National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council - excerpt from Lee O'Brien, American Jewish Organizations and Israel, 1986

This page is an extract, reproduced with permission, from Lee O'Brien, American Jewish Organizations and Israel, Washington DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1986.

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• Year established; 1944
• Chair; Jacqueline K. Levine
• Executive Vice Chairman: Albert D. Chernin
• Address: 443 Park Avenue South, New York, NY 10016
• Publication: Joint Program Plan for Jewish Community Relations

General Background, Structure, and Role

NJCRAC was formed in the 1940s as a voluntary coordinating council for the proliferating Jewish community relations agencies. Today NJCRAC's affiliates include 11 national and III local organizations. The national community relations agencies represented are: AJC, AJ Congress, ADL, Hadassah, Jewish Labor Committee, Jewish War Veterans, National Council of Jewish Women, Union of American Hebrew Congregations, Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations, United Synagogue of America, National Women's League for Conservative Judaism, and Women's American aRT. Membership is not as random as it may appear at first glance; in addition to the three defense organizations that redefined themselves as community relations agencies after World War II (AJC, AJCongress, and ADL), the national congregational bodies are represented because they have all formed internal commissions on social action.

The local organizations are divided into three categories:Community Relations Committees (CRCs), Jewish Community Councils (JCCs), and Jewish Community Relations Councils (JCRCs). Some are autonomous organizations; some are affiliates of local federations or welfare funds, and others are chapters of national agencies. These groups serve as functional agencies for community activities and often as coordinating agencies for local Jewish institutions.

According to Gary S. Schiff

It was the CJFW, representing the local communities, with its desire to avoid wasteful duplication in community relations programming and unnecessary expenditures of Jewish communal funds, that was the motivating force behind the initial establishment of NJCRAC.

However, NJCRAC has never been able to play the enforcement role needed to prevent the duplication of tasks rampant among both national and local CRCs; as Schiff notes, NJCRAC is careful ‘to keep its activities within the sphere of the 'information, consultative, coordinating and advisory' roles it is limited to, and out of the realm of programmatic activity reserved to the functional agencies.’

The major challenge to this now-accepted status quo came in 1951, when CJF initiated an investigation of the national organizations affiliated with NJCRAC. Robert MacIver, an eminent Columbia University sociologist, conducted a study that found the charges of duplication fully justified and recommended that particular functions be assigned to particular agencies; for example, he urged that all legal and legislative work be allotted to the AJCongress and no longer be done by the AJC and ADL. His recommendations were accepted by the majority of NJCRAC members but were never implemented because the AJC and ADL withdrew their membership in protest; they faced no sanctions and simply rejoined NJCRAC fifteen years later when attempts at enforcement had become a moot issue.

The major reason for NJCRAC's inability to enforce decisions is that all its, national members are powerful organizations in their own right that are unwilling to relinquish their freedom of individual action to anyone. An additional cause of NJCRAC's relative weakness is its lack of control over funding. All CRCs, both local and national, are funded through the federations' annual local campaigns. The CRCs' allocations are decided through the Large City Budgeting Conference of the CJF. While this allocation may provide a major part of a local CRC's budget, the larger, mainly national organizations conduct their own fundraising campaigns to raise additional revenues, indeed, usually the bulk of their budget. All of the CRCs enjoy tax-exempt status.

While NJCRAC does not impose any structure or division of labor on its members, it still plays a very important role as consultant and policy formulator. NJCRAC uses its umbrella status to present the annual consensus of its constituents regarding the programmatic work of the organized American Jewish community.

Israel Support Work: The Joint Program Plan

Nowhere are the political concerns and actual program agenda of the Jewish community groups delineated so clearly as in NJCRAC's major annual document, the Joint Program Plan for Jewish Community Relations, which addresses all topics on the agenda of Jewish community relations agencies, including economic and social matters, intergroup relations, and anti-Semitism. The Plan is formulated with input from each national affiliate and representatives from local CRCs (who meet at the annual plenary session) and then is written, published, and distributed by NJCRAC staff. NJCRAC describes the Plan as

products of the continual national planning process of the Jewish community relations field. Offered as a general guide for Jewish community relations programming, each Plan is meant to be used by member agencies as a basis for their own program planning', with each accepting or rejecting, modifying or expanding-according to its individual judgments, resources and needs-any of

the recommendations made.... Joint Program Plans seek primarily to identify and appraise changing conditions and trends that have occurred during the preceding year and their potential impact on Jewish community relations goals and concerns. This assessment provides a basis for projecting responsive positions, priorities and programs.

The emergence of Israel as the central concern and unifying factor for CRCs since 1967 is strikingly demonstrated by the increasing priority given to Israel-related topics and programs in these Joint Program Plan[s]. Since the political positions and action goals advocated by the NJCRAC reflect the views of those guiding mainstream, organized American Jewry, it is useful to look with some detail at the Israel-related sections of the 1982-83 and 1983-84 Joint Program Plan.

The overview section of the 1982-88 Plan notes with concern tensions between the United States and Israel, owing to what is called the U.S. policy of 'appeasement' toward Arab states such as Saudi Arabia. The overall assessment, however, is that these problems are not insurmountable:

The American Jewish community, an integral part of American life in every city of the United States, has a network of national and local agencies with the resources, will and sophistication that make them a significant factor in the shaping of public policy.

We are not alone and so we need not march in splendid isolation. As we indicated, strong support for Israel as a valued friend and ally exists, particularly in the Congress of the United States, both major parties, the trade union movement, even within the world of business (witness the Wall Street Journal), and among Christian religious movements. The American people as a whole see Israel as a true friend and Saudi Arabia as a nation who threatens the interests of the United States....

Finally, Saudi pressures on U.S. policy require that wc renew the lagging interest of the Jewish community relations field in U.S. energy policy.... The most difficult part of the problem may not be the question of expanding energy conservation but in finding ways to limit the leverage of petrodollars upon American decision-making.

The Israel section of the Plan contains a strong statement of support for and legitimation of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. (The 1982-88 Plan was adopted on 14 June 1982.) It also reiterates support for the Camp David process and rejects the Prince Fahd peace plan. Concern is expressed over the Reagan administration's concept of strategic consensus insofar as it involves strengthening the alliance with anti-communist Arab states. The Plan notes

The term 'strategic consensus' masks that foreign policy tilt. That tilt has objectively downgraded Israel's importance for the United States and downplayed any program of strategic cooperation

with Israel itself. It gambles with Israel's security and in the end, inhibits the establishment of any effective pro-Western security system in the Middle East. It also has increased Israel's vulnerability, which may require greater reliance on a strategic doctrine emphasizing the preemptive option.

There are also subsections on ‘Saudi Arabia and Appeasement’ and on ‘Israel and American Public Opinion’. The latter deplores what it terms the ‘distortions’ of the mass media's coverage of Israel but notes that public opinion is still firmly pro-Israel, despite a pro-Arab ‘well financed campaign to sway popular opinion.... ‘ The Israel section of the 1982-83 Joint Program Plan concludes with the following ‘Action Goals’ or recommendations for the Israel support work of community relations agencies:

• We recommend interpretive programs which stress that new U.S. initiatives in the wake of Lebanon to protect the interests of America and the free world would contain a fatal internal contradiction if those arrangements do not include as a basic premise recognition of a strong and secure Israel as vital to U.S. interests. Such recognition would require that: The U.S. continue to provide such economic and military aid as is necessary for Israel's defense, while taking tangible steps to implement U.S./Israel strategic cooperation; the U.S. provide such aid in a grant/loan balance which is sensitive to the new demands on Israel's strained economy engendered by the Sinai withdrawal and the explosive growth of Arab armories; the U.S. insist that, as a condition of alliance, potential Arab partners credibly renounce any intent of destroying Israel; the U.S. not inadvertently shift the balance of arms in the Middle East and erode Israeli security by the sale of arms to Arab regimes, who refuse to negotiate peace with Israel. The interpretive program should further stress that an effective security system in the Middle East requires an increased U.S. military presence in the region.

• We recommend a new stress on the theme that appeasement feeds rather than moderates extremism; and that concessions to Saudi, Jordanian, and other Arab-state demands be made only within the framework of their making essential concessions to American needs, including the acceptance of the Camp David peace process. We therefore further recommend the rejection of arms sales to Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and other Arab states unless and until these conditions are met. • We recommend an intensified program to expose the PLO as not only a terrorist organization dedicated to the destruction of the-State of Israel, but also a basic anti-American force in the Middle East. There is a critical need for the United States to resist resuscitation of the PLO after its crushing defeat in Lebanon. The folly of an appeasement policy on this score should be stressed, along with an indication of alternatives, within the Camp David process, which are compatible with American national interest. • We recommend that major emphasis be given to efforts to moderate negative treatment of Israel, particularly at the national level as demonstrated by the mass media treatment of the war in Lebanon. • We recommend strongly urging the United States to playa vigorous role in supporting the Camp David process, to reject Western European and Saudi proposals given new impetus by the Lebanese crisis, and to deepen public understanding of the Camp David Accords. The American role should also ensure that Egypt continue to honor its Camp David agreements after the Sinai withdrawal, and actively pursue the normalization of Egyptian/Israeli relations at all levels. • We recommend an intensified interpretive program on the specific issue in the framework of stressing the positive Western aspects of Israel's politics, culture and society. This program should include an emphasis on Israel's aspirations and efforts for peace, despite its continued vulnerability. These values should be contrasted with those of the Arab nations outside the Camp David process.

The subject of American attitudes toward Israel also arises in the ‘Jewish Security and Individual Freedom’ section, under the heading of ‘Anti-Semitism’. Here it is noted that traditional anti-Semitism has declined, but concern is expressed about new anti-Semitism as might be provoked by the AWACS debate:

Some surveys show a rise in the proportion of Americans who believe that American Jews are more loyal to Israel than to America. That is a matter of concern, since there is no incompatibility in supporting American and Israeli interests in the Middle East. And indeed, according to the evidence, most Americans do not feel hostile towards American Jewish activity on behalf of Israel, presumably because most Americans also see the compatibility between American and Israeli interests.

However, if the public were to lose its sense of that compatibility, it could presumably become hostile towards American Jewish activity on Israel's behalf. Thus, if the American Jewish community were to reduce its efforts to interpret Israel positively, that might paradoxically serve to increase rather than reduce levels of anti-Jewish hostility.

The overview section of the 1983-84 Plan reiterates support for the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and criticizes the United States for not strongly pursuing a treaty between Israel and Lebanon and for 'retreating from the Camp David process.' The last section of the overview, however, presents a new theme as it calls upon the Jewish community to reach out and form coalitions around broad issues, especially the domestic economic crisis, despite the strained relations and the isolation of the past decades.

The Plan notes

The security of the Jewish community and the needs of this nation require us to reach out to narrow the distance between ourselves and those who had once been our allies, even in the face of their enmity. They, as well as we, must recognize the critical need for coalitions to confront the great problems that we are facing. If we cannot act together, at minimum we have to learn once again to talk to each other. The Israel section of the 1983-84 Plan is divided into subsections on Lebanon, Camp David, U.S. arms sales to Arab countries, and U.S. public.

Opinion

Lebanon. NJCRAC applauds the Lebanon-Israel treaty as an important step toward peace but expresses much dismay over Soviet, Syrian, and PLO positions and actions

The developments underscored the central reality of the Arab-Israeli conflict: that Israel negotiates in good faith, making substantial accommodations in the search for peace, while the rejectionist Arabs maintain their refusal to make any accommodations with Israel, and reject measures that could bring peace to Lebanon.

Moving the Camp David Peace Process Forward. This subsection is mainly a rejection of the Reagan plan of September 1982 on the grounds that it is ‘contrary to the spirit’ of the Camp David Accords. A memorandum dealing with the consensus of the NJCRAC Israel Task Force on the Reagan and Fez plans is reprinted in full. While ‘sympathetic Understanding’ is expressed toward Reagan's proposals, they are rejected for being premature, too inclusive, and outside the Camp David framework. The Fez plan is described as a ‘sharp rejection’ of the U.S. initiative. The memorandum, from Bennett Yanowitz, NJCRAC chair, to NJCRAC and CJF member agencies, concludes with the following guidelines on the Reagan plan for the Jewish community:

The Task Force felt that the Jewish community's posture should stress that agreement on autonomy and the ultimate comprehensive settlement must be the product of the hard, difficult, direct negotiating process urged by President Reagan, sought by the government of Israel and envisioned by the Camp David Accords. Thus, as in the past, there is no need now for the Jewish community to force a consensus judgment on the final status of Judea and Samaria (West Bank) and Gaza. Such a debate of what are now essentially academic questions deflects attention from the current reality that these issues are not under negotiation because of the refusal of the Arab states to come to the negotiating table. The President's speech and the subsequent reactions deal with issues of long-run nature. Thus urgent debate and confrontation within the Jewish community on specific details only serves to polarize the Jewish community and the U.S. and Israel.

U.S. Arms Sales to Jordan and Saudi Arabia. This subsection simply reiterates NJCRAC's opposition to any U.S. arms sales to Arab countries. Both Jordan and Saudi Arabia are cited as ’rejectionists’; concern is also expressed over the ability of Congress to veto such arms sales, given the June 1983 Supreme Court decision that invalidated the legislative veto (on an unrelated issue). Also reprinted here is a Wall Street Journal article by Amos Perlmutter, editor of the Journal for Strategic Studies, on ‘The Saudis-Ultimate Rejectionists’. The Middle East and American Public Opinion. This subsection notes a slight increase in pro-Palestinian perceptions but expresses confidence that pro-Israel feelings are dominant in public opinion and in Congress. There is concern over ‘controversial media coverage of the war’, the tendency of some foreign policy elites toward ‘appeasement’, and ‘evidence of greater activity on the part of pro-Arab advocates, including increasingly active Arab-American associations which began to employ sophisticated political and public affairs techniques and constitute a potential force that bears monitoring in the future.... College campuses have long been vulnerable in anti-Israeli activities, a problem addressed by NJCRAC through the creation, in 1982, of the Campus Advisory Committee of the Israel Task Force; to function as a clearing house and coordinator of campus activities. The level of pro-PLO and anti-Israel activity rose significantly after the Lebanon war.’

Issues related to Israel carryover to other sections of 1988-84 Plan as well. Thus, the use of a pro-Israel yardstick to measure community relations is found throughout. For example, a section urging Jewish groups to seek dialogue and coalitions with the Hispanic community concludes

It is important to convey the views of the Jewish community on Middle East issues to the Hispanic community, which has not focused particular attention on the Middle East. This should be one of the items on the agenda for Hispanic-Jewish relations.

Likewise, the issue of anti-Semitism is measured and addressed mainly in terms of American attitudes toward Israel

The pervasive mood of foreboding among American Jews seems most directly linked to the growing sense of Israel's international isolation, and the close

identification of American Jews with Israel. Concern has been expressed as to whether this is leading to anti-Jewish hostility among some in the women's movement. The media's treatment of the Lebanon war, and the increase in Arab propaganda efforts in the U.S., contributed to the sense of apprehension.

According to NJCRAC, ‘The fundamental remedy, in this case, lies not so much in an abstract campaign against anti-Semitism, but in a continuing campaign to underline the convergence of Israeli and American national interests and political cultures’. The Plan addresses the issue of dissent versus unity in the reprint of a speech by former NJCRAC chair Bennett Yanowitz, entitled ‘Democracy and Discipline in the American Jewish Community: The Utility and Morality of Unity.’ Here Yanowitz states that, while individual Jews have the right to dissent, unity is required within the community relations field, as it is a ‘critical factor in our ability to effectively influence public policy.’ He asserts that suppression of dissent is not the issue-there is no suppression, simply a belief that dissent should take place only ‘within the tent’ of NJCRAC and should not be published. Dissenters who use public forums, he says, are trying to pressure, not persuade; they bring charges of suppression only because their views are not accepted by the majority. He goes on to say that public dissent is dangerous because it is exploited by the media and used to undermine support for Israel, making it difficult for pro-Israel forces, such as Congress, to act. Acknowledging that one may feel ‘uncertainty or unhappiness with a specific Israeli action,’ Yanowitz puts forward these alternatives to dissent, ‘choosing to remain silent as a statement of our doubt,’ or ‘postponing confrontation on an issue until it is ripe for resolution.’ However, Yanowitz warns that even these alternatives need to be exercised with ‘enormous restraint and caution.’

Other Forms of Israel Support Work

In November 1973, CJF, AJC, AJCongress, and ADL set up the special NJCRAC Israel Task Force with an initial budget of $1,090,000, most of which came from the UJA-Federation campaign and NJCRAC's constituents. NJCRAC also added an Israel specialist to its staff. The aim of the Task Force is to strengthen Israel programming; its activities include funding AJC opinion surveys on public attitudes toward Israel; underwriting a Jewish Labor Committee project for strengthening U.S. labor's ties to Israel in areas where strong pro-Israel attitudes do not exist; and funding NJCRAC's program to set up local Israel Task Forces in small communities. A number of media-related projects were funded as well. They include the following: One, a national speakers bureau to coordinate the appearance of pro-Israel speakers across the country, was set up (at a cost of $150,000) as an independent agency, with no ostensible Jewish identification, so as not to impugn its credibility in the general community.

Similarly, the services of a private, non-profit research organization, Near East Research Inc., were engaged to prepare interpretative material on Israel for Washington-based columnists, commentators and reporters ($30,000). A television feature film on Israel was produced by Dore Schary, the well-known producer prominently identified with ADL ($30,000). Another joint media project ($35,000) between the two leading community relations agencies was the development of ties with specialized trade technical publications, journals, etc., in order to introduce news of Israel, even of a purely technical nature, into this area of the media and thereby into this new constituency. The ADL undertook the production of two to three minute bi-weekly news analyses on Israel and the Middle East for some 100 radio stations ($12,000). The last media project was a program working with black media people, cultivating their confidence, and supplying them with factual and analytical materia1.

NJCRAC also makes specific recommendations to its member agencies. In 1977 for example, the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) sponsored a conference on the Middle East with Israeli general (ret.) Matityahu Peled and Palestinian activist Issam Sartawi (who did not attend, but sent a written statement); NJCRAC took the lead in imposing a boycott against Peled by sending all member agencies a letter that ‘strongly urged that Jewish organizations not be drawn into this propaganda trap by participating in and/or attending the conference.’

More recently, NJCRAC sent a letter to member groups on the subject of the March on Washington for Jobs, Peace and Freedom, held on 27 August 1983 to commemorate Dr. Martin Luther King's march twenty years earlier. The letter urged Jewish organizations "to use caution in any involvement in the march. The participation of former Senator James Abourezk, known for his advocacy of U.S. recognition of the PLO, was singled out for criticism; also, objections were posed to a section of the ‘Call to the Nation’ statement that read

We oppose the militarization of internal conflicts, often abetted and even encouraged by massive U.S. arms

exports, in areas of the world such as the Middle East and Central America, while their basic human problems are neglected.

In March 1982, a letter signed by the leaders of the 120 member groups of NJCRAC was sent to President Reagan to protest continuing U.S. arms sales to Arab states, especially the proposals to sell weapons to Jordan. In June 1982, after NJCRAC member agencies were briefed by visiting Israeli general Natan Sharon, NJCRAC chair Yanowitz sent Reagan a telegram on U.S. policy in Lebanon, in which he called for

Arrangements that will avoid Israel's need to act again in its self-defense, for not pushing for Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, and for standing against punitive action directed at Israel by the U.N. or even by officials of our own government.

NJCRAC holds annual conferences that are used to prepare for the Joint Program Plan but also serve as a forum for American and Israeli politicians.