Difference between revisions of "State Violence and Collusion Timeline 1987"

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*'''21''' - A telegram from the [[Security Service]]'s [[Assessments Group (MI5 Northern Ireland)|Assessments Group]], based at Stormont, to the agent-handling section, comments on the Nelson meeting: "Turning to the [[UDA]] - [[Grey Wolves]] link that has been established we are averse to giving this further encouragement. There is no merit in setting up an arms supply conduit where one does not currently exist …"<ref name="DeSilvavol1Ch6">Sir Desmond de Silva, [http://www.patfinucanereview.org/report/volume01/chapter006/ Volume 1 - Chapter 6: The recruitment of Brian Nelson], Pat Finucane Review, 12 December 2012.</ref>  
 
*'''21''' - A telegram from the [[Security Service]]'s [[Assessments Group (MI5 Northern Ireland)|Assessments Group]], based at Stormont, to the agent-handling section, comments on the Nelson meeting: "Turning to the [[UDA]] - [[Grey Wolves]] link that has been established we are averse to giving this further encouragement. There is no merit in setting up an arms supply conduit where one does not currently exist …"<ref name="DeSilvavol1Ch6">Sir Desmond de Silva, [http://www.patfinucanereview.org/report/volume01/chapter006/ Volume 1 - Chapter 6: The recruitment of Brian Nelson], Pat Finucane Review, 12 December 2012.</ref>  
 
*'''21''' - A letter from the [[RUC]] to the [[Northern Ireland Office]] (NIO) states that agent-handling guidelines: "take no cognizance at all of the special problems relating to Northern Ireland. They were, of course, drawn up to deal with 'ordinary' criminals in a mainland context, rather than for coping with terrorists. Given our special situation the restrictions placed upon us by virtue of the guidelines are unrealistic if we are to continue paramilitary penetration/source protection."<ref name="DeSilvavol1Ch4">Sir Desmond de Silva, [http://www.patfinucanereview.org/report/volume01/chapter004/ Volume 1 - Chapter 4: Agent-handling], Pat Finucane Review, 12 December 2012.</ref>
 
*'''21''' - A letter from the [[RUC]] to the [[Northern Ireland Office]] (NIO) states that agent-handling guidelines: "take no cognizance at all of the special problems relating to Northern Ireland. They were, of course, drawn up to deal with 'ordinary' criminals in a mainland context, rather than for coping with terrorists. Given our special situation the restrictions placed upon us by virtue of the guidelines are unrealistic if we are to continue paramilitary penetration/source protection."<ref name="DeSilvavol1Ch4">Sir Desmond de Silva, [http://www.patfinucanereview.org/report/volume01/chapter004/ Volume 1 - Chapter 4: Agent-handling], Pat Finucane Review, 12 December 2012.</ref>
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==February==
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*'''Undated February''' - [[FRU]] head A/05 recorded a conversation with the Assistant Secretary Political in which "ASP then indicated that Head Office were very interested in the … [Nelson] case. [G/03], he said, had been very impressed by … [Nelson] whom he thought had great potential. ASP further said that while he did not want it thought that his Service was 'poaching' he felt that Head Office might have it in mind to offer … [Nelson]full-time employment in a secret capacity."<ref name="DeSilvavol1Ch6">Sir Desmond de Silva, [http://www.patfinucanereview.org/report/volume01/chapter006/ Volume 1 - Chapter 6: The recruitment of Brian Nelson], Pat Finucane Review, 12 December 2012.</ref>
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*'''3''' - The Head of F8 recorded that it would be "grossly unfair" to persuade [[Brian Nelson]] to return from Germany to the detriment of his family.<ref name="DeSilvavol1Ch6">Sir Desmond de Silva, [http://www.patfinucanereview.org/report/volume01/chapter006/ Volume 1 - Chapter 6: The recruitment of Brian Nelson], Pat Finucane Review, 12 December 2012.</ref>
  
 
==March==
 
==March==

Revision as of 12:55, 15 December 2012

Events related to state violence and collusion in Northern Ireland in 1987.

January

  • Undated January - Peter Taylor states that in January 1987, the new head of the FRU, 'Colonel J' (Gordon Kerr) identified a gap in agent coverage of the loyalists, and decided to re-recruit Brian Nelson. This decision was opposed by MI5, according to Taylor, who felt that the loyalists were sufficiently covered already.[1]
  • 14 - Brian Nelson is met by the OC of East Det FRU A/03, A/07 and a Security Service officer at Heathrow Airport. The FRU contact form makes clear that the FRU's aim was to "tempt [Nelson] to return permanently" to Northern Ireland. Without having consulted the FRU, Nelson had already begun to pursue the possibility of arranging an arms shipment with the Turkish 'Grey Wolves' terrorist group in West Germany. At the Heathrow meeting, Nelson indicated that he was happy to pursue the arms shipment, and for his intelligence to be exploited and UDA members arrested, subject to four conditions. The first 'condition' was as follows: "… [the] first batch of weapons would have to be allowed through without any action by us [the security forces], or else he would be immediately suspected."[2]
  • 19 In an MI5 report of the meeting with Brian Nelson on the 14th, Nelson was said to be "highly motivated by patriotism to Britain and contempt for paramilitary godfathers". He was described as being of "a much higher calibre than the average UDA gouger".[58] Overall, the officer felt that Nelson would make an "excellent" agent for the Security Service.[2]
  • 21 - A telegram from the Security Service's Assessments Group, based at Stormont, to the agent-handling section, comments on the Nelson meeting: "Turning to the UDA - Grey Wolves link that has been established we are averse to giving this further encouragement. There is no merit in setting up an arms supply conduit where one does not currently exist …"[2]
  • 21 - A letter from the RUC to the Northern Ireland Office (NIO) states that agent-handling guidelines: "take no cognizance at all of the special problems relating to Northern Ireland. They were, of course, drawn up to deal with 'ordinary' criminals in a mainland context, rather than for coping with terrorists. Given our special situation the restrictions placed upon us by virtue of the guidelines are unrealistic if we are to continue paramilitary penetration/source protection."[3]

February

  • Undated February - FRU head A/05 recorded a conversation with the Assistant Secretary Political in which "ASP then indicated that Head Office were very interested in the … [Nelson] case. [G/03], he said, had been very impressed by … [Nelson] whom he thought had great potential. ASP further said that while he did not want it thought that his Service was 'poaching' he felt that Head Office might have it in mind to offer … [Nelson]full-time employment in a secret capacity."[2]
  • 3 - The Head of F8 recorded that it would be "grossly unfair" to persuade Brian Nelson to return from Germany to the detriment of his family.[2]

March

  • 13 - High-level meeting to discuss new agent-handling guidelines for Northern Ireland appears to have taken place between NIO officials and senior RUC officers.[3]

May

  • 18 An internal minute to the Permanent Under Secretary of the Northern Ireland Office on agent-handling concluded: "As we may well wish to see a rather different method for reviewing the guidance, it will suit us if the process set in train by the RUC makes fairly slow progress. But it would not be wise to take any steps at this juncture to halt it; we should simply desist from hastening it."[3]

June

July

  • 3 - Edward Campbell, a 40-year-old Catholic taxi-driver was shot dead by the UDA/UFF on 3 July 1987. Although he had been interned in the 1970s, he had no IRA connections at the time of his death. This was one of some 15 murders in which the Stevens Inquiry concluded Brian Nelson played an active role.[5]
  • 22 - The Chief Constable of the RUC, Sir John Hermon, wrote to the NIO seeking confirmation that "steps are being initiated to take action" on agent handling guidelines.[3]

August

  • 7 - NIO responds to Sir John Hermon's letter of 22 July.[3]
  • 23 - Michael Power was shot dead on 23 August 1987.[6], a Catholic with no paramilitary involvement, his death was the result of one of the first files passed on to the UDA by Brian Nelson. FRU files showed that this was purely an opportunity for Nelson to ingratiate himself with the UDA.[7]

September

  • 9 - Patrick Hamill, a 29-year-old Catholic with no paramilitary connections, was shot dead at his West Belfast home. The UDA/UFF used intelligence given to Nelson by the FRU for the killing.[8]
  • 21 - Jim Meighan, a 22-year-old Catholic from the New Lodge in North Belfast, was shot dead by the UDA on 21 September 1987. He was targeted by Brian Nelson because he was going out with a Protestant girl.[9]

October

  • 9 - Francisco Notorantonio was shot dead at his home. The FRU allegedly passed his name to the UDA through Nelson in order to direct them away from an FRU agent in the IRA.[10]

November

  • 8 - Provisional IRA Enniskillen bombing kills 11 people.
  • 9 - Adam Lambert, a 19-year-old Protestant , was shot dead by the UDA. The gang used information supplied by Brian Nelson who was under the impression that Lambert was a Catholic.[11] Sir John Stevens concluded that Lambert's murder could have been prevented and that there was collusion in the case.[12]

December

  • Undated December - Final arrangements made for the South African arms shipment initiated by Brian Nelson.[13]
  • 22 - UDA figure John McMichael killed by an IRA car-bomb at his home in Lisburn.[14]
  • 23 - The UDA's Tommy Lyttle agreed a list of personalities to be "targeted with a view to attacks in the New Year". Eight targets were included on the list, including T/27.[2]
  • 24 - Following a meeting with Brian Nelson, information about UDA targeting was passed by the FRU to the RUC in the form of both a MISR and an immediate report to TCG Belfast.[2]

Notes

  1. Peter Taylor, Brits: The War Against the IRA, Bloomsbury, 2002, p.289.
  2. 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 Sir Desmond de Silva, Volume 1 - Chapter 6: The recruitment of Brian Nelson, Pat Finucane Review, 12 December 2012.
  3. 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 Sir Desmond de Silva, Volume 1 - Chapter 4: Agent-handling, Pat Finucane Review, 12 December 2012.
  4. Issue 50979 Page 8356, London Gazette, 30 June 1987.
  5. Martin Ingram and Greg Harkin, Stakeknife, O'Brien Press, 2004, p. 183.
  6. David McKittrick, Seamus Kelters, Brian Feeney, Chris Thornton, and David McVea, Lost Lives: The stories of the men, women and children who died as a result of the Northern Ireland Troubles, Mainstream Publishing, 2004, p.1087.
  7. Barry McCaffrey, At least 29 killings blamed on actions of double agent;The secrets that died with Brian Nelson THE DEATH OF BRITISH ARMY AGENT 6137, Irish News, 14 April 2003.
  8. Martin Ingram and Greg Harkin, Stakeknife, O'Brien Press, 2004, p. 184.
  9. Martin Ingram and Greg Harkin, Stakeknife, O'Brien Press, 2004, p. 184.
  10. Peter Taylor, Brits: The War Against the IRA, Bloomsbury, 2002, p.295-296.
  11. Martin Ingram and Greg Harkin, Stakeknife, O'Brien Press, 2004, pp. 184-185.
  12. David McKittrick, Seamus Kelters, Brian Feeney, Chris Thornton, and David McVea, Lost Lives: The stories of the men, women and children who died as a result of the Northern Ireland Troubles, Mainstream Publishing, 2004, pp.1098-1099.
  13. Barry McCaffrey, At least 29 killings blamed on actions of double agent;The secrets that died with Brian Nelson THE DEATH OF BRITISH ARMY AGENT 6137, Irish News, 14 April 2003.
  14. David McKittrick, Seamus Kelters, Brian Feeney, Chris Thornton and David McVea, Lost Lives, Mainstream Publishing, 2004, p.1103.