Aman

From Powerbase
Jump to: navigation, search

Aman (Agaf ha-Modi'in) is Israel's military intelligence agency.[1] It is known by a number of terms in English, including Israeli Defence Intelligence (IDI).[2]

Although often overshadowed by Mossad and Shin Bet, Aman has historically been the largest Israeli intelligence agency. It is a part of the military general staff, reporting to the Chief of Staff and the Minister of Defence.[3]

History

Six Day War and War of Attrition

Aman's correct prediction that the Soviet Union would not intervene in the Six Day War, strengthened the agency's established view of the late 1960s, that the Soviet Union would not risk a confrontation with the United States in the Middle East.[4] As a result, Aman was taken by surprise when Soviet military advisors were attached to Egyptian military units in 1970.[5]

Yom Kippur War

Neverthless, Aman's leadership remained strongly attached to the 'konseptzia', the belief that Egypt was too weak and disorganised to risk attacking Israel.[6] Following the Agranat Commission into the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Aman chief Eliahu Zeira and a number of his subordinates lost their jobs..[7]

1980s - Lebanon and the Intifada

According a 1985 report in The Times, Aman was wary of Israel's involvement in Lebanon in the early 1980s:

It was Mossad, the body responsible for covert operations, that built up Israel's secret links with the Christian Phalange, a policy regarded with scepticism by Aman. But in a rare moment of agreement the heads of both organizations, Major Generals Saguy (Aman) and Hofi (Mossad) advised in 1982 against the invasion.
The current chief of military intelligence, Major General Ehud Barak, is reportedly prominent among officers who are trying to reestablish the conventional Israeli strategic doctrines that were flouted in the era of Ariel Sharon and Chief of Staff Rafael Eitan.[8]

Although this doctrine held that states rather than non-state actors were the primary threat, Barak and his successor as Aman commander were nevertheless reportedly directing operations from on board a Boeing jet off the coast of Tunisia when Israel assassinated Abu Jihad of the PLO in 1988.[5]

2006 Lebanon war

According to a study by the Rand Corporation, Aman issued an 130 page document on 'Hezbollah's War Conception' in January 2006, which accurately reported the location of many of Hezbollah's short-range rockets, but because of classification restrictions, this information did not always reach front-line commanders during the conflict later that year.[9]

Gaza War

Following the 2006 Lebanon War, according to a Rand Corporation study, Aman began a systematic 'intelligence soak' of the Gaza Strip, which identified a list of 603 allegedly Hamas-related targets for the Israeli Air Force in the subsequent Gaza War of 2008-2009.[10]

Structure and Personnel

Journalists Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman reported that Aman consisted of six departments in 1991, of which the largest were the collection and production departments.[3]

Leadership

Directors of Military Intelligence

Deputy Directors of Military Intelligence

Collection Department

The Collection Department is responsible for both agent and informer human intelligence, and for signals intelligence.[3]

Heads of the Collection Department

SIGINT - Unit 8200

Aman's signals intelligence capability is provided by Unit 8200.[24] Prior to 1976, the unit was known as Unit 848.[25]

HUMINT

The Collection Department controls a unit responsible for human sources.[26]

OSINT

The Collection Department controls a unit responsible for open source intelligence.[27]

Production Department

The production department is responsible for intelligence analysis.[3] The Department is known in Hebrew as Aman Mehkar.[28] English sources use various names for the department including research department, production department, research and analysis department, analysis and production department and research division.

The Department is organised in a desk system along functional and geographical lines.[3]

Heads of the Production Department

Assistant Directors of the Research Division for Evaluation

Assistant Director for Operations

Basic Research Team

Southern Area desk

  • Jordan and the Arabian peninsula.[3] Known as Branch 2 at the time of the Yom Kippur War.[44]
  • Lt. Col. Zusia Kaniazher head c.1973.[45]

International Desk

Known as Branch 3.[44] Responsible for the superpowers at the time of the Yom Kippur war.[46]

Eastern Area desk

Western Area desk

Branch 7

  • Technical/technological desk.[43]

"Terror and Palestinians" desk

Report and Circulation Center

  • Established after the 1967 Six Day War to circulate material from the various collection agencies within military intelligence.[61]

"Foreign left-wing groups" desk

  • Haaretz reported in March 2011 that a department had been created in the research division that "will monitor Western groups involved in boycotting Israel, divesting from it or imposing sanctions on it. The unit will also collect information about groups that attempt to bring war crime or other charges against high-ranking Israeli officials, and examine possible links between such organizations and terror groups."[62]

Other desks

  • Inter-Arab relations.[3]
  • Middle East Economics.[3]
  • Territory and targets.[63]
  • A desk responsible for aerial photography existed within the Research Department in 1973.[64]

Field Security Department

Responsible for security across the IDF.[65]

Organization Department

Handles administration matters such as logistics, finance and personnel.[66]

Contact

External Resources

Notes

  1. Aman, GlobalSecurity.org, accessed 29 July 2009.
  2. Private Israeli Company Collects Counter-terrorism Intelligence, Wikileaks, 1 September 2011.
  3. 3.00 3.01 3.02 3.03 3.04 3.05 3.06 3.07 3.08 3.09 3.10 Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman, Every Spy a Prince: The Complete History of Israel's Intelligence Community, Houghton Mifflin, 1991, pp.207-208. Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; name "Prince207-8" defined multiple times with different content Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; name "Prince207-8" defined multiple times with different content Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; name "Prince207-8" defined multiple times with different content Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; name "Prince207-8" defined multiple times with different content Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; name "Prince207-8" defined multiple times with different content Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; name "Prince207-8" defined multiple times with different content Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; name "Prince207-8" defined multiple times with different content Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; name "Prince207-8" defined multiple times with different content Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; name "Prince207-8" defined multiple times with different content Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; name "Prince207-8" defined multiple times with different content
  4. Dima P. Adamsky, American and Israeli Intelligence Failure, in Nigel John Ashton, ed., The Cold War in the Middle East: Regional Conflict and the Superpowers, 1967-73, Routledge, 2007, pp.115-116.
  5. 5.0 5.1 Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman, Every Spy a Prince: The Complete History of Israel's Intelligence Community, Houghton Mifflin, 1991, pp.208. Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; name "Prince208" defined multiple times with different content
  6. Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman, Every Spy a Prince: The Complete History of Israel's Intelligence Community, Houghton Mifflin, 1991, pp.209.
  7. Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman, Every Spy a Prince: The Complete History of Israel's Intelligence Community, Houghton Mifflin, 1991, pp.212.
  8. Michael Pinto-Duschinsky, Lebanon - army and hawks divide / Israeli foreign policy, 11 June 1985.
  9. Benjamin S. Lambeth, Air Operations in Israel's War Against Hezbollah: Learning from Lebanon and Getting It Right in Gaza, Rand Corporation, 2011, p.150.
  10. Benjamin S. Lambeth, Air Operations in Israel's War Against Hezbollah: Learning from Lebanon and Getting It Right in Gaza, Rand Corporation, 2011, p.238.
  11. ISRAEL - Heads of A'man, Mossad, & Shin Bet, The Literature of Intelligence, Muskingum University,via the Internet Archive, accessed 29 July 2009.
  12. Ira Chernus, Helping Israel on a False and Dangerous Course, CommonDreams.org, 28 June 2004.
  13. Anshel Pfeffer and Amos Harel, Rising star Kochavi to replace Yadlin as IDF intelligence chief, Haaretz, 17 September 2011.
  14. Avi Shlaim, Obituary: Professor Yehoshafat Harkabi, The independent, 14 September 1994.
  15. Yuval Ne'eman, The Telegraph, 15 May 2006.
  16. Avi Shlaim, [Israel, the Great Powers, and the Middle East Crisis of 1958], Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 12:2, May 1999, archived at users.ox.ac.uk, accessed 9 July 2012.
  17. Ami Gluska, The Israeli Military and the Origins of the 1967 War: Government, Armed Forces and Defence Policy 1963-1967, Taylor & Francis, 2007, p.105.
  18. Aryeh Shalev, Israel's Intelligence Assessment Before the Yom Kippur War: Disentangling Deception and Distraction, Sussex Academic Press, v p.192.
  19. Seymour M. Hersh, The Samson Option, Faber and Faber, 1993, p.293.
  20. Meir Elran, Institute for National Security Studies, accessed 9 July 2012.
  21. Danny Rothschild, World Economic Forum, accessed 10 July 2012.
  22. Amos Gilboa, Yochai Erlich, eds., Israel's Silent Defender: An Inside Look at Sixty Years of Israeli Intelligence, Gefen, 2011, p.65.
  23. Uri Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise Of Yom Kippur And Its Sources, Suny Press, 2005, p.236.
  24. Michael I. Handel, Thomas G. Mahnken, eds, Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence: Essays in Honor of Michael I. Handel, Routledge, 2004, p.168.
  25. Ephraim Kahana, Historical Dictionary of Israeli Intelligence, Scarecrow Press, 2006, p.43.
  26. Aryeh Shalev, Israel's Intelligence Assessment Before the Yom Kippur War: Disentangling Deception and Distraction, Sussex Academic Press, 2010, p.5.
  27. Aryeh Shalev, Israel's Intelligence Assessment Before the Yom Kippur War: Disentangling Deception and Distraction, Sussex Academic Press, 2010, p.5.
  28. 28.0 28.1 28.2 Steve Rodan, Dynamic Duo, Jerusalem Post, 14 October 1994.
  29. Amir Oren, From Erdelhun to Erdogan, Haaretz, 12 September 2011.
  30. Aryeh Shalev, Israel's Intelligence Assessment Before the Yom Kippur War: Disentangling Deception and Distraction, Sussex Academic Press, v p.105.
  31. Aryeh Shalev, Israel's Intelligence Assessment Before the Yom Kippur War: Disentangling Deception and Distraction, Sussex Academic Press, v p.255.
  32. Uri Dromi, Quiet Man, Unquiet Times, Haaretz, 18 June 2004.
  33. Danny Rothschild, World Economic Forum, accessed 10 July 2012.
  34. Akiva Eldar, Popular Misconceptions, Haaretz, 11 June 2004.
  35. About Us, American Center for Democracy, accessed 31 July 2009, archived at the Internet Archive.
  36. Ronny Sofer, IDF: Syrian army in battle positions, ynetnews.com, 15 october 2006.
  37. Amos Gilboa, Yochai Erlich, eds., Israel's Silent Defender: An Inside Look at Sixty Years of Israeli Intelligence, Gefen, 2011, p.382.
  38. Aryeh Shalev, Israel's Intelligence Assessment Before the Yom Kippur War: Disentangling Deception and Distraction, Sussex Academic Press, 2010, p.5.
  39. Meir Elran, Institute for National Security Studies, accessed 9 July 2012.
  40. Ephraim Kam, Institute for National Security Studies, accessed 10 July 2012.
  41. Aryeh Shalev, Israel's Intelligence Assessment Before the Yom Kippur War: Disentangling Deception and Distraction, Sussex Academic Press, 2010, p.5.
  42. Aryeh Shalev, Israel's Intelligence Assessment Before the Yom Kippur War: Disentangling Deception and Distraction, Sussex Academic Press, 2010, p.5.
  43. 43.0 43.1 43.2 43.3 Uri Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise Of Yom Kippur And Its Sources, Suny Press, 2005, p.115. Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; name "Watchman251" defined multiple times with different content Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; name "Watchman251" defined multiple times with different content Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; name "Watchman251" defined multiple times with different content
  44. 44.0 44.1 44.2 Uri Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise Of Yom Kippur And Its Sources, Suny Press, 2005, p.300.
  45. 45.0 45.1 Uri Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise Of Yom Kippur And Its Sources, Suny Press, 2005, p.290. Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; name "Watchman290" defined multiple times with different content
  46. Uri Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise Of Yom Kippur And Its Sources, Suny Press, 2005, p.138.
  47. Aryeh Shalev, Israel's Intelligence Assessment Before the Yom Kippur War: Disentangling Deception and Distraction, Sussex Academic Press, 2010, p.xxii.
  48. 48.0 48.1 Uri Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise Of Yom Kippur And Its Sources, Suny Press, 2005, p.179.
  49. Dima P. Adamsky, American and Israeli Intelligence Failure, in Nigel John Ashton, ed., The Cold War in the Middle East: Regional Conflict and the Superpowers, 1967-73, Routledge, 2007, p.131.
  50. Dima P. Adamsky, American and Israeli Intelligence Failure, in Nigel John Ashton, ed., The Cold War in the Middle East: Regional Conflict and the Superpowers, 1967-73, Routledge, 2007, p.131.
  51. Uri Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise Of Yom Kippur And Its Sources, Suny Press, 2005, p.47.
  52. Uri Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise Of Yom Kippur And Its Sources, Suny Press, 2005, p.183.
  53. Michael I. Handel, Thomas G. Mahnken, eds, Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence: Essays in Honor of Michael I. Handel, Routledge, 2004, p.166.
  54. Michael I. Handel, Thomas G. Mahnken, eds, Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence: Essays in Honor of Michael I. Handel, Routledge, 2004, p.166.
  55. Uri Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise Of Yom Kippur And Its Sources, Suny Press, 2005, p.110.
  56. Uri Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise Of Yom Kippur And Its Sources, Suny Press, 2005, p.291.
  57. Dima P. Adamsky, American and Israeli Intelligence Failure, in Nigel John Ashton, ed., The Cold War in the Middle East: Regional Conflict and the Superpowers, 1967-73, Routledge, 2007, p.131.
  58. Amos Gilboa, Yochai Erlich, eds., Israel's Silent Defender: An Inside Look at Sixty Years of Israeli Intelligence, Gefen, 2011, p.87.
  59. Amos Gilboa, Yochai Erlich, eds., Israel's Silent Defender: An Inside Look at Sixty Years of Israeli Intelligence, Gefen, 2011, p.384.
  60. Consultants, MM~Law, accessed 15 July 2013.
  61. Aryeh Shalev, Israel's Intelligence Assessment Before the Yom Kippur War: Disentangling Deception and Distraction, Sussex Academic Press, 2010, p.6.
  62. Barak Ravid, Military Intelligence monitoring foreign left-wing organizations Haaretz, 21 March 2011.
  63. Aryeh Shalev, Israel's Intelligence Assessment Before the Yom Kippur War: Disentangling Deception and Distraction, Sussex Academic Press, 2010, p.6.
  64. Aryeh Shalev, Israel's Intelligence Assessment Before the Yom Kippur War: Disentangling Deception and Distraction, Sussex Academic Press, 2010, p.6.
  65. Aryeh Shalev, Israel's Intelligence Assessment Before the Yom Kippur War: Disentangling Deception and Distraction, Sussex Academic Press, 2010, p.5.
  66. Aryeh Shalev, Israel's Intelligence Assessment Before the Yom Kippur War: Disentangling Deception and Distraction, Sussex Academic Press, 2010, p.5.