One Percent Doctrine

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The One Percent Doctrine, also known as the Cheney Doctrine, comes from a statement made by former US Vice President Cheney at a briefing in late November 2001. After the President, Cheney, and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice were briefed by CIA director George Tenet on possible Iraqi attempts to purchase WMDs, the Vice President, according to journalist Ron Suskind, responded: 'If there's a one percent chance that Paksitani scientists are helping al Qaeda build or develop a nuclear weapon, we have to treat it as a certainty in terms of our response.' He added: 'It's not about our analysis, or finding a preponderance of evidence. It's about our response.' According to suskind this would serve as 'a standard of action that would frame events and responses from the administration for years to come.' Suskind adds:

This doctrine--the one percent solution--divided what had largely been indivisible in the conduct of American foreign policy: analysis and action. Justified or not, fact-based or not, 'our response' is what matters. As to 'evidence,' the bar was set so low tha the word itself almost didn't apply. If there was even a one percent chance of terrorists getting a weapon of mass destruction--and there has been a small porbability of such an occurence for some time--the United States must now act as if it were a certainty.[1]
  1. Ron Suskin, The One Percent Doctrine: Deep Inside America's Pursuit of It's Enemies Since 9/11 (London: Simon & Schuster, 2006), p.62