned. Millgate Capital was founded in 1997 and is based in New York with a supplementary office in London. The firm invests in the value of companies stocks.

<ref>”[http://investing.businessweek.com Millgate Capital Inc.: Private Company Information - BusinessWeek]” Bloomberg Businessweek website, accessed 20 October 2010</ref>

==Notes==

<references/>

Globalisation:Millgate Capital

2010-10-20T12:22:08Z

Kelsey McDonald:

Globalisation (Atlantic Partnership): Millgate Capital is a hedge fund backer which is privately owned. Millgate Capital was founded in 1997 and is based in New York with a supplementary office in London. The firm invests in the value of companies stocks.

<ref>”[http://investing.businessweek.com Millgate Capital Inc.: Private Company Information]” Bloomberg Businessweek website, accessed 20 October 2010</ref>

==Notes==

<references/>

Globalisation:Millgate Capital

2010-10-20T12:20:59Z

Kelsey McDonald:

Globalisation (Atlantic Partnership): Millgate Capital is a hedge fund backer which is privately owned. Millgate Capital was founded in 1997 and is based in New York with a supplementary office in London. The firm invests in the value of companies stocks.

<ref>”[http://investing.businessweek.com Millgate Capital Inc.]” Bloomberg Businessweek website, accessed 20 October 2010</ref>

==Notes==

<references/>

Globalisation:Millgate Capital

2010-10-20T12:19:00Z

Kelsey McDonald: New page: Globalisation (Atlantic Partnership): Millgate Capital is a hedge fund backer which is privately owned. Millgate Capital was founded in 1997 and is based in New York with a supplementary o...

Globalisation (Atlantic Partnership): Millgate Capital is a hedge fund backer which is privately owned. Millgate Capital was founded in 1997 and is based in New York with a supplementary office in London. The firm invests in the value of companies stocks.

<ref>”[http://investing.businessweek.com Snapshot]” Bloomberg Businessweek website, accessed 20 October 2010</ref>

==Notes==

<references/>

Globalisation:Cambridge Energy Research Associates

2010-10-20T12:07:10Z

Kelsey McDonald:

Globalisation (Atlantic Partnership): Cambridge Energy Research Associates (CERA) is one of the world’s top advisors, as it offers essential information to worldwide energy corporations, governments, financial establishments and providers of technology.

<ref>”[http://www.cera.com About IHS CERA]" Cambridge Energy Research Associates website, accessed 20 October 2010</ref>

==Notes==

<references/>

Globalisation:Cambridge Energy Research Associates

2010-10-20T12:06:33Z

Kelsey McDonald:

Globalisation (Atlantic Partnership): Cambridge Energy Research Associates (CERA) is one of the world’s top advisors, as it offers essential information to worldwide energy corporations, governments, financial establishments and providers of technology.

<ref>”[ http://www.cera.com About IHS CERA]" Cambridge Energy Research Associates website, accessed 20 October 2010</ref>

==Notes==

<references/>

Globalisation:Cambridge Energy Research Associates

2010-10-20T12:05:54Z

Kelsey McDonald: New page: Globalisation (Atlantic Partnership): Cambridge Energy Research Associates (CERA) is one of the world’s top advisors, as it offers essential information to worldwide energy corporations,...

Globalisation (Atlantic Partnership): Cambridge Energy Research Associates (CERA) is one of the world’s top advisors, as it offers essential information to worldwide energy corporations, governments, financial establishments and providers of technology.

<ref>”[ http://www.cera.com About HIS CERA] Cambridge Energy Research Associates website, accessed 20 October 2010</ref>

==Notes==

<references/>

Globalisation:Rothschild Ltd

2010-10-20T11:58:58Z

Kelsey McDonald:

Globalisation (Atlantic Partnership): Rothschild Ltd is a significant company concerning global financial markets. For over 200 years it has provided excellent banking, financial advice and a wide range of services.

<ref>"[http://www.rothschild.com Welcome To Rothschild]",Rothschild Ltd website, accessed 19 October 2010</ref>

==Notes==
<references/>

Globalisation:L.M.Tilman & Co

2010-10-20T11:58:03Z

Kelsey McDonald: