British Policy and Influence on Trends in International Terrorism
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SUMMARY

This paper outlines a mesh of policy solutions to counteract the lifecycle of recruitment to terrorism that is creating an increased risk of attack in Britain.

The findings of this paper are presented in the Summary and the Analysis provides a more detailed discussion. The findings demonstrate that wider factors, beyond those identified in studies to date, may be driving the rate of self-recruitment. If substantiated by objective data, policies will require a much broader reach into the communications space to reduce the rate of self-recruitment. It will also be essential to consider new operational approaches to managing national strategies in pre-emptive operations against terrorists' plans to create mass casualties and attacks on critical infrastructure. A national strategic operations centre is recommended as an effective solution for police and security organisations faced with a flashover in recruited numbers of terrorists and issues of human rights requiring speed of investigation. A key component of services delivered by a national operations centre or encouraged in the private sector could be public and private sector real-time programmes within the internet that can measurably reduce the level of influence of international terror recruitment of young persons to be suicide bombers, fighters or support members for terrorist networks.

If any country has an assumption in policy that there is immunity or resistance to self-recruitment to terrorism it may well be that the phenomenon of internet recruitment has not yet been identified. In Britain the flashover of recruitment has become evident because the numbers have grown to the level where the numbers of inter-connections are multiple between networks and this has created a sustained momentum. Countries that consider networks do not exist in volume or that there is a cultural 'resistance' may still be in an 'under the radar' phase where there has not been the flashover momentum that has been identified in Britain. This means that the self-recruitment will be present but not yet obvious in numbers of connections and communications being made between persons. A characteristic that has identified the hidden problem of self recruitment is the small geographical scale of Britain and an effective national security operation which means the geographical connectedness and communications connections have been identified. The pattern in Britain may well reflect patterns that will be identified in countries in Europe and elsewhere over the next few years.

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The thesis of this paper is that recruitment into terror networks commences with self - recruitment which may be predominantly through self-driven searches of the internet for information. All young persons are exposed to these communications and some are more susceptible than others to the multiple images and messages that lead to a terrorist career choice.

Communities of Interest that are randomly generated are thereby sustainable and these virtual communities in chat rooms and other highly popular interactive sites may be responsible for significant growth in membership throughout the world. Processes independent of any terrorist cause are creating millions of start points around the world for seeking stimulus and information from the net, so the growth of a dynamic communications space is a variable independent of terrorism and one which may by sheer volume limit the capacity of governments to intervene in recruitment.

Internationally the effects of coordinated and random terror media operations by Al Qaeda and followers has led to national victim guilt which has interfered with the focus of our analysis. The equivalent to a national level of 'Stockholm Syndrome' is creating an energy to blame national foreign policies and cultures for stimulating others to make suicide bombing and other attacks. This needs to be unravelled and substituted with a clear analysis of the impacts of global communications on the perceptions of populations. Taking a strategic perspective it may be hypothesised that global communications have opened great levels of general uncertainty in some cultures and the terror messages have created a level of uncertainty about future attacks.

In reality as the trend to faster, real time communications continues populations may be shifting to attachment to global information but the innate geographical attachment of nationals within any country may or may not lead to national brands becoming important and competing more successfully with global brands. The phenomenon of 'attachment' can be measured in the commercial sector, away from terrorism and may be a useful indicator for strategic communications programmes to promote attachment of individuals to national goals, nationally valued careers and to national security. This suggests that the private sector may partner with governments in any country to enter into and balance the communications space that is influencing persons within the country to become attached to terrorist driven career options and strategic goals to overcome national governments.

It is proposed that a mesh of policies could be developed to:

i. Create dynamic real-time contextual information and balance self-recruitment by entering the communications space - using many different platforms in the public and private sectors to reduce the growth of recruitment into terrorist networks;

ii. Assess the feasibility of a National Strategic Operations Control Centre as a one stop location for international and national coordination of counter-terrorist actions in support of all local activities

iii.   Consult internationally on the possible qualification to certain Human Rights to cover a Duty of the State to protect against the catastrophic risk of mass casualty attacks.

Terrorist Lifecycle

The lifecycle of terrorism in Britain has been assessed through an international perspective to identify strengths and gaps in policy making. Policies need to be designed for the 'communications space' to defeat under-the-radar influences from terror networks. Effective policies will target the total population and vulnerable points in the lifecycle of terrorist recruitment and operations for intervention in recruitment would be identified by objective data on communications influences on young persons aged 8-25 years. The non-linear effects of communications impacts on age groups may become evident through his research. This is most significant if the influence on terror recruitment coincides with the age at which young persons are separating out from influence of parents and the parental community reference group and they are becoming open to influences independently gathered from the internet and peer group contacts.[2]

Communications Space

It is proposed that the growth of recruitment into terror networks may be slowed down by intervention within the communications[3] space. This includes websites and chat room facilities where the speed of self-recruitment is currently under-the-radar of the authorities. An under-the-radar communications space would remain untouched by the more static community programmes that use local individuals and local incentives to modify terror recruitment. Community based influences will be important but there is a decreasing level of return when the efforts are being made on young persons already committed through a virtual world of information.

It is recommended that policies that could give some context to terrorist influences on the internet should be based on the use of objective data from persons aged 8-25 years and focus group testing. Fast growth in self-recruitment into terrorist career paths can be assessed as a function of age and susceptibility to repeated visual and verbal reinforcements. There is also an independent variable of the super fast growth of multiple frequent communications pathways in the communications space. It is foreseeable that this independent variable will limit the degree to which policy will succeed in pre-

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[2] Studies in the professional socialisation of persons entering university courses have demonstrated in the past that the values of the family are replaced by peer group influences during the time spent at university and for a couple of years afterwards and following this broadening and 'liberalisation' the person tends to revert to family values. This suggests there is a lifecycle in influences in an individual's experience. There may be key ages at which influence is more likely to successfully convert the young person to influences away from the stability of the family and the community but confirmation of this dynamic interaction between internet images and information and identification with a terrorist career needs to be established by objective data gathering across the population.

[3] The communications domain is a fourth dimension that covers all means of interpersonal communication. The formal structures include the internet and texts, telephone, and interpersonal communications in the family, neighbourhood, workplace, leisure or travel space.

empting and balancing terror recruitment messages because the sheer volume of repeated messages may overcome a contextual message.

Principles for Intervention in the Communications Space also need to be designed in support of policies and some initial characteristics would be transparency and acceptance by the users in the different age groups throughout the country. To be effective, policies could not be static but would need to be as dynamic as the changing styles of communications in the market place. This is a formidable challenge and a change in the way in which policy will need to evolve to match the market place growth in communications.

National Strategic Operations Centre

A recommendation is made for policies to create an enhanced operational effectiveness against terrorism. A practical solution is to assess the feasibility for a build of a National Strategic Operations Centre facility for 24/7 activity. This would not replace but would synergise and support existing strengths in British counter-terrorist operations. A National Centre would be a one-stop strategy to use real-time communications operations within Britain to control terrorism and to liaise 24/7 with other countries.

A strategic centre would be a national hub for quick information flow to the public as well as to law enforcement and security agencies. Operations against terrorism would be effective across the four dimensions being used internationally by terror networks to operate and to prepare attacks – the communications space, on land, in the air, underground and underwater. A strategic national centre would give some pre-emptive capability over the chaotic and diffuse growth in terrorism which is growing at rate that is faster than any growth in recruitment and training within the law enforcement agencies.

The design and build of this type of strategic operations centre can be initiated by private sector companies with communications and data collation capability and internationally the market may be the optimal selection solution for the most robust and most popular form of Operations centre to service public as well as government surge crisis requirements. Joint ventures with government that allowed services to be delivered to government departments and to provide surge support to local communities or companies delivering critical national infrastructure would be one optional design for the new concept of 24/7 real time links to service providers and individuals in the society. At the lowest level the mobile handheld device is the optimal public entry point as this platform will be the life-style determinant of persons across the world including rapidly expanding developing world economies. Adaptive, agile real-time communications is a coordinated solution that will pre-empt the growth of powerful informal communications and attack cordination during crises by terror networks.

Catastrophic Risk and the Rights of Humans

In support of strategic national and international approaches there are some urgent requirements to bring the law into harmony with the social reality of national and

international risks of mass casualty attacks. It is recommended that catastrophic risk be defined for this purpose and added to the Human Rights Act [4] so that the State acquires a duty to protect the mass of the population as well as the individual in the population. Many countries have 'stretched' or created 'patches' in practice to manage the gap between the duty of the state to protect its citizens and the agreement to protect the rights of an individual. Recognition of catastrophic risk would assist nations to use legal means for the protection of the lives of persons otherwise at risk of mass casualty actions by terrorists determined to impose a new social order by the illegal use of force.

ANALYSIS

The analysis of British policy and the influence on trends in international terrorism focuses on six basic questions:

1. How may action or inaction in any British security policy be able to influence the risk of effective terrorist attacks within Britain or on British interests abroad?
2. Will British security policies or strategies increase or reduce the rate of growth of terrorist capability within Britain and abroad?
3. Could new data be sought on recruitment into terror networks and can open source data provide risk assessments and assumptions for policy making?
4. Are there global variables in operation that independently influences the risk of terror attacks within Britain and abroad and does this provide a measure of residual risk regardless of national security policy?
5. Can international strategies reduce an increasing risk of effective attacks?
6. Can Britain provide leadership and influence global counter-terrorist solutions?

Network Growth

International terrorism in Britain it is part of a global movement of structured or diffuse networks that aim to illegally impose a new social order through persuasion and force. In July 2007[5] Secretary General of NATO, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer has identified three top risks for NATO – international terrorism, proliferation of WMD and the consequences of terrorists and proliferation and failed states such as Afghanistan. Britain needs seamless policies and principles guiding these policies if any real reduction is to be achieved in the risk from terror networks within Britain and to British interests abroad.

The maturity of terror networks within the UK was identified following the 7/7 attack in 2005[6] and this pattern is similar to the growth of networks in many countries in the

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[4] A detailed discussion of catastrophic risk and the law is in a paper titled' Terrorism PLC Funding Spectaculars and Catastrophic Risk in Law, Leivesley, S., J. Money Laundering Control, 9:2, pp141-156, 2006.

[5] Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, 280707, BskyBNews interview 1818hours.

[6] Statements by Dame Eliza Manningham-Buller in the aftermath of 7/7 and 21/.7. The Times, November 10, 2006 p.1 carried an article by Michael Evans ' More Britain's are Turning to Terror says MI5 Director' and quoted 1,600 suspects under surveillance, 30 plots to kill, maim, damage and 200 terror groups o

Middle East, Chechnya, Algeria and elsewhere. Terror networks battle with governments for the hearts and minds of the population and use force and psychological persuasion. Psychological operations appear in a range of communications media including the internet. The use of the communications space by terrorist networks influences populations because of psychological dynamics where a 'national' sentiment of victim guilt emerges from attacks.

Uncertainty is a psychological state which produces doubt, suspicion of conspiracy and additional fear within some groups in the population. This creates vulnerability to videos released by terrorists. These convey messages on guilt and lectures on reforms to rectify a social order that does not recognise the terrorist's value system. Sometimes the guilt is over the suicide bomber who has acted to reform the society or the post-attack claim by an Al Qaeda leader that justifies the attack on the basis of foreign policy or the lifestyle of a country. Once a lecture on reform has been given to 'the enemy' there is justification for more attacks. In recent years nationals of some countries including the USA, Australia and the UK have been used to deliver these messages with the shock effect of a national attacking their own country for a cause.

Psychologically when there is tension and fear over further attacks the visual and verbal messages released on the internet offer the population a way of agreeing with the terrorist cause and thereby reducing tension or fear of further attacks. This is similar to the dynamics of the 'Stockholm Syndrome' identified in hostage taking situations but in the current international situation it is nations that are experiencing a national Stockholm Syndrome effect because of the pervasive and repetitive messages from terror groups.

An estimate of the growth rate of networks in Britain in 2007 is that there may have been an increase in known membership of 20%[7] over a twelve month period. The known membership of terror networks is estimated at 2,000 in 2007 compared to an estimate of 1600 given in 2006. All these figures are very basic estimates given to the public by the authorities but the rate of growth is a significant indicator of terror recruitment. In comparison, the rate of growth of additional security service personnel appointed and trained in Britain since 9/11, when averaged over the past 7 years, shows growth at a rate of 14% per year. [8] This comparison does not include police recruitment figures, but demonstrates that countries will have a significant problem in recruiting and training security personnel to deal with an overwhelming growth in terror networks. Policies therefore need to be developed that will intervene in the lifecycle of recruitment into terrorism as a career.

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networks. " Dame Eliza said she was alarmed by the scale and speed of the radicalisation which security sources later said had intensified since the 7/7 bombings."

[7] Gordon Brown Statement on Security 25 July, 2007 http://www.number10.gov.uk/output/Page12675.asp accessed 26/07/07

[8] Gordon Brown Statement on Security 25 July, 2007 http://www.number10.gov.uk/output/Page12675.asp accessed 26/07/07

The New York Police Department[9] has studied radicalisation in a number of plots that have come to the attention of law enforcement agencies in several countries. This study identifies the internet as a driver and an enabler of the causes of radicalisation and suggested there are four distinct stages– pre-radicalisation; self-identification; indoctrination and jihadization. An important finding in the study is the potential for a rapid move (months or weeks) into jihadization where the members accept a duty to participate in operational planning for a jihad or terrorist attack. The study identifies many 'triggers' some of which may be independent variables. The study states:

> 'The individual is looking for an identity and a cause and unfortunately often finds them in the extremist Islam.' [10]

However, the belief structure within the authorship of the New York study is influenced by an assumption that as there have been no successful attacks since 9/11, this has a partial relationship with Muslim groups within the USA being resistant to radicalisation. These assumptions may create comforting reduction of uncertainty about the future but the trends in radicalisation across many countries, the hidden nature of the radicalisation and the recruitment of non-Muslim nations means a belief in invulnerability within a specific country does not follow the world-wide pattern. However, alongside this the USA has been very proactive in maintaining constant alerts to the public with some recent ones covering the growth of more than two dozen terror networks in the North East of the country and threats to critical national infrastructure.

Policy

A latticework of activities and international cooperation to reduce the terrorist risk to Britain has been espoused by the Prime Minister, Gordon Brown and the scale of the global challenge is well understood by British policy makers. The approach is strategic and in 2007 there has been work on a new National Security Strategy to be driven directly from Downing Street. Importantly the 'hearts and minds' approach in policy appears to be aimed at cross-party agreement as well as community cohesion and strength against the influences of terrorism. The policy drivers appear to be integration of the population, prevention of indoctrination, core values of Britishness and winning over hearts and minds. Examples of the measures being proposed are border security, identity proof through ID cards, increased spending on security resources, actions against terror financing and legislative initiatives for policing, increasing the length of time in detention[11] and allowing questioning to continue once a suspect has been charged. A community based strategy is focused on hearts and minds and on reducing the influence of international terrorism by funding groups in communities where there are concerns

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[9] New York City Police Department, Radicalization in the West: The Home Grown Threat, Silver, M.D and Bhatt, A, 2007

[10] Ibid P.8

[11] The proposal for detention beyond 28 days has been formally rejected by a cross-party committee of MPs and peers on the Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR) on the basis of there being no evidence to justify it and it not being fair procedure and offensive to principles of natural justice and British ideas of fair play. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/6921512.stm , 290707 at 23:04 GMT. Accessed 300707

about growths in terrorist networks. There has been an announcement of dedicated funding of £70 million for this local effort. [12]

Since the London and Glasgow Vehicle Borne Incendiary Device attempts at the end of June 2007, there is a general understanding that terror networks may not consist either of people from deprived sectors, nor of people who do not intellectually have the capacity to understand the meaning of British values. The terror network responsible for attempting the London and Glasgow terror attack failed but the clear image of the alleged perpetrators as highly educated and paid professionals means that successful policies may need to be 'one for all' rather than shaped to sectors of society who are assumed as the source of terror networks. There is in reality no real certainty about who is going to grow up to be a terrorist or what professions or industries contain persons who could convert to the ideology of terrorism.

While more visible forms of terrorist activity may be identified within some profiles of the community, spectacular attacks in Britain have been characterised by an under-the - radar approach that successfully defeats CCTV scrutiny of target assessment and attack practice runs, border controls and identity checks, weapons building in small batch volumes to defeat detection or assembling within a domestic household and in domestically garaged and legitimately owned vehicles. The speed of recruitment, the wide age range between 17 and mid 40's and deliberate moves away from family, community or a geography associated with terrorism have been factors that would defeat many policy initiatives for community targeted prevention. A note needs to be added about persons aged over 60 years as a broader age group and range of prospective converts that can be assumed following some of the alleged suspects in the JFK foiled attack plot in the USA. [13] Profiling by age and nationality has become increasingly less applicable as terror network recruitment has broadened into a global phenomenon where individuals attracted into self recruitment may not fit early patterns of the dedicated terrorist.

Lifecycle

If terrorism is described as a lifecycle process for individuals, groups and countries there may be critical points in the lifecycle where intervention can reduce the rate of growth of networks. Early recruitment through web based information and reinforcement of radicalisation through a virtual communications space visited by young people may be a key point to change the speed and rate of recruitment. Communications space is under the radar of all community monitoring and connections in chat rooms, instant messaging and other communications media may be the most significant connection point for young persons seeking information on careers or just being hooked in and available for terrorist career recruitment messages. The universality of virtual communications is an optimum

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[12] Gordon Brown Statement on Security 260707 ibid

[13] The JFK plot to blow up a pipeline and jet fuel tanks feeding the New York airport was disrupted in June 2007 and alleged perpetrators included a 63 year old naturalised American and two other associates aged 51 and 57 years (The Times, 040607 p. 29 " Plot to Blow up New York Airport would have made 9/11 look small")

medium for successful matches by open minded young persons and emotional messages and images focused on pro-terrorist causes.

Strategies may be required to balance the virtual information accessed on many thousands of sites and to contextualise a career option of terrorist fighter or suicide bomber. This is particularly important if growth rates in terrorist networks are driven by self-recruitment. The communications space is global and covers many routes alongside blogs, web sites and other internet hosted activities. Phone, text, peer group persuasion in family, community, school, work, leisure, travel and any other space occupied by groups of people provide communications channels. Traditional community influences that are the current focus of policy action may be only one reference point for communications to balance a choice of terrorism as a career and in contrast the web surfing and instant chat on line are a very fast and dynamic reference space. The figures on membership in the virtual communications space are conclusive in the case of Facebook – 'in the past six months, the site's British audience has surged 523 per cent to 3.2 million and there are now more than 30 million members worldwide.' [14]

International terrorism cannot grow in a country where a high percentage of the total population reject the psychological messages and refuse to be bombed into compliance and submission to international terror demands. The public are the front line in the reduction of the terror risk and can deliver this outcome if policies empower the public to protect themselves and their territory (transient though it may be in any one instance of time[15]). This means that geographical communities and Communities of Interest in the Communications Space are both important for policy delivery. At the mass recruitment level and for community protection, delivery of a 'one for all' set of policies is essential. This will create homogeneity of public agreement on social order.

These strategies require funding to local authorities for strengthening local efforts at self protection. Local community based interventions should focus on all the needs of the community rather than recruitment as a sole activity because communities can be built up against the terrorist message if there is a public information on protection from spectacular types of terror attack such as dirty bombs. At the direct intervention level it is via assistance to community groups, working with young persons in the community and services to those who are vulnerable or to persons in institutions such as jails, schools or universities where terrorist supporters are creating persuasive influences.

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[14] The Times 140807, p. 4 ' Millions of Facebook users 'leave themselves open to identity theft' article shows the openness of persons who use of this medium for networking and the lack of security reference information to contextualise criminal misuse of this open site application.

[15] Territorial identification may be transient in any location being transited by an individual i.e. within a few metres of the individual, within the metre or so of body space that is instinctively occupied by an individual, the carriage of a train may define a local space, a workplace floor or work desk. Spatial identification moves with the individual as well as being fixed locations – the Fire Services may identify the local town area or the whole city as their territory and this is defined by their training. However individuals or communities of people will define areas and react to geographical locations including the home or work space by a specific and repetitive set of behaviours. This is a valuable factor in community based protection plans against terrorism.

Communities of Interest

The natural use of communications networks by young persons creates Communities of Interest who express similar sentiments and who may speak in hybrid/slang English that has recognition words that may show English as a second language or geographical language identity and create confidence between users. The organisation of networks used by young people on keyword searches allows common sentiments and interest groups to naturally aggregate in what may otherwise seem to be a chaotic and diffuse mass of information. Temporal and social economic variables also bring together communities of interest because of higher frequency of chat over periods when terrorist attacks or human rights abuse events bring pressure onto individuals to express sentiments.

Blogs are particularly advantageous and access to sites such as Blogger and use of web sites for private blogs for named users or public blogs accessible by key words or tags that bring together a Community of Interest. Random surfing of blogs and sites of general interest by the open minded stimulus seeking young person at 2 o'clock in the morning is in itself a predictable activity that will lead to connections. Fantasies of young people on the net and 'plots' by suspect terror groups are not in fact different to the behaviour of the traders in economic sites where individuals will construct fantasy portfolios derived from recommendations of analysts.[16]

This behaviour is particularly dangerous in terror risk terms when plots are pooled and discussed in fantasy behaviour on the net and then translated into a reality when a group decides to translate the fantasies into a realistic plot. Terror trials in Britain have reported in court evidence how networks have discussed many forms of targets and sentiments were expressed between group members over the activity. Pleasure in fantasising may then be translated in building a plot followed by testing, acquisition of weapons and further recruitment.

The data on recruitment and movement into terror networks is sparse. One definitive international study published in 2004 (Sageman, M, 2004)[17] and which is ongoing identified the self-recruitment, above national average in educational status and the more modern rather than conservative families and the interest in the Muslim religion becoming important to the individual in the year or so before being involved in active terrorism.

A recent data collection[18] and analysis on the increasing trend in radicalisation of young Muslims in Britain has used an anthropological mapping approach to trace out group and religious affiliations in different parts of Britain. This study, as yet unpublished has found a trend in identification of young people away from group membership of the parental reference groups towards groups that question the religious principles of the first

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[16] Fantasy portfolios are discussed in an unpublished paper on Community-of-interest predicated Programme Trading, by Graeme Burnett of YouDeviseLtd., 2007.
[17] Sageman, Marc, Understanding Terror Networks, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 2004
[18] Lecture under Chatham House Rules in London, June 2007

generation and more traditional Muslims.[19] There is a rejection of the religious conservatism based on tradition and unislamic suppositions and beliefs and they believe they are going back to the core principles of the religion. By embracing Wahabi Islam an Wahabi-influenced groups like the Muslim Brotherhood they become radical and questioning of their parents brand of Islam. There is a swap over from one set of religiously conservative ideas to another. [20] The lessons from this study for policy in Britain will become important if the data is ratified. Observations reported from anecdotal evidence were also made on the use of deception in pursuit of a cause and demonstrated that verbal representations of issues may be made with apparent ease and given credibility. From this study, that is yet to be published, there is an important lesson for policy makers. The conscious and unconscious use of deception in statements made about radicalisation and international terrorist causes means that the gathering of information from individuals in communities should be tested in depth for consistency and confirmed by other methods with the wider community.

Communications of ideas within universities can contribute to terrorism when there is no balance or contextualisation of a terror message. An early study of groups in 1998 identifies some groups that were important at that time as reference groups.[21] Glees (2007)[22] has claimed that currently 48 university campuses have been infiltrated by the disbanded al-Muhajiroun. The ideological control of mosques has been raised in media stories in 2007 and the influence of a hardline Islamic sect that preaches against western values and for shedding blood for Allah has been identified in 600 out of the 1350 mosques in Britain. [23] In 2002 work by Quintan Wiktorowicz to study the leadership and to make contact with a hundred members and supporters of the al-Muharjiroun movement in the United Kingdom identified the way in which individuals who were receptive to new ideas sought meaning in this group because it 'made sense' and provided a

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[19] Personal Communication, Innes Bowen 310807, discussing research conclusions for a forthcoming publication

[20] ibid.

[21] A 1998 list published on the internet names several groups mediating between the Islamic community and the government including the Union of Muslim organizations of UK (UMO) representing 180 different groups; Council of Imams and Mosques which speaks for the majority of Muslims; the Council of British Muslims speaking for fundamentalists; the Islamic part of Britain; the Muslim Parliament founded in 1991. Over 90 Muslim student groups affiliated with FOSIS (UK Federation of Student Islamic Societies). A survey at Derby University purported to have found 1400 Islamic organisations. This source represents organisational structures a decade ago and is indicative of the maturity of development of structures to represent Muslim interests and reinforces the assessment of the groups being well structured and able to verbalise the needs of this particular community. http://debate.org.uk/topics/isamasih/jul98/groups.htm

[22] Professor Anthony Glees, Director Brunel University Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, Daily Telegraph, Campus 'Holy War' threat Growing, Julie Henry, 290707p.3

[23] Andrew Norfolk, Hardline Takeover of British Mosques, The Times 070907 pp 1,6,7 and 'Two faces of British Youth in Thrall to Hardline Muslim Sect'' the Times 080907 pp 36-37 . The hardline sect is named as the Deobandi and as one of four schools of Sunni thought imported from the Indian subcontinent. There are 8350 madrassas in Pakistan in this tradition which is theologically close to Wahhabism in teaching austere conservative Islam. The other overwhelming influence in British mosques are the Bareiwi with a tradition in 550 mosques in Britain and in 1700 mosques in Pakistan. It is deeply rooted in South Asian culture and was founded by a Sufi scholar and is less politicised and more tolerant of other sects and faiths.

socialisation experience through the techniques used to work with the members including information that gave 'moral shocks', low risk , low cost activism.[24]

A published study by the Demos[25] policy 'think-tank' represented meetings and discussion sessions with contact points with Muslim communities and agencies working in the community and the study presented a broad strategy for community based intervention. An overview of the process of data gathering and consultation over this one year study would suggest that in reality the Muslim community had strengths in communicating to government through its traditional linkages, was vocal and the communities could liaise with police on any issue where there appeared to be behaviour or discrimination that was a threat to community relationships.

Other data exists on networks and recruitment but some relevant information will be in sources closed to public scrutiny. Generalised statements contributed by the intelligence sector have described the spread of terror networks and the monitoring of recruitment. Some of this data could be contributed to preventative policy formulation.

A further source of data is the information released in trials in Britain of persons charged with offences related to terrorism. The transcripts can provide small pieces of information that are sometimes informative and with the advantage of being within a large amount of contextual information. One example has been the training activities of the 7/7 bombers and other groups charged with terrorism offences which showed an adaptability of terror network training in the use of activities such as body building in gyms or sports or educational activities in outdoors locations for team building and skills development.

Real-time communications are a powerful tool for reducing the threat from extremist groups even at the stage of these individuals as a group who are moving into killing the perceived enemy of Islam. There has been evidence in the Israeli experience of suicide bombing and instances cited appear to contain these similar conditions of overwhelming force and persuasion of the suicide bomber to choose another path[26]. The Metropolitan Police Negotiators appeared to be using this same technique in 2005 when holding public negotiations with two alleged suicide bombers from a failed 21/7 transportation attack in London. The suicide bombers were persuaded to go through a process of removing their clothes in public view and to surrender peacefully. The verbal content of the police negotiations to the bombers included consistent repeated reassurance of their safety and recognition of their need for respect and to be looked after i.e. the 'captors' were caring

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[24] Wiktorowicz,Quintan, see *Google* search on this name for publications on radical development in the West including Radical Islam Rising: Muslim Extremism in the West**,** Rowman & Littlefield, 2005.

[25] Demos, http://www.demos.co.uk, Bringing it Home, Rachel Briggs et al., Community Based Approaches to Counter Terrorism, December 2006. Bringing it Home argues that we must put communities at the heart of counter-terrorism, with a broader approach which spans social justice, community cohesion and security and sets out a six-pronged strategy, which aims to enhance the lives of Muslims, strengthen community infrastructure, improve leadership, open up the foreign policy-making process, divert youth from extremism, and put communities at the heart of counter-terrorist interventions.

[26] Lectures and discussion with Israeli EOD personnel and hostage negotiators

individuals offering another pathway to achievement of goals away from a conflict. These instances of acute conflict negotiations are indicators for communications that may persuade young persons away from a career in terrorism. [27]

The use of the communications space to change rates of recruitment into terrorism is going to become an important challenge throughout Europe. Instances of native born nationals now engaged as dangerous recruits into spectacular attacks that can threaten national security were evident in the lead-up weeks to the 9/11 anniversary in 2007. [28]

The lifecycle of terror networks in Britain may be developing to a stage where cross border movements may not be needed. The ability of groups to seemingly adapt to local resources - woodlands, flats and other locations for work with explosives, experimentation, training and meetings reduces the need for network members to go abroad.

Terror networks within Britain may move over time to self-sufficiency in recruitment, training, weapons acquisition and design.

Terror Network Strengths

Strengths in what may appear to be a disorganised set of activities by different networks could indicate the potential for long term growth and a powerful development of activities against national security. Some examples of strengths which are indicative of the potential strength of terrorist networks in Britain are listed below:

1. Real-time information – international terrorists are using web sites and uploading videos within hours of an attack.

2. Distance Learning – a virtual university for distance learning across thousands of topics relating to weapons, tactics, doctrine and improvised device preparation is now available internationally.

3. Self-recruitment by access to emotive videos of human rights abuses, terrorist killings, terrorist power over others and other basic attractive information to young and open minds. This is showing a 'flashover' which is a significant change in the rate of the increase in recruitment and speed of recruitment. The speed of recruitment has been commented upon by leaders in British counter-terrorism.

4. Speed of connectivity between groups using the internet whereby the potential for individuals and groups to identify as a Community of Interest is higher because of the numbers of like minded individuals connected into the internet.

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[27] Observations discussed Dr S. Leivesley, BBC News 24 contemporaneously with the siege negotiation
[28] September 2007 had instances of network arrests in Denmark in a plot claimed to be a significant target and German nationals figured prominently in an explosives plot against US airbase and nationals in Germany that was disrupted 040907.

5. Access to the general market place of communications i.e. not attached to terrorism but which, like telecommunications provide a space for connecting is indicated in the popularity and pervasive use by many persons in Britain of Youtube, MySpace, FaceBook, MSN chat rooms, phone SMS'ing, and emails creates a mix of communications where ideas are formed without any contextualising or reference to reality.

6. This connectivity is most serious for young people because understanding of death and criminal activity is not fully matured. Persons may become vulnerable if there is no balance from contextualisation of the terrorist information or opportunities to have discussions based on reality about death and criminal acts.

7. The dehumanising and violent messages associated with terrorist role models and events can generate feelings of imperviousness to loss of self as an entity, all-powerfulness or omnipotence and reinforce the ego-centricity of the young mind as a powerful being that can make a difference to the realities of suffering in the world. The lack of identity or hidden identity on the internet is possibly a similar psychological process to the wearing of 'masks' or 'face paint' by persons committing violent acts. Identity masking allows behaviour to move outside social mores, removes guilt and reduces fear of being made accountable to the criminal justice system.

8. Coordination of terror networks – an early indication of this may be specific social events where familiarity across some networks can thereafter lead to joint activities that may be hidden from observation. For example, a party in a house with networks attending is difficult to distinguish from a social event by genuine social networks of individuals but provides a point for communication and coordination of activity.

9. Discrimination between social networks and terror networks is difficult unless there is lawful reason to access conversations or observe activities of a group. Close members of any community may observe changes and exert efforts for the recovery of a person from the influence of radicalisation but when the behaviour is secretive this may not be possible. The recruitment amongst family and social contact points means that discrimination between an evolving terrorist network with committed members who have chosen a career in terrorism normal social networks is difficult. Innocent persons can be suspected of involvement because of proximity of family, social relationships or geographical sharing of the same space e.g. flat sharing members. This problem creates social distrust and community reaction against police when operations are undertaken that impact on innocent social networks.

SOLUTIONS

There is a mesh of solutions that arise from the basic six questions raised in the analysis and it is the strength of a combination of solutions that may be required to overcome the strong levels of recruitment into a terrorist career in Britain.

1. A movement of young persons towards attraction to charismatic leaders giving fundamental messages that support a terrorist career is sometimes associated with a choice in the lifecycle to move away from parental reference points[29]. This indicates that community based policies may not be enough to reduce the rapid growth in terrorist career choice by young persons born in the UK.

2. A national and global strategy agreed with other countries facing high recruitment rates may be the basis for using the 'communications space' to build platforms to enter into a process of contextualisation and balance of the messages for recruitment into a terrorist career. This would be based on public and private sector initiatives through the internet, the personal networks on the internet and using a 'real-time' on the line process for constant chatter and attraction for young persons towards careers and social networks that are not going to move towards destructive activity with other like minded persons. At the national strategic level the C4ISTAR[30] processes used within the defence of national security may be moved into a civilian format. The national capacity of a network of communications run through a National Strategic Operations Centre would captures the efficiency of managing the risk of terrorism but makes it transparent to the population and encourage a public interface to work towards reduced recruitment levels.

3. Persons of influence in community groups who talk to governments may not be the point of reference for young persons committing themselves to an illegal terrorist activity. Prominent social leaders who are vital in making governments attend to the concerns they are representing may not themselves be the effective focus for introducing an intervention into a local community.[31] There is also an argument (as made in the Demos study) for many activities within communities to deflect young persons from terrorism as a career. Some of this may be done by natural leaders in a community but if self-recruitment precedes reference to others the first effective point for intervention may be within the initial internet communications space of the young person.

4. A 'Hearts and Minds' surge within British policies would be shaped effectively if developed on the basis of objective data. A 'one for all' approach is the starting point for all policies. Increasingly there is an international trend in the use by terror networks of nationals as an under-the-radar tactic to carry out attacks. This means that there is significant national vulnerability if policies focus on targeted groups based on historic profiles of who may be a terrorist because the converted nationals who decide on a terrorist career will not fall within this scrutiny.

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[29] This trend was observed in the unpublished research reported in Reference Note 15, 2007.

[30] C4ISTAR command, control. communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance

[31] This important role is evident in the Demos publication of its research in 2006.

5. National Surveys of children in age cohorts from 8-9 years, adolescents and young adults 20-25 years and focus group testing would provide some data to assist in the development of transparent and agreed strategies to be entered into the communications space. This would bring Government policies into the communications space of all young persons and remove 'labels' of profiled groups based on ethnicity.

6. If the communications space is a recruitment driver towards terrorism, it is one of the global variables that are independently causing terror networks to multiply. Many millions of communications contacts are being made in which sentiments are shared in real-time chats and visually persuasive information is impacting on persons searching the internet. The communications space and Communities of Interest that naturally arise from connectedness are therefore powerful independent variables behind the growth of terror networks.

7. A National Strategic Operations Centre (including all existing operations) should be built to operate in real time 24/7 (and to operate as a dispersed virtual centre under some conditions) rather the national effort being brought together as elements to respond to a specific attack or threat. There would be strength and an ability to pre-empt terror attacks through a one-stop location. It would serve as a contact point for all countries and during incidents it would provide the fast movement of information and operational support for protection. The speed of information management would reduce some of the human rights problems arising from the current problems in the time taken to investigate acts of terror. There is a pressing need for this strategic approach for international connectivity as well as national operations. In any investigation, five or more countries may be involved and currently procedures for agreement on case by case sharing of information, travel between countries, questioning or other activities in identity confirmations and network mapping are all elements in time that would come together in a 24/7 national centre that provided a central hub.

   There are pressing operational reasons for considering a National Strategic Operations Centre – there are trained insurgents moving back to Britain (and to other European countries such as Germany) with skills in improvised weapons construction and tactics learned in Iraq. These groups will give considerable weight to the planning and managing of attacks on people and infrastructure by British terror networks.

National Strategic Ops Centre — Private /Public initiatives – solutions to pre-empt catastrophic attacks or incidents

8. Policies for funding to the defence forces to increase the overall establishment and to do joint training with the emergency services may also be a measure that is necessary to match the skilled terrorist fighter returning to Britain from conflict zones abroad. The effective matching of force capability to the terrorist risk, particularly with the potential use of high energy weapons in coordinated attacks would not be as a separate 'homeland' defence group allocation. The capability of the defence forces to match the more serious level of risk will be well positioned if rotation of personnel between conflict zones and Britain brings to bear knowledge of terrorist tactics and weapons. Kilcullen (2007) [32] has recognised the vulnerability of operations that do not have an information strategy and importantly has identified the strength of Al Qaeda global information operations. There is significant value in recognising that Iraq and Afghanistan operations have created a knowledge base within defence forces that has a special information strategy application in any civilian programme to manage recruitment through the internet by global terrorists. An addition of funding to the defence establishment for personnel resources to make contributions to the 'communications space' would add the necessary weight of experience to civilian programmes. Other funding that is needed to be considered within the defence budges is the important protection defence personnel could provide in many geographic areas. The assets and capabilities of the defence forces may be critical if the country is to successfully counter any long running coordinated terrorist attacks.

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[32] See Kilcullen, David, J., New paradigms for 21st Century Conflict, http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/0507/ijpe/kilcullen.htm for a well presented grand strategy to guide decision making . Kilcullen defines the role of Special Operations Forces as being beyond general purpose forces and identifies these as the 'new strategic services' and also the use of strategic information warfare arguing the skilled use by Al Qaeda of information warfare to manipulate global audiences. Importantly Kilcullen recognises the vulnerability of planning which uses information as an add-on to ground based services rather than leading with an information strategy.

When aligned with pre-emptive security, 24/7 operations by small teams can protect city centres and critical infrastructure and work under police coordination. The defence capability in the civilian arena when coordinated by civilian emergency services would add strength in depth to the national security performance. It is particularly important in matching the mass casualty risk and in management of the potential for use of CBRN[33] enhanced weapons.

Independent Variables

The growth of terror networks has been discussed as being in part due to independent global variables including communications dynamics. Other compelling variables are charismatic leadership figures in national and international terror networks including suicide bombers who have left videos explaining their cause and in evidence in the strategic use of the 7/7 suicide bomber's video as a one year anniversary reminder to the British nation of the power of the terrorist. There is also availability of funding (sometimes through misapplication of State Aid or charities) which may operate unwittingly to support terrorist groups.

The most serious independent variable increasing the risk of terrorism internationally is war by proxy.

In 'war by proxy' there is access for terror groups to military styles of training, weapons supply, teaching of improvised explosive devices and improvised use of military munitions, State support for plots and logistics, access to CBRN chemical weapons for spectacular attacks are factors that could create new risks for Britain. War by Proxy carries pressures of public uncertainty about future attacks, fears of mass casualties and the uncertainty over effects of CBRN weapons.

The use of British diplomacy to reduce the tensions in Iran and Iraq and the promotion of full regional involvement in the issues in these two 'hot spots' could reduce some of the international risks from an emerging war by proxy in this region.

International law reform is another independent variable and an area where Britain may, by reputation, create leadership and solutions. Recognition of 'catastrophic risk' in defining human rights would place duties on states to intervene to protect against terrorism. Catastrophic levels of risk to life are not recognised within the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or the Human Rights Act 1998.

Non-proliferation and promotion of safe nuclear energy technologies to reduce the prospect of many new countries creating weapons are important indirect strategies against terrorism. This area of government intervention may reduce the level of international risk from catastrophic attacks. Some work on this has already started with agreements made at G8 meetings, especially cooperation in monitoring of illegal trade in nuclear materials.

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[33] CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear. Radiological material distributed through an improvised explosive device is generally understood by the public as a 'dirty bomb'.

CONCLUSIONS

At a national level, the challenge for the British Government is to establish a balance within the communications space that gives a context and reference for all young people. Objective studies are needed of how career choices are made by young people to determine whether the internet is now the significant influence on terror recruitment.

The young person in Britain grows up within a society filled with noise and persuasion and the key to countering terror influences is to balance and give context to terror messages in this dynamic communications space.

There are a number of actions that may reduce the speed of radicalisation in the UK:

1. Balancing what is available on the internet to recruit suggestible young people to killing and martyrdom. This would be based on objective data and principles agreed with the millions who use these on the role of the state in balancing global recruitment into terrorism. The internet would be defined as a precursor to local community influences in the lifecycle of terror network membership.
2. Considering amnesty as a safe offer to communities where young people may be noticeably persuaded to take on a terror career.
3. Considering jail and other locations for programmes to create careers that remove terrorism and paid terror activities as an option for people who are vulnerable or suggestible.
4. Ensuring that policies are one for all and not shaped to particular religions or ethnic backgrounds which would further label and shape community groupings particularly if supported by central government funding.

The analysis of strengths and gaps in policy and of the growth in capability of terrorism shows that lifecycle interventions are possible and that methodical collection of data from groups of young persons would help to shape actions in the communications space that is currently a reference point for terrorist career choice.

A change in how the community understands some of the myths of terrorist causation and an acceptance that independent connectivity in the communications space generally, is helping to create public sentiment may give more platforms for policies to remove from the public the burden of feeling guilty for acts of terror.

In conclusion, terror networks are growing more quickly than national security can match in its own recruitment and training and new solutions are needed to intervene in the lifecycle of recruitment into a terrorist career.