

However, Basayev really earned his reputation during the first Russo-Chechen war for literally bringing the Russian army “to its knees.” In June 1995, he led a daring raid on the southern Russian town of Budyonovsk, where 100 Chechens successfully held out against almost 15,000 enemy troops. Basayev also claims to have commanded the 11,000 guerillas who forcibly evicted the Russian military from Grozny in August 1996. In late August 2005, Basayev acknowledged his involvement in the bloody Beslan school siege and subsequent massacre in Ingushetia, a Caucasus region adjacent to Chechnya: “All we were doing was holding people, demanding an end to the war and the genocide in Chechnya, and it was the Russists who killed their own people.”¹⁶² By the end of the disastrous siege in Beslan, 330 innocent people were murdered, many of them young children.

Between 1995 and 2002, Ibn-ul-Khattab became a widely acknowledged “hero” among trans-nationalist Islamic militants as a result of his carefully documented exploits in waging jihad against Russia in the Caucasus. Russian authorities blame him for, among other things, a series of bombings that rocked Moscow apartment complexes in August 1999. Conversely, in response to Al-Qaida terrorist attacks on Western targets, Khattab commented, “There is no difference between the American Army and the Russian Army. They seized our territory, and Muslims have the right to seek such a solution.”¹⁶³ In mid-1997, after settling his family in Karachi, Pakistan, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed—the future mastermind of the September 11 suicide hijackings—“tried to join the mujahid leader Ibn al Khattab in Chechnya” but was “unable to travel through Azerbaijan.”¹⁶⁴ Following his capture, KSM later told American interrogators that “several” of the 9/11 hijackers had also initially sought to join Ibn-ul-Khattab but similarly “faced problems traveling to Chechnya and so went to Afghanistan, where they were drawn into al Qaeda.”¹⁶⁵ In March 2002, Ibn-ul-Khattab was finally poisoned and killed by assassins recruited from within his own organization by Russian security services.¹⁶⁶

PART V: Care International / The Al-Hussam Newsletter

Care International was founded in April 1993 in Boston, Massachusetts. The stated purpose of the charity organization was to “provide assistance to war victims and to war refugees around the Muslim world,” in countries such as Chechnya, Bosnia, Palestine, Afghanistan, Kashmir, Sudan, Bangladesh, and Turkey. However, Care International has done much more than merely provide charity aid to refugees and war

¹⁶² “No-one can prevent me from doing what God permits me to do.” Kavkaz Centre Interview with Shamil Basayev. March 24, 2005.

http://www.kavkazcenter.com/eng/content/2005/03/24/3640.shtml/t_blank.

¹⁶³ Gall, Carlotta. “Muslim Fighter Embraces Warrior Mystique.” *The New York Times*. October 17, 1999. Section 1; *Page 16*.

¹⁶⁴ *The 9/11 Commission Report*. Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. July 22, 2004. *Page 139*.

¹⁶⁵ *The 9/11 Commission Report*. Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. July 22, 2004. *Page 233*.

¹⁶⁶ “Biography of Ibn-ul-Khattab VCD.” <http://www.waislamah.net>. ©2002.

victims. In fact, long prior to its official founding in 1993, the organization acted as the local branch office of the Al-Kifah Refugee Center (a.k.a. Makhtab-e-Khidamat) in Boston.

In early 1993, just prior to the emergence of Care, the wide-ranging network behind Makhtab-e-Khidamat suddenly became the focus of several international governments, including the United States and Pakistan. In America, the Al-Kifah headquarters in Brooklyn was forced to close after being linked to the terrorist cell responsible for the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and a subsequent interlinked cell plotting to attack a series of major landmarks in the New York metropolitan area. Meanwhile, over in Pakistan, the government decided it was long since time to put the Afghan jihad in the past, and ordered the closure of Arab mujahideen offices in the country—threatening official deportation to any illegal foreign fighters who attempted to remain in Pakistan. A month later, the FBI secretly recorded Shaykh Omar Abdel Rahman offering over the telephone to send new volunteers to the Arab-Afghan training camps in Pakistan. He was told, “all of them [are] closed, Sheik, nothing is left open... even the Base [Al-Qaida] is closed completely and they all departed from here... except for special situations.”¹⁶⁷ In an

interview conducted at the Finsbury Park mosque in London in July 2002, mujahideen spokesman Abu Hamza al-Masri told me that these stranded jihadis began to debate among themselves, “shall we go, shall we run to Afghanistan... provided we go out [of Pakistan]... But then even if we tell them go inside Afghanistan... people would not take the chance to go inside... I would not dare to go there without weapons and without hand grenades.” Thus, in order for the Arab mujahideen to continue their activities in the region, they would require a trustworthy native Afghan ally to protect them and a credible cover for the now explicitly-forbidden activities of the Makhtab-e-Khidamat al-Mujahideen.

The U.S. Attorney’s Office in Boston has provided me with an evidentiary document which appears to be the minutes of a meeting that took place on April 23, 1995 between several individuals, who I believe included Emadeddine Muntasser (a.k.a. Abu Abdelrahman), Mohamad Akra (a.k.a. Abu Idris), and Mohammad Chehade (a.k.a. Abu Fayez). The meeting appears to be a conference of senior U.S.-based representatives of Makhtab-e-Khidamat. The minutes reflect a clear acknowledgment of events in Pakistan, noting that “guest homes, the Islamic Center, [and the] Peshawar office [have been]

What is CARE International?

CARE is a non-profit organization founded by Imam Abdullah Azzam to provide services to war victims and refugees around the world. For over eight years it has been administering schools, hospitals, and refugee camps .

¹⁶⁷ FBI Transcript of conversation involving Omar Ahmad Ali Abdel Rahman, “Muhammad” LNU, and two unidentified males. March 20, 1993. United States v. Omar Ahmad Ali Abdel Rahman et al. S3 93 Cr. 181(MBM). Government Exhibit 7057. Page 11.

closed due to the situation.” There are also several references to “changing the name of the Services Office”, creating a “separate structure”, and attempting to “frame... general policies (some written and some understood) for the work in America.”¹⁶⁸ In line with these stated objectives, the corporate entity known as “Care International” seems little more than a flimsy public cover for the continuing fundraising and recruitment activities of Makhtab-e-Khidamat al-Mujahideen. The cover was so flimsy that the organization kept the same officers and a virtually identical newsletter, continued to advertise its association with Makhtab-e-Khidamat founder Shaykh Abdullah Azzam, and even—in some cases—used the exact same mailing address as Al-Kifah.

Indeed, a number of flyers and fundraising appeal letters found at the Brooklyn headquarters of Al-Kifah directly implicate Care International officials from Boston in fundraising, recruiting, and providing other forms of key logistical support for violent jihad. A December 1991 letter from the “Islamic Coordinating Committee” was addressed to one-time Care International President Emadeddin Muntasser at the Al-Kifah Refugee Center location in Brooklyn. Muntasser’s name also appeared on at least three separate envelopes containing donation checks destined for Abdallah Azzam and the Mujahideen Services Office in Peshawar.¹⁶⁹ Ahmad Nawras, the registered agent and former treasurer of Care International, also appears several times in documents in the files of the Brooklyn office of Al-Kifah. In one such letter, he sent an \$80 check to Al-Kifah in Brooklyn and asked for “five video tapes of Ibn Taimiyya” in return. He ended the letter with the words, “May God bless you.”

Care International’s fundraising literature, publications, and website have all openly glorified jihad and martyrdom. In 1993, Care International issued a flyer to local Muslims titled, “A Call to Jihad in Bosnia.” After discussing the human tragedy in Bosnia, the flyer followed: “Ask yourself what you are doing for these Muslims. Ask Muslim governments what they are doing for these Muslims and their freedom. If you Desire to provide the Emerging Jihad Movement in Bosnia with more than Food and Shelter, Please send your [religious donations] to: Bosnia Fund c/o Alkifah Refugee Center, 1085 Commonwealth Avenue Suite 124”, which is in fact the registered corporate address of Care International.¹⁷⁰ Care’s notorious, now-defunct newsletter, known as “Al-Hussam” (“the Sword”), described itself as an exclusive, authentic source of information about “Jihad action”¹⁷¹. In the Spring of 1993, the masthead of Al-Hussam identified it intermittently as both the official newsletter of Care International and the Al-Kifah Refugee Center. All copies of the printed newsletter bore the official Al-Kifah logo. Care International’s first website was also the home of Al-Hussam online. Al-

¹⁶⁸ Exhibit CI1347. U.S. v. Muhamed Mubayyid, Emadeddin Muntasser, and Samir Al-Monla. Criminal Action No. 05-40026-FDS. United States District Court; District of Massachusetts.

¹⁶⁹ Letter from Ahmad Elkadi, Committee Chairman of the Islamic Coordinating Committee. P.O. Box 38. Plainfield, IN 46168. Letter was addressed to: “Br. Emadeddin Muntasser. Al Kifah Refugees Center Inc. P.O. Box 294. Brooklyn, NY 11217.”

¹⁷⁰ “Bosnia Fund c/o Alkifah Refugee Center.” 1085 Commonwealth Avenue, Suite 124. Boston, MA 02215. “A Call For Jihad in Bosnia.” Flyer found amongst material found at the former headquarters of the Al-Kifah Refugee Center in Brooklyn, NY.

¹⁷¹ Tabib, Tawfig. “Interview with Comm. Abu Abdel Aziz Barbaros.” Al-Sirat Al-Mustaqeem. August 1994. Please note the following prefaced section: “For updates on 'Jihad action' consult the homepage of CARE INTERNATIONAL, INC. or al-Hussam on-line (The Sword on-line).”

Hussam contained such violent exhortations as “Fight them, and Allah will punish them by your hands, and disgrace them, and help you (to victory) over them” and “it is now that fighting has come and there will always be a group of [Muslims] who fight in the path of Allah... they fight until the day of Judgment.”¹⁷² The newsletter also contained highly unusual news reports from illicit terrorist or extremist organizations with links to the Afghan jihad; for instance, one such edition of Al-Hussam printed in mid-December 1995 contained breaking information about the activities of Al-Gama`at al-Islamiyya, the GIA, the LIFG, and the foreign mujahideen in Bosnia-Herzegovina (in the form of a direct communication with deputy commander Dr. Abul-Harith al-Liby).¹⁷³

The July 28, 1995 edition of Al-Hussam featured an essay titled, “The Story of a Mujahid.” The article, written by an unknown author, explicitly encouraged Muslims living in the United States to abandon their jobs and families in order to sacrifice their lives in the cause of violent jihad in various conflict zones across the Muslim world:

“This story contains a lesson and wisdom—a reminder to those who sit back and... [are] hesitant who are fearful for their worldly lives... This story is centered around one of our Muslim brothers who completed his studies in his country and then journeyed to the U.S., spurred on by his parents, in order to attain specialization... In America, his eyes were opened to the wounds of the ummah. He was seared by the horrifying pictures reaching us from all over... by the reports of Muslim women’s chastity being violated at the hands of the Crusader criminals... He realized... that there could not be a life in this country, for his life could only be lived in the land of jihad and ribat (frontier-guarding). Thus, he packed his suitcase and left, never to return... He left, leaving everything behind him, taking nothing with him other than jihad apparel and some money... We used to hear these stories from afar and become elated by them, but finally, we saw it in real life. As much as it instilled pride in our hearts for our brother, it [also] left a great impression on us.”¹⁷⁴

I have been provided with numerous copies of the Al-Hussam newsletter (in addition to my own collection) by the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Boston, which shed further light on the mission of Care International and its efforts to recruit American nationals to fight abroad in the cause of violent jihad. The edition of Al-Hussam released on August 16, 1994 under the “Care International” letterhead contains an Arabic-language excerpt from Al-Jihad Magazine, the official publication of Makhtab-e-Khidamat in Peshawar, Pakistan. The article admonishes, “Jihad with money without Jihad of the soul is not beneficial to the person even if they spend all the money on earth. It is useless if they do not take part in wars.”¹⁷⁵ Another of the Al-Hussam newsletters provided to me, dated March 5, 1993, includes an article titled “Boston offers more

¹⁷² Al-Hussam Newsletters. Care International. Editions released on April 16, 1993 and February 5, 1993.

¹⁷³ Exhibit CII258. U.S. v. Muhamed Mubayyid, Emadeddin Muntasser, and Samir Al-Monla. Criminal Action No. 05-40026-FDS. United States District Court; District of Massachusetts. Originally taken from: Al-Hussam. Vol 4; No. 16. December 15, 1995.

¹⁷⁴ Care International. “The Story of a Mujahid.” Al-Hussam. Vol. 4; No. 9. July 28, 1995. *Pages 1-2*.

¹⁷⁵ Exhibit CICR 07932-07933. U.S. v. Muhamed Mubayyid, Emadeddin Muntasser, and Samir Al-Monla. Criminal Action No. 05-40026-FDS. United States District Court; District of Massachusetts. Originally taken from: “Words & Blood.” Al-Hussam. Vol. 3; No. 9. August 26, 1994.

martyrs”, which relates the story of Morabit Yahya (a.k.a. “Al Layth Abou Al Layth”, a 26-year old immigrant to the U.S. from Morocco who first arrived in 1990 and worked at a local Dunkin Donuts. While living in Boston, Yahya “met some [people] who loved and worked to support Jihad. He joined the Mujahideen in Afghanistan in 1991, where he went to training camps and later fought different battles.” The article further identified the young Moroccan-American as at least the fourth known recruit from the Boston area who was killed fighting alongside the mujahideen in Afghanistan.¹⁷⁶

Furthermore, I am also aware that Bassam Kanj, a former resident of Boston and alleged activist on behalf of Care International, was killed in January 2000 in a clash with Lebanese security forces during a failed Sunni Islamist uprising in the northern Lebanese city of Tripoli. The U.S. Attorney’s Office in Boston has provided me with the transcript of an FBI wiretap on a conversation between Mohammad Chehade and Sameer [LNU] that took place on April 6, 2000. During that conversation, “Sameer” (presumably Sameer al-Monla) commented, “I was very affected by the brother (Kanj).. I am very happy that I.. that the God the Almighty willed it that I stand by the brother.. when I was there (Lebanon), I stayed with him for about two or three weeks.. my family would get on my case ‘are you here to see him or us?’... By God the Almighty, I can give you details that.. he used to warn me, that one (Kanj), our friend... And I went and saw with my own eyes.. I saw.. I mean, I went up, and we went, and we returned and he introduced me to many men... Many, many, many... I just want to tell you that by God, the people are in need... Our brothers and our beloved that are there.. anyone that left (was martyred)... We are responsible for.. by God.”¹⁷⁷

- **Support for the Foreign Mujahideen in Bosnia-Herzegovina**

In addition to explicitly recruiting mujahideen fighters, Care International was also attempting to enlist human volunteers for other illicit purposes. Another Al-Hussam newsletter provided to me by the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Boston, dated June 1993, includes an Arabic-language appeal directly “to the brothers that are doctors” living in Boston: “the services bureau informs you that we are in need for Doctors to volunteer to work for one month in our hospitals and infirmaries in Bosnia.”¹⁷⁸ I have independently obtained a correspondence taken during a private search of the Al-Kifah Refugee Center in Brooklyn, New York dated one month later—July 11, 1993—from “Hassan Hakim”, the deputy director of the Al-Kifah office in Zagreb, Croatia, begging Al-Kifah managers in the U.S. to arrange for the purchase of an ambulance from Germany. Hakim suggested that the ambulance would initially be taken on a goodwill tour of Bosnian Muslim refugee camps and makeshift civilian hospitals “with the help of doctors volunteering

¹⁷⁶ Exhibits CI1570, CI1576. U.S. v. Muhamed Mubayyid, Emadeddin Muntasser, and Samir Al-Monla. Criminal Action No. 05-40026-FDS. United States District Court; District of Massachusetts. Originally taken from: Al-Hussam. Vol. 1; No. 22. March 5, 1993.

¹⁷⁷ FBI Wiretap Transcript of telephone call from Mohamad Chehade to Sameer [LNU] at 508-799-0906. April 6, 2000; 1856.

¹⁷⁸ Exhibit CI1357. U.S. v. Muhamed Mubayyid, Emadeddin Muntasser, and Samir Al-Monla. Criminal Action No. 05-40026-FDS. United States District Court; District of Massachusetts. Originally taken from: Al-Hussam. Vol 2; No. 3. June 11, 1993.

from Boston,” at least “until we get an opportunity to hand it over to the mujahideen in the field.”¹⁷⁹ When later contacted by the Washington Post, Hakim reportedly admitted to receiving all of his orders and funding for operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina directly from Al-Kifah representatives based in the U.S.¹⁸⁰

In fact, so much activity was taking place specifically at the Care/Al-Kifah office in Boston in support of the jihad in Bosnia-Herzegovina that the Bosnian-Muslim military intelligence service mistakenly believed that the top American Al-Kifah contact for the Arab mujahideen—Abdul Wali Zindani—was actually located in Boston and not



بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ
وَإِنِ اسْتَنْصَرُواكُمْ فِي الدِّينِ فَعَلَيْكُمْ التَّصَرُّ

HUMAN SERVICES OFFICE

HUMANITARNI POSLOVNI URED

اسستھارة كفاية

بیتیم \ ارملة

مركز البوسنة والهرسك - زغرب



مكتب الخدمات
اسمه الشريف عبد الله زان

Brooklyn.¹⁸¹ The reasons for this oversight by the Bosnian army are much clearer in the context of the numerous evidentiary documents provided to me by the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Boston which indicate significant financial transfers, totaling in the hundreds of thousands of dollars, between Care International’s office in Boston and the “Human Services Office” (a.k.a. the Al-Kifah Refugee Center) regional headquarters in Zagreb, Croatia—including Exhibits CICR03899, CICR03623, CICR03624, CICR03626, CICR03627, CICR03630, CICR03631, CICR03634, CICR03635, CICR03641, and CICR03642. With the Al-Kifah Refugee Center office in Brooklyn closed down by the spring of 1993 (only one year into the war in the Balkans), the Boston branch became the de-facto U.S. hub of recruitment and financing activities by Makhtab-e-Khidamat in support of the jihad in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

- **Support for Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (Hezb-e-Islami)**

Care International’s newsletter Al-Hussam featured regular news updates on the jihad in Afghanistan, often marked with a noteworthy bias against certain mujahideen commanders such as Ahmad Shah Massoud, while offering limitless praise for others—namely Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and his Hezb-e-Islami faction. For example, in one edition of the Al-Hussam newsletter issued in February 1995, the Afghanistan news section is populated almost exclusively by positive articles about the ideology and

¹⁷⁹ Letter from “Hassan” at the Al-Kifah Zagreb office to the Al-Kifah Refugee Center, 552 Atlantic Avenue; Brooklyn, NY. Dated July 11, 1993.

¹⁸⁰ Coll, Steve and Steve LeVine. “Global Network Provides Money, Haven.” The Washington Post. August 3, 1993. *Page A1*.

¹⁸¹ “Foreign Donors to ‘El Mudzahidin’ (“Donatori Jedinice ‘El Mudzahidin’”). “Shema Hijerarhijskih Odnosa OpO ‘Vazal.” Memorandum issued by the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina (ARBiH) Military Security Service. November 28, 1995.

achievements of Hekmatyar's Hezb-e-Islami.¹⁸² Only days earlier, a previous edition of Al-Hussam had featured a lengthy first-person report on a meeting near Kabul, Afghanistan at Char Asyab between Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Arab mujahideen representatives:

"After the sunset on Saturday most of the Arab attendees at the conference met in Kabul with the leader Hikmatyar at his headquarters in Char Asyab to strengthen the Jihad and brotherly unity, and to discuss the relevant issues in Afghanistan... [Hekmatyar told us], 'To form an Islamic nation with an Islamic president by elections will be impossible before Jihad under non-Muslim regimes. Whoever chooses this way will be wrong... I think it is better... to stay in jail than to get out being forced to accept dialogue... Dear brothers, the experience is unprecedented for ages, and the enemies know the meaning of an Islamic country after Jihad.'"¹⁸³

I have been provided with evidentiary documents by the U.S. Attorney's Office in Boston which appear to be copies of a letter addressed to Gulbuddin Hekmatyar on behalf of the Al-Kifah Refugee Center office in Boston. The letter makes mention of two previous face-to-face meetings, including one with Saifur Rahman Halimi (previously cited in this report as Hekmatyar's representative in the West) and another that apparently took place in the context of Hekmatyar's aforementioned conference with Arab mujahideen at Char Asyab near Kabul. According to the letter:

"To his presence the virtuous brother and prince, engineer Kalb Al-Deen Hikmatyar, May God protect him... We, those who love you, from the Boston Office write to you asking for your direction for us in matters concerning serving the Jihad for the cause of Allah. As you know we have vowed our support through your deputy, brother Saif Al-Rahman Haleemy, in New York two years ago. And we have renewed this vow to you when I met you in Shihar Siab two months ago. Upon my return it was suggested that we fold under their brigade and join under their banner and subjugating our policies and our educational and financial programs to how you see fit. They told us this is what you would like and want. If this is the case and you wish us to do so then we wish you to write about that at the bottom of this page and we are then God willing to abide by your commands and we are forever in the fold of obedience and military."¹⁸⁴

The U.S. Attorney's Office in Boston has also provided me with an evidentiary document which appears to be the minutes of a meeting that took place on April 23, 1995 between several individuals, who I believe included Emadeddine Muntasser (a.k.a. Abu Abdelrahman), Mohamad Akra (a.k.a. Abu Idris), and Mohammad Chegade (a.k.a. Abu Fayeze). During the meeting, the participants refer to themselves as a "brigade" or

¹⁸² Exhibit C.I. – ELSUR 00259. U.S. v. Muhamed Mubayyid, Emadeddin Muntasser, and Samir Al-Monla. Criminal Action No. 05-40026-FDS. United States District Court; District of Massachusetts. Originally taken from: Al-Hussam. Vol. 3; No. 21. February 10, 1995.

¹⁸³ Exhibit CI1392. U.S. v. Muhamed Mubayyid, Emadeddin Muntasser, and Samir Al-Monla. Criminal Action No. 05-40026-FDS. United States District Court; District of Massachusetts. Originally taken from: Al-Hussam. Vol. 3; No. 20. January 27, 1995.

¹⁸⁴ Exhibits CIF0333 and CI1324. U.S. v. Muhamed Mubayyid, Emadeddin Muntasser, and Samir Al-Monla. Criminal Action No. 05-40026-FDS. United States District Court; District of Massachusetts.

“battalion”, which I interpret as a reference to the overall franchise unit of Makhtab-e-Khidamat operating in the United States. The minutes reflect a heated discussion between these individuals about the need for an overarching commander, or “ameer”, in charge of jihad operations. They also indicate that the “battalion’s position” was that “we see that one of the commanders is closer to truth than any other commander - based on this we see that is dutiful to uphold this truth and are; thereby, not allowed to retire from it or stop.”¹⁸⁵ At one point during the minutes, there is specific discussion as the identity of the “ameer”, or commander, chosen to head the jihadi movement:

“Lebanese: Who is your Ameer [commander]?
Abu Abdulrahman: Idrees hinted [it is] the engineer.”¹⁸⁶

There are several other similar references to the “engineer” being nominated as an appropriate candidate to be the overall “ameer” of the mujahideen. The moniker “the Engineer” is unmistakable pseudonym and a clear reference to Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who often goes by the formal title “Engineer Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.” Attached to these minutes, I have been provided a hand-drawn chart (and translation) which appears to be a visual representation of the relationship between Makhtab-e-Khidamat franchises and representatives based in the U.S. with the “Ameer” or commander of the “Battalion.”¹⁸⁷ Based upon the above documentation, I believe it is likely that this chart is attempting to depict how the Makhtab-e-Khidamat would function as part of an organized, hierarchical international jihadi network headed by, presumably, “Engineer” Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. In this sense, Hekmatyar would be playing a remarkably similar role to that of Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar on behalf of Usama Bin Laden in present day Afghanistan.

Interestingly, the minutes of the April 1995 meeting make mention of a “fundamental disagreement with Bin Laden” that has evidently caused them to prefer Hekmatyar as their choice for the overall leader of the mujahideen. The minutes seem to suggest that the disagreement is between Bin Laden and other Arab mujahideen fighters, rather than directly with the Makhtab-e-Khidamat. This appears to be a reference to a long-term strategic dispute that arose between Bin Laden and Abdullah Azzam—one that may have cost the latter his life. Bin Laden was interested in centralization, regimentation, and utmost secrecy. Using the Afghan war as a cover, he wanted to segregate all the foreign jihadi recruits together and train them as one body—preparing them as a mobile international Islamist blitzkrieg unit, trained to seize power quickly and violently. Azzam was more of a practicalist; by contrast, he was more concerned with forging long-term bonds with Afghani Islamist allies in hopes of establishing a future Islamic state there and consolidating mujahideen power. With Afghanistan as the “solid foundation,” Azzam hoped to then later use a unified Muslim army—comprised of Arab

¹⁸⁵ Exhibits CI1313 - CI1337. U.S. v. Muhamed Mubayyid, Emadeddin Muntasser, and Samir Al-Monla. Criminal Action No. 05-40026-FDS. United States District Court; District of Massachusetts.

¹⁸⁶ Exhibits CI1313 - CI1337. U.S. v. Muhamed Mubayyid, Emadeddin Muntasser, and Samir Al-Monla. Criminal Action No. 05-40026-FDS. United States District Court; District of Massachusetts.

¹⁸⁷ Exhibit CI1347. U.S. v. Muhamed Mubayyid, Emadeddin Muntasser, and Samir Al-Monla. Criminal Action No. 05-40026-FDS. United States District Court; District of Massachusetts.

and Afghan alike—to “liberate” the entire Islamic world. Azzam’s lieutenant Shaykh Tamim al-Adnani later attempted to explain the uneasy schism: “It was as if [Bin Laden] wanted to profit from the jihad rather than the jihad profiting from us, whereas we wanted the jihad to benefit from us rather than us benefiting from the jihad. The conceptual difference is a very minor one since it was jihad in either case.”¹⁸⁸

Nonetheless, given the political conditions in 1995 and Bin Laden’s uncertain future existence in Sudan, Hekmatyar—who held great sway and territorial control inside Afghanistan—was quite evidently a more attractive mujahideen ally than Bin Laden. The minutes record conference participants commenting, “one of the leaders is closer to the truth, and tells that must help and support and we cannot retire or stop.... The engineer [Hekmatyar] for Muslims not [just] the Afghans and he supports all Jihad matters.”¹⁸⁹

- **Support for the Armed Islamic Group (GIA)**

When the Algerian government cancelled national elections in 1992 to prevent a victory by the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), several militant factions took up arms against the government and its security forces. Despite this, only one of these groups was ever favorably profiled in jihadi news reports printed in Care International’s official newsletter *Al-Hussam*: the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), a.k.a. *Al-Jamaa al-Islamiyya al-Musallah*. The GIA also happened to be arguably the most extreme of the anti-regime mujahideen factions, and the one with the closest ties to the Arab mujahideen fighting in Afghanistan. In December 1994, *Al-Hussam* editors printed an article declaring their relief upon hearing the news that more moderate Islamist fighters had “come around” and agreed to merge their forces with the GIA, giving jihadi extremists “what Allah has wanted us to hear. The Mujahideen have done what they promised... After heavy communications and advice, the Phalanges of the Muslim Military finally joined the armed Jama’a Islamiya. Now, with courage and dependence on Allah, they are united in Jihad.”¹⁹⁰

In February 1996, Care International’s *Al-Hussam* newsletter printed an Arabic-language GIA communiqué taken from its official magazine, *Usraat al-Ansaar*. The communiqué gloated about the “big catastrophe that Islam could create if it reaches the government” in Algeria, but lamenting how the West “controls” the Muslim world “through democracy”:

“So if the [democratically-elected Islamic Salvation] Front rules today, if it rejects the results of democracy and diversity, tomorrow the West could militarily come in and remove it from authority. That is why the Jama’a Islamiyya [the GIA] is a threat to them

¹⁸⁸ Muhammad, Basil. *Al-Ansaru l’Arab fi Afghanistan*. The Committee for Islamic Benevolence Publications; ©1991. Page 201.

¹⁸⁹ Exhibit CI1347. *U.S. v. Muhamed Mubayyid, Emadeddin Muntasser, and Samir Al-Monla*. Criminal Action No. 05-40026-FDS. United States District Court; District of Massachusetts.

¹⁹⁰ Exhibit CI1378. *U.S. v. Muhamed Mubayyid, Emadeddin Muntasser, and Samir Al-Monla*. Criminal Action No. 05-40026-FDS. United States District Court; District of Massachusetts. Originally taken from: *Al-Hussam*. Vol. 3; No. 18. December 30, 1994.

[the West] today because they cannot control it... America did not define its stand toward Algeria because it is still studying the situation. It is trying to enter the arena in a smart contorted way to pressure and affect Jihad. This will not happen because Allah promised to give victory to His religion today and tomorrow, thanks be to Allah... Jihad is a principle which threatens the enemies of Allah, the tyrants, the apostates, the polytheists, and this principle needs to be spread.”¹⁹¹

I have never seen, nor have I been provided, with any evidentiary documents or copies of Al-Hussam that would indicate that Care International ever renounced its tacit endorsement of the GIA, even after the latter group accepted responsibility for kidnapping, torturing, and killing innocent Muslim civilians.

- **Support for the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG)**

As with the GIA in Algeria, the “Jihad News” section of Care International’s newsletter Al-Hussam was limited to reports from only one militant faction: the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG). The LIFG used its relationship with Al-Hussam to help spread word of assassination attempts on Libyan government officials and to deny any supposed relationship with Western intelligence agencies. In October 1995, Al-Hussam featured a lengthy, exclusive front-page interview with Shaykh Abul-Mundhir As-Saidi, the spiritual leader of the LIFG who first joined the jihad in Afghanistan in 1988.¹⁹² A decade later, in 1998, al-Saidi returned to Afghanistan and established various educational and charitable enterprises on behalf of the ruling Taliban movement. In appreciation for al-Saidi’s efforts, Taliban supreme commander Mullah Mohammed Umar reportedly bestowed upon him the title of “the Shaykh of the Arabs in Afghanistan.”¹⁹³ Al-Saidi was reputed for delivering stern speeches to Arab fighters training in Afghanistan, admonishing them to strictly follow the laws of the Taliban as long as they remained in the country.¹⁹⁴ When asked during his 1995 interview “what are your words to the publishers and respected readers of Al-Hussam”, he replied, “I say to the Al-Hussam team: May Allah reward you well for providing this great opportunity. I pray to Allah for your success, and ability to exert even more effort in propagation through the media, for the service of this religion, for establishing the truth and dispelling falsehood.”¹⁹⁵

¹⁹¹ Exhibit CI1105. U.S. v. Muhamed Mubayyid, Emadeddin Muntasser, and Samir Al-Monla. Criminal Action No. 05-40026-FDS. United States District Court; District of Massachusetts. Originally taken from: Al-Hussam. Vol. 4; No. 18. February 16, 1996.

¹⁹² Exhibit CICR 07913. U.S. v. Muhamed Mubayyid, Emadeddin Muntasser, and Samir Al-Monla. Criminal Action No. 05-40026-FDS. United States District Court; District of Massachusetts. Originally taken from: Al-Hussam. Vol. 4; No. 14. October 13, 1995.

¹⁹³ “The Shaykh of the Arabs in Afghanistan Al-Saadi who was handed over to Libya by the Americans.” Al Hayat (London). February 16, 2005.

¹⁹⁴ “The Shaykh of the Arabs in Afghanistan Al-Saadi who was handed over to Libya by the Americans.” Al Hayat (London). February 16, 2005.

¹⁹⁵ Exhibit CICR 07917. U.S. v. Muhamed Mubayyid, Emadeddin Muntasser, and Samir Al-Monla. Criminal Action No. 05-40026-FDS. United States District Court; District of Massachusetts. Originally taken from: Al-Hussam. Vol. 4; No. 14. October 13, 1995.

- **Support for Chechen Mujahideen / Shamil Basayev**

Care International's Al-Hussam newsletter was one of the first such publications to print firsthand reports from mujahideen representatives fighting the Russian military in the Caucasus, particularly Chechnya. Al-Hussam was also one of the first sources to authoritatively document the presence and "martyrdom" of Arab mujahideen fighters during battle in Chechnya. Once again, Al-Hussam was careful about who among the native Chechen resistance it would give endorsements to, favoring those who expressed a fervent commitment to fundamentalist Sunni Islam. One of Al-Hussam's favorite subjects of study in Chechnya was notorious Islamist warlord Shamil Basayev, who has openly conceded his involvement in such terrorist acts as the 2003 Moscow theater siege and the botched Beslan school hostage-taking massacre. There seems little doubt that the editors of Al-Hussam understood exactly what Shamil Basayev's mission and method were; in June 1995, they printed a highly positive article endorsing Basayev's terrorist takeover of a civilian hospital in Budyonovsk, seventy miles inside Russian territory. At least 105 civilians in Budyonovsk were killed during the incident, including 18 women, and nearly 400 hostages were wounded. Nonetheless, Al-Hussam celebrated Basayev as an unqualified hero and endorsed his strategy of "fighting evil with evil":

"Minute by minute the whole world watched with agony, as some of the Mujahideen (not exceeding 80), under the leadership of Mujahid Shamil Basyev took 1500 Russians, demanding that the Russian government stop its operations against the unarmed Muslim Chechnyan population... The prince of the group Basayev refused a Russian offer for a sum of money and private plane which would take them to any place on earth. Those who have sold this world and bought the other refuse such cheap offers because they are waiting for the more precious one-Paradise. The aim of this operation was to reach Moscow and take control of the Russian Parliament, but the Mujahideen did not have enough money to get them to Moscow... The Chechnya Mujahideen from suicide brigades performed suicide attacks against the Russian Forces... We cannot depend on anybody's help; we have to fight evil with evil. The operation of the Mujahid Shamil Basayev is perfect proof."¹⁹⁶

PART VI: The Global Relief Foundation (GRF)

On December 14, 2001, the Department of Treasury froze the assets of Global Relief Foundation ("GRF") as a result of their financial support of Al-Qaida.¹⁹⁷ On October 18, 2002, the U.S. Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control

¹⁹⁶ Exhibit CI1516. *U.S. v. Muhamed Mubayyid, Emadeddin Muntasser, and Samir Al-Monla*. Criminal Action No. 05-40026-FDS. United States District Court; District of Massachusetts. Originally taken from: *Al-Hussam*. Vol. 4; No. 7. June 30, 1995.

¹⁹⁷ U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control. Executive Order 13224 blocking Terrorist Property and a summary of the Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, Terrorism List Governments Sanctions Regulations, and Foreign Terrorist Organizations Sanctions Regulations. February 26, 2003.

(OFAC) listed GRF as a “Specially Designated Global Terrorist.”¹⁹⁸ According to the Treasury Department, “Global Relief Foundation, has connections to, has provided support for, and has provided assistance to Usama Bin Ladin, the al Qaida Network, and other known terrorist groups.”¹⁹⁹ According to the Treasury Department, high-ranking al Qaeda financier Mohammed Zouaydi, who was arrested in April 2002 in Spain, had given more than \$200,000 to GRF.²⁰⁰ The Treasury Department further reported that a GRF pamphlet produced in 1995 and recovered by the U.S. government explained that, “God equated martyrdom through JIHAD with supplying funds for the JIHAD effort. All contributions should be mailed to: GRF.”²⁰¹ Another GRF newsletter reportedly requested donations “for God’s cause – they [the Zakat funds] are disbursed for equipping the raiders, for the purchase of ammunition and food, and for their [the Mujahideen’s] transportation so that they can raise God the Almighty’s word . . . it is likely that the most important of disbursement of Zakat in our times is on the jihad for God’s cause...”²⁰² The Treasury Department further disclosed that, “Rabih Haddad, a senior GRF official who co-founded GRF and served as its president throughout the 1990s and in the year 2000, worked for Makhtab al-Khidamat (MAK) in Pakistan in the early 1990s.”²⁰³ Through the course of my research, I have known of a particularly close relationship between GRF and its corporate officers with Makhtab-e-Khidamat al-Mujahideen in Pakistan.

I have independently reviewed an original copy of an Arabic-language newsletter known as “Al-Thilal” that was produced by GRF and distributed in the U.S. in January 1996. The flyer advertised that, despite the end of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, mujahideen recruits were still needed to create “a nightmare for the American troops in Bosnia” and argued that their continued presence was absolutely necessary to enable local Bosnians “to stay true to their Islamic values and open their mind to Jihad and the love of martyrdom for Allah.” Moreover, according to the flyer, “[t]he mujahideen have a school which trains hundreds of mujahideen every month... those fighters win all their battles because of their love of martyrdom for Allah.”²⁰⁴

The U.S. Attorney’s Office in Boston has provided me with numerous evidentiary documents that, taken as a whole, indicate a close relationship between Care International and the Global Relief Foundation (GRF) based primarily upon their mutual association

¹⁹⁸ U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control. Executive Order 13224 blocking Terrorist Property and a summary of the Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, Terrorism List Governments Sanctions Regulations, and Foreign Terrorist Organizations Sanctions Regulations. February 26, 2003.

¹⁹⁹ “Treasury Department Statement Regarding the Designation of the Global Relief Foundation.” United States Treasury Department Office Of Public Affairs. October 18, 2002.

²⁰⁰ “Treasury Department Statement Regarding the Designation of the Global Relief Foundation.” United States Treasury Department Office Of Public Affairs. October 18, 2002.

²⁰¹ “Treasury Department Statement Regarding the Designation of the Global Relief Foundation.” United States Treasury Department Office Of Public Affairs. October 18, 2002.

²⁰² “Treasury Department Statement Regarding the Designation of the Global Relief Foundation.” United States Treasury Department Office Of Public Affairs. October 18, 2002.

²⁰³ “Treasury Department Statement Regarding the Designation of the Global Relief Foundation.” United States Treasury Department Office Of Public Affairs. October 18, 2002.

²⁰⁴ *Al-Thilal*. Published by the Central Information News Agency Network and the Global Relief Foundation. January 1996.

with Makhtab-e-Khidamat. These documents include the transcripts of wiretaps involving conversations between representatives of Care International and GRF, financial documents, and—perhaps none more explicitly—the minutes of an April 1995 sit-down conference involving corporate officers from both groups, which aimed to “specify the general provisions, draw various policies for the activity in America and Canada, in accordance with the directions and recommendations of” the leadership of the “Battalion.”²⁰⁵ At least some of those in attendance were in favor of GRF and Care merging their operations: “There is no need for us to stay separate... I met with Imad [Muntasser] and Mohammad [Chehade] and found acceptance. We pray the Lord may unite us and remove hatred from within us.” An individual under the name “Abu Abdulrahman” (presumably Emadeddine Muntasser) responded, “After the latest developments - we sought a meeting with the brothers - how to [establish] the relationship and coordinating with the battalion - some brothers are nervous in Boston. There can be more coordination among us if we agree on some of the issues - Afghanistan has priority.”²⁰⁶ Several Care International officers appear to have “defended independence”, expressing a “fear” of merging with GRF and being swallowed in the morass of an admittedly larger organization: “we will loose more... control.”²⁰⁷ Other participants pushed hard for a compromise to avoid the “severely short sighted” outcome of having two competing Makhtab-e-Khidamat franchises trying to sustain themselves on the same small piece of local turf: “Boston cannot accommodate two jobs i.e. CARE and GRF.”²⁰⁸

PART VII: The American Islamic Group / The Islam Report Newsletter

In 1993, two individuals from southern California, Mohammad Zaki and Kifah Jarryousi, established a haven of radical Muslim fundamentalist thought in Southern California. Their extremist ideals were channeled into the creation of three closely-linked entities: the American Islamic Group (AIG), American World-Wide Relief (AWW), and the Islamic Information Center of the Americas. Essentially, the three groups played separate but integral roles in a critical terrorist recruitment and support center for disciples of Usama bin Laden. AIG served as the political front, issuing regular communiqués and news reports. AWW (formerly known as “Save Bosnia Now”) was the charitable arm, providing substantial financial support to Al-Qaida-affiliated terrorist groups in Algeria, Bosnia, Chechnya, and elsewhere. By networking with other extremists across North America and Europe, the AIG was able to expand its reach to the east coast of the United States (through Florida resident Adham Hassoun) and eventually to continents around the world. Evidence provided to me in the present case would tend

²⁰⁵ Exhibit CI1347. U.S. v. Muhamed Mubayyid, Emadeddin Muntasser, and Samir Al-Monla. Criminal Action No. 05-40026-FDS. United States District Court; District of Massachusetts.

²⁰⁶ Exhibits CI1313 - CI1337. U.S. v. Muhamed Mubayyid, Emadeddin Muntasser, and Samir Al-Monla. Criminal Action No. 05-40026-FDS. United States District Court; District of Massachusetts.

²⁰⁷ Exhibits CI1313 - CI1337. U.S. v. Muhamed Mubayyid, Emadeddin Muntasser, and Samir Al-Monla. Criminal Action No. 05-40026-FDS. United States District Court; District of Massachusetts.

²⁰⁸ Exhibit CI1347. U.S. v. Muhamed Mubayyid, Emadeddin Muntasser, and Samir Al-Monla. Criminal Action No. 05-40026-FDS. United States District Court; District of Massachusetts.

to indicate that Care International and the American Islamic Group were essentially franchise sub-units (along with the Global Relief Foundation) within a shared larger international organization: Makhtab-e-Khidamat al-Mujahideen.

Following the violent death of Mohammed Zaki in 1995 while fighting alongside the mujahideen in Chechnya, the responsibility of managing AIG was primarily assumed by Kifah Jayyousi. Jayyousi, a Palestinian-American engineer, authored the organization's press releases, including their infamous "Islam Reports." In February 1994, Jayyousi published an open e-mail concerning the details of a planned resurgent Muslim empire. He explained, "I am a Muslim citizen of the great upcoming Islamic State." Jayyousi referred to those opposed to this new Islamic state as "bloodsuckers... who are enslaving Muslims in Asia and Africa and around the World, they are the ones who are fueling the war using their agents." He urged other Muslims to "be an achiever and help form it... Help rid the land of [the infidels] and [the hypocrites]." More specifically, Jayyousi wrote, "as to [Egyptian President Hosni] Mubarak, may Allah curse him, his departure or assassination, [God willing], will be a major Fath or victory to strengthen Islam." Moreover, although Egypt and other secular Middle Eastern regimes were deemed to be troublesome adversaries by Jayyousi, he made a point to "reiterate that the west is Islam's enemy No.1." When Jayyousi's e-mail was met with criticism and ridicule from other subscribers to the message forum, Jayyousi angrily replied, "I will take your advise[sic] and not waste my time with people who are followers of [secular Pakistani leaders]. See You in Peshawar." Peshawar is, of course, the infamous Pakistani town that has served as the gateway to jihad in Afghanistan for thousands of international mujahideen recruits.²⁰⁹

Like Care International's sister publication Al-Hussam, the official newsletter of the AIG—the so-called "Islam Report"—was arguably one of the most radical English-language jihadist propaganda publications in recent history, with impeccable sources and credentials. The April/May 1994 print edition of AIG's "Islam Report" featured a particularly noteworthy endorsement from "Mujahideen Camps in Kabul, Afghanistan": "Islam Report is a powerful voice of truth, please send it regularly, our brothers read every word of it as it keeps us informed."²¹⁰ On many of the Islam Reports between 1994 and 1995, while legally disclaiming connections to any actual guerilla outfits, Kifah Jayyousi wrote that, nevertheless, "we would be proud to identify with GIA and other mujahideen."²¹¹

- AIG published numerous English translations of communiqués through the "Islam Report" originally authored by "Abu Al-Ma`ali," the Algerian leader of the foreign mujahideen brigade fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina.²¹²

²⁰⁹ Imran Anwar (imran@panix.com). "Attacks on Pakistanis & B. Bhutto Fwd: Re: Islam Report (News & Analysis)." Newsgroups: soc.culture.pakistan. February 11, 1994.

²¹⁰ "Editorials." *Islam Report*. Vol 1; Issue 7. April/May 1994. American Islamic Group (AIG). Page 2.

²¹¹ American Islamic Group (islam@powergrid.electricti.com). "Islam Report (Air France Real Story Part II)." Newsgroups: soc.religion.islam. January 2, 1995.

²¹² American Islamic Group (islam@powergrid.electricti.com). "Islam Report(Jihad in Europe! Now A Muslim Brigade!)" Newsgroups: alt.current-events.bosnia. September 23, 1995.

- Using the “Islam Report”, the AIG has led a tireless campaign to free convicted terrorist mastermind Shaykh Omar Abdel Rahman. Rahman, spiritual leader of Al-Gama’at al-Islamiyya and the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (both Al-Qaida subgroups), is currently serving a prison sentence in the U.S. for his central role in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing conspiracy. However, according to Jayyousi, the trial of Rahman was “The Greatest Conspiracy Against Islam.”²¹³ Jayyousi explained to readers that the trial was part of a larger “US-Egyptian regime plot to silence Islamic opposition to the oppressive regime of Hosni Mubarak.”²¹⁴ AIG issued numerous fundraising appeals purportedly to help pay the legal expenses of Rahman, with an ultimate goal of raising over \$300,000.
- AIG issued a flurry of special-edition “Islam Reports” to republish GIA communiqués concerning the December 1994 hijacking of an Air France commercial airliner by a GIA suicide team. In May 1996, AIG published another violent dispatch from the “Ameer”, or commander, of the GIA, Abu Abdel Rahman Ameen, on the subject of seven French Catholic monks who were abducted by the mujahideen.²¹⁵ In July 1996, AIG posted an Islam Report celebrating the following inflammatory excerpts from Issue No. 35 of the GIA newsletter Al-Qital:

“Mujahideen never felt a day of truce with those apostates who sold out their religion and waged war (on Islam) with everything at their hands... It is a cry repeated today by every Mujahid youth of GIA, he repeats it with courage and steadfastness and do not fear anyone of the apostates nor do they fear the cowardice of the sick-hearted people away from the straight path [of Islam], it is the cry of No Truce, No Reconciliation and No Dialogue... Repeat it, my brother, while you are in your trench awaiting the soldiers of the apostates despite their hate... Repeat it while on your way in a raid over the Muftadi’a despite the hate of the hypocrites and rumor spreaders. Repeat it while you are beheading France.”²¹⁶

The U.S. Attorney’s Office in Boston has provided me with countless evidentiary documents containing references to the American Islamic Group, the Islam Report, American World-Wide Relief, Save Bosnia Now, Kifah Jayyousi, Adham Hassoun, and Mohammed Zaky (a.k.a. “Abu Omar al-Masri”)—including as many as thirty separate wiretap transcripts of telephone correspondences between either Jayyousi or Hassoun and corporate officers of Care International that took place in a period of only two years from 1996 to 1998. These wiretaps, in combination with other documents, show Jayyousi and Hassoun using their various organizations to work hand-in-hand with Care International

²¹³ American Islamic Group (islam@Powergrid.electriciti.com). “Islam Report (Just In! \$800 Million spent to destroy Islam).” Newsgroups: Koleksi Diskusi Isnet (<http://www.isnet.com>). December 8, 1994.

²¹⁴ American Islamic Group (islam@powergrid.electriciti.com). “Islam Report(US Trial of Islam Service to La Mubarak).” Newsgroups: soc.religion.islam. February 1, 1995.

²¹⁵ American Islamic Group (islam@powergrid.electriciti.com). “ISLAM REPORT(EMERGENCY! ALGERIA JIHAD COMMUNIQUES!)” Newsgroups: soc.religion.islam. May 25, 1996.

²¹⁶ Syed Yusuf (yusuf921@harrier.csr.uidaho.edu). “Islam Report (Algeria Jihad! No Truce!)” Newsgroups: alt.religion.islam. July 18, 1996.

in Boston in hopes of pooling their joint efforts and resources for Makhtab-e-Khidamat. This included identifying Adham Hassoun in fundraising literature as the preferred direct postal recipient of certain donations collected under the name of Care International.²¹⁷

Conversely, documents seized by the Federal Bureau of Investigation show at least a handful of personal visits by Kifah Jayyousi to the Boston area between 1996 and 1998 that were carefully coordinated and arranged by Care International and its officers.²¹⁸ One such document purports to be a letter from Samir al-Monla (a.k.a. Abu Waleed): “I would like to ask for your participation and assistance to help our brother KIFAH JAYYOUSI brings to your Masjid the latest video tape from CHECHNYA showing how Groznyy was recaptured by Muslims and how the CHECHENS are struggling to implement the Islamic rule in their land by help of Allah (S.W.T). It will be a fund raising event. For the Donations we have our direct contact to CHECHNYA.”²¹⁹

Care International and its staff were particularly cooperate in spreading word of the “martyrdom” of the founder of the American Islamic Group, Mohammed Zaky, while fighting alongside the mujahideen in Chechnya. Jayyousi was warmly welcomed to the Boston area in order to bring the news to local Muslims. Organizers were told to arrange the following in honor of Zaky: “Please write an introduction about the following -- CARE International offers you its thanks for welcoming him since he went to relay to you the Muslims news in Chechnya. We ask you to distribute the donation cards when the Sheikh finishes collecting donations. At the end pray for their success. Note: A short memoir is to be printed (Brother Kifah Jayyousi).”²²⁰ A fundraising flyer advertising one of these events and provided to me by the U.S. Attorney’s Office states unequivocally: “It is our duty support the family of brother Mohamed Zaki. The Messenger of Allah said, ‘Who ever look after the family of a Mujahid will get half his reward.’”²²¹

Similarly, Care International’s Al-Hussam newsletter was also used to broadcast the message of Mohammed Zaky’s sacrifice and to raise money in order to support his family. An Arabic-language article featured by Al-Hussam in June 1995 narrated:

“He had been in Chechnya for one month, on the front lines fighting the Russians when his appointment with martyrdom came to. He was participating in a religious lesson when a shell landed in the center of the meeting. Allah (swt) chose only him from among the Mujahideen, for he was hit by several pieces of shrapnel and fell unconscious. He regained consciousness after receiving first aid treatment; he raised his hand to the sky and said to those around him: I saw the hoor alain, and they told me I would follow them. Following this, Abu Umar fell asleep under the influence of the sedative given him...

²¹⁷ Exhibit CICR08010. U.S. v. Muhamed Mubayyid, Emadeddin Muntasser, and Samir Al-Monla. Criminal Action No. 05-40026-FDS. United States District Court; District of Massachusetts.

²¹⁸ Exhibit CICR 07218. U.S. v. Muhamed Mubayyid, Emadeddin Muntasser, and Samir Al-Monla. Criminal Action No. 05-40026-FDS. United States District Court; District of Massachusetts.

²¹⁹ Exhibit CICR08010. U.S. v. Muhamed Mubayyid, Emadeddin Muntasser, and Samir Al-Monla. Criminal Action No. 05-40026-FDS. United States District Court; District of Massachusetts.

²²⁰ Exhibit CICR 07219. U.S. v. Muhamed Mubayyid, Emadeddin Muntasser, and Samir Al-Monla. Criminal Action No. 05-40026-FDS. United States District Court; District of Massachusetts.

²²¹ Exhibit CICR08010. U.S. v. Muhamed Mubayyid, Emadeddin Muntasser, and Samir Al-Monla. Criminal Action No. 05-40026-FDS. United States District Court; District of Massachusetts.

Brother Abu Umar was one of the best Mujahideen; he began his odyssey in Afghanistan, and continued on this path in Bosnia, and ended on this path in Chechnya.”²²²

Days later, Zaky was the subject of a matching front page, English-language eulogy carried by Al-Hussam titled, “Abu Umar... A Martyr in Chechnya.”²²³

PART VIII: Shaykh Abdullah Azzam’s “Join the Caravan”

If Makhtab-e-Khidamat founder Shaykh Abdullah Azzam can rightfully be considered as the godfather of modern jihad, then no single written work of his has been more influential in that respect than his landmark book “Join the Caravan.” The title itself refers to the “Caravan of Martyrs” (“Qawafil ash-Shuhadaa”) who have given their blood as “martyrs” in the military service for Islam. A foreword written by the publisher of the second English-language edition of the book explained:

“Join the Caravan is a translation of the book *Ilhaq bil-Qaafilah* written by Shaheed Sheikh Abdullah Azzam in April 1987 at the peak of the Afghan Jihad. This book was one of the principal inspirations for thousands of Muslims from all over the World to go and fight in Afghanistan to defend Muslim blood, property, and honour... Due to popular demand and the book being sold out, we decided to publish a Second English Edition. Although a part of the book focuses on Afghanistan, most of it is applicable to Jihad in general.”²²⁴

In his book, Azzam declares that “Jihad today is individually obligatory... by self and wealth, on every Muslim... Allah has not excused anybody to abandon Jihad other than the ill, the cripple, and the blind, as well as children who have not yet reached puberty, women who have no way of emigrating and performing Jihad and those advanced in years... Anybody else has no excuse before Allah, whether he is a professional, a specialist, an employer, or a great businessman. None of these is excused from performing Jihad personally or permitted to merely contribute materially.”²²⁵ Azzam continues on in *Join the Caravan* by celebrating the “faithful youth,” whose “hearts are burning with a fire, spurting forth enthusiasm, and blazing with zeal that their pure blood may irrigate the earth of the Muslims.”²²⁶ In other words, according to Dr. Azzam, the only Muslims who will be ultimately redeemed by Allah are those who sacrifice their lives in the greater “cause of Islam.”

²²² Exhibit CI1178. *U.S. v. Muhamed Mubayyid, Emadeddin Muntasser, and Samir Al-Monla*. Criminal Action No. 05-40026-FDS. United States District Court; District of Massachusetts. Originally taken from: *Al-Hussam*. Vol 4; No. 5. June 2, 1995.

²²³ Exhibit CI1161. *U.S. v. Muhamed Mubayyid, Emadeddin Muntasser, and Samir Al-Monla*. Criminal Action No. 05-40026-FDS. United States District Court; District of Massachusetts. Originally taken from: *Al-Hussam*. Vol. 4; No. 6. June 16, 1995.

²²⁴ “Publishers Foreword.” *Join the Caravan: Second English Edition*. Azzam Publications. BCM UHUD. London WC1N 3XX, U.K. August 2001. Page 5.

²²⁵ Exhibit CICR08091. *U.S. v. Muhamed Mubayyid, Emadeddin Muntasser, and Samir Al-Monla*. Criminal Action No. 05-40026-FDS. United States District Court; District of Massachusetts.

²²⁶ Exhibit CICR08091. *U.S. v. Muhamed Mubayyid, Emadeddin Muntasser, and Samir Al-Monla*. Criminal Action No. 05-40026-FDS. United States District Court; District of Massachusetts.

The U.S. Attorney's Office in Boston has provided me with an English-language copy of "Join the Caravan" which appears to have been published and printed by Care International.²²⁷ I recognize the individual listed as responsible for translating the document—Abu Shaheed—from other English translations of Abdullah Azzam material posted on the former Internet website of Care International. During his foreword, Abu Shaheed echoes the notion that though "the book focuses on the Afghan jihad... most of what is mentioned is applicable to jihad in general."²²⁸

ALFEEA FOUNDATION

²²⁷ Exhibit CICR08091. U.S. v. Muhamed Mubayyid, Emadeddin Muntasser, and Samir Al-Monla. Criminal Action No. 05-40026-FDS. United States District Court; District of Massachusetts.

²²⁸ Exhibit CICR08091. U.S. v. Muhamed Mubayyid, Emadeddin Muntasser, and Samir Al-Monla. Criminal Action No. 05-40026-FDS. United States District Court; District of Massachusetts.